

THE EARLY STOA ON TWO KINDS OF “PLEASURE”

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ABSTRACT. In this paper, I want to offer a detailed justification of the thesis that the early Stoics made a significant distinction between two types of *hedone* (i.e. “pleasure”), namely, physical pleasure and pleasurable emotion, despite using the same term for both. To this end, I first summarize the arguments in favour of this thesis that have already been presented in scholarly literature: emotion is a mental activity, while physical pleasure is one of the possible objects of this activity; the opposite of pleasure as an emotion is *lype* (“distress”), whereas the opposite of physical pleasure is *ponos* (“pain”); emotion is a moral evil, whereas physical pleasure is an indifferent. I then offer further arguments to demonstrate that, in early Stoic thought, physical pleasure should be understood as a bodily affection rather than a mental activity. Finally, I analyze and criticize the views of those scholars who argue that the early Stoics regarded physical pleasure either as a mental activity or as a component of emotion.

KEYWORDS: ancient ethics, emotion, pain, pleasure, stoicism.

In the scholarly literature on ancient stoicism, there is a widespread view that the early Stoics applied the term ἡδονή both to fairly elementary physical pleasures (P₁) and to one of the chief varieties of the so-called πάθη, i.e. “emotions” or “passions” (P₂).¹ There are two aspects to this story. The first is purely terminological. The point here is that in Stoic usage the word ἡδονή was multivocal. The other aspect is conceptual: P₁ and P₂ seem to be importantly different for, whereas P₂ is basically a mental activity directed at various intentional objects (such as wealth, fame,

¹ E.g. Haynes 1962, 414–415; Long 1968, 80; Inwood 1985, 145; Long, Sedley 1987, 1:421, 2:405; Sandbach 1989, 62–63; Nussbaum 1994, 386, n. 64; Cooper 1998, 101, n. 13; 2005, 206, n. 2; Brennan 2003, 277, n. 47; Görler 2004, 20, Anm. 10; Graver 2007, 227, n. 44; Dyson 2009, 135–136; Forschner 2018, 239–240.

etc.), P1 may rank precisely among these very objects and *prima facie* does not belong either to the agent's activities at all or, at least, to the activities of the same type as P2, i.e. "emotions." I believe that this view, which for the sake of convenience I will further call "multivocity thesis" (MT), is essentially correct. Critical attitude towards MT, to my knowledge, is comparatively rare but still counts among its proponents some eminent scholars.² Although the content of their critique considerably varies depending on the author, I take them all to subscribe to what I will call "univocity thesis" (UT), i.e. the general idea that the term ἡδονή as used by the early Stoics has but one conceptual meaning, and this is either because it only applies to P2 or because P1 and P2, after all, are not that different (e.g. P1 may be thought of as a constituent part of P2 or as a mental activity of approximately the same kind). In this paper, I want to restate the case for MT in actual critical engagement with the views of its opponents since for some reason, as far as I can judge, they are not widely debated. For this aim, I, firstly, present in some detail what is usually considered to be the main argument in favour of MT; secondly, I offer an additional argument for MT by attempting to show that P1 is best interpreted not as a mental activity but as a bodily affection; and, lastly, I review three most articulate versions of UT that I am aware of in order to understand the logic behind them and clarify the reasons for my disagreement.

1. The main argument in favour of MT.

The initial problem with MT is that the alleged distinction between two essentially different kinds of "pleasure" appears to be mostly implicit. Except for the single cursory remark by Cicero, which is actually rather vague,³ no text explicitly mentions it. By itself, this does not prove that MT is wrong. Although sometimes the Stoics went to great lengths in order to distinguish different meanings of the

² Rist 1969, 37–53; Gosling, Taylor 1982, 426–427; Wolsdorf 2013, 208–209. See also Graeser 1975, 135–138; Annas 1992, 112; Horn 2014, 163.

³ In Fin. III, 35 (= SVF III, 381), Cicero, enumerating the four basic emotions, describes P2 as follows: "quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam." (Most abbreviations I use are those adopted in the Oxford Latin Dictionary and The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek) The vast majority of translations I know seem to assume that gen. *corporis et animi* depends on abl. *nomine*, i.e. the point of Cicero's remark is that the Stoics designate "the elation of the mind" with a term that itself applies to both bodily and mental pleasures (e.g. Woolf 2004, 76: "what the Stoics call *hêdonê*, a term applicable to body as well as mind"). Still, from the expression *communi nomine corporis et animi* alone, it is not obvious that Cicero has in mind specifically Stoic rather than general Greek usage. And even in the former case, this is quite compatible with some versions of UT.

same term,⁴ in other cases they seem to have left such differences unarticulated (at least, in the extant texts).⁵ Still, this means that MT needs to be justified on the basis of those Stoic fragments where the term *hēdonē* or similar words derived from the same root are present. A common argument in favour of MT appeals to the observation that many of such fragments fall rather neatly into two main groups, one dealing with the Stoic theory of the “emotions” and the other with the notion of the indifferent. As a result, *hēdonē* as a kind of “emotion” (P2) and *hēdonē* as an indifferent (P1) prove to be endowed with a number of different and sometimes incompatible characteristics.

Let us examine these characteristics in some detail. When it comes to P2, *hēdonē* is presented as one of the four generic emotions along with distress (*lypē*), desire (*epithymia*) and fear (*phobos*).⁶ In Stoic view, each emotion is essentially an “impulse” (*hormē*),⁷ i.e. a kind of mental activity that either results from the mind’s assent to a proposition which may be generally expressed as “*x* is good” or “*x* is evil” or is simply identical to this act of assent.⁸ In the case of desire and fear, the emotion concerns, respectively, the good or evil expected in the future, while in the case of *hēdonē* and distress, it concerns the good or evil that already takes place in the present.⁹ Thus, emotions are always directed at what the agent herself *believes* to be good or evil.¹⁰ Typically, however, this opinion of the agent is interpreted by the Stoics as entirely erroneous¹¹ since from the standpoint of Stoic axiology the things usually judged by most people as good or evil (life and death, health and illness, wealth and poverty, etc.), thus giving rise to corresponding emotions, are

⁴ For some examples, see Atherton 1993, 69–71.

⁵ A good example is the term *pathos* itself, which is applied not only to emotions but also to *phantasia* (SVF II, 54; 57; 63) and bodily affections (SVF I, 518; III, 471; cf. II, 64; 79; 854), although no single fragment in SVF makes these conceptual distinctions explicit.

