

TEACHING CLASSICS

NOVOSIBIRSK SCHOOLS 2007–2013

INVITED LECTURES



ПРЕПОДАВАЯ АНТИЧНОСТЬ

НОВОСИБИРСКИЕ ШКОЛЫ 2007–2013

ИЗБРАННЫЕ ЛЕКЦИИ

Античная философия и классическая традиция
Приложение к журналу СХОЛН, Том VI

ПРЕПОДАВАЯ АНТИЧНОСТЬ

TEACHING CLASSICS

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE CLASSICAL TRADITION
ΣΧΟΛΗ SUPPLEMENTS

VOL. VI

TEACHING CLASSICS

NOVOSIBIRSK SCHOOLS 2007–2013
INVITED LECTURES

EDITED BY
EUGENE AFONASIN

Novosibirsk 2022

АНТИЧНАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ
ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ К ЖУРНАЛУ ΣΧΟΛΗ

Том VI

ПРЕПОДАВАЯ АНТИЧНОСТЬ

НОВОСИБИРСКИЕ ШКОЛЫ 2007–2013
ИЗБРАННЫЕ ЛЕКЦИИ

ПОД ОБЩЕЙ РЕДАКЦИЕЙ
Е. В. АФОНАСИНА

Новосибирск 2022

ББК 87.3
УДК 1 /19
А 94

*Подготовлено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ
и Правительства Новосибирской области в рамках научного
проекта № 20-411-540002 р_а «Философское антиковедение
в Новосибирском Академгородке»*

Преподавая Античность. Новосибирские школы 2007–2013. Избранные лекции / Под общей ред. Е. В. Афонасина. – Новосибирск: Центр изучения древней философии и классической традиции НГУ; Офсет-ТМ, 2022. – 243 с. (Античная философия и классическая традиция. Приложение к журналу СХОЛН [Том. VI]; изд. с 2020 г.)

ISBN 978-5-85957-194-9

В данном томе перепечатываются заново отредактированные лекции и статьи известных зарубежных антиковедов, подготовленные ими для участников философских школ, которые, при поддержке Института «Открытое общество», проходили с 2007 по 2013 гг. в Новосибирском Научном Центре. Все статьи, кроме послесловия, специально написанного для этого издания, в разные годы публиковались в журнале СХОЛН (Schole) (classics.nsu.ru/schole). Тома серии доступны по адресу: schole.ru.

*В оформлении обложки использован фрагмент римской фрески,
Национальный музей Неаполя*

© Е. В. Афонасин, составление, 2022

© Коллектив авторов, 2022

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

Platonism and the world crisis JOHN DILLON	7
Трансформация метафизики в эпоху Поздней Античности ДОМИНИК О'МАРА	31
The beauty of the world in Plato's <i>Timaeus</i> DOMINIC O'MEARA	53
Consciousness of self, of time and death in Greek philosophy: some reflections DOMINIC O'MEARA	66
<i>Logos</i> и <i>logoi</i> у Плотина. Их природа и функция ЛЮК БРИССОН	77
Family, political power and money in the Neoplatonic schools of Athens LUC BRISSON	92
Time and eternity from Plotinus and Boethius to Einstein MICHAEL CHASE	102
Whitehead's organismic conception of God and its religious availability LEONIDAS BARGELIOTES	162
Aristotle on love and friendship DAVID KONSTAN	172

6 Содержание

The art of life. An ancient idea and its survival TEUN TIELEMAN	181
Les stoïciens sur les tempéraments du corps et de l'ame TEUN TIELEMAN	192
Heraclitus and <i>Logos</i> – again THOMAS ROBINSON	207
Beauty, love and art: the legacy of Ancient Greece DAVID KONSTAN	218
ПОСЛЕСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ	235
SUMMARY	242

PLATONISM AND THE WORLD CRISIS

JOHN DILLON
Trinity College, Dublin

PREFACE

I am conscious of employing here a somewhat portentous title for what I am about to say, a title which may promise rather more than is actually going to be delivered; but it is in fact my deeply-held conviction that Plato, and the tradition deriving from him, has a number of important things to say to the modern world, to which the modern world would do well to listen. Of course, Plato had no conception of the nature or complexity of the issues with which modern civilisation is currently faced, but nonetheless, it seems to me, there are many useful insights which we may derive both from his own works – in particular his last great work, *The Laws* – and from those of certain of his followers, in particular Plotinus.

The topics on which I would like to focus my attention on this occasion are just three, but they seem to me to be such as, between them, to represent the great bulk of what is wrong with modern western society, and what is inexorably putting intelligent life on this planet under mortal threat. They are the following:

- (1) *The problem of the destruction of the environment and of waste disposal.*
- (2) *The problem of religious conflict and mutual intolerance.*
- (3) *The problem of the legitimization of authority and the limits of personal freedom.*

On each of these questions it will be found, I think, that Plato has things of importance to say. I will address them in turn.

I

Let us start with the question of the radical imbalance currently prevailing between us and our environment. This is not, of course, just a problem of advanced Western civilisation, though it is a problem primarily caused by it. We are being joined in our aspiration for an affluent and wasteful lifestyle, in particular, by two enormous members of the emergent world, China and India, who, between them, have the capacity to sink the planet simply by seeking, as they have a perfect right to do, to emulate the material achievements of the chief Western powers, in particular the United States; while at the same time much of the so-called 'third world', particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is engaged in a reckless proliferation of its population without exhibiting the slightest ability to support even its existing numbers.

At the root of our problems in this area over the last two hundred years or so is quite simply the modern concept of progress – that is to say, linear development upwards and outwards in all areas of society. We must build ever more roads, more houses, more public facilities; we must increase wealth – the Gross National Product – increase trade, exploit ever more fully all natural resources, vegetable, animal, and mineral. The inevitable increase in population consequent on that then necessitates further such development. And all this is naively viewed as progress towards a happy and glorious future.

This concept of progress is so deeply ingrained in our psyches that it is hard for modern man to comprehend a culture in which no such concept is present. But such was the situation prevailing, so far as I know, in all pre-modern (let us say, pre-1600 A.D.) societies, and notably in the high civilisations of Greece and Rome, which, along with the Judaeo-Christian tradition, are our own direct ancestors. Among Greek and Roman intellectuals, it was fully recognised that nations and societies had their ups and down, that empires rose and fell – and there may even be discerned, in the period of the high Roman Empire (notably the 2nd century A.D.) the notion that political arrangements, in the form of the *Pax Romana*, had attained a sort of apex, if not of perfection, then at least of satisfactoriness – but nowhere can we discern any trace of the modern

obsession with 'progress'. On the contrary, it was universally accepted that change in the physical world was cyclical: some new inventions were made from time to time, predominantly in the area of warfare, populations might increase locally, and cities, such as Alexandria, Rome or Constantinople, grow to great size, communications, in the form of roads or safe passage on the sea, might improve marginally; but all this would be balanced by a decline somewhere else – none of these local developments was thought to be such as to disturb the overall cyclical nature of sublunar existence, especially as the life of the physical world, as it ceaselessly unrolled itself, was seen merely as a temporal projection of the eternal life of a higher, intelligible world, in which, of course, there was no question of change or development.

The nearest thing, I suppose, to an exception to this world-view was provided by thinkers in the early Christian tradition, who did indeed look forward to an end-time, the second Coming of Christ and the Day of Judgement, towards which all human life was working, a progression upon which Christ's first coming was an important milestone. This Christian scenario does indeed involve a concept of linear progress, albeit of a distinctly otherworldly variety, but it has been argued, and I think not without some plausibility, that it is this Christian concept, duly secularized and truncated of its culmination in a Last Judgement that has spawned the modern concept of endless material progress.

For it is, after all, endless, and herein surely lies its inherent contradiction, and much of its perniciousness. Although all our material progress is notionally working towards some goal, this goal can logically never be attained. It must always be receding over the horizon, as it is an essential part of the dogma of modern capitalist development that a slow-down in the rate of growth is a disaster, as that is to be equated with *stagnation*, and stagnation is a very bad thing indeed, being next of kin to the ultimate misfortune, which is *recession*. So the Gross National Product has to keep on rising, and World Trade has got to keep on increasing, and the under-privileged hundreds of millions of China, India and elsewhere must continue to aspire to the ownership of motor-cars, second homes, computers, refrigerators, and video-recorders.

Most importantly, there can be no 'steady state' at the end of this rainbow. Every aspect of the economy must go on increasing exponentially. And herein lays the root of the crisis. Already we are seeing the

disastrous results of global warming – a phenomenon in face of which the greatest polluter on the planet, the United States, is quite simply in a state of denial – most dramatically on sub-Saharan Africa, where desertification is spreading relentlessly, and at the two poles, where the icecaps are melting fast, but everywhere in recent years extremes of weather have been manifesting themselves, not least in the United States itself, with a succession of notable hurricanes. We are also seeing the initial steps in what is going to become an increasingly frantic battle for ever-shrinking oil resources – the preposterous and disastrous efforts to bring ‘freedom and democracy’, first to Afghanistan, and then to Iraq, being the opening shots, soon to be followed by devious intrigues among the corrupt regimes of Central Asia. And all this because our civilisation is, it seems, hopelessly hooked on the ever-increasing consumption of non-renewable fossil fuels.

At the same time as all this exponentially growing consumption is going on, we are faced also with the ever-increasing problem of the disposal of the waste matter generated by our life-style, some of it very toxic indeed, and all of it troublesome in one degree or another. Some years ago, a widely disseminated calculation estimated that the average middle-class American generates up to twenty-five times as much garbage as the average Indian or African villager, the average European not being far behind and of course much more of that garbage is non-biodegradable. Admittedly, efforts are being made, much more seriously on the continent of Europe than either here in Ireland or in the U.S., to recycle as much of this as possible, but in this country in particular more or less every effort to re-process waste materials productively is met by ignorant or vexatious objections, and those by people who are generally every bit as productive of garbage as anyone else.

And that is only in relation to household rubbish. There is also the problem of commercial and medical waste, and beyond that the problem of the reckless pollution of rivers and lakes by farmers either ignorantly applying too much fertiliser to their fields, in search of ever-higher yields, or carelessly or dishonestly disposing of farmyard slurry. Everywhere one turns these days, one comes upon one aspect or another of the detritus of a culture expanding out of control.

So what does Plato, and the Platonist tradition, have to say about all this? What, one might wonder, could he possibly have to say? In fact, I

want to propose to you that he has a great deal to say, and that we would do well to listen to him. I will take my examples primarily from his last work, *The Laws*, in which he presents us with his most serious sketch of an ideal state, but I will start from a passage in his more famous work, *The Republic* – also a sketch of an ideal state, but a far more peculiar one than that of *The Laws*, and one, I am convinced, that is not to be taken literally.

However, in Book II of *The Republic*, where he is engaged in a schematic account of the genesis of the state, he makes a particularly significant point when describing the transition from a primitive stage of society – which he portrays, with more than a touch of satire, as a kind of Golden Age utopia, in which small communities are living in complete harmony with their environments – to a more advanced stage, which he terms the ‘pampered’ or ‘luxury-loving’ state (*tryphôsa polis*) – or, more pointedly, the ‘fevered’ state (*phlegmainousa polis*). This is, of course, the situation in which all existing societies find themselves, and it comes about, he proposes (II 372Eff), as a result of the incessant desire to add luxuries to the necessities of life. To quote him:

“There are some people, it appears, who will not be content with this sort of fare, or this sort of life-style (sc. of the primitive state); couches will have to be added, and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and courtesans and cakes – all sorts of all of them! And the items we first mentioned, houses and clothes and shoes, will no longer be confined to the level of the necessary, but we must introduce painting and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?”

The consequence of this process of elaboration, as he goes on to point out, will be that the state will have to become bigger, and thus encroach on its neighbours (who will simultaneously be driven to encroach upon it), and the inevitable result of that will be that wars will break out, in the struggle to acquire more land and resources, or to protect trade routes – as ever-increasing foreign trade will follow necessarily from the demand for luxuries.

Is this not all, I would ask, though written in the middle of the fourth century B.C., depressingly relevant to our present situation? We flatter

ourselves that we have attained to a high degree of rationality and orderliness in our international relations, after the excesses of the past century in particular, but we must face the unpalatable fact that this thin façade of reasonableness will quickly break down if anyone dares to try to part us from our oil – as I say, the attempted ‘liberation’ of Iraq is only the first step in such a break-down; and such interventions as this will inevitably provoke ever more desperate and extreme responses from those who feel that they are being ruthlessly exploited, and have nothing to lose. And in the midst of all this mayhem, the oil itself, even making allowances for dramatic new discoveries in Central Asia and in Asiatic Russia, will inevitably run out in considerably less than a century from now. It is a limited, and non-renewable, resource.

So is there any solution to this problem? I am not at all sure that there is, but if there is, it has to be along the lines sketched out by Plato in his *Laws*. Now Plato is of course operating at a much simpler level than is appropriate for us, but, *mutatis mutandis*, I think that he can provide us with much food for thought. One of the first conditions that he establishes for his ideal state, in Book V of the work, is that its membership is to be strictly limited. This is easier to do, of course, when one is establishing a new colony, as he is, but the principle can be applied, broadly, to any state.

Let us take Ireland, for example. We in this country are in a rather interesting position in the modern world. We are a nation that, something over 150 years ago, had really far too many inhabitants for the resources available to support them – something over 8 million – and a dreadful famine was the result. I would not wish here to deny that British laissez-faire capitalism and plain indifference to Irish misery contributed to the dreadfulness, but the fact remains that the famine occurred because there were too many people for the available resources – and this is a situation being repeated in many parts of Africa, India and China today. However, in Ireland at the beginning of the 21st century, the situation is very different. After an initial halving of the population in the mid to late 19th century, and many decades of stagnation after that, our numbers are now rising, in response to the stimulus of unprecedented prosperity in the last decade of the 20th century, towards the 5 million mark. The question now arises, is there somewhere in here an ideal number of people to inhabit this green and pleasant land?

I have seen it stated, by responsible economists and demographers, that we probably could now support a population of something like the 8 million that pullulated here in misery in the early 1840s, and I don't doubt that they have a reasonable case. But, even if we granted that, the question arises, where do we stop? Are we to look forward then to 10 million? 15 million? After all, Holland, for instance, among our European neighbours, is about the size of Munster, and is now home to 16 million, and rising. Admittedly, they are Dutch – highly organised, very disciplined, used to living cheek-by-jowl – and we are... who we are, and used to a somewhat more chaotic and less crowded lifestyle; but still, the question may be raised.

I would like to answer the question, baldly and controversially, by proposing that an ideal population for us on this island would be just 5, 040, 000 – and I will now reveal why. Plato, in *Laws* V (737Dff.), declares that his ideal state, Magnesia, should consist of just 5040 households – that is to say, 5040 heads of household, with their wives and offspring, for a total citizen population of something like 20,000 – 25,000. This number – which is arrived at for amusing numerological reasons (it is divisible by all the numbers up to ten, and 59 ways in all!) – is truly tiny by modern standards, and need not be taken seriously in itself. What is significant about it is the ideological position that it represents. It lays down the principle of a 'steady-state' economy, of balance with the environment, and as such should be taken very seriously indeed. What Plato specifies is that the legislator should study the territory available very carefully, and determine as exactly as possible what number of people it could support 'in modest comfort', and then stick to that. It is central to his system that every citizen should have a basic stake in society, a land-holding that is inalienable and may not be subdivided: "the number of hearths established by the initial distribution must always remain the same; it must neither increase nor decrease. The best way for every state to ensure this will be as follows: the recipient of a holding should always leave from among his children only *one* heir to inherit his establishment.¹ This will be his favourite son, who will succeed him and give due worship

¹ This goes against normal Athenian practice, according to which a man's property is divided equally among his sons. Plato is not advocating the custom of primogeniture, however, as will be seen in a moment.

to the ancestors... of the family and state" (740B). The other children will be married off, if girls, or given out for adoption by childless households, if required – or else simply required to emigrate.

This is a stern arrangement – though something like that in fact prevailed unofficially in this country for many generations, God knows! – but there is a more positive aspect to it. Plato is above all concerned that no one in his society should fall below a certain level of modest prosperity; if they were to prove quite unable to run their allotment, they would simply be asked to leave the country (though every sort of advice and encouragement would be offered to them before that happened). Conversely, although Plato recognises the desirability of acknowledging different degrees of industriousness among the citizenry, and therefore allows some gradations in wealth, he is adamant that no one may be allowed to accumulate more than five times the basic property-valuation. Ancient Greeks did not think in terms of income, but rather of property, but if we were to transpose this principle into modern terms, we could say, as a rule of thumb, that, if the basic wage were fixed at, say, E 20, 000, then no one – doctor, lawyer, property speculator, or IT whiz-kid – for whatever reason, could be allowed to earn more than E 100, 000 per annum. If they wished to go beyond that, they would, once again, be asked to leave the country. As Plato puts it (744E-745A):²

"The legislator will use the holding as his unit of measure and allow a man to possess twice, thrice, and up to four times its value. If anyone acquires more than this, by finding treasure-trove or by gift or by a good stroke of business or some other similar lucky chance which presents him with more than he's allowed, he should hand over the surplus to the state and its patron deities, thereby escaping punishment and gaining a good name for himself."

This, I must say, seems to me an excellent provision, much as it would disgust the contemporary neo-conservative ideologists of capitalism. In modern terms, one would simply have to prescribe that anyone earning over five times the minimum wage would have the choice, and privilege, of donating his surplus to one of a number of approved public or private

² In my quotations from the *Laws*, I adopt in general the excellent Penguin translation of Trevor Saunders.

enterprises – I would naturally favour third-level education, but I recognise that there are many other very worthy causes out there! – or have the money removed from him by 100% taxation. It seems to me that society as a whole would be immensely the better for this, despite the frustration caused to a few. After all, as Plato remarks in the *Republic*, it is not our purpose to make any one class in the state happy, but rather the state as a whole.

I would certainly not wish to claim that Plato's vision of Magnesia is without flaws or defects. In particular, Plato exhibits a truly aristocratic disdain for anything approximating to 'trade' or industrial production, other than agriculture, in which we need not follow him. However, in his insistence on limiting such production (which in his ideal state would actually be performed by resident foreigners and/or slaves) to necessities rather than luxuries, and his insistence that, though there could be, no doubt, improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, there should be at all events no overall *growth*, I think that we should pay very serious attention to him. If his vision of a modest sufficiency of material goods sounds a little like that of Mr. De Valera, in his famous St. Patrick's Day address of 1943, that is no accident; as political thinkers Plato and Dev had actually quite a lot in common. Let us take a passage of the *Laws* on the question of the possession of material wealth, and then append to that a portion of Dev's address. First Plato (743C-744A):

"The whole point of our legislation was to allow the citizens to live supremely happy lives in the greatest possible mutual friendship. However, they will never be friends if injuries and lawsuits arise amongst them on a grand scale, but only if they are trivial and rare. That is why we maintain that neither gold or silver should exist in the state, and there should not be much money made out of menial trades and charging interest... The citizens' wealth should be limited to the products of farming, and even here a man should not be able to make so much that he can't help forgetting the real reason why money was invented (I mean for the care of the soul and body, which without physical and cultural education respectively will never develop into anything worth mentioning). That's what has made us say more than once that the pursuit of money should come last in the scale of value. Every man directs his efforts to three things in all, and if his efforts are directed with a correct sense of priorities he will give money the

third and lowest place, and his soul the highest, with his body coming somewhere between the two.”

Now, as I say, we do not have to follow him in imposing a total ban on gold or silver money; let us focus rather on his scale of priorities.

And now here is Dev:

“Let us turn aside for a moment to that ideal Ireland that we would have. That Ireland which we dreamed of would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as the basis for right living, of a people who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit – a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, the contests of athletic youths and the laughter of comely maidens, whose firesides would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. It would, in a word, be the home of a people living the life that God desires that man should live.”

It has in recent years become sadly customary, among the forward-thinking sophisticates of modern Ireland, to mock this speech – particularly, I suppose, the romplings of sturdy children, contests of athletic youths and the laughter of comely maidens (with which we may, I suppose, aptly contrast the proceedings every weekend nowadays in such venues as Temple Bar and elsewhere) – but I am inclined to salute it as an approximation to a noble vision. It is, at any rate, entirely in line with the vision of Plato.

What Plato, then, is presenting for our scrutiny is a strictly regulated ‘steady-state’ society, designed to secure both internal harmony by reason of the justice of its political and sociological arrangements, and harmony with its natural environment by ensuring that the demands it puts upon it do not exhaust or distort that environment. I should specify, in connexion with the former aim, that Plato placed enormous stress on education for citizenship (*paideia*), beginning from infancy,³ with the

³ Indeed, from the womb, since he even presents regulations for harmonious exercises on the part of pregnant women, to ensure that their offspring get off to a good start (VII 788E ff)!

purpose of ensuring the full understanding of, and assent to, the principles on which the state was founded, on the part of the whole citizen body. In modern times, the United States goes some way towards this ideal – and of course the former Soviet Union and its satellites strove unsuccessfully to do so, as does China even now – but we in Europe have largely abdicated from any effort along these lines. Plato wanted above all, as did Benjamin Franklin and the other founders of the American Republic, an educated citizenry, any of whom could take on administrative responsibilities if necessary, but all of whom could at least make an informed judgement as to who among them was best qualified to rule, and vote accordingly. Indeed, so strongly did he feel on this point that anyone who proved unable or unwilling to exercise his citizenship was to be asked to leave the state altogether. There was no place in Magnesia for the ‘Don’t knows’!

To turn briefly to the problem of waste disposal: this is something on which Plato has really nothing to say, for the good reason that in the world, as he knew it, it was not a problem. The Classical Greeks were not necessarily a particularly tidy people – standards of hygiene in ancient cities would leave much to be desired from a modern perspective – but the fact was that most waste was thoroughly biodegradable and non-toxic, and did not pile up in such amounts as to constitute a crisis – dogs and birds could deal with most of it. What is left over is mostly the potsherds and metal utensils that give such delight to modern archaeologists; there were no indestructible plastics or radio-active residues to worry about. I think, however, that we can reasonably extrapolate from our knowledge of his philosophy in general so far as to say that he would have required that all the waste products of his ideal state should be recycled in one way or another – any pile-up of unusable garbage would inevitably indicate that society was no longer in harmony with its environment.

A further question might well occur to you, and it is one that I find a little awkward to answer, but answered it must be. It is all very well for Plato, you might say, to specify a fixed population of 5040 homesteads, and then say that all superfluous persons must simply leave; but how, in a modern democratic state, can one presume to set any sort of cap on population growth? The first reply I would make to that is to observe that

it is in fact a feature of advanced western societies to limit their population growth spontaneously, to the extent that in Western Europe generally the indigenous population has attained something like steady state (with countries like Italy and Greece, – rather surprisingly – exhibiting a net decline); but nevertheless one must make provision for worst-case scenarios! If, as I feel would not be the case, population increase continued relentlessly, it would be necessary to take certain steps. One simple one would be to limit children's allowances to the first three children of any couple, instead of actually increasing them, as is currently the case. This would send out a pretty clear signal, I should think – though of course stirring up indignation in certain quarters. A more extreme procedure would be – along Plato's own lines, but also borrowing a feature from the Kyoto Protocol on the production of greenhouse gases – that any children over the number of three produced by a given couple – or indeed a single mother – would have to be presented for adoption by childless couples, or at least those who had less than the maximum permitted number; or else the errant couple would actually have to 'buy' the variance to keep another child from some couple who had less than the specified number – very much as Ireland is currently having to pay up for generating too much carbon dioxide! And of course, parallel with all this, possibilities of immigration would have to be very strictly limited.

I realise, of course, that such provisions will strike many decent people as deeply shocking, but I would suggest to them in response that the situation that the human race as a whole currently faces is so serious that a seismic shift in our ethical consciousness will be necessary. It must come to seem (as I believe it is) deeply selfish and irresponsible, and hence positively *immoral*, to have more children than the environment can support, and such legislative provisions as I have outlined will only be expressing this sense of general disapproval. Morality, after all, is not a fixed quantity, much as religiously-minded people might like to think that it is; ethical positions shift in answer to changing societal circumstances – and it is quite reasonable that they should.

II

But that is, perhaps, enough about that for the moment! The second issue that I want to deal with is that of the clash of religious traditions, and religious intolerance in general. On the world stage, what we currently

find ourselves faced with is the disastrous fact that, even as irrational and violent differences between the various Christian sects have either faded away or are steadily lessening (except in such odd corners of the world as Northern Ireland!), the old antagonism between Christianity and Islam has taken on new and deadly forms. Of course, as we are constantly and correctly being reminded, this antagonism is not primarily fueled by theological concerns – it is rather a response to the beastly treatment by the *Christian* United States' protégé Israel of its Palestinian neighbours, and more generally to the shock to Islamic morality inflicted by the gross vulgarity of Western (and again, largely American) popular culture, which floods in upon traditional Muslim societies through films, TV, music and glossy magazines. This is not to deny that Muslim society could do with some serious shocks, particularly in respect of its attitude to women, and to the treatment of criminals, but that does not lessen the force of the shocks inflicted, and this provokes a strong reaction, of some of the results of which we are all too aware. We must add to these provocations the economic pressures of Western consumer society, which are also afflicting the majority of the inhabitants of Muslim nations, those who are not so fortunate as to belong to the Westernized elites who can enjoy the more positive aspects of consumerism. We saw, back in 1979, what could happen in a state such as Iran, and what in recent years has brought an (admittedly most moderate and circumspect) Islamist party to power in secular Turkey; and we should take due note of the pressures which are building up in such a society as Saudi Arabia.