⁶ SVF I, 211; III, 378; 381; 385–388; 391–394; 412; 438; 444; 447; cf. I, 370; III, 230; 380; 463.

⁷ SVF I, 205–206; II, 458; III, 377–378; 386; 391; 412; 446; 462; 479.

⁸ SVF I, 207–209; III, 380–383; 456; 459; 461. Cf. nn. 43–44.

⁹ SVF I, 212; III, 385–388; 391–394; 438; 444; 447.

¹⁰ SVF I, 212; III, 378; 385–387; 391; 393–394; 456; 463; 481.

¹¹ E.g. SVF I, 208; III, 379–382; 385; 389–390; 394; 412; 444–446; 468; cf. III, 172; 428. It is possible that the early Stoics at least debated the existence of such emotions that are not based on false value judgments (e.g. in the case of someone experiencing *lypē* over their own moral depravity, which is a genuine evil; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* III, 77 (= SVF I, 577); IV, 61; White 1995, esp. 244–245; Wolsdorf 2013, 197–200).

in fact indifferent and, therefore, of no importance for their happiness or unhappiness.¹² In such a context, defining *hēdonē* as “an unreasonable elation at something one believes worth choosing” (SVF III, 400: ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἰρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν)¹³ implies that the *haireton* or, which comes to the same thing,¹⁴ *agathon*, in relation to which the agent experiences *hēdonē*, only *appears* to be a good without actually *being* one. Similarly, when the opposite of *hēdonē*, i.e. *lypē*, is defined as “a shrinking before what is thought to be a thing to avoid” (SVF III, 463: μείωσιν.... ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν),¹⁵ this primarily refers to a state of affairs in which an agent mistakes an indifferent for something that deserves avoidance (*pheukton*), i.e.¹⁶ a genuine evil (*kakon*). Since, from the Stoic standpoint, moral virtues are basically forms of infallible knowledge (*episteme*),¹⁷ which only belongs to the sage,¹⁸ the mistaken value judgment underlying emotions provides the reason¹⁹ for seeing in them manifestations of a vicious state of the soul, and thus genuine moral evils (*kaka*)²⁰ or morally wrong activities (*hamartēmata*).²¹ All of this applies fully to P2²² and explains why the virtuous sage is completely immune to this “pleasure”, as indeed to other emotions.²³ Based on this brief overview, three characteristics of P2 relevant to our topic can be identified:

- a) It is a variety of *emotion*, i.e. a mental activity involving among other things a mistaken value judgment about certain indifferent objects;
- b) Its opposite or counterpart is another variety of *emotion* typically referred to as *lypē*;
- c) Like any *emotion*, P2 is a genuine evil and morally wrong activity.

On the other hand, if we turn to the texts that can be taken as evidence in favour of P1, in a number of fragments *hēdonē* is characterized as an indifferent, both when discussed separately²⁴ and as an item in the lists of typical indifferent

¹² See esp. SVF I, 359; III, 256 (= T2); 456; cf. 421; 424; 427; 480. On the indifferents in general, see e.g. SVF I, 185; III, 118–119; 122; 128–129; 139–140; 181; 764.

¹³ Transl. White 2020, 299.

¹⁴ SVF III, 29; 38–40; 73; 87–89; 91–92; 109–110; 118; 131; 48 Diog.; cf. III, 23; 62; 256; 363.

¹⁵ Transl. De Lacy 1981, 241.

¹⁶ SVF III, 88; 118; cf. 363.

¹⁷ SVF I, 200–201; III, 255–256; cf. III, 283–284.

¹⁸ SVF I, 53–54; 66; II, 90; 95; 132; III, 112; 213; 548–550; 566; 598; 617; 657.

¹⁹ Cf. SVF III, 172; 462; 468; 528.

²⁰ SVF III, 85; 95; 103; 106; 113; 416; cf. 380; 435.

²¹ SVF III, 468; 501; 504; cf. 445.

²² SVF III, 404; 435.

²³ SVF I, 434; III, 381; 406; 431; 437–438; 444; 454; 570–572; 639.

²⁴ SVF I, 195; III, 155; 374; 685.

things,²⁵ which represent conventional bodily and external goods and evils rejected by Stoic axiology. This in itself suggests that P₁, like other indifferents, may well be the object of emotions, including P₂, and thus of an erroneous value judgement by which it is acknowledged as a genuine good. Moreover, there are a couple of fragments where exactly this situation is described more or less explicitly (see T₂–3 below). The nature of this indifferent *hēdonē*, i.e., in particular, whether it is itself a mental activity or not, is usually not clarified. However, there is at least one fragment that strongly supports a negative answer to this question. In SVF III, 136 (ArD. 7b, pp. 44–47 Pomeroy), all indifferent things are divided into preferred (προηγμένα), dispreferred (ἀποπροηγμένα), and those that are neither preferred nor dispreferred (οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτ' ἀποπροηγμένα), and then, for each of these three classes of indifferents, the doxographer gives examples that concern the soul, the body and the externals (apparently by analogy with the similar division of goods and evils traditionally adopted in ancient ethical discourse). Regarding those indifferents that are neither preferred nor dispreferred, the text among other things says:

T₁ “[a] Neither preferred nor dispreferred concerning the soul (περὶ ψυχῆν) are impression (φαντασίαν) and assent (συγκατάθεσιν) and the like. [b] And concerning the body (περὶ δὲ σώμα), [neither preferred nor dispreferred] are pale or dark [skin] (λευκότητα καὶ μελανότητα), the brightness of the eyes (χαροπότητα), every pleasure and pain (ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον), and anything else of this type” (transl. Pomeroy 1999, 47 with slight alterations).

It is obvious that in this case *hēdonē* is described as something purely physical ([b]), especially considering that, if necessary, the author of this text had the full opportunity to classify it as an indifferent concerning the soul but did not do so ([a]).

As in T₁[b], in several other fragments the indifferent *hēdonē* does not correlate with *typē* but is contrasted with *ponos*,²⁶ a term that often clearly refers to bodily

²⁵ SVF I, 190 = III, 70; III, 117; 39 Diog.; cf. III, 181; 256.

²⁶ SVF I, 190 = III, 70; III, 117; 229a; 234; 39 Diog.; cf. II, 1103; 1169. This contrast is also implied in the story about Dionysius the Renegade who accepted *hēdonē* as the highest good under the influence of severe *ponos* in his eyes or kidneys (I, 38; 422; 427; cf. 431–432; 607). Cf. also the opposition of *hēdonē* and *algēdōn* in III, 229a and *hēdy* and *aniaron* in III, 256.

pain.²⁷ However, the exact status of both *hēdonē* and *ponos* within the category of the indifferent is described differently in various sources and, apparently, was a subject of intra-school debates. According to the Stoic position as presented by Arius Didymus (ArD. 7–7g, pp. 42–51 Pomeroy) and in some respects confirmed by Cicero (Cic. Fin. III, 50–51) and Sextus Empiricus (S. XI, 73), the Stoics divided the indifferents into the things that are in accordance with nature (*ta kata physin*), those that are contrary to it (*ta para physin*), and neither of these (*ta oute para physin oute kata physin*).²⁸ Whatever is in accordance with nature has some value (*axia*), whatever is contrary to it has disvalue (*apaxia*).²⁹ When something in accordance with nature has *great* or *sufficient* value, it is a preferred indifferent, whereas, when something contrary to nature has *great* or *sufficient* disvalue, it is a dispreferred one.³⁰ Although a couple of fragments suggest that some Stoics, including Chrysippus, might have considered *hēdonē* as a preferred indifferent,³¹ the standard position seems to be the one reflected in T1[b]: it is neither preferred nor dispreferred.³² This, however, is still compatible with the idea that *hēdonē* is in accordance with nature (*kata physin*) and possesses at least some minor value (*axia*). According to Sextus Empiricus (S. XI, 73),³³ many Stoics disputed even this last thesis, although in different ways: Cleanthes thought that *hēdonē* is not in accordance with nature and has no value (μήτε κατὰ φύσιν... εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν), thus possibly placing it among things which are neither in accordance with nature nor contrary to it (τὰ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν), while Archedemus believed that it is in accordance with nature, like armpit hair, but still has no value (κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν). This last position clearly does not

²⁷ E.g. SVF I, 38; 241; 422; II, 900, although, of course, the word may also mean something like “toil” or “labor” (perhaps in I, 611; III, 264). Other Greek words that may denote physical pain in SVF are *algēdōn* (II, 900; III, 122; 146; 757) and *odynē* (II, 858).

²⁸ SVF III, 140.

²⁹ SVF III, 124.

³⁰ SVF I, 192 = III, 128; III, 122; 129; 133. According to the alternative description by Diogenes Laertius, the indifferents are divided into *preferred*, which have value, and *dispreferred*, which have disvalue (Diog. VII, 105–106 = SVF III, 126–127), whereas the term “in accordance with nature (*kata physin*)” in this account is associated with those indifferents that are preferred for their own sake and not for the sake of something else (Diog. VII, 107 = SVF III, 135).

³¹ SVF III, 117; 181.

³² SVF III, 136; 155; 374 (if one substitutes οὔτε προηγμένον for οὔτε προηγούμενον in von Arnim’s text; see e.g. Bees 2004, 71, Anm. 77); cf. 154.

³³ SVF III, 155; cf. I, 574; III, 21 Arch.; Pan. Fr. 80 Alesse.

align with the thesis that *everything* in accordance with nature has some value.³⁴ Finally, Panaetius held that some pleasures are in accordance with nature and some are contrary to it (τινὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν), which could, in principle, mean that they do have value and disvalue, respectively, though not significant enough to turn them into preferred or dispreferred indifferents.³⁵ On the other hand, *ponos* or bodily pain, contrary to what is stated in T1[b], is usually characterized not just as contrary to nature,³⁶ but also as a dispreferred indifferent.³⁷ Significantly, in such a case, it is sometimes contrasted not with *hēdonē* but with the absence of pain (*aponia*; *vacuitas doloris*).³⁸ The implied view here could be that the absence of pain is a preferred indifferent, pain itself is a dispreferred one, and bodily pleasure is neither of these. Although the precise conceptual content of all these positions can only be a matter of speculation for us, it is hard to imagine that this wide and differentiated range of opinions could have made sense in relation to P2, which, as an emotion, is simply an unequivocal evil.

Thus, it seems quite evident that P1 has a number of characteristics that are hardly compatible with the above-mentioned characteristics of P2, namely:

- a1) It is physical *pleasure*, which can be the object of emotions but is unlikely itself to be an emotion or some other mental activity akin to it;
- b1) Its opposite is *ponos*, i.e. physical pain, not *lypē*;
- c1) It is an indifferent, not an evil or morally wrong activity.

2. Indifferent *hēdonē* as bodily *pathos*.

Besides this main argument in favour of MT, this thesis, in my opinion, is supported by some fragments that allow to clarify in more detail the nature of P1 and its place both in the process of sense perception and in the formation of emotions, including P2. Let us first consider the following description of the Stoic position by Galen:

T2 “[a] If then a person fears (δεδιώς) death or poverty or disease (τὸν θάνατον ἢ τὴν πενίαν ἢ τὴν νόσον) as evil (ὡς κακὰ), when the right course is to feel confidence

³⁴ Cf. Rist 1969, 104.

³⁵ Cf. Bett 1997, 106–107. Alternatively, Alesse 1997, 217, n. 80 suggests that by pleasure *para physin* Panaetius may have meant P2, although this does not align well with the fact that Sextus presents various Stoic opinions as referring to indifferent pleasure.

³⁶ Cf. SVF I, 185.

³⁷ SVF I, 185; III, 122; 129; cf. 181. For the general idea that pain is an indifferent, cf. I, 38; 190; 359; III 35; 70; 117; 146; 166; 168.