However, all that said, the fact remains that this reaction is expressed in a distinctly *religious* mode, and it is the intransigent attitudes of both Christianity and Judaism that lends fuel to it. I speak with some feeling, as I have been recently browsing extensively in the Qur'an, and have come to see that, despite a good deal of polemic, Mohammed's revelation is deeply rooted in both Jewish and Christian thought. I myself would have considerable difficulty with the Prophet's prohibition on wine (which I believe was actually the result of rather local concerns, in the form of his objection to the use of wine in rituals honouring pagan goddesses in the region of Mecca), but in many other areas I feel that he has a lot to teach us. Primarily, though, Islam is traditionally much more tolerant of Judaism and Christianity than they have been of it. It sees itself, after all, as merely the culmination of a series of revelations which were

made in earlier times to Abraham, to Moses, and to Jesus, and it incorporates much of what they had to say in its sacred text. The chief scandal and absurdity, from their point of view, is the claim by later Christians (though, they feel, not by Jesus himself) that he was, in some physical way, the *son* of God – and I must confess I find myself very much in agreement with them on that point. If the Christians could see their way to reformulating Jesus' status to that simply of a major prophet, and a man specially chosen and inspired by God, then, I think, the three great 'religions of the Book' could largely agree to differ on who delivered the most perfect and *final* revelation. The political and social pressures and sources of aggravation would continue, of course, but they would not be fueled to the same extent by theological tensions.

But where, you may ask, does Plato and Platonism come into all this? Very significantly, I feel. Plato has an interesting attitude to established religion. On the one hand, as a legislator, he is most particular that the gods should be worshipped by the citizens of his state in the most conventional and traditional way. Atheism or irreverence he is prepared to punish most severely, as being profoundly subversive of morality. But he himself does not believe in the gods in their traditional forms, nor does he expect the wisest and most senior citizens in his ideal state to do so; and this attitude of his (which was in fact, it must be admitted, by no means unique to him among the intellectuals of Classical Athens) communicated itself to his successors, in the form of a tradition of allegorizing religious symbols and myths.

In his early dialogue *Euthyphro*, Plato makes his mentor Socrates probe mercilessly the theological assumptions of the pompous Euthyphro, who is actually representing, albeit in an extreme form, the beliefs of the Athenian people in general. It is plain from Socrates' questions that he does not accept the traditional myths about the gods, their amours, their other interventions in the human world, and their quarrels among themselves. Later, in Book II of the *Republic* (378Aff.), Plato makes Socrates lay down a set of rules about how to talk about the gods, which once again indicates Plato's rejection of traditional mythology. The gods, or God – Plato is quite happy to talk about 'God' (*ho theos*) in the singular – must not be described as doing any harm to, or perpetrat-

ing any deception upon, men; God is entirely good, and eternally unchanging. This effectively takes care of the great bulk of Greek traditional theology, which Socrates proceeds to take apart.

And yet in the *Republic*, and more clearly still in the *Laws*, Plato insists on scrupulous religious observance in his ideal state. The traditional gods of the Olympian pantheon, though stripped of all unsuitable stories about them, are to be worshipped in the traditional manner, and so are a host of lesser divinities, daemons, heroes and even nymphs. In Book V of the *Laws* (738Cf.), he insists that all traditional ceremonies and sacrifices should be performed, and that all the citizens should attend the festivals. There is to be a full set of temples on the acropolis of the central town, and other precincts of the gods in each of the twelve divisions into which the state is divided (745Bff.).

How are we to reconcile these positions? Is Plato being simply disingenuous, and promoting traditional religion as something like an 'opium of the people? Well, I think that one would have to admit that he is not being entirely straightforward, but he is not being hypocritical either. He would reconcile these two positions by the application of allegorical exegesis. In Book X of the same *Laws*, after all, in the course of an attack on atheism (which, as I have said, is a serious crime in his state), he launches into an exposition of the real nature of the divine power in the world. This, it turns out, is nothing other than a rational World-Soul, and the traditional gods are merely manifestations of various aspects of this entity at work in the world. This truth, however, is only to be imparted to a very limited group of the wisest and most experienced of the citizens, who form a rather peculiar Council of State, known as the Nocturnal Council, from their custom of meeting just before dawn to consider basic issues connected with the smooth running of the state.

So for Plato the world was created – though timelessly – and is administered by an impersonal, though benign and intelligent, entity, which is best worshipped, however, by the observance of traditional rituals – and this would be true of all well-run states, whatever their particular traditions about the gods. There was absolutely no proselytizing tendency among the ancient Greeks, despite their firm conviction of their superiority to all other peoples. They were interested in other people's gods, but only to the extent of trying to assimilate them in their own

minds to their indigenous gods, and occasionally – as in the case of interesting deities like the Egyptian Isis, or the Anatolian Cybele or Adonis – adopting them into their own religious system.

There are surely a number of important lessons here for us in the modern world. First of all, we must, I would maintain, divest ourselves finally of any nagging concern that we still may have that the whole human race should come to believe exactly what we believe – if only we could decide exactly what that was! Christians and Muslims are particularly guilty of this dangerous obsession – other religions, such as Judaism, Buddhism or Confucianism, are blessedly free of it. We must come to see other religious traditions as simply pursuing other paths – not better or worse ones – to the same goal, of paying due respect to the one positive divine force in the universe.

But secondly, we must learn to allegorize our beliefs, rather than rejecting them outright in a fit of misplaced rationality – to see our particular ceremonies and myths as bodying forth hidden symbolic representations of a higher truth, all of them ultimately reconcilable with one another. Within the two most troublesome faiths that I have picked out, I would commend, respectively, the positions of such Christian Platonists as Marsilio Ficino or Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in Renaissance Italy, and the Sufi tradition within Islam. No adherent of either of these tendencies ever started a religious war, or burned anyone at the stake – though they occasionally suffered such a fate themselves. And it is to Plato, and in particular his later followers, the Neoplatonists Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus, that both these traditions owe the degree of enlightenment that they possess. By all means let us continue to observe our respective traditions, but let us also refine and mellow them by resolving to see them henceforth as symbols of a higher truth, a truth that is ultimately mutually reconcilable – and on such details as whether or not to take a glass of wine, or to indulge in a loin of pork, let us just agree to differ.

III

The last issue on which I wish to dwell is one that I would expect that many would find considerably less urgent than the other two areas of crisis that I have touched on, but one that seems to me just as important

in its way, and that is the problem of the legitimation of authority in the context of advanced liberal democracy.

It may be that I am becoming just a little cranky in my old age, but it seems to me that one great problem that we in the West are facing is a progressive breakdown in the legitimation of authority. By that I mean an ever-increasing unwillingness on the part of citizens to accept the credentials of any authority, religious or secular, to prescribe what they shall do or not do; and this goes together with an avid enthusiasm for criticising the public and private conduct of those in public life, and for ascribing the worst possible motives to their actions.

Now of course one might say that in all too many cases, sadly, such an attitude is not unjustified, and that a healthy disrespect for the great and good is the hallmark of an advanced and highly educated democracy. I would just like to enter a plea for the proposition that this sort of thing can go to far, and lead inevitably to such phenomena as disregard of one's duties as a citizen (even to the extent of denying that there is such a thing as civic duty), a toleration of anti-social behaviour, and an unwillingness to make use of one's franchise in elections (the attitude of 'Ah sure what's the use? Aren't they all the same?').

It should be clear that no society can flourish very long when such attitudes prevail; but the question may well be asked in response, "Just what do you propose to do about it?" It is here again, I think, that Plato can be of some help.

Admittedly, it is by no means obvious at first sight that Plato has anything much to offer to a modern liberal democracy. He was himself an unashamed totalitarian, who repeatedly expressed his disdain for contemporary Athenian democracy, which was in many ways – despite its direct participatory nature – more restrictive than our own. But we should look more closely, I would suggest, at just what Plato's position was.

His main objection to the contemporary democratic dogma, after all, is that it is held that citizenship is something that just comes naturally. There is no art or learning attached to being a good citizen, nor is there any expertise proper to good government. In theory, any Athenian was as capable of ruling as any other – provided that he was male and legitimate! – and any other citizen was entitled to challenge his credentials. For Plato, and for his master Socrates before him (if we can trust Plato's

testimony), this is an absurd and thoroughly dangerous position to hold. It is his basic claim, in the area of political theory, that ruling is an art (*tekhnê*) or science (*epistêmê*), which must be acquired by a long and arduous process of self-discipline and study – study, indeed, of various rather abstract topics, chiefly mathematical in nature; and even to be a good citizen a process of self-examination ('know thyself' – *gnôthi seauton*) and moral training (*paideia*) is necessary.

He encapsulates his criticism of the democratic dogma in Book VI of the *Republic* (488A-E), with the striking image of the 'Ship of Fools':

"Imagine the following situation on a fleet of ships, or on one. The owner has the edge over everyone else on board by virtue of his size and strength, but he's rather deaf and short-sighted, and his knowledge of naval matters is just as limited. The sailors are wrangling with one another because each of them thinks that he ought to be captain, despite the fact that he's never learned how, and can't name his teacher or specify the period of his apprenticeship. In any case, they all maintain that it isn't something that can be taught, and are ready to butcher anyone who says it is. They're for ever crowding closely around the owner, pleading with him and stopping at nothing to get him to entrust the rudder to them. Sometimes, if their pleas are unsuccessful, but others get the job, they kill those others or throw them off the ship, subdue their worthy owner by drugging him or getting him drunk or something, take control of the ship, help themselves to its cargo, and have the kind of drunken and indulgent voyage you'd expect from people like that. And that's not all: they think highly of anyone who contributes towards their gaining power by showing skill at winning over or subduing the owner, and describe him as an accomplished seaman, a true captain, a naval expert; but they criticise anyone different as useless. They completely fail to understand that any genuine sea-captain has to study the yearly cycle, the seasons, the heavens, the stars and winds, and everything relevant to the job, if he's to be properly equipped to hold a position of authority in a ship. In fact, they think it's impossible to study and acquire expertise at how to steer a ship (leaving aside the question of whether or not people want you to) and at the same time be a good captain." (trans. Robin Waterfield).

Well, we get the message, I think. The ship-owner is the State, or the Sovereign People, and the crew members are the democratic politicians and ideologues. Much of his criticism, I feel, is applicable to our own situation, as much as to that of Classical Athens. We too hold in theory to the democratic creed that any citizen is *ipso facto* capable of rule, and that that requires no particular degree of expertise – though in practice we recognise that the details of government now have become so abstruse that there is need of a highly-trained civil service and a host of (highly-paid) advisers and consultants on top of that, to manage the politicians and set them right.

Plato, on the contrary, maintains that ruling is a science, and indeed the master science, and that perfection in it requires years of training. In the ideal state portrayed in the *Republic*, which is what is familiar to most people who know anything about him, this results in the rule of a small elite of so-called ‘philosopher-kings’, presiding over a large standing army-cum-police force, and a much larger proletariat of artisans and farmers, who constitute the productive element in the state, but who wield no power whatsoever.

I am always surprised, though, that this arrangement is taken seriously as a political blueprint by so many scholars who should know better, as well as by the general public. For me, the problem with it is this. It runs counter to one principle which was basic to Plato’s political philosophy, and which he inherited from Socrates (it features in the *Apology*, which is Socrates’ speech from the dock, as well as in the *Laws*), so that it cannot be dismissed as just something that he developed in his old age: the principle that any well-run state requires the *educated assent* of all the citizens, and this in turn requires that they *all* undergo the same *paideia*, or moral and intellectual training. This training is something that the lowest and largest class in the *Republic* conspicuously lacks – indeed, if the scenario presented is pressed to its logical conclusion, they do not even possess the brain to absorb such a training. In fact, what Plato is doing in the *Republic* is taking the opportunity to air a number of his cherished political ideas, while primarily presenting a schema of the well-ordered human soul, in which the reasoning element corresponds to the philosopher-kings, the spirited element to the soldiery, and the passionate element to the artisan class. The passionate element in the soul is essentially irrational, and must be subdued initially by force,

though in a well-ordered soul it can come, like a well-trained and obedient dog, to assent to its being ruled, though without ever attaining full understanding of the whys and wherefores of that.

In the *Laws* – where he *is* being serious about constructing a state – we find a very different situation. Every citizen of the state, male and (to some extent, at least) female, is assumed to have been subjected to the same comprehensive education – beginning not just in infancy, but even in the womb (Plato was a great believer in ante-natal exercises [cf. VII 788A-790A], to instil a sense of harmony into the unborn infant!) – which, while covering the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, is primarily concerned with instilling right attitudes – young people are to learn, from their earliest years, to love and hate the right things (653A-C):

“I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul... I call ‘education’ the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion. But there is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we ought to love. Call this ‘education’, and I, at any rate, think you would be giving it its proper name.”

Now this, we might say, is outright ‘brain-washing’, and we might appear at first sight to have a point, but I think that we should be less free than we are in the use of that term. The aim of ‘brain-washing’ techniques, after all, is to scrub from the brain a set of existing beliefs, and to produce a sort of zombie in place of a reasoning being. Plato is concerned to inculcate right beliefs in brains which have not yet acquired any, and he would make no apology for that. It was his view that young persons should be set firmly on the right road, morally and intellectually, by their

elders – and when they in turn come into the full possession of their reason, they will reflect rationally on their education, and see that it was the right one, and be duly grateful.

Now we in the western world are, not unreasonably, pretty uncomfortable these days about the inculcation of ‘values’ into the young – the whole process smacks of authoritarianism of one sort or another, religious or secular – and yet we do, I think, often wish that they had some values. Our position, I would argue, is in fact deeply incoherent, where Plato’s is coherent. We feel that there should be *some* instruction in schools concerning ethical principles and the duties of citizenship, but we have great difficulty in deciding just what that should be like. Is one, for instance, to have totally value-free, ‘non-judgemental’, sex education, or should one throw in some recommendations against reckless promiscuity and in favour of treating people as whole persons, rather than as mere sex-objects? And how about standards of honesty and public-spiritedness, when dealing with one another or with the state? Then, we are most uncomfortable in general about censorship of books and films, but we draw the line at child pornography and the stirring-up of racial hatred. And then we get very hot under the collar, and enact strict regulations, about smoking and drug-taking, but we simply wring our hands when faced with excessive drinking of alcohol or ingestion of junk foods. A censorious outsider, such as Plato – or indeed some relic from the former socialist countries – might conclude that we have simply lost our nerve, and are floundering around from case to case.

I must confess that I have come to the conclusion, in my old age, that modern western society is going to have to tighten itself up, on various fronts, if we are to avert a serious breakdown of civil society. If we do not take the proper steps voluntarily, I would predict a series of outrages in the areas of morality and public order, which, like ‘9-11’, will produce a convulsive over-reaction, and we will wake up one morning to find ourselves under a dictatorship far more unpleasant than anything that I am advocating.

So what am I advocating? Well, the single biggest innovation that I would propose is a system of National Service, and by that I mean something truly worthy of that name – not just a euphemism for military service (though I would have no objection to the imposition of military discipline during such a period!). It seems to me that our greatest failure

as a society in modern times is to develop a mechanism for initiating young persons into adult life, a life of responsible citizenship, such as is more or less universal in more traditional societies, and was in place even in democratic Athens. The period from eighteen to twenty is one of great stress in most young people's lives, and it here that a regime of strict, though rational, order might most advantageously be imposed. This would, of course, involve considerable initial cost, but the savings in the avoidance of anti-social behaviour and blighted lives, as well as the various worthy FAS-style projects that the young people would be set to work on, would amply compensate for this in the long run.

Should such an institution be compulsory? Probably, but one alternative that occurs to me would be simply to make it clear that, if one refused to take part, one would henceforth no longer be considered a citizen of the state, for the purpose of receiving any benefits, such as health services, higher education, unemployment benefit or old age pension. That should settle the matter for most people. During the eighteen months or two years of service, young people, besides experiencing strict discipline and order, and performing useful physical labour, would attend lectures on the history and structure of the state, and on ethical and political theory. This sounds pretty heavy stuff for many young persons, but these subjects could be made lively and attractive with some thought and suitable packaging.

Not only would I prescribe this basic period of National Service: I would advocate that, as is the practice in Switzerland, for instance, at the present time, all adults should be encouraged to return to the system for a period of a week or two every year up to at least the age of sixty, and that they should be given time off from their work to do this, over and above their normal holiday allowance. I think that this would prove a very salutary 'topping-up' of the good practices that they had developed during their original service. It would be a tonic for both body and mind!

This, then, I would see as one key development, if one wished to restructure the state along more Platonic lines. I say *more* Platonic, as I would not for a moment advocate a full dose of Platonism for a modern state, even if there were any prospect of a modern state being prepared to take it. The degree of planning and control of citizens' lives which Plato advocates is something that I for one would find quite intolerable, and I am sure that this would be the general reaction. It is

only the basic premise of Plato's political philosophy that I feel we have something to learn from, and that is that it is the right and duty of a state, not only to provide a life for its citizens, but a *good* life, in the sense of a virtuous and purposeful life. And since states cannot do their own providing, being abstract entities, this has to translate into a consensus, however arrived at, of the citizens over thirty – that is to say, the dominant generation. It is they, I should say, who have the right, and the duty, to prescribe codes of conduct, and subjects of study, for the younger generation, including, of course, their own children. If this dominant generation loses its nerve – as I must say I saw it doing in the America of the 1960's – then society as a whole begins to fall apart. When I arrived in Berkeley, California, in 1966, the slogan going around was 'Don't trust anyone over thirty!' In a well-run society, I would suggest, this slogan should be virtually reversed: 'Don't entrust any decision-making to anyone under thirty!'

If the principle of a period of National Service were accepted, I think that all else that is necessary would follow from that. Firstly, a sense of discipline and purposiveness would be projected downwards, throughout the school system; and secondly, the influence of the institution would progressively filter upwards throughout the state, as cohort after cohort graduated, and took their place in society. A spin-off of this would, I hope, be an enhanced respect – duly earned, one hopes! – for those in public office or other positions of authority, and a willingness to attribute the highest motives rather than the lowest to them, unless proved otherwise.

That is all I have to say on my third chosen topic. I realise that, on all three of these topics, which seem to me more or less the salient features of the crisis which is facing western civilisation in particular, but also the world in general, I have been driven to utter many hard sayings, and some things that may appear shocking to some sensibilities. What I have tried to do, though, is to apply principles that I discern in Plato, and the tradition that originates with him, to the world in which we live, to see if he might have anything to offer us. I have deliberately confined myself on this occasion to his political thought. Another discourse, on another occasion, might concern itself rather with his metaphysics, his belief in another realm of existence superior to this physical one, a realm of the spirit, where the purified soul may contemplate eternal truths without

the interference of the body. But Plato himself is first of all a deeply political philosopher. His first priority is to get the *environment* right, to establish a state in which rational life and discourse can flourish. And that is what I have been concerned with on this occasion.

ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ МЕТАФИЗИКИ В ЭПОХУ ПОЗДНЕЙ АНТИЧНОСТИ

ДОМИНИК О'МАРА
Университет Фрибурга, Швейцария

Тема, которую мне хотелось бы обсудить в этой статье, – развитие метафизики, понимаемой как философская дисциплина или наука. Пожалуй, как и все люди, мы так или иначе всегда задавались метафизическими вопросами – вопросами о предельных основаниях действительности, о причинах существования вещей и нашего собственного существования. Однако решение подобных вопросов в рамках, заданных концепцией рационального научного знания, – это особая традиция, восходящая к греческой философии. В данной статье мне хотелось бы обосновать предположение о том, что последний период развития греческой философии, длившийся примерно с III по VI в. н. э., внес много нового и интересного в процесс становления метафизики как философской дисциплины, а именно превратил метафизику в метафизическую науку, выявив в то же время пределы такой науки.

Такая оценка может показаться на первый взгляд несколько преувеличенной. В конце концов, могут возразить, традиция греческой философской метафизики была основана намного ранее, Платоном и Аристотелем, или даже ещё раньше – Парменидом. Однако назвать метафизической наукой то, что предлагает нам Парменид, можно лишь в очень специальном смысле слова. Да и великие метафизические труды Платона и Аристотеля, в особенности *Государство* Платона и *Метафизика* Аристотеля, по большому счёту представляют собой лишь наброски того, чем могла бы стать метафизическая наука, – ее предмет, методы, некоторые центральные положения. Эти тексты являются скорее программными

проектами и предварительными исследованиями, могущими стать разработанной метафизической наукой, заключающей в себе целостную систему теорем. Я считал бы возможным утверждать, что, насколько нам известно, такая система впервые была найдена в философских школах поздней античности. Покойный профессор Жерар Вербек (Gérard Verbeke) в 1978 г. в рамках Machette lecture series посвятил свое выступление этой теме, и я сам работал над нею на протяжении многих лет. Мне бы хотелось свести воедино эти исследования с тем, что сделано другими, для того чтобы дать здесь набросок общей картины, которая, как мне кажется, начинает вырисовываться.¹

Работа состоит из четырех частей. В части первой я представляю тот способ, посредством которого Александр Афродисийский, великий комментатор-аристотелик начала III в., интерпретируя метафизический трактат Аристотеля, стремился отыскать в нем метафизическую науку. Во второй части статьи я пытаюсь показать, как случилось так, что философ-неоплатоник начала V в. Сириан не только принял интерпретацию Александра, но и, вдохновленный ею, начал искать ту же самую метафизическую науку уже у Платона. Однако, будучи платоником, Сириан прекрасно осознавал проблему трансцендентного: как возможна наука о первых принципах реальности, если они трансцендентны по отношению к человеческому знанию? Мне хотелось бы описать, как Сириан подходит к этой проблеме, а затем, в третьей части статьи, показать, как все это приводит к появлению шедевра метафизики – *Началам теологии* ученика Сириана Прокла. Наконец, в четвертой части, мне хотелось бы обратиться к, пожалуй, последнему великому метафизическому труду греческой философии – *Трактату о первых принципах*, написанному преемником Прокла на посту главы Платоновской школы в Афинах в начале VI в. Дамаскием, – труду, в котором границы метафизической науки исследуются с необычайной проницательностью и упорством.

¹ Verbeke 1981; O'Meara 1986; Kremer 1961. Далее я буду ссылаться на более современные исследования. Я рад возможности посвятить эти страницы Джону Уиппелю (John Wippel) в знак своей признательности этому человеку и метафизике.

**Превращение «Метафизики» Аристотеля
в метафизическую науку**

Итак, начнем с Александра Афродисийского. Можно допустить, что написание Александром комментария на метафизический трактат Аристотеля было связано с тем, что он преподавал аристотелевскую философию в Афинах. В самом деле, все философы, о которых пойдет речь в этой статье, были преподавателями, и труды их были связаны с преподавательской деятельностью. Знание этого факта станет более ясным, если мы вспомним, что эти учителя рассматривали себя в качестве представителей той философии, которую преподавали: Александр представлял аристотелевскую философию, Сириан, Прокл и Дамасский – философию Платона. Представителями они были в том смысле, что полагали, будто труды преподаваемого ими философа, будь то Платон или Аристотель, содержат наилучшую, истинную философию. Так, например, Александр считал, что лучшее, что мы можем сделать для обретения философской истины, – это читать труды Аристотеля.² Следствием такого подхода явилась своего рода канонизация трудов Платона или Аристотеля: во-первых, этим трудам был придан огромный авторитет, а во-вторых, они оказались упорядочены таким образом, чтоб образовывать целостные систематические своды знания. В случае Александра это было несколько облегчено тем, что при публикации трудов Аристотеля, примерно за два столетия до описываемых событий, эти труды уже были приведены в некую систематическую связь, будучи объединены в группы, посвященные проблемам логики, физики, метафизики, этики и политики. При преподавании этого корпуса текстов Александр, не колеблясь, воспринял это систематическое единство, что повлияло, как мы покажем ниже, и на его представление о метафизике как науке, и на его воззрения о том, чем она должна заниматься.

² Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima*, ed. I. Bruns (Berlin 1887), p. 2, 4–9.

Комментарий Александра на *Метафизику* Аристотеля, в том виде, в каком он дошел до нас по-гречески, охватывает лишь первые пять книг названного трактата.³ В этих книгах Аристотель рассуждает о высшей науке, которую называет мудростью и которая должна рассматривать первые принципы или причины всего сущего. Аристотель говорит также о некой универсальной науке о сущем, сущем как сущем, субстанции, – науке, именуемой первой философией и содержащей аксиомы, являющиеся основанием для всех доказательств (прежде всего – Принцип непротиворечия), науке о божественной субстанции, которую он называет теологией. В своей трактовке этих книг аристотелевского трактата Александр исходит из того, что Аристотель обладал единой, целостной концепцией и говорил повсюду об одной и той же науке. Таким образом, «мудрость» и *есть* «первая философия», или «теология».⁴ И дело не только в том, что эти разные обозначения относятся к одной науке, но также и в том, что разнообразные объекты, к которым имеют отношение эти науки, должны, как мы вскоре увидим, быть связаны друг с другом.

Исходя, таким образом, из того, что Аристотель говорит об одной-единственной науке, – назовем ее для простоты «метафизической», – Александр совершает еще один важный шаг: он полагает, что эту науку следует мыслить как науку аподиктическую,⁵ в соответствии с тем, как определяет ее Аристотель во *Второй аналитике*. Это очень значимый шаг.⁶ Ведь если мы, с одной стороны, и

³ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin 1881). Комментарий на книгу А переведён У. Дули (W. Dooley, London 1989), на книги **α** и **В** – У. Дули и А. Медиган (W. Dooley, A. Madigan, London 1992), на книгу **Г** – А. Медиган (A. Madigan, London 1993).

⁴ Alexander, pp. 15, 32–33; 18, 10–11; 171, 5–11.

⁵ В англоязычной антиковедческой традиции аристотелевское ἀποδεικτική переводится обычно как «demonstrative science»; В. Ф. Асмус в своём переводе «Второй аналитики» говорит о «доказывающей науке». – *Прим. пер.*

⁶ Это было обнаружено М. Бонелли (Bonelli 2001). Далее я буду ссылаться на это исследование, с его полным и тщательным обсуждением соответствующих частей Александрова комментария.

по сей день читаем трактат Аристотеля как исследовательский, диалектический, насыщенный апориями незавершенный труд, Александр, со своей стороны, надеется отыскать в нем науку, структура которой полностью соответствует структуре аподиктической науки, описываемой в *Аналитике* Аристотеля. Так, будучи аподиктической наукой, метафизика, согласно Александру, использует аксиомы, имеет свой собственный предмет (*hupokeimenon genos*) и, отталкиваясь от определений, разрабатывает доказывающие силлогизмы, обосновывая сущностные свойства своего объекта.⁷ Аксиомы метафизики, с точки зрения Александра, – это те самые, которые обсуждает Аристотель в книге Г (особое значение среди них принадлежит принципу непротиворечия); Александр приходит к выводу о том, что эти основополагающие аксиомы представляют особый интерес для метафизики – поскольку точно так же, как и метафизика, они связаны со всем сущим.⁸ Таким образом, предметом метафизики, ее *hupokeimenon genos*, является все сущее, или сущее как сущее. Однако род сущего, о котором идет речь, это не такой род, который просто относит соотносимые виды к какой-либо категории. Скорее, это род, образованный сущими, которые, в свою очередь, бытийствуют через отношение к некому центральному типу бытия, исходя из него и относятся к нему, – речь идет об отношении *aph'henos, pros hen*. Так отдельные виды сущего образуют род сущего, относящийся к центральному типу бытия, то есть к субстанции.⁹ Такое отношение является одновременно отношением через определение и через существование: значения того, что существует помимо субстанции, логически предполагают значение субстанции; и существование иного сущего, то есть сущего в категориях, отличных от категории субстанции, производно (*huparxis*) от существования субстанции.¹⁰ Более того, существует иерархия субстанций, так что более высокие первичные субстанции являются причинами более низких, вторичных. При этом первичные субстанции бытийствуют в

⁷ Bonelli 2001, ch. 2.

⁸ Bonelli 2001, 249–250.

⁹ Bonelli 2001, 122.

¹⁰ Bonelli 2001, 116–117, 120–121.

своей первичной, наиболее напряженной форме. Эта первичная субстанция есть аристотелевская божественная субстанция, трансцендентный Ум книги А.¹¹ К сожалению, неясно, как именно, с точки зрения Александра, божественная субстанция оказывается причиной существования низших родов сущего, более низких субстанций и того, что существует в иных категориях. Наконец, Александр отождествляет сущностные свойства, которые обосновываются метафизикой, с теми, о которых говорит Аристотель в книге Г: единство – множество, сходство – различие, равное – неравное.

Из вышесказанного видно, что Александр занимает очень характерную и оказавшую большое влияние на последующих философов позицию по центральному вопросу о предмете метафизики, – вопросу, по которому позиция самого Аристотеля кажется неясной, – является ли метафизика универсальной наукой о сущем как сущем, разновидностью общей онтологии, или же она представляет собой особую науку о божественном бытии или субстанции, философскую теологию? Пожалуй, Александр придерживается той позиции, что бытие не есть род в обычном смысле слова – род, определяющий отношение видов к той или иной категории. Бытие, согласно Александру, образует ряды начальных и последующих членов, причем начальный член является причиной бытия членов, следующих за ним, – и тем, к чему они относятся.¹² И таким исходным членом является божественная субстанция – причина бытия всех иных членов рода сущего. Таким образом, наука о божественной субстанции *есть* наука обо всем сущем как наука о бытии в его изначальной форме, причине всех последующих видов бытия.¹³ Впрочем, в своей превосходной книге, в которой она столь удачно показала, как Александр использовал *Вторую аналитику* Аристотеля для формализации аристотелевской метафизики, М. Бонелли утверждает, что Александр оставляет вопрос открытым, иногда проводя различие между всеобщей наукой о

¹¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria*, pp. 138, 17–23; 147, 3–148, 10.

¹² Alexander, p. 249, 28–33.

¹³ Alexander, p. 251, 24–38; см. Также ссылки в примеч. 11.

сущем и теологией, а иногда отождествляя их.¹⁴ Однако я не понимаю, как Александр, если он думал о роде сущего именно так – то есть как о рядах начальных и последующих членов, – мог полагать возможной науку о сущем, которая просто обобщала бы частные науки о видах сущего. Ведь бытие, по Александру, – это не род, состоящий из видов, и поэтому соответствующие науки не будут универсальной наукой, обобщающей частные науки. В этом я согласен с интерпретацией Вербека, предложенной им еще в 1978 г.¹⁵

Платонизация аристотелевской метафизической науки

Давайте сменим школу и обратимся к позднеантичным платоникам. Здесь авторитетный канон образуют диалоги Платона. Однако Аристотель вовсе не изъят из курса обучения. Если бы чуть позже, в середине III в., мы заглянули в школу Плотина в Риме, мы застали бы его читающим и использующим *Метафизику* Аристотеля и комментарии Александра Афродисийского.¹⁶ Толкованием Аристотеля занимались также ученик Плотина Порфирий и ученик Порфирия Ямвлих. Кажется, именно с Ямвлихом, возглавлявшим философскую школу в Сирии в начале IV в., связан детально разработанный учебный курс, которому будут следовать в платоновских школах Афин и Александрии в V и VI веках. Этот учебный курс включал в себя два цикла. Первый цикл, именовавшийся «малыми таинствами», основывался на чтении текстов Аристотеля; за ним следовал второй цикл – «великие таинства», включавший изучение избранных диалогов Платона.¹⁷ У нас есть описание этого курса, оставленное Проклом, который в молодости, в 432 году, проходил его в Афинах под руководством Сириана, бывшего в то время главою Афинской школы.¹⁸ В рамках первого цикла Прокл читал работы Аристотеля по логике, этике, политике, физике и метафизике. Затем Прокл приступил ко второму циклу – к изучению

¹⁴ Bonelli 2001, ch. 5 (note pp. 232–233).

¹⁵ Verbeke 1981, 121. Cf. Alexander, pp. 250, 20–33; 266, 5–14.

¹⁶ Порфирий, *Жизнь Плотина*, гл. 14, 5–7 и 13.

¹⁷ Об этом учебном курсе см. Westerink–Trouillard–Segonds 1990, XLIII–LXXVI.

¹⁸ Марин, *Жизнь Прокла*, гл. 13.

диалогов Платона, собранных в соответствии с той же последовательностью наук. Здесь стоит отметить два аспекта данного учебного курса. (1) Последовательность наук рассматривалась как восхождение по лестнице философского познания, начинающееся со знания практического и завершающееся высшим теоретическим знанием, метафизикой. (2) Первый, аристотелевский, цикл восхождения по лестнице познания оставался предварительным, подготовительным, несовершенным в отношении ко второму, платоновскому циклу. По отношению к метафизическому трактату Аристотеля это означает, что он образовывал высший уровень знания, достижимого в первом цикле. Однако он был всего лишь подготовительным и несовершенным этапом в сравнении с платоновским диалогом, раскрывающим метафизику на вершине второго, платоновского цикла – *Парменидом* Платона. Таким образом, у платоников V и VI столетий имелись достаточно веские основания для того, чтоб интересоваться метафизическим трактатом Аристотеля. Однако, несмотря на то, что в данном трактате усматривалось присутствие высочайшего теоретического знания, на него смотрели как на несовершенное предварение платоновского *Парменида*.

К счастью, у нас есть возможность прочесть *Комментарий* Сириана на *Метафизику* Аристотеля и получить при его посредстве представление о том, как именно этот трактат открылся юному ученику Сириана – Проклу.¹⁹ Впрочем, при более внимательном рассмотрении обнаруживается, что *Комментарий* Сириана вовсе не является комментарием в обычном смысле этого слова. Сириан составляет комментарий на книги В, Г, М и N аристотелевского трактата и объясняет свою задачу следующим образом.²⁰ В книгах М и N Аристотель сосредоточен преимущественно на критике платонической и пифагорейской метафизики. Задача Сириана –

¹⁹ Издание: Syrianus, *In metaphysica commentaria*, ed. W. Kroll (Berlin 1902); английский перевод опубликован Дж. Диллоном и Д. О'Марой (Dillon–O'Meara 2006 и 2008).

²⁰ Подробнее об этом говорится в моём введении к переводу комментария Сириана на книги В и Г «Метафизики», где собраны ссылки: Dillon–O'Meara 2008, 3–5.

доказать несостоятельность этой критики, дабы у ученика не сложилось пренебрежительного отношения к платонико-пифагорейской метафизике. В книге В Аристотель представляет и обсуждает противоположные точки зрения по различным метафизическим вопросам. Сириан стремится показать, какие позиции верны, а какие нет; верными оказываются платонические. И, наконец, в книге Г Аристотелем представлен общий очерк метафизики, который Сириан в целом принимает; поэтому он довольствуется пересказом текста, отсылая ученика к комментарию Александра Афродисийского для детального разъяснения отдельных мест. Итак, за комментарием на работу Аристотеля ученик отсылается к Александру,²¹ однако, поскольку он должен получить наставление в платоновской метафизике, работа Сириана оказывается необходимой как противоядие на ту критику платонизма, которая развивается в текстах Аристотеля и Александра.

Следствия такого подхода к Аристотелю и Александру в учении Сириана весьма важны. Мы могли бы подумать, что Аристотель и Александр оказываются попросту «инструментализированы», подчинены интересам платонизма. Но в действительности, как это видно из *Комментария* Сириана, неоплатоник принимает предложенную Александром интерпретацию аристотелевской метафизической науки и использует ее для толкования Платона. Так, Сириан полагает, что высшая наука, о которой Платон говорит в *Государстве*, – знание форм и формы Блага, та наука, которую Платон называет «диалектикой», тождественна аристотелевской мудрости, первой философии или теологии.²² Следовательно, он признает, что осуществленная Александром формализация аристотелевской метафизики применима и к метафизике или диалектике Платона. Как следствие, платоновская метафизика у Сириана оказывается аподиктической наукой, относящейся к тому типу, который описан Аристотелем во *Второй аналитике*. Она

²¹ Полезное филологическое исследование того, как Сириан использует комментарий Александра, можно найти в работе Luna 2001.

²² Syrianus, p. 55, 27–33.

носит характер определяющий и аподиктический. Эти методы Сириан дополняет платоновскими методами анализа и разделения.²³ Кроме того, метафизика имеет дело с универсальными аксиомами – прежде всего, с принципом непротиворечия.²⁴ Ее предметом является подлежащий род (*hupokeimenon genos*) – род сущего как сущего. Но этот род – особый: он образует ряды бытия первичного и вторичного, так что изначальное бытие – божественная субстанция – есть высшая форма бытия и причина существования производных видов сущего.²⁵ Согласно Сириану, божественное бытие соответствует трансцендентным формам Платона, понимаемым как мышление божественного Ума, от которого зависит становление мира, – божественного Ума, напоминающего Аристотелев божественный Ум. Исследуя божественное бытие, метафизика тем самым оказывается *также* наукой о полноте сущего.²⁶ Наконец, метафизика постулирует сущностные свойства бытия – как Аристотелевы, так и упомянутые Платоном в *Софисте*, в частности, покой и движение.²⁷ Забавно, что аристотелевская метафизика, формализованная Александром, войдя в учебный курс школы Сириана, подсказала способ формализации неоплатонической метафизической науки – по мнению Сириана, в несовершенной форме присутствующей в метафизическом трактате Аристотеля и получившей полное выражение в *Пармениде* Платона.

Однако, несмотря на видимость замечательного соответствия между формализацией метафизической науки как науки о божественной субстанции у Александра и диалектикой Платона как науки о трансцендентных формах, Сириан осознавал главную сложность, которую в связи с метафизикой Аристотеля сформулировал еще Теофраст: как возможно знание о трансцендентном божественном бытии?²⁸ У Сириана эта сложность усугубляется конфликтом между его платонической убежденностью в том, что

²³ Syrianus, pp. 3, 30; 4, 26-29; 12, 10-12.

²⁴ См. мое исследование O'Meara 2009.

²⁵ Syrianus, pp. 57, 23-24; 61, 19-24.

²⁶ Syrianus, p. 57, 29-30.

²⁷ Syrianus, p. 5, 16-33.

²⁸ Theophrastus, *Metaphysics*, ed. A. Laks and G. Most (Paris 2002), 4 (4b); 25 (9b).

божественный Ум и объект его мышления, формы, трансцендентны по отношению к дискурсивному человеческому рассудку,²⁹ и принятием формализации метафизики Александра, где та представлена как вполне дискурсивная наука. Таким образом, встает фундаментальный вопрос: как возможна человеческая наука о сущностях, трансцендентных по отношению к объектам, постижимым средствами человеческой науки?

Решение этой проблемы, предложенное Сирианом в его *Комментарии на Метафизику* Аристотеля, можно вкратце сформулировать так.³⁰ В согласии с *Тимеем* Платона, создающий мир божественный Ум (или демиург) создает также и душу – мировую душу и души индивидуальные, образуя их в соответствии с определенными формальными принципами и по особым математическим законам.³¹ Поэтому, занимаясь математикой, человеческая душа в самой своей природе открывает врожденное знание математических законов – знание, которое она затем выражает в математических доказательствах. И эти математические законы соответствуют законам вселенной, поскольку это те самые законы, которым следует божественный Ум, упорядочивающий мир.³² Сами элементы присущего человеческой душе врожденного знания, называемые Сирианом «субстанциальными логосами»,³³ которые включают математические законы, являются образами своего творца – божественного Ума и предмета его мысли – трансцендентных форм. Следовательно, в развитии научного знания, такого как чистая математика, человеческая душа проектирует образы трансцендентного божественного бытия. Таким образом, научное, дискурсивное знание божественного бытия возможно как научное выражение врожденных идей, являющихся образами этого бытия.³⁴

²⁹ Syrianus, pp. 4, 34–37; 100, 28–29; 147, 14–15.

³⁰ См. мою вышеупомянутую статью: O'Meara 1986.

³¹ Syrianus, p. 4, 5–11.

³² Syrianus, pp. 27, 31–37; 88, 24–27.

³³ Syrianus, 91, 29–34.; 161, 30–34.

³⁴ Я попытался исследовать это понятие «образа» трансцендентного бытия в работе O'Meara 2001.

Соответственно метафизика, как вполне дискурсивная, научная форма знания, не мыслит трансцендентное бытие, которое ускользает от дискурсивного познания, непосредственно, но имеет дело с присущим душе врожденным знанием – теми понятиями, которые могут быть выражены и которые выявляют, как образы, это трансцендентное бытие. Именно таким образом оказывается возможной наука о том, что находится за пределами науки.³⁵

Однако в *Комментарии* Сириана на *Метафизику* Аристотеля мы не обнаруживаем развернутого изложения этой платонизированной аристотелевской метафизической науки, поскольку, как уже было сказано, Сириан преимущественно сосредоточен на том, чтобы опровергнуть аристотелевскую критику платонизма. Сириан предполагает существование некоего канона пифагорейских и платонических текстов, в котором, по его мнению, эту метафизическую науку следует обнаружить. Но сам он не дает изложения этой науки. Судя по учебному курсу, которому он следовал, можно предположить, что наиболее адекватным ее выражением должен был стать *Парменид* Платона.

Развертывание метафизической науки

Комментарий Сириана на *Парменид* нам, к сожалению, недоступен, но мы можем обратиться к работе последнего и наиболее яркого ученика Сириана, который изучал *Метафизику* Аристотеля вместе с ним, – к работе Прокла, и в нашем распоряжении есть его *Комментарий* на *Парменид* Платона. Кроме того, у нас есть его гигантская работа, носящая название *Платоновская теология*. Но я полагаю, что, если мы хотим найти трактат, в котором представ-

³⁵ Можно задаться вопросом, сам ли Сириан разработал эту концепцию метафизической науки как дискурсивного выражения врожденных понятий, являющихся образами трансцендентного бытия, или эта концепция была им унаследована, например, от Ямвлиха. Ввиду отсутствия точных сведений о Ямвлихе, трудно ответить на этот вопрос сколько-нибудь определенно. Однако, похоже, что к Ямвлиху восходит теория математической науки, которая в этом контексте играла, кажется, важную роль (см. Sheppard 1997; O'Meara 1989, 133–134); таким образом, вполне возможно, что и учение Сириана о метафизике также восходит к Ямвлиху.

лена метафизическая наука, разработанная в духе тех идей, которые сформировались под влиянием рецепции Сирианом формализации Аристотеля, осуществленной Александром, нам следует обратиться к Прокловым *Началам теологии*.³⁶ Эта работа пользовалась популярностью в средние века (существуют ее арабские, латинские и грузинские переводы), и зачастую именно с нее начинают изучение Прокла сегодня. Сейчас мне хотелось бы показать, что она представляет нам метафизическую науку в том виде, как понимал ее Сириан. Начнем с предварительного замечания об этой книге.

В заглавии говорится о «теологии»; теология понимается здесь в аристотелевском смысле – как наука о божественной субстанции. И действительно, Сириан называет труд Аристотеля, посвященный метафизике, «теологическим трактатом». ³⁷ Слово «начала» (*stoicheiosis*) в заглавии работы Прокла убеждает, что речь идет о пособии для студентов, и, кроме того, напоминает о *Началах* Евклида. Переключка с Евклидом подтолкнула некоторых ученых к тому, чтобы видеть в этой книге Прокла *метафизику, доказанную геометрическим способом* (*more geometrico*). В действительности, беглый обзор показывает, что данная работа по форме отличается от Евклидовой:³⁸ в отличие от *Начал*, она не открывается перечнем определений, общих понятий и аксиом, но состоит из цепи доказательств, в которых обосновываются положения, каждое из которых помещено в заголовок соответствующего доказательства. Математический или геометрический вид трактата, возможно, обусловлен тем, что именно математическая наука фундаменталь-

³⁶ См. Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, ed. with English translation by E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1963). Комментарий Прокла на Парменид публикуется в новом издании, подготовленном C. Steel (*Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*, Oxford 2007, 2008), в переводах G. Morrow и J. Dillon (Princeton 1987). [См. новый комментированный перевод: Прокл, *Начала теологии* (теоремы 1–33), пер. и комментарий С. Месяц, АРХЭ. Труды культурологического семинара, Вып. 5 (Москва 2009) 235–260; http://diglossa.org/Proclus/Institutio_Theologica. – Прим. пер.].

³⁷ Syrianus, p. 80, 17.

³⁸ См. обсуждение этой темы в моей работе О'Meara 1989, 196–198.

ным образом вдохновляла те представления о научном знании, которые развивались Аристотелем и Сирианом. Наконец – и это действительно исключительная черта, – в тексте не цитируется ни один из античных авторитетов, нет даже ссылок на Платона и Аристотеля. Однако в своем издании Доддс показал, что в тексте имплицитно присутствует *Парменид* Платона, в чем у нас еще будет возможность убедиться.

Приступая теперь к более внимательному рассмотрению *Начал теологии* Прокла, я хотел бы показать, что этот текст действительно представляет собой изложение метафизической науки в том виде, как ее понимал Сириан. Для этого необходимо показать, что ему присущи определенные особенности. Так, в нем должны выражаться врожденные понятия, касающиеся трансцендентных сущностей, использоваться аксиомы, развиваться доказательства, в нем должно говориться о вещах божественных как о причинах сущего и о бытии вообще, должны описываться сущностные свойства бытия.

Нетрудно заметить, что некоторые из этих черт действительно присутствуют в тексте Прокла. Мы действительно сталкиваемся здесь со сферой божественного, исходящей, как полагают платоники, из первопричины всего сущего – Единого, через Ум, вплоть до Души.³⁹ Описывая эти божественные сущности, Прокл говорит также и о причинах бытия. Кроме того, ряд сформулированных им теорем, например, Теорема 1 («Всякое множество тем или иным образом причастно единому»), носят предельно общий характер. Исследуются определенные сущностные свойства бытия – в особенности, единство и множественность. Можно отметить также, что выводы строятся на основании строгих убедительных аргументов и что выводы из некоторых аргументов используются затем как основания для аргументов, обосновывающих дальнейшие выводы, создавая в целом потрясающую цепь доказательств, отображающую цепь, связующую само бытие. Можно также выявить аксиомы, используемые для доказательства. Например, доказа-

³⁹ Proclus, *Platonic Theology*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (Paris 1968–1997), I, 26, vol. 1, pp. 114, 23–116, 3.

тельство Теоремы 1, которое строится как доказательство от противного (*modus tollens*), в конечном итоге основывается на двух аксиомах, упоминаемых Проклом в конце рассуждения: о том, что целое больше части, и что ничто не происходит из ничего.⁴⁰ Но является ли эта аподиктическая наука, представленная в *Началах теологии* Прокла, научным выражением не трансцендентных сущностей, а наших врожденных понятий об этих сущностях, как того требует данное Сирианом истолкование возможности метафизической науки? Пожалуй, это наименее очевидная особенность книги Прокла, однако, как мне представляется, она ей присуща.

Чтоб убедиться в этом, нам, правда, придется обратиться прежде к отрывку из другой работы Прокла, его *Платоновской теологии*. Здесь, в книге II, гл. 12, мы находим следующий текст:

«Так что же это за первое понятие (*поёта*) науки [то есть теологии], которая происходит от [божественного] ума и являет себя? Какое понятие мы могли бы назвать таковым, если не наиболее простое и постижимое понятие этой науки? Ведь именно это понятие особенно подобно знанию ума. Что же это такое? “Единое, – говорит Парменид, – если оно едино, не будет многим”. В самом деле, многое по необходимости причастно единому, единое же единому не причастно, но есть единое само по себе».⁴¹

Прокл здесь задается вопросом о наиболее первичном понятии (*поёта*) теологии и находит его в одном из положений платоновского *Парменида*: «Единое, если оно едино, не будет многим» (137 с 4–5). Эта цитата взята из первой гипотезы второй части *Парменида*, в которой, по мнению платоников поздней античности, речь шла о высшем метафизическом принципе, причине всего сущего – Едином. Заметим, что это положение выражено как теорема и что оно является первым положением теологии.

Если теперь мы вернемся к *Началам теологии* Прокла, то в Теореме 1 обнаружим, что всякое множество тем или иным обра-

⁴⁰ Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 1, p. 2, 11–13.

⁴¹ Proclus, *Platonic Theology*, II, 22, vol. 2, p. 66, 4–9.

зом объединено, а в Теореме 4 – что все объединенное, то есть всякое множество, отлично от того, что едино как Единое. Иными словами, Теорема 4 оказывается равнозначна тому положению, которое в *Платоновской теологии* выступает как первое положение теологии. Таким образом, мы видим, что выводы из доказательств в *Началах теологии*, которые приводятся в виде заглавий соответствующих им доказательств, в действительности являются понятиями, выраженными в форме теорем о сущем. Теорема 4, постулирующая различие между всяким объединенным множеством и тем, что едино само по себе, вводится на основании трех предшествующих теорем и сама является важным звеном в системе аргументации, поскольку отделяет объединенные множества от того, что объединяет их и что само по себе, в конечном итоге, не может быть объединенным множеством, но должно быть единым самим по себе. Таким образом, мы встречаемся с утверждением о том, что вся действительность как объединенное множество зависит в собственном бытии от первопричины своего единства, которая является не объединенной сущностью, но лишь чистым трансцендентным Единым. Далее Прокл развивает серию аргументов, определяющих порядок возникновения различных уровней сущего из самого первого начала – трансцендентного Единого.

Итак, можно сделать вывод, что в *Началах теологии* Прокла мы находим развернутое изложение той метафизической науки, которая была задумана Сирианом, вдохновленным, в свою очередь, истолкованием Аристотеля у Александра Афродисийского. Эта метафизическая наука представляет собой не непосредственное познание трансцендентного, но дискурсивное выражение врожденных понятий, итогом которой оказываются теоремы о трансцендентном.⁴² Трудно избавиться от ощущения, что философ мог испытывать желание использовать это дискурсивное знание для того, чтоб шагнуть за его пределы и достичь границ самого божественного бытия, посредством знания, лежащего за гранью научной дискурсивности (*discursivity*). В связи с этим уместно вспомнить, что, по словам самого Платона в *Пармениде* (135d–

⁴² См. также: Proclus, *Commentary on the Parmenides*, 895, 24–896, 17; 981, 20–982, 30; 986, 7–29.

136а), вторая часть диалога представляет собой упражнение для молодого неопытного Сократа. Прокл подхватывает эту идею в своем *Комментарии на Парменид*, а Сириан описывает как упражнения противоборствующие аргументы в книге **В** *Метафизики* Аристотеля. Я полагаю, что и *Начала теологии* Прокла можно рассматривать как руководство, необходимое для приобретения навыка метафизического мышления.⁴³ Это не последнее слово в метафизическом познании, но лишь ступень, ведущая, в конце концов, к постижению божественного бытия, лежащего за пределами дискурсивности.

Преодоление метафизической науки

Завершающая часть этой статьи посвящена Дамаскию, последнему главе Афинской школы, который, менее чем через полстолетия после смерти Прокла, был вынужден покинуть Афины по причине антиязыческой политики императора Юстиниана и, вместе с другими философами, в начале 530-х годов отправиться в изгнание в Персию. К теме нашего исследования прямое отношение имеют две работы Дамаския: *Комментарий на Парменид* Платона и трактат *О первых началах*, полное название которого – *Затруднения и разрешения, связанные с первыми началами*.⁴⁴ Эта последняя работа весьма примечательна. Она представляет, со ссылкой на первые начала или причины действительности (т. е. на собственный предмет метафизики), тщательно разработанную панораму затруднений и противоречий, присутствующих в утверждениях, которые мы делаем о таких началах. При чтении этой книги может показаться, что все, что говорится о подобных началах, противоречиво, и что не остается ничего несомненного. По сравнению с ясной и прямой тропой, проложенной сквозь метафизические проблемы *Началами теологии* Прокла, работа Дамаския предстает

⁴³ См. О'Меара 2000; по Сириану см. мое введение к английскому переводу *Комментария* Сириана на книги **В** и **Г**, стр. 8.