³⁸ SVF III, 129; cf. I, 368; III, 138; 142.

about them, as things indifferent (ὡς ἐπὶ ἀδιαφόροις), [b] he makes this assumption from lack of knowledge (ἐνδείκ μὲν ἐπιστήμης), being ignorant of the truth, as Ariston and Chrysippus would say, and he has that vice of soul (κακίαν... ψυχῆς) that is called cowardice; the virtue (ἀρετὴν) opposed to these things, they say, is courage, which is knowledge of what one should and should not face with confidence, that is, obviously, of things good and evil that are really good or evil (ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν τῶν ὄντως δηλονότι τοιούτων), not assumed to be so by false opinion (οὐ κατὰ ψευδῆ δόξαν ὑπειλημμένων), [c] as is the case with health and wealth, disease and poverty (ὑγίεια καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ νόσος καὶ πενία). For none of these, they say, is either good or bad, but all are indifferent (τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι φασιν, ἀλλὰ ἀδιάφορα πάντα). [d] Furthermore, if a person thinks that the pleasant is good and the painful evil (εἰ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ νομίσας τις ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρόν κακόν) and as a consequence of this belief (ἀκολουθῶν τῇ δόξῃ τῇδε) chooses the one and flees from the other (τοῦ μὲν τὴν αἵρεσιν ποιοῖτο, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φυγὴν), he has not learned the essence of the good (οὐσίας ἀγαθοῦ) and is therefore intemperate. [e] For since in all actions we choose what appears good (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν) and avoid what appears evil (τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν), and since we possess by nature these conations toward each, philosophy, by teaching (us) what is truly good and evil (τὸ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν), makes us unerring." (SVF III, 256, 21–36 = Gal. PHP VII, 2; transl. De Lacy 1980, 437)

According to this text, an agent who is deprived of knowledge and susceptible to false opinions due to the corrupt state of her soul ([b]) may take indifferent things — such as death, health and illness, wealth and poverty ([a], [c]) — for good and evil ([a]-[c]), which, of course, should be qualified as merely apparent rather than true ([b], [e]). That this is the occurrence of emotions is clear not only from the general context but also from the fact that T2[a] refers to fear of death, poverty and illness ([a]), i.e. to the manifestation of one of the four generic emotions. The mention of opinion or belief (δόξα) ([b], [d]) in this context also implies the concept of emotion, which in many fragments is described as unreasonable opinion.³⁹ What is most significant in terms of our topic, however, is that this text ([d]) explicitly states that the pleasant (ἡδύ) and the painful (ἀνιαρόν) can function in exactly the same way as other indifferent things, viz. they can be mistaken by the agent for good and evil and as a consequence cause *hairesis* and *phygē*, i.e. those

³⁹ SVF I, 212; III, 378; 391; 394; 463; 466; 481. See also n. 11.

kinds of *hormē* which are rationally justified only in relation to genuine good and evil⁴⁰ but are completely misplaced, when it comes to the indifferents.⁴¹

The standard Stoic theory describing emotions in a rational being states that in the act of judgment which underlies them the immediate object of assent (*synkathesis*) on the part of the mind is either the so-called *phantasia*,⁴² i.e. a rational impression located within the “governing principle” (*hēgemonikon*),⁴³ or, more precisely, a proposition (*axiōma*) expressing the content of this impression.⁴⁴ Of course, not all propositions of this kind are evaluative, i.e. imply a judgment that something is good, evil, or indifferent. For example, any perceptual impression (*phantasia aisthētikē*) can be articulated in factual propositions (e.g. “this is white,” etc.),⁴⁵ which are also objects of possible assent on the part of the mind within the context of sense perception itself.⁴⁶ In the case of emotions, however, one deals specifically with evaluative propositions, one of which might be “This pleasure (P₁) is good.”⁴⁷ Obviously, then, P₁ must somehow underlie the impression that is expressed by this proposition. This is precisely what another place in the same work by Galen indicates:

T₃ “[a] What necessity is there that children be enticed by pleasure as a good thing (ὕπὸ μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς ὡς ἀγαθοῦ), when they feel no kinship (μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχοντας) with it, or that they avoid and flee from pain (τὸν πόνον) if they are not by nature also alienated (ἡλλοτριῶνται) from it?... [b] For when he [i.e. Chrysippus] says that corruption arises in inferior men in regard to good and evil (περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν) because of the persuasiveness of appearances (τὴν πιθανότητα τῶν φαντασιῶν) and the talk of men, we must ask him why it is that pleasure projects

⁴⁰ SVF III, 88; 109; 131. See also nn. 14 and 16.

⁴¹ SVF I, 239; III, 118–119; 123; 146.

⁴² SVF I, 61; II, 70; 74; 90–91; 97; III, 63; 177; 974; 993; cf. II, 52; 61; 67; 839; 981; 983; 988; III, 276; 551.

⁴³ SVF I, 143; II, 826; 831; 837; 848; 850; Sext. S. VII, 232–236.

⁴⁴ SVF III, 171; Sext. S. VII, 154. Such a proposition was apparently understood as an objective component of any rational impression (cf. Brennan 2003, 261, n. 8).

⁴⁵ Cf. SVF II, 91.

⁴⁶ Cf. SVF II, 72–74; 115.

⁴⁷ It is not clear whether a single impression can be correlated with multiple propositions. According to some scholars, either a single impression corresponds to one proposition, which is a conjunction, or each proposition presupposes a distinct impression (e.g. propositions “this pain is sharp” and “this pain is evil” relating to the same pain express the content of different impressions). See Brennan 1998, 46–47; 64, n. 60; 2003, 261, n. 8; 2005, 57–58; Shogry 2019, 50–51.

the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil (ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλγῆδών δ' ὡς κακὸν πιθανὴν προβάλλουσι φαντασίαν).” (Gal. PHP V, 5; transl. De Lacy 1978, 321; cf. SVF III, 229a, 34–38)

T3[b] implies that pleasure and pain, — ἀλγῆδών ([b]) in this context is clearly used as a synonym for πόνος ([a]) — while being indifferent, somehow create in the agent’s mind persuasive impressions that can be expressed by the propositions “(this) pleasure is good” and “(this) pain is evil.” This already suggests that P1 is distinct both from the impression formed in the mind and from the possible subsequent assent to it, which underlies emotions, including P2. But how exactly should one conceive of the process of impression formation in this case?

To answer this question, let us first turn to the following fragment:

T4 “Chrysippus [says that] the generic pleasant (τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδύ) is an object of thought (νοητόν), but the specific and experienced (τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον) is in fact a sense object (αἰσθητόν).” (SVF II, 81 = Aet. IV, 9, 13; transl. Runia 2018, 430 slightly altered)

Like T2[d], this fragment uses the term ἡδύ rather than ἡδονή, while defining it as αἰσθητόν,⁴⁸ that is, an object of perception (αἴσθησις). Does this mean that the texts imply some important distinction between ἡδύ and the indifferent ἡδονή? For example, if ἡδύ (in T2[d] and T4) denotes some external sense object (αἰσθητόν) that brings pleasure to the agent, then this pleasure itself (including ἡδονή in T3[b]) should perhaps be interpreted precisely as the perception (αἴσθησις) of that object and, consequently, as some activity of the mind? In my view, such an interpretation would be mistaken.