⁴⁴ Трактат опубликован Л. Вестеринком (L. G. Westerink) и Ж. Комбе (J. Combès) под названием *Traité des premiers principes* с французским переводом (Paris 1986–1991). *Комментарий* Дамаския на *Парменид* также был издан и переведен Л. Вестеринком и Ж. Комбе (Paris 1997–2003).

как море неопределенности, противоборствующих позиций, смятения, расстройства, без какого бы то ни было ясного направления и горизонта.⁴⁵ Поддавшись этому впечатлению, некоторые ученые находили в работе Дамаския выражение отчаяния, упадка и крушения мира языческого интеллектуала, который задыхался в христианизированной империи Юстиниана. С философских позиций можно заметить, что разрабатываемые Дамаскием цепи аргументов, в которых один аргумент опровергается другим, напоминают противоречивые аргументы, нагромождаемые философом скептиком, считающим себя обязанным воздерживаться от окончательных суждений. К этому ли стремится Дамаский? Метафизика, чересчур глубоко погруженная в собственные противоречия, уничтожает себя и становится скептицизмом? Или, если использовать образ, которым пользовался сам Дамаский, занимаясь метафизикой, не блуждаем ли мы в пустоте?⁴⁶ Не становится ли она чисто теоретическим, концептуальным размышлением, лишенным всяческого эмпирического основания и обреченным на уход в ничто? Однако ни одно из этих предположений о смысле подхода Дамаския не соответствует тому, как сам он понимает свою задачу.⁴⁷ Мне хотелось бы показать это, но прежде приведу пример той апорийной, противоречивой аргументации, которая представлена в этой экстраординарной книге.

В начале своего трактата Дамаский рассуждает о самом первом метафизическом принципе – Едином, – в терминах, связанных с понятиями части и целого, теми понятиями, которые уже были вовлечены в обсуждение проблематики единого в том, что считалось соответствующей частью платоновского *Парменида*. Дамаский доказывает, что (1) Единое есть часть целого и что (2) Единое не есть часть целого. Возьмем первое утверждение: (1) Единое есть часть целого. Понятие целого можно определять по-разному. Например, под «целым» мы можем подразумевать то, в чем нет никакого недостатка. Или же «целое» может обозначать порядок причин и

⁴⁵ Трактат Дамаския обсуждался, к примеру, в работах: Linguisti 1990; Rappe 2000, ch. 9; cf. Napoli 2008.

⁴⁶ См., например, Дамаский, *Затруднения*, р. 8, 1.

⁴⁷ Детально эта мысль обосновывается в работе Tresson 2009.

следствий. Или же «целое» может означать всю совокупность мыслимого.⁴⁸ При любом из этих способов определения целого ясно, что Единое есть часть некоего целого. Теперь возьмем противоположное утверждение: (2) Единое не есть часть целого. Дамаский показывает это при помощи следующих аргументов: если целое есть ряд причин и следствий, то эти причины и следствия соподчинены друг другу, образуя этот ряд. Но если самое первое начало, Единое, есть причина всего, то оно будет причиной и этого согласованного ряда как целого и поэтому не может быть членом данного ряда. Таким образом, оно не есть часть целого.⁴⁹ Чуть далее Дамаский приступает к доказательству того, что Единое и едино, и не едино. Оно едино, будучи высшей степенью единства в ряду вещей, представляющих собой объединенные множества, и не едино, не будучи членом этого ряда.⁵⁰

Но как сам Дамаский понимает те противоречия, через которые он проводит своего читателя? Что, по его мнению, раскрывается в этих затруднениях? Несколько раз Дамаский обращается к сократовскому образу родовых мук – мук души, пытающейся породить знание.⁵¹ Точно так же страдаем и мы, пытаясь породить в нашем мышлении пребывающее в нас Единое. Пытаясь выразить в нашей мысли (в наших понятиях и рассуждениях) и в нашей речи то, что не может быть постигнуто и высказано, мы теряем его в том, что из него исходит. И все же мы хотим найти его, вернуться к нему. Проецируя непостижимое на уровень постижимого, мы и отдаляемся от непостижимого, и, тем не менее, ищем путь возвращения к нему. Родовые муки, которыми мы страдаем, суть затруднения, загадки, противоречия, возникающие тогда, когда мы посредством наших понятий рассуждаем о непостижимом.⁵² И в то

⁴⁸ Дамаский, *Затруднения*, pp. 1, 9–2, 6.

⁴⁹ Дамаский, p. 2, 9–18.

⁵⁰ Дамаский, p. 4, 1–12.

⁵¹ См., например: Дамаский, p. 86, 10–16, а также положение, выдвинутое Трессоном, упомянутое в примечании 47 (Tresson 2009, ch. 7).

⁵² Дамаский нередко справедливо указывает на то, что его критический анализ связан с идеями (*επινοία, ερπνοία*), к которым мы прибегаем, мысля о трансцендентном (см., например, стр. 2, 5 и 19; 4, 14; 6, 9; 7, 18–21). Таким образом, он рассуждает в контексте учения о метафизической

же время они представляют собой способ, которым мы можем дискурсивно мыслить непостижимое. Итак, Дамаский предлагает нам поупражняться в дискурсивном рассуждении о метафизических принципах, посредством которого обнаруживаются пределы, неадекватность такого рассуждения по отношению к трансцендентному; и в то же время оно служит средством обнаружить это трансцендентное в нашем мышлении о нем и за пределами этого мышления.⁵³ Таким образом, Дамаский показывает пределы метафизической науки и, продвигая эту науку до ее собственных пределов, демонстрирует также, как она может побудить разумную душу к выходу за собственные пределы навстречу трансцендентному. Работа Дамаския представляет собой отнюдь не результат разочарования, признания безусловной неудачи греческой метафизики, а высшее достижение в развитии метафизической науки, начатой Александром Афродисийским и продолженной Сирианом и Проклом.

Приспосабливая предпринятую Александром формализацию аристотелевской метафизической науки к платонизму, Сириан знал, что такая наука представляет собой лишь средство к достижению познания о трансцендентном, а не само это познание. Знал это и Прокл, хотя его *Начала теологии*, в которых метафизическая наука представлена с такой систематической красотой, могут на первый взгляд показаться окончательными определениями. Если после этого у нас все еще остались иллюзии относительно адекватности нашей метафизической науки, Дамаский исцеляет нас от

науке, которое мы находили у Сириана. Я полагаю, что анонимный комментарий на *Парменид*, который П. Адо (P. Hadot) приписывает Порфирию, предполагает учение о метафизике как дискурсивном проговаривании идей (см. *Commentarium in Platonis "Parmenidem"*, ed. A. Linguiti, Florence 1995, I, 25–30; II, 1–4, 13, 20; IV, 17; VI, 23–26; IX, 11–20) – учение, которое мы находим у Сириана и Дамаския. Таким образом, данный комментарий должен быть датирован более поздним периодом – четвертым или пятым веком. Впрочем, это предположение нуждается в отдельном исследовании.

⁵³ Дамаский, р. 8, 12–20. К вопросу о том, как посредством критики метафизических идей можно выйти за их пределы, см. Tresson–Metry 2005.

них, открывая наши умы тому, что лежит за пределами, или выше, наших собственных метафизических усилий.⁵⁴

Библиография

- Bonelli, M. (2001) *Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa*. Naples.
- Dillon, J., O'Meara, D., (2006) *Syrianus, On Aristotle Metaphysics 13–14*. London.
- Dillon, J., O'Meara, D., (2008) *Syrianus, On Aristotle Metaphysics 3–4*. London.
- Kremer K. (1961) *Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule*. Münster.
- Linguiti, A. (1990) *L'Ultimo Platonism greco. Principi e conoscenza*. Florence.
- Luna, C. (2001) *Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d'Aristote*. Leiden.
- Napoli, V. (2008) *Epekeina tou henos. Il principio totalmente ineffabile tra dialettica ed esegesi in Damascio*. Catania.
- O'Meara, D. (1986) "Le problème de la métaphysique dans l'Antiquité tardive", *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 23, 3–22
- O'Meara, D. (1989) *Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics and Philosophy in late Antiquity*. Oxford.
- O'Meara, D. (2000) "La Science métaphysique (ou théologie) de Proclus comme exercice spirituel", *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne*, ed. A.-Ph. Segonds and C. Steel (Paris) 279–290
- O'Meara, D. (2001) "Intentional Objects in Later Neoplatonism", *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. D. Perler (Leiden) 115–125
- O'Meara, D. (2009) "Le Fondement du principe de non-contradiction chez Syrianus", *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive*, ed. A. Longo. Naples.

⁵⁴ Я признателен за те полезные вопросы, которые были мне заданы, когда эта статья была представлена в виде лекции в Вашингтоне, и на семинаре, проходящем под руководством Е. Афонасина в Новосибирске.

- Rappe, S. (2000) *Reading Neoplatonism. Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius*. Cambridge.
- Sheppard, A. (1997) "Phantasia and Mathematical Projection in Iamblichus", *Syllecta Classica* 8, 113–120
- Tresson, C. (2009) *L'Aporie ou l'expérience métaphysique de la dualité dans le Peri Archôn de Damascius*, unpublished PhD. Thesis (Fribourg)
- Tresson, C. and Metry A. (2005) "Damaskios' New Conception of Metaphysics", *History of Platonism. Plato Redivivus*, ed. R. Berchman and J. Finamore (New Orleans), 222–226
- Verbeke, G. (1981) "Aristotle's Metaphysics viewed by the Ancient Greek Commentators," *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. D. O'Meara (Washington, D. C.) 107–127
- Westerink, L. G., Trouillard J. and Segonds A.-Ph., eds. (1990) *Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon*. Paris.

Перевод А. А. Каменских

Пермский государственный университет

THE BEAUTY OF THE WORLD IN PLATO'S *TIMAEUS*

DOMINIC O'MEARA
Fribourg University, Switzerland

In the *Timaeus* Plato describes the world as the 'most beautiful' (*kallistos*, 29a5) of generated things. Perhaps indeed this is the first systematic description of the beauty of the world. It is, at any rate, one of the most influential statements of the theme. The Stoics were deeply convinced by it¹ and later, in the third century A.D., at a time when contempt and hate for the world were propagated by Gnostic movements, Plotinus, interpreting the *Timaeus*, would write magnificent passages on the beauty and value of the world.²

But what does Plato mean by the 'beauty' of the world? What makes the world beautiful? In this paper these questions will be approached first (1) by a brief discussion of the distinction which Plato appears to make in the *Timaeus* between beauty and the good.³ In one passage (*Tim.* 87c) 'measure' seems to relate to this distinction. It will be suitable then (2) to look at a section of another late work of Plato, the *Philebus*, where the themes of beauty, goodness and measure may be compared in more detail. The theme of measure will then take us back (3) to the *Timaeus*, in order to examine the role played by measure, in particular mathematical measure, in constituting the beauty of the world. I would like to discuss in detail the way in which mathematical structures make for the beauty of soul and body in the living whole that is the world.

¹ See P. Hadot (1992) 185-8.

² Plotinus, *Enn.* II 9, 17; V 8, 8 and 13.

³ The relation between beauty and the good in Plato's earlier work is discussed in a recent issue of *Classical Philology* (2010).

1. A Distinction between Beauty and the Good

We are often reminded that the ‘beautiful’ (*kalos*) and the ‘good’ (*agathos*), in ancient Greek texts, are closely related in meaning. ‘Beautiful’, we find in these texts, can refer to moral quality and is not affected by a separation of aesthetics from ethics characteristic of modern thought. The closeness of the beautiful and the good in ancient Greek discourse is said in a nutshell by the expression *kalos kagathos*, which designates an admirable person.⁴ It thus seems prudent to be careful of separating beauty from the good when speaking of Greek philosophical texts. Yet in Plato’s *Timaeus* the main speaker, Timaeus, does seem to make a distinction between the beautiful and the good in some parts of his speech. If he does indeed do this, we would need to know in what way the distinction is made and what the distinction means for the relation between beauty and the good.

A first passage where the distinction can be found is at the beginning of Timaeus’ speech, where he raises the question as to which model it was that the divine craftsman of the world, or demiurge, would have used in making the world:

We must go back to this question about the world: After which of the two models (*paradeigmata*) did [the world’s] builder (*tektainomenos*) produce it – after that which is always in the same unchanging state, or after that which has come to be? If, now (*men*), this world is beautiful (*kalos*), and (*te*) its maker is good (*agathos*), clearly he looked to the eternal; on the contrary supposition (which cannot be spoken without blasphemy), to that which has come to be. Everyone, then, must see that he looked to the eternal; for the world (*men*) is the most beautiful (*kallistos*) of generated things and (*d’*) he is the best (*aristos*) of causes.⁵

The Greek particles *men/te*, *men/de* suggest that the beauty of the world is contrasted with the goodness of the demiurge. It is because the demiurge is good and wishes the good that he makes a world which is most beautiful. The same contrast can be found a little later in the text:

⁴ See, for example, Plato, *Timaeus* 88c6.

⁵ *Tim.* 28c5-29a6. I quote the translation by F. Cornford (1935), somewhat modified.

Desiring, then, that all things should be good and, so far as it might be, nothing imperfect, the god took over all that is visible – not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion – and brought it from disorder into order, since he judged that order was in every way the better. Now it was not, nor can it ever be, permitted for the best (*aristô*) to produce anything but the most beautiful (*kalliston*). (30a2-7)

The goal of the demiurge is the good, that is, he wishes to produce a world which is unified, self-sufficient, complete, harmonious, which functions correctly.⁶ In producing this world, by imposing order, he achieves this goal and the result is a world which is most beautiful. We might infer then that the beauty of the world is what results when the good of the world is achieved.

Before developing these ideas in more detail, we should note that the world is the most beautiful of *generated things*. The model of the world (what I will call the 'intelligible paradigm') is *also* described as 'most beautiful', the most beautiful of *intelligible things* (30d2).⁷ It thus seems that the question of the relation between the good and beauty concerns two levels: that of the model and that of the product made after the model. If the product, the world, is most beautiful because in it the good is achieved as far as possible, then in what sense is the model most beautiful? Perhaps in the sense that it is precisely the *model* of how the good can be realized. At any rate, we can say for the moment that the beauty of the world is not described simply by saying that the world realizes the good intended by the demiurge: it does this by being modelled after the most beautiful intelligible model (28a6-b2, 30c5-d2). To this we should also add that it is not just (or simply) the model that makes the world beautiful: by being a living animal having intelligence, the world can be 'more beautiful', 'most beautiful' (30b2-6).

⁶ The goal of the legislator in the *Laws*, the good, can be expressed by terms such as unity, friendship, harmony, happiness (688a, 693bc, 701d, 715c, 962a). Unity, friendship, harmony are also found in the world produced by the demiurge in the *Timaeus* (32c2, 34b4-9), a world which is a "happy (*eudaimôn*) god" (34b8).

⁷ Beauty also characterizes the political model developed by the legislator in the *Laws* (746b8).

Bringing these aspects together one might say then that the question of the relation between beauty and the good in the *Timaeus* involves several levels: the relation between the good and the beauty of an intelligible paradigm or model; the realization of the good as the beauty of the world through the world's relation to the intelligible paradigm and through the ensouled and rational life of the world. Before pursuing these themes further in the *Timaeus*, it may be useful to take account first of the treatment of the relation between the good and beauty in the *Philebus*.

2. At the Entrance of the Good

A distinction between the good and beauty appears towards the end of a discussion presented in the *Philebus* concerning the good, understood as that which can make human life happy (11b4-5, d4-6). The competing claims of pleasure and intelligence to be the good are considered and neither, by itself, seems to satisfy completely.⁸ A long analysis is proposed, differentiating between sorts of pleasure and sorts of intelligence (and knowledge), with a view to making a selection and a mix of them that would come near to the good.

Then here, one might say, we have at hand the ingredients, intelligence and pleasure, ready to be mixed, the materials in which, or out of which, we as builders (*dêmiourgois*) are to build our structure – that would not be a bad image.⁹

Since neither pleasure nor intelligence can claim to be, by itself, the complete good (61a1-2) and thus claim 'first prize', the question arises as to which of them may still obtain a 'second prize':

We shall have to grasp the good, either precisely or at least in rough outline (*tupon*), if we are to know to what we must give, as we put it, the second prize. (61a4-5)

⁸ See already *Rep.* 505bd.

⁹ 59d10-e3. I quote the translation by R. Hackforth (1945), somewhat modified. The image of the demiurge takes up a theme introduced earlier in the *Philebus*, at 27b1, of a demiurge who is a cosmic ruling intelligence (28c7) identified as Zeus (30d1-2).

It is proposed then to look for *where* the good is, as one might look for somebody by finding out first where the person lives (*oikêsin*, 61a9-b2). The good would seem to 'reside' in a certain mixture of kinds of knowledge and pleasure. This mixture includes forms of knowledge and pleasures which are pure and true and accompany virtue. Other pleasures which bring folly, evil and irrationality are to be excluded from a mixture that is to be the 'most beautiful' and peaceful, if one wishes to see, in the mixture, what the good might be "in man and in the universe" (63e7-64a3).

To me it appears that in our present discussion we have produced what might be called an incorporeal ordered system (cosmos) for the rightful control of a body which is ensouled... We now stand already at the entrance (prothurois) of the residence of the good. (64b6-c3)

What makes a mixture valuable and good is "the nature of measure (*metrou*) and symmetry (*summetrou*)" (64d9).

So now we find that the power of the good has taken refuge in the nature of the beautiful. For measure and symmetry everywhere, I imagine, are beauty and virtue. (64e5-7)

Although the progression of this argument is somewhat allusive, it does suggest a distinction between the good and beauty, as if beauty were where the good 'resides' (or 'takes refuge'). Beauty itself seems to have to do with an order in which the principal factors that make the order valuable are measure and symmetry. As this incorporeal order is described in the following pages, we find that what is of primary importance or value in the mixture is measure, the measured and the appropriate (66a6-8), which are followed, in declining order of importance, by symmetry, the beautiful, the complete and sufficient and suchlike (66b1-2). After them come intelligence, forms of knowledge and, finally, in the last place, certain pleasures (66b6-c5).

The images used in these final pages of the *Philebus* of a residence and its entrance seem to concern domestic architecture rather than something on a more monumental scale. Even so, it seems that analogies can be made with the cosmic construction of the *Timaeus*. The

good, in the *Philebus*, is tracked down in its ‘residence’, which is approached by its entrance. The good takes refuge in the beautiful. The beautiful has to do with an order (*cosmos*), in which measure and symmetry appear to be crucial: they are responsible (*aitia*, 64d4) for giving the order its value. The order, in the mixture of ingredients, is constructed by the speakers in the dialogue, in particular Socrates, as an order *for* the life of a soul in body that may thereby be happy. The order itself is incorporeal, a model, we might say in a comparison with the *Timaeus*.

The analogies this suggests with the cosmic making of the *Timaeus* reinforce our impression in the *Timaeus* that the good is indeed to be distinguished from beauty, that beauty is where the good is found. In particular, the *Philebus* gives much emphasis to the importance of measure in producing an order where beauty comes to be. It is the moment then to return to the *Timaeus* and to the function of measure in the ordering of the world.

3. Measure in the World

A connection between the good, beauty and measure is suggested by Timaeus towards the end of his speech, when dealing with the relation between the human soul and body:

All that is good is beautiful, and what is beautiful is not without measure; accordingly a living creature that is to possess these qualities must have symmetry. Symmetries of a trivial kind we readily perceive and compute; but the most important and decisive escape our reckoning. For health or sickness, goodness or badness, the symmetry or lack of measure between soul and body themselves is more important than any other. (87c4-d3)

What is good is beautiful, and what is beautiful presupposes measure. ‘Symmetry’ (*summetria*) here seems to be the opposite of ‘without measure’ (*ametria*): as concerning the relation between soul and body, the one involves health and virtue, the other sickness and vice in soul and body. But prior to the relation between soul and body in humans, there is the symmetry constituted by the making of soul in general and of the body of the universe. I would like thus to go back to these more fundamental ‘symmetries’, as they are described earlier in Timaeus’

speech, in order to identify in particular what measure or symmetry it is that can make soul and body beautiful.¹⁰

(i) The Making of Soul (*Tim.* 35a-39e)

The demiurge of the world makes soul first (a)¹¹ by constituting (35a1ff.) what Cornford¹² describes as 'soul-stuff', a third kind of *ousia*, made up by mixing together 'being', 'identity' and 'difference', as these three are found in indivisible and in divisible being (presumably that which is unchanging and what is changing and generated, as these had been distinguished earlier, at 29a). The mix appears to be complete (although some force [35a8] is required to join 'difference' to 'identity'!). The 'soul-stuff' thus produced seems to be seen as a sort of two-dimensional strip or band: it must have both length and breadth, since it will later be divided 'lengthways' into further bands (36b7), but length seems to be its prominent dimension.

The demiurge then (b) divides this stuff (35b4ff., lengthways?) by measuring off intervals in it (36a1, *diastēmata*). This is done by marking off a portion of the whole (35b4-5), then by doubling and tripling, successively, this portion (so, by doubling the portion 1, doubled: 2, doubled: 4, doubled: 8; and by tripling 1, tripled: 3, tripled: 9, tripled: 27), giving the series of intervals thus produced: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27. The portion functions, I believe, as a measure, which, by doubling and tripling in alternating succession, produces a series of determinate intervals (or lengths) which are in proportion to the measure as doubles and triples of it. These proportions constitute "geometrical" progressions (1, 2, 4, 8; 1, 3, 9, 27) or "geometrical equalities" (identical ratios in $1 : 2 = 2 : 4 = 4 : 8$; and in $1 : 3 = 3 : 9 = 9 : 27$), the progressions being produced by the successive and alternating operations of doubling and tripling. The length of the first portion, used as measure, is not given (and perhaps not pertinent).

Once the succession of proportional intervals are marked out in the soul-stuff and thus *divide* it, these intervals are then *united* (36a) by the

¹⁰ I cover in the following roughly the same ground as G. Vlastos (1975), chapters 2 and 3, but in search of different things.

¹¹ 35a1 suggests a contrast between (a) that "out of which" soul is put together and (b) the 'way' in which it is put together.

¹² In his translation (above note 6).

insertion in the intervals of two other proportionalities (which had been distinguished by the Pythagorean Archytas), harmonic and arithmetic proportions, which give 'identical' (*tautô*) and (quantitatively) 'equal' (*isô*) relations (36a3-5).¹³ The 'hemiotic' (2 : 3), 'epitritic' (3 : 4) and 'epogdoadic' (8 : 9) intervals thus produced are completed by a final interval: 256 : 243.

The summary I have just attempted to give of Plato's text is intended to emphasize (I hope reasonably) certain points: that an essentially one- (verging on two-) dimensional being is structured by imposing determinate intervals which both divide it and unite it; these intervals are proportions (of a given measure of the being) which express identity in the form of different kinds of equality (identity of ratios in geometrical and harmonic equality, quantitative identity in arithmetic equality). The proportions are first generated by operations of doubling and tripling a measure, operations which can be thus be considered as ways of making identity dimensional, at various degrees (doubling, then tripling): the intervals thus constituted, as equalities, are dimensional expressions of identity. The structure of soul-stuff thus consists of proportions (see 37a4), which give it identity in the form of different kinds or degrees of equality. Degrees of equality also mean degrees of inequality (equality of ratios in inequalities of quantities, and the reverse). Thus geometrical equality can also be described as an "unequal proportion" (*anisô summetrô*, *Laws* 744c).¹⁴ Degrees of equality can be supposed to obtain in relation to their proximity to identity.

The mix of ingredients making up soul-stuff serves to introduce the capacity in soul to know both intelligible and sensible beings (37a2-37c5), whereas the structuring of soul by a system of proportions seems

¹³ See Archytas fr. 2 (in C. Huffmann 2005, with commentary). The three proportionalities might be expressed as follows (see Huffmann 2005, 169): Geometrical proportion is based on identity of ratios (e.g. 1 : 2 = 2 : 4, i.e. the ratio of 2); harmonic proportion is based on the same fraction of the extremes (e.g. 6 : 8 = 8 : 12, i.e. the mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same fraction [1/3] of each of the extremes); arithmetic proportion is based on identical quantity (e.g. 2 - 1 = 3 - 2, i.e. the same quantitative difference of 1).

¹⁴ Such proportions as the equal and the double are referred to as 'symmetries' in *Rep.* 530a1; *Phileb.* 25d11-e1.

to be designed to introduce the account of the movements of the heavens and their production of time. The demiurge splits the soul-stuff, once structured, lengthways into two bands (36b7), each band being bent into a circle, the outer circle being designated (*epephêmisen*) by the demiurge as that of the identical, the inner that of the different (36c4-5). The outer circle is that of the invariant movement of the fixed stars. The inner circle, that of the different, is divided again into 7 unequal circles (those of the sun, moon and planets), of which three correspond to the double, three to the triple interval (36d2-3), three having a 'similar' speed, four a dissimilar speed, all moving in ratio (*logô*, 36d6).

Without going into the mechanics of this system, the way in which it articulates the distances and speeds of heavenly bodies, we can at least observe that it reflects a hierarchy of value in which the identical precedes the different and the different expresses itself in degrees of (in)equality, the double and triple, the similar and dissimilar. The structured, proportionate, movements of the heavens mark out in turn the parts of time, the most evident of which are the divisions into day, month and year. Time expresses, imitates, in number (*kat' arithmon*, 38a7), which must mean here in proportions (see also 38a7), the unity of its eternal model, the intelligible paradigm (37d6, 39e1).¹⁵

At this point it might be useful to take stock of what has been seen so far, as it might relate to the questions raised at the beginning of this paper. If what makes the beauty of the world is the realization of the good in it, this realization is achieved through imitation of the most beautiful model, the intelligible paradigm, and through the presence of rational soul in the world (above part I). Now if time, as the proportionately structured movements of the heavens, is an imitation of the intelligible paradigm, these proportions are first given to soul when it is constituted by the demiurge. It seems to follow from this that the demiurge imitates the intelligible paradigm in structuring soul. Rational soul makes the world beautiful in that it is structured in proportions which

¹⁵ There appears to be a problem here. In speaking of the making of time, Timaeus seems to have the demiurge redouble his efforts to imitate the intelligible paradigm (37c6-d1), even though it seems that time results from the structure of soul. Does Timaeus wish to remind us of the theme of the imitation of the intelligible paradigm, which is not made explicit in the demiurge's making of soul? Or is Timaeus, as in some other places, confusing things a bit?

make of the ordered heavenly movements that it carries out an imitation of the intelligible paradigm. The proportions, as different kinds of equality/inequality, are expressions of different degrees of identity/difference, at first in the quasi one-dimensional nature of soul and then in the two (or three) dimensional heavens.

(ii) The Making of the Elements (53c-56c)

If the world, as a whole, is the most beautiful of generated things, it is not uniformly beautiful or perfect. The heavens represent what is most perfect in the world, which also includes lower levels of existence, a hierarchy amusingly suggested in the conclusion of Timaeus' speech in the account of the fall of souls from their former, stellar lives to the depths of slithering, murky, aqueous indignity. Having described the making of soul in the world, Timaeus also needs to account for the making of body. Body is constituted of the elements of fire, air, earth and water, and so Timaeus offers an account of how these elements are produced. If the demiurge makes the soul-stuff, before structuring it, he does not make the stuff of the elements, which pre-exists as a chaotic, irrational, indeterminate *milieu* (52d-53b), but simply imposes rational order on it (e.g. 53b4-5). Timaeus approaches the constitution of the elements in two steps, discussing first (53c-54d) certain mathematical structures, and then (54d-56c) dealing with the production of the elements from these structures.

The discussion of mathematical structures concerns geometrical figures, in particular different kinds of triangles. In comparison with the one-dimensional, linear structures of the proportions used in ordering soul, geometrical figures are two-dimensional structures out of which three-dimensional bodies can be built. A possible explanation of Timaeus' concentration on triangles would be that they are the simplest rectilinear figures (out of them squares and oblongs can be produced), whereas circles seem to be the privilege of the heavens. Timaeus asserts (53c8-d2) that all triangles derive from triangles having one right angle and two acute angles, which triangles he distinguishes into two kinds: those with equal sides and two half right angles (right-angled isosceles triangles, in Cornford's terminology); and those with unequal sides and two unequal angles (right-angled scalene triangles). He then says:

This [geometrical shape]...we suppose to be the origin (*archê*) of fire and the other bodies... But the causes (*archas*) of these from above (*anôthen*) god knows and he of men who would be a friend of god. (53d4-7)

I return in a moment to this enigmatic passage.

After having raised the question as to what the four 'most beautiful', dissimilar bodies might be that can be changed into each other, Timaeus returns to his triangles and then tells us (54a1-2) that there is only one form (or nature) of the isosceles triangle, whereas there are unlimited sorts of scalene triangles, of which the most 'beautiful' is that which, when doubled, makes an equilateral triangle (54a7). It appears thus that the most beautiful triangle is the equilateral triangle and the scalene triangle that can produce it by doubling. The equilateral triangle is characterized by equality (of sides and angles) and the best scalene triangle achieves this beauty by doubling, thus turning its inequality (of sides and angles) into the equality of the equilateral triangle. Equality and doubling thus obtain here also, as in the structure of soul, but now in the two-dimensional proportions of plane figures.

Timaeus then constructs the bodies of the four elements from these 'numbers' (*arithmôn*, 54d4). One element is composed of 4 x 6 isosceles triangles constituting a cube (earth), whereas the other three are made up of scalene triangles, the first (fire) being a pyramid, having equal and similar parts (2 x 3 x 4 scalenes), the second and third (air and water) being an octahedron and an icosahedron, i.e. multiples of these triangles (2 x 3 x 8; 2 x 3 x 20). The section closes with the following summing up:

And with regard to their number (*plêthê*), their motions, and their powers in general, we must suppose that the god adjusted them in due proportion, when he had brought them in every detail to the most exact perfection permitted by Necessity willingly complying with persuasion. (56c2-7)

4. Some conclusions

For the purposes of this paper we do not need, I think, to get involved further in Timaeus' elemental Legoland.¹⁶ Perhaps enough indications have been collected from Plato's text to support the following inferences as regards the relations between the good, beauty and measure as they characterize the world. I have suggested that what makes the world beautiful is the realization in it of the good. This realization is achieved in that (a) the demiurge orders the world in imitation of the most beautiful model, the intelligible paradigm. But what makes the world beautiful, we have also seen, is that (b) it is animated by rational soul. These two aspects come together in that the order of heavenly movements and of time, an imitation of the intelligible paradigm, reflects the structure of rational soul, as the demiurge articulated soul when making it. From this we can infer that the demiurge imitates the intelligible paradigm in structuring soul, this imitation expressing itself in the heavenly movements carried out by soul. The structure in question is one made up of proportions ('symmetries') which correspond to various kinds of equality/inequality, which in turn correspond to degrees of identity/difference in a dimensional being. Identity, given dimension, becomes the equality between terms differentiated in that dimension. The account of the making of the elements, in which we reach the constitution of three-dimensional body, makes use of the same themes as those appearing in the structuring of soul: here also, equality, as a proportion constituting two- and three- dimensional objects (geometrical figures and bodies), is fundamental. It is produced by processes of multiplication (at first by doubling), which extend in a range going to greater degrees of inequality. It thus appears that the demiurge uses the same principles in ordering the elements and body as those he uses in ordering the soul, even if much distinguishes soul from body (for example, soul-stuff is made by the demiurge and it is not three-dimensional), and this order is essentially the same: it is an order of proportions expressing equality/inequality to different degrees and developing from one-dimensional being to three-dimensional body.

¹⁶ In my account I have left out in particular the problem of the transformation of elements into each other, a process which the interchangeability of triangles is supposed to solve.

I have suggested that equality is identity expressed in a dimension marked off by differentiated terms. The origin or principle of equality, the *archê* mentioned in the passage (53d4-7) cited above (p. 7), would then appear to be identity, as found in the intelligible paradigm. But perhaps this inference is too audacious, since such things are only known by god and by the man “who would be the friend of god”. It may also be too audacious to suggest as well that what makes the intelligible paradigm itself ‘beautiful’ is that realizes it, *as a paradigm* (as Platonic Form), the good. But such an inference might be made in analogy with the beauty of the world. The beauty of the world, in which the good is realized, is achieved through its structuring in terms of proportions (equalities) which express in particular, I suggest, identity in the intelligible paradigm.

In organizing a good city in the *Laws*, distributing property in terms of geometrical equality, the lawgiver exhorts us with these words:

Don't ignore likeness, equality, identity and the harmonious, either in number or in any faculty producing what is beautiful and good (*kalôn kagathôn*). (741a)

The citizens of a good city, and we as inhabitants of the world of the *Timaeus*, can observe these principles as expressed in the heavens and organize our lives so that they too will become beautiful and good (see *Tim* 47bc).

REFERENCES

- Hadot, P. (1992) *La Citadelle intérieure*. Paris.
 Vlastos, G. (1975) *Plato's Univers*. Oxford.
 Cornford, F. (1935) *Plato's Cosmology*. Indianapolis.
 Hackforth, R. (1945) *Plato's Examination of Pleasure*. Cambridge.
 Huffmann, C. (2005) *Archytas of Tarentum*. Cambridge.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF, OF TIME AND OF DEATH IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY: SOME REFLECTIONS

DOMINIC O'MEARA
Fribourg University, Switzerland

Perhaps as we get older, the awareness of our inevitable death settles in our minds, slowly, bit by bit. This awareness, I imagine, has been there, from our adolescence. But, with the passing of time – the time which will bring our death – it becomes more and more insistent. I would like to distinguish between this awareness (A) and the ways (B) in which we can try to think about our death: What it is? Why must it be? What does it mean? The answers which we give to these questions may be religious or philosophical, traditional or autonomous: they allow us to come to terms with (A), to accept what we know must be, and, perhaps, be consoled. Thus we might think, if we are educated in the Christian tradition, that death is not the end of us, that there will be life for us after death. Or we might think of ourselves as being part of the animal world, belonging to cycles of birth and death, accepting our death as part of what it is to be able to be alive (Heraclitus says this far better than I!).

In this paper, I do not propose to discuss the ways (B) of thinking about and coming to terms with our awareness (A) of our coming death. I would like rather to discuss a more particular and perhaps unusual problem, that of the relation between (A) our awareness of our death and (C) our consciousness of ourselves. Let us assume, on the one hand, that plants and (some?) animals live from day to day, in the constant struggle to survive, and that they are not aware of, and do not reflect on the death which time will inevitably bring: they live on a primary level, seeing no further than the present and pressing need to continue to live. We, on the other hand, can become aware of ourselves, aware not only of our long-term prospects, but also of the very fact of

our being aware, of thinking, these things. This consciousness (C) includes both awareness of our coming death (A) and of ourselves as thinking about these things. The ways in which we think about death (B) might make the relation between self-consciousness (C) and its awareness of its own death (A) unproblematic. For instance, we can think of ourselves, as conscious beings, as just a certain form of life, which belongs to the general pattern of life, which includes death. However, our self-consciousness (C) may have difficulty with the fact of death: how could we, who think, who can know many things, who can think the past and the future, who find meaning in things, how could *we* be subject to annihilation? It is not so much annihilation as such that is problematic: it is the annihilation of ourselves as conscious of ourselves which may cause difficulty. For it is we, as conscious of ourselves, who give sense to things, and it is the annihilation of ourselves as conscious which seems to destroy the sense of things.

The revolt of self-consciousness in the face of death can take religious forms. Here, however, I would like to suggest that it also marks Greek philosophy and that it is a fundamental aspect of philosophy for the ancient Greeks. In the following I will take four examples: Parmenides, Plato, Epicurus and Plotinus. I would like to sketch the different ways in which these philosophers saw the relation between self-consciousness and death, how they tried to dissipate what seemed to them to be a tension, even a contradiction, between these two parts of our existence. My discussion will not seek to make a contribution to the philological analysis of specific ancient texts, but will propose rather an attempt to reach an overall view which might be of a broader interest.

1. Parmenides

The first and most radical position on the subject was taken by Parmenides. The word 'death' (θάνατος) does not occur in the surviving fragments of his poem. However, Parmenides argues in these fragments in such a way as imply the conclusion that death and self-consciousness are mutually exclusive. It is true that Parmenides does not, strictly speaking, formulate a theory of self-consciousness. But he does speak of thinking, and he stipulates that thinking – *true thinking* – is one with its object, it is identical with its object, "what is", or "being" (fr. 3 Diels-Kranz): thinking and being are one. From this we can easily derive the

conclusion that the subject and object of thinking are not different from each other: true thinking thinks itself. Furthermore, if thinking, to be true, can only think “what is”, then it follows that it cannot think death. Death is destruction (ὄλεθρος) and the thought of destruction (like the thought of coming-to-be) involves combining “what is” with “what is not” (fr. 8, 6-21). Furthermore, it also follows, not only that there can be no true thought of death, but also that *thinking* itself cannot admit of death. What is, cannot not be; true thinking is identical with what is; death involves what is not; therefore thinking, as such, admits no death. Just like its object, “what is”, it is indestructible (ἀνώλεθρον) (see fr. 8, 3). Subject to no birth or death, thinking also excludes a past which would have seen our birth and a future time which will bring death (fr. 8, 5-15).

Mortals (βροτοί), however, who know nothing, who are blind and deaf, confuse “what is” and “what is not” (fr. 6, 4-9; fr. 8, 39). Their thinking of death, we can infer from Parmenides’ poem, is false opinion, not true thinking. Perhaps, we might speculate, just as true thinking of death is impossible and thinking itself incompatible with death, so also those who think death, not only do not truly think, but also mix death itself into their lives (see fr. 6, 4-9), as Heraclitus had already suggested (fr. 88).

Parmenides’ reasoning implies then, I suggest, that thinking (which is self-thought) and death are mutually exclusive, both conceptually and ontologically: you cannot truly think, if you think of death; thinking in itself, in what it is, excludes death. Indeed conceptual and ontological exclusiveness are the same: thinking and its object are the same. Where there is true thinking, there is no death. If we say that philosophy is concerned with thinking the truth, then we can also say that philosophy is opposed to death, it is incompatible with death. Our awareness of our death (A) is a false opinion, not to be reconciled with true self-consciousness (C).

The radical separation between true thinking and death is just part of the larger problem caused by Parmenides’ separation of true thought from the world of ordinary experience. Various ways of dealing with this problem have been proposed, of course, by Parmenides’ ancient and modern readers. Rather than going into this interpretative problem, I would like to emphasize the idea that death could seem, at an

early and important stage in the history of Greek philosophy, to be incompatible with true thinking. Where there is true thought (which includes self-thought), there is no death. Or, to put it another way, where there is true philosophy, there is no death. For Parmenides, the initial awareness of death (A), contrary to what I have suggested in my introduction, cannot be a 'given' of consciousness. It is rather a confused opinion, entertained by many humans, to be evacuated from the thought of the true philosopher.

2. Plato

Another important treatment of the theme can be found in Plato's *Phaedo*. The *Phaedo* recounts the death of Socrates, the day of his death. This day does not lie in an obscure and uncertain future, but is clearly and precisely known: it is today. There can be no vague procrastination in our awareness of Socrates' impending death. If we take Socrates as exemplifying philosophy, then we can say that the text shows the relation between philosophy and death, or rather shows how the true philosopher relates to death. Socrates describes philosophy as the "practice of death" (μελέτη θανάτου, 64a6-9; 81a1-2). But by this he means, not that philosophy is a matter of learning how to yield to death, but rather that the philosopher seeks knowledge; that the body is an obstacle to this search; and that death, as the freeing of soul from the body, gives access to the knowledge which the philosopher has been seeking. All this assumes, of course, that the soul can survive the death of the body and that its objects of knowledge exist independently of the body. The conversation between Socrates and his friends on the day of his death, as told by the *Phaedo*, provides arguments in support of these assumptions. I would like to look in particular at aspects of these arguments which concern more especially the theme of this paper.

The capacity of soul to survive death, to exist independently of the body, is argued in the *Phaedo* on the basis of the soul's function as a principle of life (which excludes death) and as a principle of knowledge. In particular, as regards the latter function, Socrates tries to show that the soul has, as the proper objects of its knowledge, certain realities, the Ideas or Forms (e.g. the Form of Equality, the Form of Beauty), which are incorporeal, non-composite and indestructible (78c ff.). These realities are contrasted with the ever-changing corruptible nature of bodies

which as such are subject to destruction. The incorporeal Forms are invisible, known only by thinking, whereas bodies are visible, grasped by sense-perception. Socrates then asks (79b, d9-e1), given this contrast between incorporeal Forms and bodies, to which sort of reality should be assigned the human soul: to the incorporeal Forms, or to bodies? The human body belongs clearly to the general realm of the visible, of bodies, whereas soul is invisible. However soul seems to oscillate between bodies and the Forms. It can become preoccupied and confused by bodily matters (79c). Yet it can also turn away from them and relate by thinking to the incorporeal Forms (79d). Its capacity to have access to the Forms seems to suggest some sort of *similarity*, some sort of natural *affinity* (συγγενέστερον, 79e1) with the Forms. On the basis of this affinity, Socrates can claim that soul belongs much more to the realm of the Forms than to that of bodies (80b). And this means that soul, in thinking the Forms, also takes part in the indestructibility, the immortality of the Forms.

It seems then that our capacity to think, to grasp the proper objects of knowledge, involves the exclusion of death. However, Plato's position does not seem to be as radical as that of Parmenides. In thinking the deathless, the Forms, we manifest a proximity to, not an identity with, the deathless; by thinking we take part in the deathless, but we are not identical with it. We can also, as souls, turn to the body and become involved in its processes, hovering near it after death. In this case our souls do not appear to die, but attempt to carry on a dismal existence in relation to the body (108b). Or they can share, through thinking the Forms, in the deathlessness of the Forms. We can, it seems, think death, but we can also, in thinking the deathless, share in it.

Plato has other arguments in support of the idea that soul is immortal. In particular soul, as a principle of life, seems to exclude its opposite, death (see 106b). And he takes up the theme of the immortality of the soul again in other dialogues. But if we limit ourselves here to the question of the relation between thought and death, then it seems that his position is comparable to that of Parmenides, even if he is less radical. In so far as we think the true objects of knowledge, we take part in what is without death. True thinking excludes death. But we can also think *of* death, an awareness (A) which, when conceptualizing death (B) as the separation of immortal soul from the body (67d), no longer stands in

contradiction to true thought, as it did in Parmenides. So, in Plato, as in Parmenides, true thinking excludes death, and philosophy leads us to this deathlessness.

Allowance being made for the many important differences separating Aristotle's philosophy from that of Plato, I think that we can say that what Aristotle suggests at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (X, 7) is essentially similar. There he calls us to share in the life of the gods, the immortals, as far as possible:

One should not follow the advice of those who say 'Human you are, think human thoughts', and 'Mortal you are (θνητόν), think mortal' ones, but instead, so far as is possible, you should immortalize (ἀθανατίζειν)! And do everything with the aim of living in accordance with what is highest of the things in us. (1177b31-34, transl. Broadie/Rowe, slightly modified)

The highest thing in us is intellect, and it is by the perfection of thinking, by knowing (θεωρία), that we can take part in immortality. As we learn in the *Metaphysics* (XII, 7 and 9), the activity of the divine is thinking, a perfect unity of subject and object, self-thought.

3. Epicurus

In Epicurus we find what we might assume is a quite different way of relating consciousness to the awareness of death. Our awareness of our coming death (A) can be conceptualized in ways (B) which bring great anxiety to our lives: we may fear in anticipation the pain which our death, we think, will involve; we may be terrorized by what we think might happen afterwards, punishments inflicted on us by the gods. Epicurus wishes to free us of these false conceptions of death which cause such anxiety, to substitute for them *true* conceptions of death which will bring us peace. Thus, in showing that the gods - if they exist - are not concerned with our affairs and will not therefore intervene as judges of our lives, punishing us for what we did, Epicurus removes one false conception which contributes to our fear of death. He also removes another such false conception, the idea that our souls are immortal or that they will survive death: No! Souls, like everything else in the world, are congeries of atoms which will dissipate and be dissolved. This also applies to thinking: thinking, as well as sense-perception, will simply dissolve

and be no more. There is nothing left of us in death. So death is nothing to us: while we live, death is not there; when death is there, we are no longer:

Death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not (οὐκ ἔστι), and the latter are no more. (*Letter to Menoikeus* 124-125, transl. Bailey)

Thus the practice of correctly conceptualizing our awareness of death will preserve us from all sorts of false notions which terrify us. I would add that the correct conception of death, as we are aware of it, involves no incompatibility with our self-awareness as thinking beings: a correct knowledge of what we are as thinking beings will easily fit with a correct conception of death. True thinking is not incompatible with death; it is incompatible only with false notions of death. So we could apply Plato's description of philosophy, as a preparation for death, to Epicurus, but as a means of expressing a very different position: philosophy prepares us for death, because it teaches us what we are, how we are constituted, how this involves death, and what precisely death is.

However, my summary of Epicurus' account of death is not complete. Even if we understand that death, when we are no longer, does not concern us, and that there is nothing to fear from death or from an afterlife, the thought that death will come to us, one day in the future, can still worry us: How long do I have? What should I do with the time left to me? In other words, the temporal dimension which is included in our awareness of our coming death can bring further anxiety.

Epicurus also deals with this temporal dimension. We should not live in the past or for the future, he tells us, but in and for the present:

We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone joy: life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us, in being busy, dies. (*Gnom. Vat.* 14, transl. Bailey slightly modified)

Living in the present is linked to Epicurus' conception of human happiness as consisting of pleasure. The highest pleasure is a state of freedom from pain and from anxiety. This pleasure is that of the present

moment. We should therefore live for the present moment, not postponing our happiness for some hypothetical future, or mourning a happiness of the past: there is no happiness if it is not happiness *now*.¹ Thoughts of past pleasures or anticipations of future pleasures can help in strengthening pleasure now, or in counteracting the pain we might feel, now. Happiness is essentially linked to the 'now', since happiness is pleasure. What this means is that time, in the ethical domain, is transformed: there is only one time for happiness, the present moment of pleasure. Since the gods (if they exist) should be conceived as enjoying perfect, uninterrupted happiness, they live a life of undying 'nows'. To the extent that we are happy, now, we live this life of the gods. And it is through philosophy, through the cultivation of correct thinking about ourselves and about the world, that we can live in this way. We live as the immortals live, if we live our happiness now, philosophizing.²

Thus we attain a certain immortality through thinking. This is not the immortality of a limitless temporal duration, but the immortality of the divine life at the present moment. I think that this might be the meaning of a saying attributed to Metrodorus, Epicurus' close disciple:

Remember that, being mortal by nature and having a limited time to live, you have ascended, through discussions about nature, to the infinite and eternal, seeing 'things that are now and are to come and have been'. (*Gnom. Vat.* 10, Bailey transl. slightly modified)

Perhaps we should remember this past experience as a way of bringing joy to our present.

So it seems, after all, that true thinking, cultivated by philosophy, involving self-knowledge and knowledge of nature, reaches immortality, escaping death. But this is the immortality of a divine life lived at the present moment. It is the quality of life that matters, not the quantity of days that it lasts. And, of course, this knowledge includes true conceptions of our nature, our temporal limits and our death.

¹ See Hadot 2008, 42–51.

² See Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 125.IV Smith (a fragment perhaps from a letter of Epicurus to his mother).

4. Plotinus

Finally, I would like to come to the philosophy of Plotinus. As a good Platonist, Plotinus holds to the immortality of the soul, which he seeks to prove in *Ennead* IV, 7. In this treatise, having argued against the positions of the Epicureans, Stoics and of Aristotle, Plotinus concludes in ch. 10 that our soul is akin (συγγενής) to divine and immortal things. If we want to know our soul, in its true nature, then we should remove everything that is extraneous to it, stripping it of everything which has been added to it. If one does this, what will one see?

He will see an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe full of light [...] so he will often think that this was very well said: "Greetings, I am for you an immortal god" [Empedocles fr. 112], having ascended to the divine and concentrating totally on likeness to it. (*Enn.* IV, 7, 10, 32-40, Armstrong transl.)

The divine, the immortal in soul, is its reason. When it relates itself to body, to a body, lower psychic functions emerge (emotions, passions), generated by bodily life. But, for Plotinus, reason is the essence of soul: it is what is left when all that which is associated with bodily life is removed from the nature of soul. Indeed, according to a notorious doctrine which Plotinus proclaims in *Enn.* IV, 8, ch. 8, part of us, our intellect, remains in the intelligible world, even if our soul is involved and preoccupied with material concerns. Philosophy helps us recover our consciousness of our life as intellect in the intelligible world. This life is a life of self-knowledge which is also knowledge of all eternal intelligible truths. Thus concentrating ourselves on the life of intellect, we live as the immortal, the divine, in which there can be no death.

But, as Plotinus indicates in *Enn.* I, 4, 4, 33, the wise man "knows what death is". The context of this statement is the ethical evaluation of death, the judgement that death – the death of loved ones, one's own death – is of little ethical significance to the wise man,³ who lives an eternal life as intellect. But we can suppose that the wise man also knows death as a natural phenomenon, knowing death, like Socrates in the

³ See Plato, *Rep.* III, 387d.

Phaedo, as the separation of soul from the body. Plotinus' wise man will know that soul has a natural function in illuminating and caring for the body; that this function is limited in time; that the body as the instrument of the soul can break, like the musician's lyre (I, 4, 16, 20-29); that in due course soul will be freed of the body and will be able to live its life, if it is purified, as intellect in the eternal and divine. This life is what Plotinus identifies as happiness in *Enn.* I, 4, chs. 3-4. This happiness is lived, not in time, but in an a-temporal 'now', where there is no non-being (the past, which is no more; the future, which is not yet). This 'now' is the totality of being, eternity, which finds its image in the fragmentation and dispersal of time (*Enn.* I, 5, ch. 7).⁴

In Plotinus, then, self-consciousness reaches full self-knowledge in the knowledge which soul attains of itself as intellect, as part of the intelligible world of eternal truths. The soul which has this self-knowledge also knows its functions in ordering bodily existence and the limits of these functions, which includes the death of the body which is intrinsic to these functions. The deathlessness of soul relates to its life as intellect, beyond time, in an a-temporal 'now'. In comparison with this life, the termination of soul's duties to the body is of little importance to what would make our happiness. Our awareness of our coming death (A), correctly thought (B) with respect to what death is, what it means to us, what we are as intellect, fits well with our consciousness of ourselves as intellect (C): death does not concern us, to the extent that we are intellect.