To show this, an analogy with the Stoic view of physical pain may be helpful. According to the testimony by Plotinus, the Stoics conceived of it as follows:

T5 “[a] When a human being is said to have a pain in his toe (ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγεται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος), the pain obviously centres on the toe (ἡ μὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δῆπουθεν), [b] but the perception of the pain (ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν), they will plainly have to acknowledge, occurs in the controlling principle (περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν). [c] Now, while the breath is certainly different from the part that is hurting (ἄλλου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος μέρους τοῦ πνεύματος), [d] the controlling

⁴⁸ The expression τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον [sc. ἡδύ], in my view, refers to specific pleasures experienced through the five senses (cf. SVF II, 853: πέντε τὰς εἰδικὰς αἰσθήσεις) as opposed to the general notion of pleasure, which is νοητόν.

principle does the perceiving (τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεται), and the whole soul experiences the identical thing. [e] How, then, does this come about? By a process of ‘transmission’ (διαδόσει), they will say, whereby it is the breath in the toe that suffers the affection in the first instance (παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος); then, that is passed on to the next part, and that in turn to another, until it arrives at the controlling principle (πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν).” (SVF II, 858 = Plot. IV, 7, 7; transl. Gerson 2018, 496)

This text distinguishes, on the one hand, the physical pain itself (ὀδύνη) located in a specific part of the body ([a], [c]) and, on the other hand, the perception of this pain (ἡ δ’ αἰσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν) carried out by the “controlling principle” ([b], [d]) with the help of the psychic *pneuma* which spreads from it and transmits information about the pain from the affected body part to the *hēgemonoun* ([c], [e]). This conception is confirmed by other sources as well.⁴⁹ In particular, one literal quotation from Chrysippus states that “when our foot hurts us or our head, the hurting occurs in our foot or head [lit. in those very places]” (ὅταν τὸν πόδα πονῶμεν ἢ τὴν κεφαλὴν, περὶ τούτους τοὺς τόπους ὁ πόνος γίνεται).⁵⁰ Here, πόνος clearly refers to the same thing which in T5[a] is called ὀδύνη, viz. a physical pain located in a specific part of the body.⁵¹ If, as appears from T5[b], such pain is the object of

⁴⁹ See e.g. SVF II, 71; 826; 836; 850; 861; 879; 885 on the sensory *pneuma* issuing from *hēgemonikon*, and I, 151 = II, 882; II, 1013, 15–19 on transmission (*diadosis*). The idea that it was Strato of Lampsacus whom Plotinus may have had in mind in T5 (cf. Blumenthal 1971, 73, n. 16), in my view, is unconvincing. Although Strato may have used the very term *diadosis* when discussing similar topics (Strat. Fr. 111 Wehrli), he claims that “we do not have a pain in the foot when we stub our toe, nor in the head when we crack it, nor in the finger when we gash it” (transl. Sandbach 1969, 45), which clearly contradicts T5[a], and, in general, his position which attributes all possible affections (*pathē*), including bodily pleasures and pains, to the soul alone is explicitly opposed in our source itself (Plut. Libid. 4–6; Sandbach 1969, 43–49) to the Stoic view by Posidonius who distinguishes between various kinds of affections belonging either to the body or to the soul (*Posid. Fr.* 154 Edelstein-Kidd; see n. 53 below).

⁵⁰ SVF II, 900, 10–12 = Gal. PHP III, 7; transl. De Lacy 1978, 213.

⁵¹ Cf. τοῦ πονούντος μέρους in T5[c]. Note that, according to the proposed interpretation, the expression παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος ([e]) does not describe the ὀδύνη itself ([a]), i.e. the bodily affection (cf. [c]), but rather the very first stage of perception, referring to that specific part of *pneuma* which directly feels this affection located in the finger.

aisthēsis, it is obviously itself an *aisthēton*. Apparently, what is meant here is a certain variety of those bodily affections which are mentioned in the following fragment as one of the types of *aisthēta* alongside external objects:

T6 “For the primary sense objects (πρῶτα... αἰσθητὰ) are the affections in our own bodies (ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασι τὰ παθήματα), while the secondary ones (δεύτερα) are the things present externally bringing these about (τὰ τούτων ποιητικὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα)” (SVF II, 79 = Gal. Dig. Puls. I, 5; transl. Johnston, Papavramidou 2023, 272 modified).

In yet another fragment, such affections located in specific parts of the body are clearly contrasted with perceptions occurring in the governing principle:

T7 “On bodily affections (περὶ παθῶν σωματικῶν) and whether the soul shares in suffering these (εἰ συναλγεί τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ).⁵² The Stoics [say that] the affections [take place] in the affected places (τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις), but the perceptions [take place] in the governing principle (τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ).” (SVF II, 854; Aet. IV, 23, 1; transl. Leith 2020, 60, n. 83 slightly altered)⁵³

Thus, if *ponos* is a bodily *pathos*, which is an object of perception rather than perception itself, then its counterpart according to T1[b], i.e. indifferent *hēdonē* (P1), should also be considered a bodily *pathos* and thus an *aisthēton* rather than *aisthēsis*.⁵⁴

⁵² This chapter title is absent in SVF.

⁵³ On bodily affections in the Early Stoa, cf. also SVF I, 518 (*corporalium passionum*) II, 471 = Gal. PHP V, 2, pp. 298, 23 – 300, 20 De Lacy (e.g. τῶν τε συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς [sc. σώμασι] παθῶν). In the later tradition, Posidonius offers a classification of πάθη, according to which “(1) some are of the soul (ψυχικά), (2) some are of the body (σωματικά), and (3) some do not belong to soul but are physical with mental effects (τὰ μὲν οὐ ψυχῆς, περὶ ψυχὴν δὲ <σωματικά>), and (4) others do not belong to the body but are mental with physical effects (τὰ δ' οὐ σώματος, περὶ σῶμα δὲ ψυχικά)” (Posid. Fr. 154 Edelstein-Kidd; transl. Kidd 1999, 207). Hierocles also distinguishes between bodily and mental affections (Hierocl. Eth. El. col. 4, 11–17 Bastianini-Long: ...τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν... τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς πάθεσι).