Conclusion

I have sketched a variety of positions taken by ancient Greek philosophers with regard to the relation between our awareness of our coming death (A) and our consciousness of ourselves as thinking beings, as capable of knowledge (C). In the case of Parmenides, it seems that these (A and C) are incompatible and irreconcilable: true thinking, true knowledge, does not admit of death, either in what it is or in what it thinks. Our coming death cannot be truly thought: it can only be a false

⁴ See Linguiti 2007, 19-49; L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: "If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present." (6.4311)

opinion. Philosophy, as the practice of true thinking, stands in contradiction to death. In the other cases, those of Plato, Epicurus and Plotinus, various ways of reconciling (A) and (C) can be found, whereby our awareness of our coming death (A), if thought correctly (B), can fit with our consciousness of ourselves, as thinking, as knowing (C). In the cases of Plato and Plotinus, in our existence as rational souls, as intellect, we share in the immortal and live a life free of death. Our death is a separation of soul from the body, which does not affect the immortality of soul. Death is just part of the natural existence of body; it frees soul to live the deathless life of knowledge. Philosophy opens the door to immortality and relativizes the importance of death. Curiously, Epicurus reaches a comparable resolution of the problem, albeit on the basis of very different arguments. Thinking correctly (B) about death and about what we are removes the fears generated by false conceptions of death and its consequences. In thinking and reaching knowledge of ourselves and of nature, we give ourselves the means for living a life of happiness, which is eternal in that it is lived fully and completely in the present moment and is comparable to the life of the gods. Even in Epicurus, through self-knowledge and knowledge of nature, we enjoy a kind of deathlessness, which, however, is not that of an infinite temporal extension. This taking part in deathlessness includes a true understanding of our coming death and of the fact that, in comparison with our present joy, it is of no concern to us. Curiously, in Plotinus, temporality and death also contrast with a deathless 'now'. But in Plotinus this 'now' transcends time. In general, then, I think we can say that for these ancient Greek philosophers, the perfection of our capacity to think, to know, in philosophy, is the way in which we can transcend death. Furthermore, for Plato, Epicurus and Plotinus, philosophy also helps us to understand, accept and evaluate our death for what it is.

REFERENCES

- Hadot, P. (2008) *N'oublie pas de vivre. Goethe et la tradition des exercices spirituels*. Paris.
- Linguisti, A. (2007) *Plotin traité 36* (I, 5). Paris.

LÓGOS И LÓGOI У ПЛОТИНА. ИХ ПРИРОДА И ФУНКЦИЯ

Люк БРИССОН

Национальный центр научных исследований, Париж

Если верить сообщению Порфирия (*Жизнь Плотина*, 21), Плотин пытался гармонизировать то, что он считал пифагорейскими первоначалами, с первоначалами Платона. Однако, поскольку Плотин жил в окружении, для которого было характерно доминирующее влияние стоических идей, легко понять, почему предложенный им синтез испытал глубокое влияние стоицизма. «Его произведения переполнены замаскированными стоическими и перипатетическими идеями», – говорит нам Порфирий (*Жизнь Плотина*, 14).

Все это особенно очевидно, когда речь заходит о понятии «логос» (λόγος). Плотин пытался синтезировать платонизм, помещающий Единое, Бытие и Душу за пределы космоса и отдельно от него, со стоическим витализмом, который наделял космос жизненной энергией, оформляющей его в бесконечной последовательности циклов.

Стоическая доктрина на физическом уровне

Стоики предлагают грандиозное видение космоса как божественного, живого, самозарождающегося тела, организованного по рациональным законам и методично управляемого Промыслом.¹ В основу своей космологии они помещают следующие два начала. Одно из них обладает только качеством подвластного бытия: это

¹ Эти несколько параграфов о стоиках написаны под впечатлением яркой работы Жака Брюнсвига (Brunschiwig 1998).

материя (ὕλη), лишенная всякого стремления, движения и инициативы; другое обладает способностью действовать, придавать форму, качество и движение материи. Это второе начало является «разумом»² (λόγος). Ничто в космосе не является «тем» или «этим», и ничто не может быть названо «тем» или «этим» без присутствия в нем этого, независимого от материи, начала. В таком контексте λόγος может так же называться «богом», поскольку его деятельность по характеру схожа с деятельностью творца космоса, хотя такого творца, чье искусство присутствует во всех порождениях природы. Доведя до предела понятие промежуточности материи, стоицизму пришлось признать в одном только логосе причину самых простых физических явлений, таких как четыре первоначала (огонь, воздух, вода, земля), и результат их соединения в чувственно воспринимаемых объектах. Вот почему стоицизм можно назвать «корпорализмом» или даже «материализмом»: воздействие логоса на материю и тела всегда остается материальным, телесным действием.

Действующий принцип, который стоики называют логосом, имеет и физическое имя – «огонь». Это не физический огонь, а нечто, включающее в себя все качества физического огня. Этот «огонь» есть энергия, и остальные три элемента (воздух, вода, земля) соответствуют трем состояниям, в которых он может проявляться, в газообразном, жидком или твердом. Помещая себя в традицию, восходящую к Гесиоду, стоики считали, что космос возник в результате ряда превращений бога, который в качестве творящего огня осуществляет порождение мира. Кроме того, возникновение в контексте бесконечной последовательности циклов неотделимо от своей гибели, наступающей в результате полного возгорания. Космос возвращается в то состояние, из которого он возник, причем каждый цикл является лишь повторением всех предшествующих. Это всегда одни и те же «семенные или зародышевые начала» (λόγοι σπέρματικοί), которые заново актуализируются в каждом случае.

² Как мы вскоре увидим, этот термин не следует понимать в его обычном смысле.

Тождественный богу огонь, идентифицируемый с логосом, может быть понят как огненное дыхание, вездесущая *πνεῦμα*. Во всех частях мира, наполненных и оформленных этой пневмой, горячий огонь ассоциируется с ростом, а холодный воздух характеризуется сжатием. Это колебание, которое одушевляет все тела и обеспечивает их согласованность, называется «напряжением» (*τόνος*), и оно различно в разных частях космоса. Оно называется «состоянием», «обладанием» или «сохранением» (*ἔξις*) в неодушевленных предметах, «ростом» (*φύσις*) у растений и деревьев, и «душой» (*ψυχή*) у живых существ.³ В любом случае его функцией является объединение всех тел, прежде всего тех, что в космосе.

В своем диахроническом аспекте эта единая и динамическая сплоченность мира соотносится с Промыслом, что приводит к знаменитой теории судьбы как детерминизма. С целью избежать столь строгого детерминизма стоики объясняли, что каждое событие имеет не одну единственную, но множество причин; однако это лишь смещало акценты в данной проблеме.

Структура идей Плотина

Столкнувшись с этой в высшей степени согласованной доктриной, Плотин сохранил верность Платону, выразив свои идеи в терминах трех «ипостасей», известных как Единое, Ум и Душа в качестве ипостаси, то есть душа, отделенная от всякого тела. В этих ипостасях нет ничего телесного, они представляют собой высший уровень действительности, который никоим образом не может быть сведен к телесному, как это было у стоиков.

Для того чтобы определить место Логоса в этой структуре и понять его функции, мы должны поставить вопрос об ипостаси Души. Вместе с вопросом о происхождении Души, вопрос о том, что отделяет ее от умопостигаемого, содержит в себе значительные трудности. В то время как Ум является «одним и многим», Душа является «многим и одним». В Уме всякое знание является одновременно и непосредственным, а в Душе происходит переход (*μετάβασις*) от одного элемента к другому, поскольку разум движется от предпосылки к заключению. Важной характеристикой

³ SVF II, 1013 = Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* IX 78.

Ума является вечность, Душа же ассоциируется со временем, которое возникает одновременно с Душой, что само по себе создает парадоксальную ситуацию, поскольку Душа, как и Ум, является вечной реальностью. Душа включает в себя последовательно и раздельно все то, что в одновременном и сжатом состоянии находится внутри Ума. Плотин выразил эту мысль с помощью λόγοι, которые внутри Души эквивалентны формам, или, говоря яснее, эти λόγοι суть формы на уровне Души. Душа причинно зависит от Ума, ведь Единое порождает Душу посредством Ума, а следствия всегда отличаются от причины. Точно так же и Ум, который в некотором смысле ответственен за сотворение чувственного мира, не может быть привлечен к ответственности за тот контроль, который душа осуществляет над этим миром.

На этом уровне предметом рассмотрения становится уже не Душа, независимая от всех форм телесности, но души, воплощенные в тела, такие как мировая душа и индивидуальные души.⁴ И хотя Плотин настаивает на единстве душ, мировая душа и индивидуальные души не являются частями находящейся над ними Души, что могло бы стать точкой сближения со стоицизмом; наоборот – они ее отражения. Мировая душа отличается от индивидуальных душ тем, что то тело, которое она порождает и одушевляет, лучше человеческого тела. Более того, ее не волнуют те проблемы, которыми обеспокоены души людей, и даже животных, хотя Плотин, который верил в реинкарнацию,⁵ все-таки заинтересован в этой разновидности душ.

Ниже тел мы находим материю, их конституирующее основание, которую можно помыслить как эманацию нижней части мировой души.⁶

⁴ Души богов, демонов, людей, животных и даже растений также следует отнести к этой группе.

⁵ См. об этом Deuse 1983.

⁶ Разногласия по этому поводу продолжаются. Денис О'Брайн считает, что существует эманация материи и настойчиво доказывает это в своих двух книгах: O'Brien 1991 и 1993. Жан-Марк Нарбонн занимает более осторожную позицию и обращает внимание на ряд нюансов (Narbonne 1993).

Λόγος и λόγοι у Плотина

Как и ранее у Платона, это грандиозное теоретическое построение призвано согласовать две особенности нашего мира: видимость детерминизма в материи и сохранение порядка, позволяющего людям вообще и философам в частности определить свое место в мире и найти в нем применение своей мысли и ее словесному выражению, что само по себе предполагает определенную стабильность в пространстве изменений.

Но как нам соотнести друг с другом уровни этого построения? Ответ непрост для платоников, потому что для них, – в отличие от стоиков, которые воздействие на тела объясняли посредством логоса, телесного агента, уподобленного теплomu дыханию, – всякое действие, в том числе и телесной природы, должно происходить из области бестелесного и даже умопостигаемого. Кроме того, эта задача осложняется отказом от фигуры «демиурга», выведенного в *Тимее* Платона в качестве ремесленника, который начал работать после того, как поразмышлял.

У стоиков Плотин заимствует не только термины Λόγος и λόγοι, но также и доктрину, которую он, тем не менее, перемещает в платонический контекст. Когда слово «логос» в *Эннеадах* не употребляется в таких обычных значениях, как «речь», «учение», «разумная способность» или даже «математическая пропорция»,⁷ оно приобретает стоическую окраску или даже соответствует аристотелевскому словоупотреблению. Как и у Аристотеля, у Плотина «логос» отсылает к разумному содержанию. Правда, в платонической перспективе это разумное содержание предполагает существование форм, на которых он основан и которые призван выражать и проявлять.

Следовательно, логосы (λόγοι) представляют собой выражения форм в разумной речи, в то же время соответствуя тем активным началам, которые моделируют формы в чувственно воспринимаемом мире. В этом контексте Логос (Λόγος) представляет собой набор логосов (λόγοι), которые делают возможным как размышление, так и порождение и организацию чувственно воспринимаемого мира. Точнее, Логос соответствует процессу перехода от Ума

⁷ Систематическое описание представлено в Sleeman–Pollet 1980.

к разумной или творческой душе на всех уровнях ее проявления, будь то Душа в качестве ипостаси, мировая душа или индивидуальные души.⁸ Чаще всего в этой связи цитируется следующий отрывок (*Энн.* I 2 [19], 3, 27–30):

Как произнесенное слово (λόγος) представляет собой имитацию (μίμημα) слова (λόγος) в душе, так и логос (λόγος) в душе есть имитация логоса в чем-то еще:⁹ как произнесенное слово (ὁ [λόγος] ἐν профорᾷ)¹⁰ расколото на части по сравнению со словом в душе, так и логос в Душе сопоставим с тем, что находится перед ним и что он истолковывает (ἐρμενεύς).

Плотин принимает стоическое различие между речью как мышлением (внутренним голосом души) и речью произнесенной посредством чувственно воспринимаемых звуков. Однако он перемещает это различие на иной онтологический уровень. Теперь логос, выраженный чувственно воспринимаемыми звуками сопоставляется с логосом в гипостазированной Душе, а логос-мысль сопоставляется с логосом в Уме, то есть, строго говоря, с областью умопостигаемого. На основании этой пропорции из четырех терминов можно теперь заключить, что Логос в гипостазированной Душе истолковывает Логос в Уме.

1. Логосы (λόγοι) в гипостазированной Душе

В Уме умопостигаемые формы присутствуют ὁμοῦ πάντα («все вместе») и абсолютно одновременно, в гипостазированной же Душе они раскрываются в дискурсивной последовательности, отделенными друг от друга так же, как они проявляются в уме в процессе размышления или в речи в процессе говорения. Теперь становится

⁸ Индивидуальные души в данном контексте мы почти не затрагиваем. Подробнее об этом см. специальную работу о психологии Плотина: Blumenthal 1971.

⁹ Из контекста ясно, что поскольку здесь речь идет о Душе, то иной реальностью будет Ум.

¹⁰ Техническое стоическое выражение. См. *SVF* II, 135 = Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VIII, 275. См. также *Энн.* V 1 [10] 3, 7–8; и даже Arist., *Anal. post.* A 10, 76b24–25.

понятным, почему, указывая на одну и ту же реальность, Плотин использует Логос (Λόγος) в единственном числе, когда речь идет об Уме, и логосы (λόγοι) во множественном – когда он имеет в виду Душу. Правда, последнее проявление может все же рассматриваться в качестве Логоса как совокупности всех логосов, причем множественное число выражает идею делимости во времени и пространстве.

В этой доктрине, в данном случае относящейся лишь к Душе в качестве ипостаси, соблюдаются две важнейшие предпосылки платонизма Плотина: 1) что низшее никогда не отсекается от своей причины; душа не отсекается от Ума, поскольку умопостигаемые сущности присутствуют здесь особым способом в качестве логосов, и 2) что космос возникает в результате созерцания. Подобно Аристотелю и стоикам Плотин отказывается от идеи творца, который, на манер платоновского демиурга, занимался бы оформлением материи с целью создания мира чувственно воспринимаемых вещей. Подлинным демиургом платоновского *Тимея* Плотин считает Ум. Однако этот демиург не творит: он передает свой Логос Душе, которая использует логосы для оформления чувственно воспринимаемых вещей способом, который подробнее мы рассмотрим ниже. Суть его, однако, состоит в следующем: Душа принимает в себя умопостигаемые формы в качестве нематериальных логосов, которые затем отражаются в низшей части мировой души, то есть в природе. Приняв эти логосы, природа начинает воздействовать на материю, тем самым создавая тела и поддерживая объединяющий их порядок. В конечном итоге можно утверждать, что Душа в качестве ипостаси представляет собой совокупность всех логосов, которые суть формы, одновременно присущие Уму и дискурсивно гипостазированной Душе.

Эти соображения позволяют перевести термин Λόγος в единственном числе как «Разум» или, во множественном числе, как «рациональные формулы» (λόγοι). В единственном числе, то есть на уровне Ума или даже гипостазированной Души, он означает совокупность всех логосов. Во множественном числе ситуация осложняется, ведь, поскольку возникновение у Плотина неотделимо от созерцания, логосы одновременно оказываются и разум-

ным содержанием, и правилами, законами или формулами, управляющими процессом порождения чувственно воспринимаемой действительности низшей частью мировой души.¹¹

2. Логосы (λόγοι) в мировой душе

Опустимся на уровень ниже гипостазированной Души. Хотя, по определению, она никак не связана с телами, ее можно помыслить интуитивным образом как нечто присущее всем остальным душам, оживляющим и организующим телесный мир, таким как душа мира (то есть космоса) и индивидуальные души (то есть души богов, демонов, людей, животных и растений). Можно пойти дальше и сказать, что, грубо говоря, индивидуальные души есть лишь аспекты мировой души. Они являются сестрами мировой души, отделившимися от нее и утратившими с нею связь.¹²

Применив принцип, согласно которому всякая душа действует на двух уровнях, можно сказать, что мировая душа, рассматриваемая в аспекте своей продуктивности, должна быть помещена на уровень природы, в то время как на более высоком уровне, в качестве оформительницы вещей посредством созерцательной активности, она может быть понята как Промысел. В мировой душе мы вновь встречаемся с оппозицией дискурсивного разума (διάνοια) и ума (νοῦς), которая проявляется в каждой индивидуальной душе.

2.1. Порождение: природа

В качестве низшего аспекта мировой души, или ее продуктивной части, природа может быть определена как множественность рациональных формул (λόγοι), организованных в систему. Так что она обладает, одной ей присущим образом, совокупностью умопостигаемых форм, которые соответствуют всем явлениям чувственно воспринимаемого мира, как одушевленного, так и неодушевленного. Именно природа в качестве организующего начала способна объяснить не только то, что лошадь – это лошадь постольку, поскольку физически существующая лошадь создана по

¹¹ С известной долей условности можно даже соотнести эти «рациональные формулы» с компьютерной «программой».

¹² Об этом см. *Епп.* IV 8 [6], 4.5–10; IV 3 [27], 4.14–21 & 6.10–25.

образу умопостигаемой Лошади, но также и то, что камень является камнем потому, что чувственно воспринимаемый камень оформлен в соответствии с моделью умопостигаемого Камня. Такое представление о вещах обусловлено отказом от креативистской (artificialist) метафоры.

2.1.1. Отказ от креативистской метафоры

Приняв без обсуждения критику Аристотеля, которая, по его мнению, направлена на ложные толкования диалога *Тимей*, Плотин дистанцировался от креативистской метафоры, предложенной Платоном, а именно от образа демиурга, который оформил чувственно воспринимаемый мир, созерцая умопостигаемые формы. Отказавшись от посредничества демиурга, работающего как ремесленник, Плотин перенес роль организующего материю агента на Душу, оживляющую космос и создающую тела. Приблизившись посредством такого построения к стоическому корпорализму или материализму, он, тем не менее, постарался подчеркнуть роль Ума и умопостигаемого мира для того, чтобы избежать крайнего имманентизма, который сделал бы невозможным разделение трех ипостасей – Единого, Ума и Души. Он показывает, что даже гипостазированная Душа, с которой связаны мировая душа и индивидуальные души, не есть абсолютное начало, но выводится из высшего начала, Ума. Последний же может считаться демиургом особого рода – не размышляющим и не работающим. Плотин объясняет эту стратегию в *Энн. III* 2 [47], 2, 8–42. Наш космос – это живое существо, составленное из материи и форм.¹³ Его существование обусловлено тем обстоятельством, что материя в своей совокупности восприняла форму, обеспечившую ее организацию. Однако для того, чтобы материя могла быть организована посредством форм, необходимо активное начало, и для космоса, который не является результатом труда ремесленника, но есть порождение природы, это активное начало не может быть сведено к мастеру, который лишь размышляет, подсчитывает и работает. Активным началом оказывается Душа, которая формирует материю для того,

¹³ Следующие параграфы написаны под впечатлением работы Жозефа Моро (Moreau 1970, 37–45).

чтобы произвести тела, прилагая к четырем материальным первоначалам (огню, воздуху, воде и земле) формальный принцип, их организующий. Но для того, чтобы передать эту форму материи Душа должна была получить ее. От кого? Очевидно, от Ума, который, в свою очередь, занимает подчиненное положение по отношению к Единому.

2.1.2. Возникновение чувственно воспринимаемого космоса

Душа представляет собой ипостась, которая происходит от другой ипостаси, являющейся ее причиной, – от Ума, зависящего, в свою очередь, от Единого. Опираясь на *Тимей* (35a-b), Плотин настаивает на промежуточном характере Души, расположенной между тем, что по сути неделимо, умопостигаемым началом, и тем, что разделено в телах. При этом он уточняет, что душа попадает в тела случайно. Она разделена в телах, так как в каждом теле есть своя душа, и неделима в умопостигаемом мире. Она везде и нигде, как повторяет в *Сентенциях* Порфирий.

Таким способом Плотин различает между божественной, цельной душой (ἡ ὅλη ψυχή), Душой в качестве ипостаси, которая вечно пребывает с Умом, и частными душами. Божественная или цельная Душа – это то, что обычно называется гипостазированной Душой. К этой уникальной Душе присоединяются все остальные души, такие как мировая душа и человеческие души. Все они пребывают в состоянии единства в виде одной единственной души до того, как распространяются во все стороны подобно лучам света, который, достигая земли, распределяется по ней, оставаясь при этом нераздельным. Мировая душа (ἡ ψυχή τοῦ πάντος) порождает тела и управляет ими. Чтобы понять этот процесс во всей его полноте, необходимо напомнить в общих чертах о том, как устроен мир. Гипостазированная Душа принимает в себя умопостигаемые формы (εἶδη), взятые в модусе «разумов» (λόγοι). Низшая часть мировой души, ее вегетативная сила, или природа, засеивает этими «разумами» (λόγοι) материю (ὑλη). Так возникает тело (σῶμα), которое может быть описано как совокупность качеств (ποιότητες), прикрепившихся к ὅκος – к части материи (ὑλη), наделенной величиной (μέγεθος). Иными словами, тело есть состав, состоящий из материи (ὑλη), с которой связана конкретная величина

(μέγεθος), наделенная определенными качествами (ποιότητες). В конечном итоге, эта величина и качества обусловлены «разумами», то есть формами, помещенными в материю (ἐνυλὰ εἶδη). Тело может быть живым или неживым. Каждое живое тело оживляется вегетативной силой, ответственной за питание, рост и размножение, и эта сила непосредственно восходит к мировой душе. В случае человека, отец передает эту силу через семя, которое, попадая в матку, производит эмбрион. В момент рождения человеческая душа, пришедшая извне, соединяется с вегетативной душой, ожививший эмбрион, в результате чего рождается человек. При этом благодаря своему уму (νοῦς) человеческая душа не утрачивает своей связи с высшим началом.

В *Энн.* IV 3 [27], 10, 10–42 говорится о том, как возникает космос. Последний параграф этого отрывка примечателен рассуждением о том, в каком смысле, в данном контексте, мир может быть назван «полным богов», в соответствии с изречением, приписываемым Фалесу.¹⁴ Космос представляет собой художественное творение, возникшее не в результате деятельности внешней причины, вроде демиурга платоновского *Тимея*, но порожденное из самого себя внутренней причиной – организующей силой, известной как природа. Как будто кусок мрамора сам придал себе форму Венеры Милосской.¹⁵ Что же такое природа? Это сила, соответствующая низшей части мировой души, той части, которая вступает в контакт с материей. Упорядочивание, которому она подвергает материю, обусловлено действием рациональных формул (логосов), которые, в гипостазированной Душе, соответствуют умопостигаемым формам, и пребывают в модусе рассеяния, а не в состоянии единовременности, подобно умопостигаемым формам в Уме. С помощью присущих ей рациональных формул, адаптированных для ее уровня, мировая душа способна упорядочить материю и породить все тела, как одушевленные, такие как лошадь или дерево, так и неодушевленные, такие как камень. С этой точки зрения можно заключить, что чувственно воспринимаемый мир представляет собой образ всех рациональных формул, содержащихся в

¹⁴ Согласно свидетельству Аристотеля (*De Anima*, A5, 411a7).

¹⁵ См. *SVF* II, 1044 = Alexandr. Aphrodis., *De Mixt.*, p. 225.18 ff Bruns.

мировой душе. На этом низшем уровне Плотин проводит очень интересное различие между действием душевным и телесным. Оба эти действия стремятся уподобить себе другие сущности посредством рациональных формул, которые они усвоили. Однако если душа всегда бодрствует, тело в активной роли выступает лишь опосредованно, под воздействием других тел. Дерево дает тепло лишь сгорая, душа же поддерживает жизненные силы непрерывно.

И все же душевные силы на любом уровне приходят в нее извне. Лишь при посредстве логосов души – как мировая душа, так и отдельные души, все вместе связанные с гипостазированной Душой, – сохраняют, как это объясняется в главе 17 *Энн.* II 3 [52], связь с Умом. Космос есть порождение природы, а не искусства. Это порождение не зависит от размышления или понятий, но представляет собой результат действия силы, запечатлевающей себя в материи. Ум передает присущие ему умопостигаемые формы гипостазированной Душе, в которой они становятся рациональными формулами. Гипостазированная Душа затем передает эти рациональные формулы мировой душе, которая порождает одушевленные и неодушевленные сущности, как будто выполняя приказание свыше. Ответственность за эти творения лежит на низшей части мировой души, которая в своих действиях опирается на низшую форму разума, присущую ей самой. Именно это обстоятельство объясняет несовершенство творений и присутствие зла в чувственно воспринимаемом мире, несмотря на то, что он по-прежнему управляется Промыслом.

2.2. Созерцание: Промысел

Как и другие души, мировая душа одной своей частью постоянно контактирует с Умом. Именно эта высшая часть мировой души может быть соотнесена с Промыслом – своего рода правовым сводом, установленным в области умопостигаемого, – который, как Плотин объясняет в *Энн.* IV 3 [27], 15, 15–23, управляет космосом.

Если попытаться выразить одной фразой то, что Плотин хотел сказать в трактатах 47 (*Энн.* III 2) и 48 (*Энн.* III 3), можно сказать, что Промысел следует понимать как совокупность логосов, взятых не в их продуктивной функции, в качестве организующих начал

для материи, но в роли хранителей, поддерживающих упорядоченный мир в неизменном состоянии,¹⁶ которое, как мы видели, есть лишь отражение структуры умопостигаемого космоса, возникшего при посредстве логосов, являющихся слепами умопостигаемых форм.

Однако это естественным образом порождает две проблемы: вопрос о пределах детерминизма и проблему существования зла, на которую указывает последняя строка упомянутого отрывка.