⁵⁴ Note also that even if *hēdy* characterised as *aisthēton* in T4 refers exclusively to pleasant external objects (which, in my opinion, is not that obvious), it does not follow that the only option left is to interpret *hēdonē* as the perception of these objects, i.e. as *aisthēsis*, since, as T6 demonstrates, *aisthēta* can also include bodily affections and *hēdonē* may be one of them.

The term *aisthēsis* in Stoic usage is again multivocal.⁵⁵ Among other things, it can denote the psychic *pneuma* spreading from the governing principle to the sense organs,⁵⁶ as well as perception itself occurring in the *hēgemonikon* through the mediation of this *pneuma*.⁵⁷ This is broadly in line with what is said in T5. In addition, there are several fragments claiming that *aisthēsis* already constitutes assent (*synkatathesis*).⁵⁸ As we have seen, the immediate object of assent is a certain impression located in the *hēgemonikon* or, alternatively, a proposition expressing the content of that impression. SVF II, 74 as revised by von Arnim is quite consistent with this standard understanding of assent when it states that “perception is assent to a perceptual impression” (αἰσθητικῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις...).⁵⁹ Hence it follows that at that stage of the perception process when the *pneuma* is still transmitting information about the bodily *pathos* to the *hēgemonikon*, no assent can occur since at this stage there is no perceptual impression which could serve as an object of assent. It is only when such an impression has already arisen in the governing principle that the process of perception seems to culminate in assent to it or to a proposition expressing its factual content (e.g. in the case of P1 this would be the assent to the proposition that it is, in fact, pleasant). Of course, this assent does not give rise to any emotion because that would require assenting to an evaluative judgment such as “P1 is good.”

To sum up, P1 is a bodily *pathos* (cf. T1[b] and T5–7), which is an *aisthēton* or an object of perception (T4 and T6). Perception begins when the psychic *pneuma* perceives the content of this *pathos* and transmits it to the *hēgemonikon* (T5). It is only then that a *phantasia aisthētikē* to which the mind can give its assent first arises (SVF II, 74). P2 can only arise if assent is given to an erroneous value judgment concerning the same bodily *pathos* (or similar judgments about other indifferents). Thus, P1 or indifferent bodily pleasure is neither *aisthēsis*, nor *synkatathesis*, nor *hormē*, nor *pathos* in the sense of emotion. It is not any mental activity at all but merely a possible object of such activities as much as the *phantasia aisthētikē* formed on its basis. All these conclusions fully align with MT.

⁵⁵ See Rubarth 2004.

⁵⁶ SVF II, 71.

⁵⁷ SVF II, 850.

⁵⁸ SVF II, 72–74.

⁵⁹ Therefore, in my opinion, von Arnim was correct in replacing the nominative with the dative in this phrase. Nevertheless, Hülser 1987, 304 (Fr. 294) and Smith 1993, 271 (Fr. 252) present the phrase as follows: αἰσθητικὴ γὰρ φαντασία συγκατάθεσις ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις [sc. συγκαταθέσεως], which would mean that perceptual impression *is* the very act of assent or perception of this act.

3. Main versions of UT

Let us now turn to the position of those scholars who reject MT and accept one or another form of UT. Here I cannot afford an exhaustive analysis of their views. However, it makes sense to answer at least two questions: first, what conceptual meaning they attribute to UT, and second, for what reasons they find this thesis preferable. I will examine the versions of UT known to me in an order that, in my opinion, reflects the increasing degree of their scholarly importance — that is, I will start with the one which seems to me outright erroneous and conclude with the most interesting.

3.1. Gosling and Taylor (1982)

In their monograph *Greeks on Pleasure*, Gosling and Taylor flatly reject MT, describing it as “a modern error of interpretation” (p. 426). The grounds for this position are summed up in the following passage: “In our view, the texts which we have examined give no support to the view that the Stoics regarded agreeable bodily sensations as a form of pleasure. In their theory such sensations were appearances which might indeed give rise to pleasure, provided they were assented to, but which must always be distinguished from pleasure, which was the act of assent itself. To be more specific they were the appearance of bodily functioning, e.g. the ingestion of food, as good; such appearances are indeed counted as pleasures by Epicurean theory, but emphatically not by Stoic.” (Ibid.) It seems evident that, according to Gosling and Taylor, the Stoics certainly recognized the very existence of “agreeable bodily sensations” or “bodily satisfactions” (cf. p. 420)⁶⁰ but did not associate them with the notion of pleasure, which by definition is “the act of assent,” involves an erroneous evaluative judgment, and thus constitutes an emotion. Accordingly, these “agreeable bodily sensations,” though acknowledged by the Stoics, were simply not designated by the term *hēdonē* — although Gosling and Taylor do not explain what terms the Stoics did use to describe them — and, therefore, all fragments where this term appears should be understood as related to P2. For example, Gosling and Taylor clearly assume that all texts where *hēdonē* is presented as an indifferent refer to that very pleasure which is an emotion (p. 417). The obvious problem that P2, as an emotion, is by definition a moral evil rather than an indifferent is entirely ignored by them, as, indeed, are the fragments like T1 and T5–7, which, taken together, suggest that the indifferent *hēdonē* and *ponos* should

⁶⁰ Although Gosling and Taylor apparently identify them primarily with *phantasiai* (“appearances”) rather than with bodily *pathē* underlying these *phantasiai*.

be considered bodily affections. In my view, these reasons alone suffice to conclude that their criticism of MT is untenable and ultimately stems simply from not having taken into account all relevant data.⁶¹

3.2. Rist (1969)

Rist’s position is much more ambiguous and, on the whole, extremely difficult to analyze. On the one hand, he acknowledges that the Stoics “distinguished, implicitly if not explicitly, between two types of pleasure” (p. 38),⁶² designating them by the same term *hēdonē*. However, he argues against sharply contrasting P₁ and P₂ as purely bodily and mental pleasures, preferring to call them “first-order pleasures” and “second-order pleasures” (Ibid.), since in his view “there is no reason to believe that there is a fundamental difference in kind, but only a difference in degree” between them (p. 39). The specific meaning of this claim is that both P₁ and P₂ are types of impulse and assent, i.e. mental activities.⁶³ Rist, however, does not claim that P₁ is already a full-fledged emotion, i.e. the type of *hormē* that involves assenting to an erroneous value judgment that some indifferent thing is a good or an evil. Rather, as can be inferred by analogy from his remarks on “first-order pains,” he seems to think that assent in this case is given to the factual proposition that pleasure is pleasant.⁶⁴

The problem with this interpretation, in my view, lies primarily in the fact that Rist also ignores fragments such as T₁ and T₄–7, which suggest that indifferent *hēdonē* and *ponos* are bodily affections and objects of perception.⁶⁵ As a result, he

⁶¹ Cf. Long, Sedley 1987, 2:405; Cooper 1998, 101; Prost 2004, 228.

⁶² Gosling, Taylor 1982, 426 count him among the proponents of MT on this basis.

⁶³ Cf. Rist 1969, 39: “all pleasures, whether acceptable or not, are ὁρμαί of one kind or another;” 40: “both first- and second-order pleasures, for Chrysippus, are assents of reason and acts of judgment;” 44: “for the Old Stoa, all pleasures and pains, even first-order pleasures and pains, are acts of assent.”

⁶⁴ Cf. Rist 1969, 51: “Assent to pain, provided that it is only the mental awareness of pain and not an assent to the proposition that pain is either good or bad, is a non-moral assent;” 52: “Being human, we cannot help but assent to pain, that is, to admit that it is painful.”

⁶⁵ The only text that both Rist 1969, 38–41 and Gosling, Taylor 1982, 427, n. 11 discuss in this regard when disputing the existence of purely bodily pleasures is a passage from Aulus Gellius (Gel. XII, 5, 7 = SVF III, 181) which Haynes relied on in defending MT (Haynes 1962, 414, n. 12; 418, n. 27). The crucial phrase is actually in Gel. XII, 5, 8 which states with respect to indifferent pleasures and pains that “the newly-born child is endowed with these first sensations of pain and pleasure (*his primis sensibus doloris voluptatisque*) before the appearance of judgement and reason (*ante consilii et rationis exortum*)” (transl. from Gosling, Taylor, Ibid.). This, of course, contradicts Rist’s idea that all pleasures are “assents of reason and acts of judgment” (see n. 63), but, given the evidence I have discussed above (T₁, T₄–

essentially takes P₁ to be the very perception of pleasure, which, like any perception, is indeed a mental activity involving assent. But then it becomes unclear what exactly is the object of this assent. Indeed, according to the proposed interpretation of Rist's position, on the one hand P₂ or "second-order pleasure" is an assent to the proposition "this indifferent (e.g. P₁) is good." On the other hand, P₁ or "first-order pleasure" is also an assent to the proposition "(this) pleasure is pleasant." Clearly, the pleasure *referred to* in this last proposition is included in the content of a certain impression and therefore can no longer be P₁ itself, precisely because P₁ is merely an act of assent to this representational content, i.e. to the fact that this pleasure already present in the impression is indeed pleasant. Thus, we still have to allow for some "basic" pleasure which is not a form of mental activity, although the whole point of Rist's position was precisely that, according to the early Stoics, such pleasures do not exist. Alternatively, one could assume that the only possible objects of P₁ are other indifferents.⁶⁶ However, first, Rist does not say this, and second, even in this case the mind would presumably have to assent to a proposition like "this indifferent (e.g. food) is *pleasant*," and this still implies some idea of "basic" pleasure in the sense that "pleasantness" of such an indifferent is already somehow included in the content of the *phantasia* to which assent is given. It is much simpler to assume that the "basic" pleasure is P₁ itself, which is not the activity of perception but merely its object, as I have attempted to show above.

Lastly, what are we to make of the fact that P₁ is something indifferent, while P₂ is an unequivocal moral evil? Unlike Gosling and Taylor, Rist addresses this problem but in a very misleading way (pp. 38, 45–49). Roughly speaking, his position boils down to the idea that the indifferent "first-order pleasures" become morally bad when they accompany morally wrong activities, whereas, if they accompany morally right or at least appropriate activities, they remain preferred indifferents (at least according to Chrysippus), which Rist further identifies with the so-called

7), Rist's claim that the position described in Gellius cannot reflect the views of the early Stoics (Rist 1969, 41) seems wrong.

⁶⁶ This seems to be the view of Gosling and Taylor, who furthermore assume that these indifferents are thereby mistaken for goods (Gosling, Taylor 1982, 426: "[agreeable bodily sensations] were the appearance of bodily functioning, e.g. the ingestion of food, as good;" cf. Horn 2014, 163.). However, due to a false evaluative judgment involved such a pleasure would already constitute a full-fledged emotion, i.e. P₂, but, as we have seen, the object of P₂ can be P₁ itself, not just other indifferents (T2–3).

charai (“joys”), i.e. a particular type of “good feelings” (*eupatheiai*) (pp. 46, 49).⁶⁷ As far as I can judge, this rather inconsistently implies that “second-order pleasures” are simply the same “first-order pleasures” that the agent has consented to enjoy in the context of an activity that is itself morally wrong for reasons independent of these pleasures (for example, “enjoying the meal in full knowledge that the food has been stolen” (p. 38) or experiencing sexual pleasure from adultery (p. 45)).⁶⁸

In my view, this interpretation distorts the Stoic understanding of P2 in at least two respects. On the one hand, P2 may well exist in the absence of P1. For example, an agent may psychologically enjoy the awareness of her being rich, which she considers a genuine good, even when she does not experience any specifically physical pleasures that her wealth could in principle provide her. This purely mental pleasure is already a clear example of *hēdonē* as a morally bad emotion. On the other hand, even if we assume that in this case Rist refers only to a particular type of emotion rather than all emotions in general, it still remains true that P2 can exist outside the context of any morally wrong activity distinct from itself. For example, even if an agent experiences physical pleasure from eating food that is his rightful property, moreover, even if in this case the very act of eating is an appropriate action, he may still experience *hēdonē* as a morally bad emotion (P2) simply on the grounds that he takes this physical pleasure (P1) to be a genuine good. However, if he derives physical pleasure from stolen food, while for some reason treating this pleasure as an indifferent, then P2 does not actually occur, although the agent may well be under the sway of some other morally bad emotions that led him to commit the theft in the first place.