Как это видно из трактата 3 (III, 1), следует различать судьбу и Промысел. Божественный Промысел (соответствующий, *grosso modo*, деятельности мировой души) определяет общую структуру становления, не проявляя себя в каждом конкретном случае. Следовательно, имеет смысл различать причины отдаленные и ближайшие. Вор и убийца несут ответственность за свои поступки, в то время как вся совокупность космических причин не может быть объявлена сопричастной тому, что неприемлемо. Даже так называемые «смягчающие» обстоятельства не избавляют от бремени принятия решения. И все же Плотин не совсем отказывается от понятия судьбы (*fatum*), той самой, о которой мы говорим тогда, когда непредвиденные события случаются с кажущейся неизбежностью. Избыток реальности, придаваемый тому, что не может быть предусмотрено, но все-таки случается, не может быть устранен кинической логикой: «Таков порядок вещей». И хотя зло не присуще богам, а человек свободен, все происходящее происходит в рамках мирового порядка. Согласно Плотину судьба проявляет себя в качестве остаточного следа Промысла: не в качестве необходимого связующего звена, как, например, при смене времен года или определении траекторий движения планет, но все же звена, которое позволяет, до некоторой степени, предусмотреть наши действия. По этой причине Плотин не отвергает астрологию и гадания.

Вопрос о зле возвращает нас к заключительной стадии в рождении низшей части мировой души, стадии материи. Начав с

¹⁶ Такое функциональное разделение не следует абсолютизировать, так как оно вводится лишь для ясности изложения (см. *Enn.* VI 9 [8], 9.7–11).

Платона и Аристотеля, Плотин заканчивает метафизической конструкцией, которая противоположна концепции Аристотеля. Идея действительного разделения таких начал, как Благо и «зло само по себе» была одной из причин разрыва между Аристотелем и Платоном. Конечно же, Аристотель признает в *Категориях*, что добро и зло относятся к различным родам, однако он не делает их противоположными началами. Что же касается Плотина, то по его представлению «максимальное отстояние» добра от зла не сводится к различию между родом добрых и родом злых сущностей, но предполагает наличие двух абсолютных начал, внешних по отношению друг к другу. Иными словами, если Аристотель признает лишь индивидуальные злые явления, которые могут затем быть сгруппированы в род злого, согласно Плотину существует зло как таковое, источник всякого зла, воздействующий на сущности. Два основных тезиса трактата, а именно, вопрос о существовании зла, самого по себе и отдельного от всего иного, то есть источника всех конкретных проявлений зла; и идентификация этого абсолютного зла с материей, – многим не давали впоследствии покоя, в том числе и в рамках неоплатонической традиции. Вне всякого сомнения, наиболее ясная и точная критика позиции Плотина в отношении статуса зла содержится в главах 30–37 трактата Прокла *De malorum subsistentia*.

Итак, стремясь остаться верным Платону в стоическом окружении, Плотин развил учение о логосах (λόγοι), которое позволило ему, во-первых, описать порождение мира, не прибегая к технической метафоре, и, во-вторых, противостоять стоическому детерминизму, не отрицая существования необходимости и признавая наличие зла.

БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ

- Brunschwig, Jacques (1998²), in *Philosophie Grecque* [1987], Premier cycle (Paris) 534–548 (рус. пер. Канто-Спенсер М., ред. (2008) *Греческая философия*, в 2-х тт. (Москва), т. 2, с. 560 сл.)
- Deuse, Werner (1983) *Untersuchungen zur mittelpatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre*, Mainz. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur 3. Wiesbaden: Steiner.

- O'Brien, Denis (1991) *Plotinus on the origin of matter. An exercise in the interpretation of the Enneads, Elenchos* supp. 22. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
- O'Brien, Denis (1993) *Théodicée plotinienne et théodicée gnostique*, *Philosophia antiqua* 57. Leiden: Brill.
- Narbonne, Jean-Marc (1993) *Plotin, Les deux matières* (Ennéade II 4 [12]), introd. texte grec, trad. et comm., *Histoire des Doctrines de l'Antiquité classique* 17. Paris: Vrin.
- Sleeman J., Pollet G. (1980) *Lexicon Plotinianum*. Leiden: Brill / Leuven: Univ. Press.
- Blumenthal H. J. (1971) *Plotinus' psychology. His doctrines of the embodied soul*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Moreau, Joseph (1970) *Plotin ou La gloire de la philosophie antique*, *Bibliothèque de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*. Paris: Vrin.

Перевод Е. В. Афонасина
Новосибирский государственный университет

FAMILY, POLITICAL POWER AND MONEY IN THE NEOPLATONIC SCHOOL OF ATHENS

LUC BRISSON
CRNS – Paris

1. *The family of Plutarch*

The history of the Neoplatonic School of Athens is associated with that of a family that goes back to a certain Nestorios, who occupied a religious function during the second half of the 4th century. When, toward the end of the 4th century, the supporters of Iamblichus managed to gain the upper hand at Athens, Plutarch, grandson of this Nestorios, became the first leader of the Platonic School to join this tendency, which made him, in the eyes of his successors and even of modern historians of philosophy, the founder of the Neoplatonic School of Athens. This Plutarch belonged to a wealthy family, attached to the values of religion at least since the time of the aforementioned Nestorios. This Nestorios had a son, Hierios, and a daughter, Asclepigeneia (the elder). Since Marinus specifies that it was she who transmitted the secrets of theurgy to Proclus, we may suppose that Asclepigeneia died without descendants, for it was to her children that she should have transmitted the secrets that belonged within her family, which went back at least as far as Nestorios, grandfather of Plutarch, who was succeeded by Syrianus at his death in 432. Hierios taught philosophy “under Proclus”, who became diadoch upon the death of Syrianus in 437. This Hierios had two sons, Plutarch and Archiadas.¹

¹ On the history of the School of Athens, see the Introduction of Saffrey in Saffrey–Westerink 1968, ix–xxxv, and the genealogical table at p. xxxv.

We know nothing about this Plutarch, except that he was the contemporary of Pamprepius, grammarian and poet and ambitious politician (*Philos. hist.* 112A–C and 115C)² and Hermeias the rhetor, who came to Athens around 460. Archiadas, who should have been born around 415, must have been slightly younger than Proclus, who was born in 412. In 432, Plutarch, on his deathbed, commended Archiadas and Proclus to Syrianus, who had been their teacher. Syrianus, who had become head of the School, therefore took them into his large house, close to the Asclepieion and the temple of Dionysus and visible from the Acropolis; the house had been left to them by Plutarch, who had also lived there. Proclus became the mentor of Archiadas, and a very strong friendship developed between them (*V. Procl.* 12, 27–36). Archiadas married Plutarchê, with whom he had a daughter, Asclepigeneia (the younger, *V. Procl.* 29, 5–6).³

It was in favor of this Asclepigeneia that the miraculous healing obtained by Proclus' prayers occurred (*V. Procl.* 29). The event has been situated in the course of the decade 440–450, on the basis of this remark: “Indeed, at that time, the city still had the good fortune of benefitting from the presence of the god, and the temple of the Savior had not yet been sacked.” (*V. Procl.* 29, 19–21)⁴ If Asclepigeneia was “still a little girl raised by her parents” (*V. Procl.* 29, 7–8) between 440 and 450, that means that she was born between 430 and 440, very probably around 435, if one takes into account another anecdote concerning Theagenes (see *infra*), who was to become her husband.

The *Souda* relates the following anecdote about Theagenes, which should probably be situated in 447, right after the pillage of Athens by Attila: “Whereas most of this property had been pillaged, and when he realized that Theagenes, who was still a child, was sad at the sight of the destruction and devastation, Archiadas declared: ‘you must recover your confidence at once, and thank the gods for having saved our lives, instead of letting yourself be discouraged by the loss of our property. Indeed, if Athena Poliades had ordered us to spend this property for the

² That is Damascius, *The Philosophical history* (= *Philos. hist.*), Athanassiadi 1999, 269 n. 301. For a critical review, see Brisson 2001.

³ Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le bonheur* (= *V. Procli*), Saffrey–Segonds 2001.

⁴ On the aggressivity of the Christians, see Henri Dominique Saffrey (1990 a, b).

Panathenaia, we would have made the necessary expenditures. In fact, we must consider the present trial as more filled with glory and piety than that of the Panathenaia or any other festival'." (*Philos. hist.* 105A) This is why he was known as the "most pious Archiadas". As far as Theagenes is concerned, to whom this edifying response was given, Archiadas may have adopted him, or at least have already chosen him as his future son-in-law, since he himself had only a daughter and no son to transmit his property to. If this was the case, the anecdote would take on a particularly poignant aspect, for it was when contemplating the ruin of the property that was to be his, and which was also the property of the School of Athens, that Theagenes would have been overwhelmed with despair. This would place the birth of Theagenes between 430 and 440, and hence around 435, like Asclepigeneia: at the time, he must have been between 12 and 17 years old.

Born at Athens, Theagenes came from a noble family: his father's name may have been Ichtyas (*Philos. hist.* 100A, B). He was said to have been the descendant of such great figures as Miltiades and Plato. His marriage with Asclepigeneia, the only daughter of the wealthy aristocrat Archiadas, might explain the fact that Theagenes quickly became well-known. Theagenes seems to have made concessions to Christianity. These concessions, together with the abrupt character of Marinus, seem to have precipitated the break between Theagenes and Marinus.

From the marriage of Theagenes to Asclepigeneia, daughter of Archiadas, a son, Hegias, was born in about 465. Despite his youth (he may have been around 15 at the time), he was accepted into the classes Proclus gave on the *Chaldaean Oracles* near the end of his life (*V. Procli* 26, 46-55), that is, between 480 and 485. Hegias played a part in the School between Proclus's death in 485 and the arrival of Damascius as head of the School. He therefore knew Marinus, who led the School until his death, which must have occurred between 495 and 500, but he was primarily the student of Isidorus. After the death of Isidorus, he must have taught philosophy in the School, which he probably directed, together with Asclepiodotus, at the very end of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th century. He must have been quite bad at it, however, for according to Damascius, under his direction philosophy fell into deep disrepute in Athens, probably because Hegias' fascination with religion entailed a lack of interest in philosophical questions (*Philos. hist.* 145A, B).

Hegias had two sons, who must have been born at the end of the 5th or the beginning of the 6th century: Eupeithios and Archiadas, named after his great-grandfather. Eupeithios, gifted with intelligence, had a taste only for private life. Archiadas, for his part, had no predisposition for philosophy: he was a pious man, although involved with life in the world (*Philos. hist.* 145A, B). Thus, the influence of Plutarch's family in the Neoplatonic School of Athens died out.

Politics

In order to keep teaching Plato, whose philosophy was considered as a theology that was to be harmonized with all other pagan theologies, in an Athens where the Christians had acquired political power, it was necessary to have considerable protection. Plutarch's family also played a political role of the first importance at Athens.

The relations Proclus maintained with Archiadas, son of Plutarch, illustrate this kind of relation. Proclus, who had acquired the moral virtues by reading the political works of Aristotle, in addition to Plato's *Laws* and *Republic*, encouraged Archiadas, to whom he also gave lessons in financial liberality, "not only to concern himself with the affairs of the city in general, but also to show himself to be benevolent with regard to each person in particular, displaying all the kinds of political virtue, and above all justice". (*V. Procli* 14, 10-14) Everything indicates that the wealth and political power of Archiadas were a powerful aid to the School, although Proclus himself intervened from time to time at a political level : "Sometimes as well, the philosopher himself became involved in political deliberations: he attended the public assemblies on the affairs of the city, gave his opinion wisely, addressed requests <to the> governors to defend what was right, and not only encouraged them, but, in a certain way, by making use of the freedom of speech proper to a philosopher, he constrained them to give each person his due" (*V. Procli* 15, 1-8). We may imagine that Proclus had to expend a great deal of effort to defend himself against the attacks, which the Christians launched against him. Archiadas helped him, and this was true, perhaps even more so, in the case of Theagenes, who, as we have just seen, Archiadas must have adopted in order to make him his son-in-law.

Theagenes was a figure of the first importance in Athens. Damascius describes him as an archon: the title of eponymous archon, which was purely honorific at Athens, was sought after by the members of the local aristocracy (*Philos. hist.* 100A). Theagenes was a member of the Roman Senate, and a member of the Senate of the capital, Constantinople. If the panegyric composed in his honor by Pamprepis was written before 476, this means that Theagenes was already a senator by this time. He was a skilled orator with a pleasant character, assisting cities and individuals by his wealth. At Athens, he gave his support to teachers and to doctors. Damascius even describes him as a philosopher. However, relations became difficult between the philosopher, Damascius, and the wealthy politician, Theagenes. According to Damascius, Theagenes let himself be led by flatterers to despise philosophy, which implies that he compromised with the Christians in one way or another.

All indications are that the family's political influence continued after the death of Theagenes, particularly with Hegias, whose behavior Damascius criticizes (*Philos. hist.* 145A–B). Although “Hegias was better than his father in the virtue of eloquence”, he does not seem to have helped the School as much as his father: “In Hegias there was also something of the generosity of Theagenes, but he was more attentive than the latter in his expenditures in favor of his friends and of the poor”. What is more, Theagenes seems to have been less interested in philosophy than in the *Chaldean Oracles*, to which he had been initiated by Proclus, as we said above. This is probably what Damascius implies in this severe judgment on the period in which Hegias must have led the Academy: “We have never heard it said that philosophy was more despised at Athens than what we had the opportunity of seeing under Hegias”. Damascius, moreover, hints that Hegias was surrounded by Christians, probably on his wife's side of the family: “Those people corrupted Hegias' life, pushing him to a practice of philosophy that was not legitimate. It was by following another path that he desired to know everything that allows nature to be explained. Sometimes, following this other method, he even departed from correct reasoning. Wishing to be the most pious of men, he carried out the sacred rites on the territory of Attica for those close to him without notifying them, since he had not persuaded them to carry out those rites himself; thus, he overturned many religious

practices that were very long established, with a zeal that was more inconsiderate than pious. This is why he was denounced in the city, and gained dangerous enemies, who wished to seize his vast wealth and set traps for him, relying on the current laws". This passage is enigmatic, but it suggests that part of Hegias' circle was made up of Christians, and that these people had led him away from the paths of Platonism, particularly with regard to "nature": perhaps an allusion to the question of creation and hence of the origin of the world. In addition, his one-upmanship in the field of pagan religion inspired the disapproval of his fellow-citizens and drew upon him the ill-will of people who wanted to see him fall, by despoiling him or hauling him into court. It is understandable that the members of the School considered this behavior unnecessarily provocative.

Money

Perhaps more than its political support, it was the School's financial independence that allowed it to maintain itself for so long in the hostile atmosphere of the Christians, who, if we may believe some testimonies, tried to plunder it on several occasions.

The Neoplatonic School of Athens did not directly continue the School organized by Plato: its geographical location and its economic basis were different. The Neoplatonic School of Athens was no longer situated in the Academy, but in a large house at the foot of the Acropolis, which had been owned by Plutarch, and which he had transmitted first to his grandson Archiadas, and then, through him, to Theagenes, his daughter's husband, and to their descendants. Finally, the School was a private philosophical community living off the income from its property. Hence the importance of its benefactors, and of the main one, who belonged to the family of Plutarch and must have been the manager of this property.

In Proclus' time, the Academy possessed a capital, constituted from a bequest by Plutarch and by private gifts that produced more than a thousand *nomismata* per year: "The property possessed by the successors of Plato did not have their origin in Plato's fortune, as most people believe. Plato was poor, and possessed only the garden of the Academy, the income from which was three *nomismata*: the income from their

total fortune amounted to one thousand *nomismata*⁵ or more under Proclus, because many people, at their death, bequeathed their possessions to the school" (*Philos. hist.* 102). What did this wealth consist in, land or money? Probably both, but in what proportion? We cannot say. Proclus himself was one of the donors: "In addition, Proclus inspired a kind of emulation in Archiadas, for he offered him a model of liberality with regard to money and munificence, because he made gifts, sometimes to his friends, sometimes to his relatives, whether they were foreigners or co-citizens, and because in every circumstance he showed himself above the desire to acquire wealth. He also attributed large sums for public buildings, and at his death his left property, first to Archiadas, and then to his fatherland, as well as to Athens." (V. *Procli* 17, 14-22) Everything leads us to believe that the gift Proclus made to Archiadas was in fact made to the School, of which Archiadas was still the manager in 412. These financial resources guaranteed the School's independence with regard to the City, from which it did not expect grants, and from its auditors, who did not have to pay fees as was the case at Alexandria. We may assume that this property was confiscated, although a text by Olympiodorus implies that even in 560, the essential part of the School's property had been preserved.

With Marinus, relations seem to have deteriorated between the philosopher and Theagenes, son-in-law and heir of Archiadas, the benefactor on whom the political and financial support of School relied. Initially, Damascius has nothing but praise: "Marinus kept to the traditional gravity of philosophers, and respected Theagenes as was appropriate. With regard to Marinus, then, Theagenes was not a braggart, rough, or haughty in his approach nor difficult in his relations, nor, in general, did he seek to be of the condition of an ordinary man, but he showed himself to be welcoming, and escorted him, rendering him the honors that were due, as should be rendered by a man who occupied the first position in the city, and perhaps in the entire Roman Empire" [...] That is why Marinus tried to increase the grandeur of his reputation

⁵ A *nomisma* (in Greek) is a *solidus* (in Latin). In those days, a doctor was on an annual basis paid 35 solidi, and a stone carver 12 solidi. So 1000 *nomismata* was a large amount of money.

in all things.” (*Philos. hist.* 100 A, B) The portrait sketched here of Theagenes, as a public figure, is flattering. In contrast, Marinus was a difficult man: “Although Marinus was abrupt in his relations, he was pleasant in his actions and manifested great perspicacity”. What seems to have been the turning point, however, was the change in relations between Theagenes and the Christians: “Yet since he was moody and could not stand it when people paid him no mind, and wanted, on the contrary, to be flattered by everyone, and above all by those who practiced philosophy, that he looked down upon the others and spat upon them, and especially those who seemed to be in power and who tried to shine in the imperial government. Since he preferred the new dogmas to the ancient customs of piety, he did not realize that he was falling into the way of life of the vulgar, separating himself from the Hellenes and his more ancient ancestors. Nor did he realize that the people around him were no longer true friends, but deceptive flatterers. He no longer maintained his previous respect for philosophy, and whereas in theory, he surrounded himself with philosophers, in fact they were flatterers.” (*Philos. hist.* 100 A) This convoluted text insinuates that Theagenes had compromised himself with the Christians and had separated himself from the Platonic philosophers. Without having converted, Theagenes seems to have distanced himself from the School of Athens, probably because it was the best way to save his fortune, his social position, and his political power. Indeed, it seems that political tensions were high at this period, between 495 and 500. At one point, Marinus, fearing for his life, had to leave Athens and take refuge at Epidaurus. At Marinus’ death, which happened a few months later, Isidorus even considered leaving Athens (*Philos. hist.* 101 C).

After Marinus’ death, the School of Athens was led jointly by Asclepiodotus and by Hegias. Under their direction, the School entered a period of decadence on the philosophical level, for Hegias seems to have been more interested in pagan religion than in philosophy. What is more, his provocation in the field of religion increased the number of his enemies, who sought to plunder him or take him to court. Beginning in 515, Damascius tried to set things right, particularly by re-establishing the entire program of studies (of Aristotle, Plato, and the *Chaldean Oracles*). It may have been precisely this renaissance that was the cause of the order given by Justinian in 529, under the consulate of Flavius

Decius Junior and sent to Athens, which forbade the teaching of philosophy.⁶ Damascius left Athens, but he thought this exile would only be temporary.⁷

The Neoplatonic School of Athens seems to have been closely linked to the life of a family of aristocrats, originally associated with practice of pagan cults, possessing a considerable personal fortune and exerting no inconsiderable political influence. It was in a house belonging to this family that the activities of the School took place, and it was the head of this family who managed the property that ensured the financial independence of the School and who, it seems, appeased the conflicts that might arise between these convinced pagans and the Christians in power. What is more, at the beginning and the end of its history, the members of this family played a role in the intellectual life of the School, for better or worse.

REFERENCES

- Athanassiadi, P., ed. (1999) Damascius, *The Philosophical history* (= *Philos. hist.*). Athens: Apameia Cultural Association. For a critical review, see Luc Brisson, *Revue des Études Grecques* 114 (2001) 269–282.
- Beaucamp, J. (2002) «Le philosophe et le joueur. La date de la fermeture de l'École d'Athènes», *Mélanges Gilbert Dagron*. Paris: Centre de recherche d'histoire et civilisation de Byzance, 21–35.
- Beaucamp, J. (2008) «L'enseignement à Athènes au VI^e siècle : droit ou science des astres ?», in H. Hugonnard-Roche, éd. *L'enseignement supérieur dans les mondes antiques et médiévaux*. Paris: Vrin, 201–218.
- Hoffmann, Ph. (1994) «Damascius», in Goulet, R., éd. (1994) *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* II. Paris: CNRS, 548–555.
- Saffrey, H. D. (1990a) «Allusions antichrétiennes chez Proclus, le diadoque platonicien» [1975], reprinted in *Le Néoplatonisme après Plotin* I. Paris: Vrin, 201–211.

⁶ Malalas, *Chronographia* xviii 47, p. 379 Thurm. On the subject, see Beaucamp 2002 and 2008.

⁷ Cf. Hoffmann 1994.

- Saffrey, H. D. (1990b) «Le theme du Malheur des temps chez les derniers philosophes néoplatoniciens» [1992], reprinted in *Le Néoplatonisme après Plotin* I. Paris: Vrin, 207–217.
- Saffrey, H. D.; Segonds, A.-Ph. ; Luna, C., eds. (2001) Marinus, *Proclus* ou *Sur le bonheur* (= V. Procli). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Saffrey, H. D.; Westerink, L. G., eds. (1968) *Théologie Platonicienne* I. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

TIME AND ETERNITY FROM PLOTINUS AND BOETHIUS TO EINSTEIN

MICHAEL CHASE
CNRS, Paris

I. Einstein and the *Plotiniana Arabica* on Time and Eternity

1. Panofsky on Serapis

In a classic article,¹ Erwin Panofsky dealt with the interpretation and ancient sources of the painting entitled “Allegory of Prudence”, now in London’s National Gallery. Attributed to Titian,² this work depicts a male head with three faces – elderly, middle-aged, and young – which is associated with the heads of a wolf, lion, and dog respectively. The work’s Latin inscription: “The present acts prudently on the basis of the past, lest it disfigure future action”³ makes it clear that the three animal heads correspond to the three main divisions of time: past, present, and future.

Before giving a history of the manifestations of this symbolism throughout the Middle Ages and into the period of the Counter-Reformation, Panofsky sketches its ancient origins. He identifies the main source of this iconographical tradition in a passage from the fifth-century Latin author Macrobius (*Saturnalia* I, 20, 13-16), adding that other

¹ Panofsky 1993.

² I am not concerned here with the correctness of this attribution, which Panofsky holds to be unquestionable. Wind (1968², 260 & n. 4) is inclined to attribute the painting to Titian’s disciple Cesare Vecelli.

³ EX PRAETERITO / PRAESENS PRVDENTER AGIT / NI FVTVRAM ACTIONEM DETVRPET.

details of the painting are to be sought in ancient cult statues and other figurative representations of the Hellenistic Egyptian divinity Sarapis.

Macrobius informs us that the statue of the Alexandrian god Serapis or Sarapis, who is to be identified with the sun, was accompanied by the figure of a three-headed animal. Of the beast's three heads, the largest one in the middle was that of a lion; on the right was the head of a dog, and on the left that of a wolf. All three heads were surrounded by a serpent, whose head reached up to the god's right hand, by which he dominated the monster like a dog on a leash. Macrobius tells us that of the three animal heads, the lion signifies the present because of its power, violence, and burning impetuosity; the wolf's head signifies the past, since the past snatches away the memory of things; finally, the dog represents the future, which flatters us with hope like a fawning pet. Macrobius gives no interpretation of the serpent that surrounds this beast, but since we are told that time obeys its *auctor*, we must, I think, understand that Serapis/Sol is the creator of time. Panofsky,⁴ following Macrobius, therefore interprets Titian's image as follows:

If a snake surrounds the body from which the three heads emerge, it is the expression of a higher unity, of which present, past, and future are only the modes: temporality, whose lack of beginning and end was symbolized early on by a snake biting its tail.

⁴ Panofsky 1999, 22: "Si un serpent entoure le corps d'où sortent les trois têtes, il est l'expression d'une plus haute unité dont présent, passé et avenir ne sont que les modes: la temporalité dont l'absence de début et de fin a très tôt été symbolisée par un serpent de «l'éternité» qui se mord la queue".



I think Panofsky is essentially right, with one exception: rather than “temporality” or duration, the serpent probably signifies the absence thereof; that is, eternity. If this is right, we thus have a conception, dating from the fourth or fifth century AD at the latest, in which time is considered as secondary to and embraced by eternity. On this view, time, with its divisions of past, present, and future, is an epiphenomenon, while the fundamental reality underlying it is identified as eternity or timelessness (Greek *aiôn*, Latin *aeternitas*).

2. Einstein als Beichtvater (Einstein the Confessor)

A current debate in the philosophy of time is that between advocates of the so-called block universe view, otherwise known as eternalists, and those, known as presentists, who defend the reality of the passage of time and of its division into past, present and future. I will not enter details of this debate here, but I would like to sketch the contemporary origin of this idea in the theories of Albert Einstein, then compare it with a manifestation of a similar idea, first in Plotinus and then in the Medieval Arabic adaptation of Plotinus' *Enneads* that circulated under the title of the *Theology of Aristotle*. In the process, we'll glimpse some of the ethical implications of the controversy in both ancient and modern discussions.