3.3 Wolfsdorf (2013)

In his monograph *Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Wolfsdorf acknowledges that “the Stoics seem to have operated with two conceptions of pleasure, a commonsensical one and a technical philosophical one” (p. 183), apparently understanding the former as P1 (Ibid.: “the common experience of pleasure”) and the latter as an emotion, i.e. P2. At the same time, he believes that, if the second of these conceptions “is substantively related to the experience of pleasure” (Ibid.),

⁶⁷ In fact, every *eupatheia* is a genuine moral good, not a preferred indifferent (III, 95; 103; 106; 113; 115; 501). In contrast to emotions (*pathē*), which are always morally bad, *eupatheiai* are a special kind of mental affections that can be experienced only by sages (SVF III, 175; 435; cf. 672). For similar interpretation, see also Annas 1992, 112.

⁶⁸ Cf. Rist 1969, 45: “We are now in a position to determine the relation of the wise man to what we have called *first-order pleasures*. He will experience such pleasures provided they are not called forth by immoral objects. This is the true sense of *apatheia*. The sage is insensible to immoral (and therefore irrational) *emotions*” (Italics are mine – A.S.).

then attributing to the Stoics two fundamentally different conceptions of pleasure is not really necessary. Wolfsdorf then goes on to discuss mostly P2 but, toward the end of his analysis, suggests that the possible connection between P1 and P2 may be related to the characterization of P2 as *eparsis* (“elation” or, as he translates the term, “swelling”) (pp. 207–209). Indeed, one of the standard Stoic definitions of such emotions as *hēdonē* and *lypē* states that they are, respectively, either “unreasonable elation” (ἄλογος ἔπαρσις) or “unreasonable contraction” (ἄλογος συστολή) of the soul.⁶⁹ These terms seem to describe not only the objective processes of expansion or contraction of the soul’s *pneuma*, accompanying the mind’s false evaluative judgment, but also how they are subjectively felt by the agent.⁷⁰ Wolfsdorf characterizes these processes as “the psycho-physical changes to which pleasure and pain [i.e. *hēdonē* and *lypē*] are directed” and suggests that they “correlate with physical and psychic conditions that normally accompany pains and pleasures and their kin” (p. 207). Since he thereby allows for a “physical” component in them, it seems that, in his view, *eparsis* may at least partly refer to the pleasurable bodily affections produced by this emotion, i.e. some kind of P1. Ultimately, Wolfsdorf arrives at the following conclusion: “Insofar as the Stoics refer to pleasure in a conventional sense, it seems to me that they are referring to the psycho-physical swelling described in the technical conception. This or rather the subjective psychic correlate of this psychophysical change is what people commonsensically and naively take themselves to be referring to when they speak of pleasure. Evidently, this conception is not entirely divorced from the technical conception; it merely entails a part of that conception, the terminal part. Given this, it seems to me doubtful that the Stoics use two radically different conceptions of pleasure” (208–209).

On the whole this interpretation seems to me erroneous primarily because P1 may well exist independently of P2. Physical pleasure, like physical pain, are indifferents that may be either mistaken for good and evil or not. In the former case, there arise such emotions as *hēdonē* and *lypē*; in the latter, they obviously do not arise, but physical pleasures and pains themselves still occur. In the case of pain, the sources demonstrate this quite clearly: while the sage does not experience *lypē* with respect to his own physical suffering,⁷¹ he undoubtedly feels the suffering itself.⁷² Hence, P1 cannot be merely a psycho-physical component of P2. Nevertheless, in my view, Wolfsdorf is partially right since some bodily pleasures can indeed

⁶⁹ SVF I, 209; III, 386; 391; 394; 412; 445; 454; 463; cf. III, 378; 392–393; 438; 461; 466; 468; 481.

⁷⁰ Cf. SVF III, 380–381; 385; 468.

⁷¹ Or for any other reason. See SVF I, 434; III, 381; 437–438; 444; 570–571; cf. 454; 572; 574; 639.

⁷² SVF III, 441, 12–13; 574; cf. I, 185; 431. See also Pan. Fr. 84 Alesse; Sen. Ep. 9, 1–3; 71, 27–29; 85, 29; Dial. II, 10, 4; 16, 2; Gel. XII, 5, 4–10.

be such a component if one has in mind exclusively those pleasurable bodily affections that may accompany P₂ and are produced by it. The Stoic fragments repeatedly mention that emotional experiences are felt in the specific part of the physical body where the governing principle is located, namely in the chest or in the region of the heart.⁷³ In the Stoic context, such an effect of emotional affections on the physical body can be accounted for by the idea that both body and soul are corporeal,⁷⁴ exist in a state of complete mixture,⁷⁵ and have mutual sympathy.⁷⁶ Some quotations from Chrysippus seem to describe this kind of bodily affections produced by such emotions as fear or distress.⁷⁷ Accordingly, the conclusion that P₂ can also cause pleasurable bodily affections in the chest area appears quite plausible.

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⁷³ SVF I, 210; 572; II 848; 881; 886–887; 890–891; 899–900; 903; 906; III, 416.

⁷⁴ E.g. SVF I, 137; 518; II, 773–774; 780; 785; 790–792; 796–798. Cf. the characterization of emotions themselves as bodies and *aisthēta* (II, 848; III, 84–85).

⁷⁵ SVF I, 145; I, 518; II, 471–472; 796–797; 826.

⁷⁶ SVF I, 518; II, 411; 792; 899; 1013, 18–19.

⁷⁷ E.g. SVF II, 899, 20–24 = Gal. PHP III, 5; “And the affections of distress (τὰ τῆς λύπης πάθη) arise somewhere there naturally, no other place experiencing sympathy or sharing the affection (οὐδενὸς ἄλλου συμπάσχοντος οὐδὲ συναλγούντος τόπου). For when certain pains (ἀλγυδόνων) associated with the affections of distress (κατὰ ταῦτα γιγνομένων) become intense, no other place exhibits these physical effects (ἕτερος μὲν οὐδεὶς ἐμφαίνει τόπος τὰ πάθη ταῦτα), but the region of the heart (ὁ δὲ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν) does so to a great degree” (Transl. De Lacy 1978, p. 209). Cf. SVF II, 900, 6–15.

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