A popular literary genre in ancient philosophy was that of the *consolatio*, in one variety of which the philosopher provided arguments intended to alleviate the grief of someone who had recently suffered the loss of a loved one.⁵

Whether he knew it or not, Albert Einstein was continuing this tradition when, in 1949, he wrote to a Rabbi whose young daughter had died:

A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe", a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest – a kind of optical illusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us [...] our task must be to free ourselves from this prison [...].⁶

⁵ Examples include Cicero's (lost) consolation to himself; Seneca's three consolations, addressed to Marcia, daughter of the Roman historian Cremutius Cordus; to his mother Helvetia, and to Nero's freedman Polybius; and Plutarch's *Consolation to Apollonius*. The most famous and influential example is no doubt Boethius' *Consolation of philosophy*, which we'll investigate below.

⁶ Einstein's quote was cited by Pierre Hadot in a book of interviews published in 2001 (p. 263), but it proved hard at first to track down Einstein's utterance. As he wrote at the time (op. cit. 263-4): "Michael Chase and I have searched for years in Einstein's published works. Impossible to find it". I was finally able to identify the source and include in my revised translation of Hadot's book: it comes from W. Sullivan, "The Einstein papers: a man of many parts", *New York Times*, March 29, 1972. See Hadot 2011, 169; 205 n. 4.

Pierre Hadot called attention to this text in a book first published in 2001. As he points out there, the idea that many of our worries and sufferings come from our false sense of isolation from the whole constituted by the universe is typical of Einstein, who elsewhere writes that to determine a human being's value, we must discover the degree to which he has liberated himself from himself.⁷ Hadot relates this attitude to the ancient spiritual exercise of the "look from above", in which we imagine flying high above the scenes of our daily life, in order to realize the pettiness of our day-to-day worries and anxieties. We all have a natural tendency to consider ourselves the center of the universe, interpreting everything in terms of our own likes and dislikes: what we like is good, what we don't is bad. If it rains on a weekend, then that's bad, because it spoils our plans for a picnic: we do not take into consideration the fact that the rain may be good for the region, territory, or country as a whole. For ancient schools of thought such as the Sceptics, by contrast, the key to happiness, says Hadot, is to "strip off man completely, or liberate oneself entirely from the human point of view".⁸ In Antiquity, Hadot writes elsewhere, "philosophy was held to be an exercise consisting in learning to regard both society and the individuals who comprise it from the point of view of universality",⁹ and "philosophy signified the attempt to raise up mankind from individuality and particularity to universality and objectivity". Hadot went on to discuss the notion of a "practical physics", the goal of which was, by contemplating the vast spaces of the universe, to be able to put human worries and problems into perspective, and thereby gain peace of mind. Hadot liked to quote Marcus Aurelius (*Meditations* 9, 32) in this regard: "You have the power to strip off many superfluous things that are obstacles to you, and that depend entirely upon your value-judgments; you will open up for yourself a vast space by embracing the whole universe in your thoughts, by considering unending eternity".

Michele Besso had been Einstein's closest friend since the days when the two were fellow-university students at Zurich, then worked as patent

⁷ "The true value of a human being is determined primarily by the measure and the sense in which he has attained to liberation from the self". Einstein 1949, 7.

⁸ Cf. Hadot 1995, 112-113.

⁹ Hadot 1995, 242.

clerks in Bern. After a lifelong friendship, in which Besso served as the main sounding-board for many of Einstein's most revolutionary ideas, Besso died in March 1955, only a month before Einstein's own death, whereupon Einstein wrote a letter of consolation to Besso's family:

Now, with his departure from this strange world, he has slightly preceded me once again. This means nothing. For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present and future has only the meaning of an illusion, albeit a persistent one.¹⁰

For Einstein, then, at least at this late stage of his life, it seems that ultimate reality is eternal, and time – a mere illusion. It follows that death is also a mere epiphenomenon, that is, a surface phenomenon without substantial reality or importance: As Porphyry claimed in his *Sentences*, time is a *parupostasis*. It is worth quoting the exegesis of this quote by Einstein given by the philosopher of science Michael Lockwood (2005). According to Lockwood, our grief at the death of a loved one has three primary motivations. Two of these cannot be alleviated by Einsteinian physics: (1) the thought that we shall never see the deceased person again, and (2) the idea that a valuable life has been cut short.¹¹ Einstein's consolation is, says Lockwood, directed at a third source of grief: the notion (3) that the dead person “no longer exists, is simply not there anymore”. This last source of grief, Lockwood contin-

¹⁰ “Nun ist er mir auch mit dem Abschied von dieser sonderbaren Welt ein wenig vorausgegangen. Das bedeutet nichts. Für uns gläubige Physiker hat die Scheidung zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nur die Bedeutung einer, wenn auch hartnäckigen, Illusion”. Einstein to Vero and Mrs. Bice, March 21, 1955, Einstein Archive, reel 7-245. My translation.

¹¹ It is not clear to me why Einstein's consolation cannot be directed to source (2) as well. Another possible consolation for source (2) might be the claim that the goodness and/or happiness of a life do not depend on temporal duration: it might be claimed that an instant of maximal goodness or happiness is equivalent in value to any arbitrary duration of such goodness/happiness. See, for instance, Plotinus, *Enneads* I 5, 7, 22-26: “Happiness... must not be counted by time but by eternity; and this is neither more nor less nor of any extension, but is a ‘this here’, unextended and timeless”. On this notion in Epicureanism, taking up notions from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, K 3, cf. Krämer 1971, 187ff.

ues, derives from the fact that we equate existence *tout court* with existence now, at the present moment. However, such a view “makes sense only if we think of time in a way that physics shows to be mistaken”. Einstein contends, and Lockwood agrees, that the terms “past”, “present” and “future” do not express objective differences in time, but relative differences, in the same sense as such terms as “to the east”, “here” and “there” express relative differences in space. But if this is so, says Lockwood, people who *have lived* in other times are analogous to people who *are living now* in other places. It follows that

death is not the deletion of a person’s existence. It is an event, merely, that marks the outer limit of that person’s extension in one (timelike) spatio-temporal direction, just as the person’s skin marks out the limit in other (spacelike) directions (...) Einstein is urging us to regard those living in times past, like those living in foreign parts, as equally out there in space-time, enjoying the same flesh-and-blood existence as ourselves. It is simply that we inhabit different regions of the continuum.

What could have led Einstein and his interpreters to talk this way?

3. Einstein on time: the theoretical background

One of my favourite films from the 1970’s was the Swiss director Alain Tanner’s *Jonas who will be 25 in the year 2000*. In one scene, a high-school teacher walks into his class with a length of blood sausage and begins to chop it into slices with a meat-cleaver: each slice, he explains, can be considered a moment in history. If, following Einstein’s theory of special relativity as modified by his former math teacher Hermann Minkowski, we imagine reality as a four-dimensional spacetime continuum, then we can imagine the sausage as representing a world-tube, or the three-dimensional trajectory traced by a person or thing as he, she or it travels through spacetime. In the case of a conscious being, each slice of the sausage can be imagined as a “now” from that being’s perspective, containing everything in the universe he/she/it considers to be simultaneous at that instant. Yet the compatibility between what two or more moving observers consider to be simultaneous, and even the objectivity and meaningfulness of the very notion of simultaneity, were

among the first casualties of Einstein's special theory of relativity, published in 1905.

This theory, which showed that instead of representing the world we live in as specified by four dimensions, three for space and one for time, we must think of spacetime as constituting an indivisible whole, led to a number of other paradoxical results. At speeds close to that of light, time slows down and the length of objects contracts. Most interestingly for our theme, what one observer perceives as space, another one in motion may perceive as time: thus, time and space may transform into one another. Finally, depending on whether or not they are in motion with regard to one another, another observer may not consider as simultaneous two events that seem clearly simultaneous in my own reference frame; likewise, he, she or it may consider an event that seems to me to be in my future as having already occurred in his/her or its past.

To exemplify these ideas, I'd like to offer a variation on a thought-experiment presented by Brian Greene (2004). Imagine if you will that I am standing here, but that a friend is standing on a planet 10 billion light years away. Each of us has a handheld device called a simultanophone, which provides a constantly-updated list of all the spacetime events its owner considers to be simultaneous at each instant – for instance, right now my simultanophone lists “Barack Obama going for a walk, Queen Elizabeth snoring, the sun rising over Australia, etc., etc”. Now, my friend, although he is very far away, is – for all intents and purposes – immobile with respect to me: that is, we share the same reference frame. The list of events on his simultanophone is therefore identical to mine, and we consider the same events to be simultaneous. Suppose, however, that my friend gets up and decides to go for a brisk jog away from me: his simultanophone will now indicate events under the subheading “earth” that *my* phone indicates took place 150 years ago, and should he decide to jog in my direction, his simultanophone will list events that my phone says lie 150 years in the future. Let's say, moreover, that my friend owns a supersonic car, and decides to hop in and drive away from me at a speed of 1000 miles per hour. His simultanophone will now list events that happened 15,000 years ago in my perspective; and if he should slam on the brakes, turn around, and gun

his engine in the other direction, that is, toward me, his list of simultaneous events will include events that, as far as I am concerned, lie 15,000 years in the future.

As if these results aren't odd enough, Einstein's theory of special relativity also states that there's no reason why either viewpoint – mine or my friend's – should be considered right and the other wrong; both simultaneity lists are equally valid. There is no basis on which to decide between them.

Such phenomena are far from being the only relativistic effects affecting time and simultaneity: others are brought about when one observer is imagined to travel at speeds approaching the speed of light, such as the famous twins paradox. But the simultaphone phenomenon seems particularly revealing. In the words of Brian Greene (2004, 138-39):

If you buy the notion that reality consists of the things in your freeze-frame mental image right now [i.e., in my example, the list of simultaneous events that appears on your simultaphone], and if you agree that your now is no more valid than the now of someone located far away in space who can move freely, then reality encompasses all of the events in spacetime.

In other words, if another observer in motion with regard to me can *already* regard as present to him events that *I* think are in the future, then there's a sense in which future events *already* exist, and past events *still* exist. In the words of Greene, "Just as we envision all of space as really being out there, as really existing, we should also envision all of time as really being out there, as really existing, too (...) the only thing that's real is the whole of spacetime".

As Paul Davies has written, such considerations seem to leave us no choice but to consider that "events in the past and future have to be every bit as real as events in the present. In fact, the very division of time into past, present and future seems to be physically meaningless. To accommodate everybody's nows (...) events and moments have to exist 'all at once' across a span of time" (Davies 1995, 71). Or in the words of Hermann Weyl (2009):

The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body,

does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time.

If we leave aside the scientists and turn to literature, perhaps the best portrayal of the block-time view appears in Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse-Five*, when Billy Pilgrim describes the perspective of the Tralfamadorians:

The Tralfamadorians can look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They can see how permanent all the moments are, and they can look at any moment that interests them. It is just an illusion we have here on earth that one moment follows another like beads on a string, and that once a moment is gone it is gone forever.

Once again, we are reminded of Pierre Hadot's "view from above", by means of which, the soul is "capable of observing the totality of space and time", and "has no fear even of death" (Hadot 1995, 242). The view from above turns out to resemble what Huw Price (1996) has called the "view from nowhen", that is, the ability to consider reality as characterized by the simultaneity of the block-time view, rather than the fleetingness of a flowing "now".

4. Time and Eternity in Plotinus and the *Plotiniana Arabica*

One could go on to follow the ramifications of Einstein's views in contemporary debates within the philosophy of science between presentists (those who believe only the present exists) and eternalists. Here, one would have to discuss MacTaggart's influential distinction between A-series (a series of events that are relative to the present, such as "one year ago", considered less real) and B-series (events that have permanent temporal labels, such as "New Year's Eve 2011", considered more real), and go on to discuss the views of such current advocates of block-time as Huw Price and Julian Barbour. But that will have to be the topic of another publication.

Instead, I'd like to consider what I think are some similar views to that of Einstein in Plotinus, the third-century CE founder of Neoplaton-

nism, and an adaptation of his thought in the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a ninth-century Arabic work that was highly influential on Islamic thought.

The broad outlines of Plotinus' thought are well known: from the ineffable first principle imperfectly known as the One or the Good, reality emanates forth timelessly and eternally, like light from a lamp. This emanation first produces the Intellect (Greek *nous*), which contains the Platonic forms of sensible reality. Since it is unchanging, the Intellect is characterized by eternity (Greek *aiôn*), which can be considered the life of the intellect.¹² More precisely, Plotinus describes eternity as "that unchanging life, all together at once, already infinite, completely unswerving, standing in and directed toward the one",¹³ or else as "life in rest, in the same thing and identically, already infinite".

From the hypostatized Intellect derives the hypostasis of Soul, and it is not until this stage that time appears upon the scene. Originally consubstantial with the Intellect, the Soul eventually gets tired of remaining in the intelligible world and contemplating the intelligible Forms. Some force or faculty within it feels curiosity and a desire to become independent and individualized. As a result, it "temporalizes itself", creating the sensible universe at the same time as it creates time. Whereas eternity can be said to be the life of the intellect, time is the life of the soul.

I find it interesting that according to Plotinus, there's an ethical element to the distinction between time and eternity. Soul abandons Intellect and creates time because it's unsatisfied with its lot – its eternal contemplation of the forms and proximity to the One – and wants more. But the very fact that time and/or the soul always wants something more explains why it's never complete, never really what it is, but always one-

¹² This idea probably derives from Plato's *Timaeus* 37d, where Plato writes the following about the Intelligible Being (in Greek *to autozôion*), that is, the world of forms that served as model for the Demiurge's creation of the world: "for the nature of the living being (*tou zôou*) happened to be eternal". *Aiôn* originally meant "life-span".

¹³ *Ennead* III 7 (45), 11, 3-5: τὴν ἀτρεμὴ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπειρον ᾗδῃ ζῶην καὶ ἀκλινῇ πάντα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ πρὸς ἕν ἐστῶσαν. Armstrong's translation here is surprisingly poor.

thing-after-another.¹⁴ Eternity, by contrast, is already precisely what it is, and therefore has nothing further to seek for. Whereas eternity is the satisfied repose of something that already is all that can be, already possessing, all at once, everything it could ever desire,¹⁵ time is the headlong, endless pursuit of something more, since by definition it cannot possess everything it desires all at once.

This, as Pierre Hadot has repeatedly stressed, is a key theme in Greek moral thought. Most of us are unhappy most of the time precisely because we are never happy with what we've got, but always believe that we need something else in order to be happy: the result of this spiritual restlessness is, of course, that we are never actually happy but postpone our happiness indefinitely to that hypothetical future in which we will win the lottery, get that big promotion, or finally be able to buy that new I-Phone. Should we ever actually achieve any of these things, of course, we derive only the most fleeting enjoyment from them, because by that point our hopes, desires and acquisitiveness have seized upon another object, which, once again, we are convinced will bring us happiness.

4.1. Plotinus on "always"

One of the points Plotinus emphasizes when trying to make clear the difference between time and eternity is the potentially misleading function of the word "always" (Greek *aei*). We see this in a passage from *Ennead* III 7 [45] 6, where, speaking of eternity, he writes¹⁶:

¹⁴ Thus, Plotinus can say (III 7 (45), 13, 26) that time "runs along or together with" (συνθεῖ καὶ συντρέχει) the soul. Eternity, in contrast, "does not run alongside time or extend itself along with it" (οὐ συμπαραθέων οὐδὲ συμπαρατείνων αὐτῇ, *ibid.*, 44-45).

¹⁵ Cf. *Ennead* V, 1, 4, 13: "Why should it [sc. the Intellect] seek to change when all is well with it? Where should it seek to go away to when it has everything in itself?"

¹⁶ Οὐκ ἔχει οὖν οὔτιον [τὸ] ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐδ' ἄρα διαστήσεις, οὐδ' ἐξελίξεις, οὐδὲ προάξεις, οὐδὲ παρατενείς, οὐδ' ἄρα οὐδὲ πρότερον αὐτοῦ οὐδέ τι ὕστερον λαβεῖν ἔχεις. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δ' «ἔστιν» ἀληθέστατον τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὕτω δέ, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς οὐσία ἢ τῷ ζῆν, πάλιν αὖ ἡκεῖ ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ λέγομεν, ὁ αἰών. Ὅταν δὲ τὸ αἰεὶ λέγομεν καὶ τὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἡμῶν, ἔνεκα [τῆς σαφηνείας] δεῖ νομίζειν λέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ τό γε αἰεὶ τάχ' ἂν οὐ κυρίως λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ ληφθὲν εἰς δῆλωσιν

So it does not have any “this and that”; nor, therefore, will you be able to separate it out or unroll it or prolong it or stretch it; nor, then, can you apprehend anything of it as before or after. If, then, there is no before or after about it, but its “is” is the truest thing about it, and itself, and this in the sense that it is by its essence or life, then again there has come to us what we are talking about, eternity. But when we use the word “always” and say that it does exist at one time but not at another, we must be thought to be putting it this way for our own sake; for the “always” was perhaps not being used in its strict sense, but, taken as explaining the incorruptible, might mislead the soul into imagining an expansion of something becoming more, and again, of something which is never going to fail. It would perhaps have been better only to use the word “existing”. But, as “existing” is an adequate word for substance, since, however, people thought becoming was substance, they required the addition of “always” in order to understand [what “existing” really meant]. For existing is not one thing and always existing another, just as a philosopher is not one thing and the true philosopher another, but because there was such a thing as putting on a pretense of philosophy, the addition of “true” was made. So too, “always” is applied to “existing”, that is “*aei*” to “*on*”, so that we say “*aei on* [aion],”, so the “always” must be taken as saying “truly existing”; it must be included in the undivided power which in no way needs anything beyond what it already possesses; but it possesses the whole.

The Greek word for eternity is *aiōn*, and a popular etymology, current at least since the time of Aristotle, analysed it as deriving from *aei* (“always”) + *ōn* (“being”), so that eternity would mean “always being”.

τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πλανῶ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔκτασιν τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἔτι ὡς μὴ ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε. Τὸ δὲ ἴσως βέλτιον ἦν μόνον τὸ «ὦν» λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν ἀρκοῦν ὄνομα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἐνόμιζον, ἐδεήθησαν πρὸς τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ προσθήκης τοῦ αἰεί. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν ὄν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰεῖ ὄν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἄλλο μὲν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ ἀληθινός· ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ὑποδύμενον ἦν φιλοσοφίαν, ἢ προσθήκη τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐγένετο. Οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ αἰεῖ καὶ τῷ «ὦν» τὸ αἰεῖ, ὥστε λέγεσθαι «αἰεὶ ὦν»· διὸ ληπτέον τὸ αἰεὶ οἶον «ἀληθῶς ὦν» λέγεσθαι καὶ συναιρετέον τὸ αἰεὶ εἰς ἀδιάστατον δύναμιν τὴν οὐδὲν δεομένην οὐδενὸς μεθ’ ὃ ἤδη ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

The temptation, then, is to think of what's eternal as something that just exists for a long time, and perhaps forever. But this is wrong, says Plotinus: what is eternal is not what exists for a long or infinite time, that is, what has a long or infinite duration, but what has no duration at all. What's eternal or in eternity is not in time, but has an existence that is atemporal or durationless.

5. Plotinus *apud* Arabes

Sometime in the first half of the 9th century CE, a group of translators at Baghdad, centered around the great philosopher Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (ca. 801-873) set about translating a number of Greek philosophical texts into Arabic. Among these was the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a text which, although purporting to be by Aristotle, in fact consisted in a series of paraphrased extracts from the last three books of Plotinus' *Enneads*, together with explanatory glosses and interpolations. Scholars are still divided as to the exact origin and purpose of this work, but the fact remains that it ended up being extremely influential on subsequent Islamic philosophy.¹⁷

In the eighth treatise of this work, the author of the *Theology* is discussing the ways we can come to know the Intelligible world. If we wish to see this world, he writes, we should begin by looking at the soul, which contains things like the senses and the intelligence. We are to abandon sense and follow intelligence, for although sense allows us to know such individual beings as Socrates, intelligence allows us to grasp the universal man (*al insān al-mursal* p. 11, 9 Badawi). In this world, the soul possesses universal notions only by means of discursive reasoning, which starts out from specific premisses and continues, following logical steps, until it reaches a conclusion. Things are different in the intelligible world: there, one can see the universal ideas with one's one eyes (*'iyānān*), since everything is fixed, stable and perpetual. The author continues as follows:

¹⁷ See, for instance, M. Aouad 1989.

Plotinus, <i>Ennead</i> , V, 1, 4	Translation Armstrong (Loeb Classical Library), modified	<i>Theology of Aristotle</i> , p. 111, 12f. Badawi = 107-108 Dieterici = vol. II, p. 269, §120-121 Lewis	Translation Lewis (in <i>Plotini Enneades</i> , vol. II, Paris- Brussels 1959)
ἀλλ' ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα, καὶ ὁ ὄντως αἰὼν, ὃν μιμεῖται χρόνος περιθέων ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν παριείς, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβάλλων. Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα αὐτὸ περὶ ψυχῆν· ποτὲ γὰρ Σωκράτης, ποτὲ δὲ ἵππος, ἔν τι ἀεὶ τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πάντα. Ἐχει οὖν [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] πάντα ἐστῶτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔστι μόνον, καὶ τὸ «ἔστιν» ἀεὶ, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ μέλλον–ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τότε–οὐδὲ τὸ παρεληλυθός–οὐ γάρ τι ἐκεῖ παρεληλυθεν–ἀλλ' ἐνέστηκεν ἀεὶ	...all things are in eter- nity, and the true eternity, which time imitates, run- ning round the soul, let- ting some things go and attending to others. For around Soul things come one after an- other: now Socrates, now a horse, al- ways some one particular being, but In- tellect is all things. It has therefore eve- rything stand- ing in the same thing, and it merely is, and its “is” is forever, and	<i>wa-innamā hiya qā'ima fa- qaṭ, wa-l- qiyām hunāika dā'im bi-lā zamān māḍin wa lā ātin, wa- ḍālīka anna al- ānī hunāika ḥāḍīr wa-l- muḍīy mawjūd</i>	Cleave to mind, because sense knows only indi- vidual things, such as Socrates and such-and- such a horse; sense is only ca- pable of appre- hending articular things, whereas mind lets you know what ‘man’ is in general, and what ‘horse’ is in general...the sub- stances in that noble world be- ing all of them permanent and abiding in one thing of them; they are simply permanent. Ex- istence ¹⁸ there is everlasting, with- out time past or future, because the future there

¹⁸ “Permanence” Lewis. But the Arabic *qiyām* can also mean ‘existence’ or ‘subsistence’; cf. Wehr s.v.

nowhere does
the future ex-
ist, for then
too it is – nor
the past – for
nothing there
has passed –
but they are
always pre-
sent (*ene-
stêken*)

is present and
the past existent

As is often the case, the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus contained in the *Theology of Aristotle* here says basically the same thing as Plotinus, only a bit more explicitly. Plotinus says the Intellect “is” is forever, that it has no place for the future or for the past. The Arabic Paraphrast comes right out and says why this is the case: if there is no past or future time in the Intelligible world, as Plotinus stated, it is because the future there is present and the past existent.

I submit it would be hard to find a pithier summary of the “block universe” view we have found emerging from Einstein and developed by physicists and philosophers over the past century or so, than the formulation “the future is present and the past existent”. The difference, and it is an important one, is that Plotinus and his paraphrast reserve this durationless mode of being for the intelligible world, allowing the sensible, phenomenal world in which we all live to be characterized by flowing time. Defenders of the block universe view, for their part, tend to speak instead of reality vs. illusion: reality is tenseless, whereas our perception of that reality, is, owing to some psychological or physiological quirks of our nature, artificially tensed and divided into past, present and future. The distinction may be more terminological than substantive, however: both Plotinian Neoplatonists and contemporary eternalists agree that the fundamental nature of reality is timeless, while the passage of time is, in some sense, a secondary, derivative, or illusory feature of our experience.

6. Conclusion: some thoughts on methodology

We thus seem to have found a close parallel between conceptions of time set forth, on the one hand, by a third-century CE Egyptian-born Neoplatonist and his followers, and, on the other, by a German Jew from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Now, of course, someone might accept the broad outlines of what I've just presented, but respond by saying "So what?" It seems quite unlikely that Einstein ever read Plotinus, much less the *Plotiniana Arabica*. Why is it interesting that two thinkers, so different in history, cultural, linguistic and intellectual background happened to come up with similar ideas?

One might answer that one possible explanation of this coincidence is that the ideas in question are simply correct: Einstein came up with them on the basis of his scientific training, Plotinus on the basis of his philosophical studies and, perhaps, his personal mystical experience. Or perhaps we don't need to hazard such a risky proposition, and can content ourselves with adopting Max Jammer's (1999, 212) view that

there persist throughout the history of scientific thought certain ideas, patterns, or paradigms that may have been influential, even if only subconsciously, on the construction of a new theory (...) a study of such anticipations can provide some information about the ideological background that supported the formation of the new theory.

This study of "the informative importance of anticipations", which the historian M. Sachs (1973) has called "invariant ideas with respect to change from one contextual framework to another", may thus be one a number of methods capable of shedding light on the scientific theories that shape our modern world.

II. Boethius on time, eternity, providence and philosophy as a way of life

Born sometime between 475 and 480, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius made it his life's work to provide the Latin-speaking world with complete access to Greek philosophical instruction. To do so, he set out to do nothing less than translate into Latin and comment upon all of

Aristotle and Plato. He was not able to complete this plan, however, partly because he also wrote a number of other important treatises, on music, astronomy, geometry, and theological issues, and partly because his life was cut short when he was accused of treason in 524 under the reign of Theodoric,¹⁹ thrown in jail, and condemned to death.²⁰ It seems to have been in prison, or perhaps merely under house arrest,²¹ that Boethius wrote his most famous work, the *Consolation of Philosophy*. Here, following an ancient philosophical and literary tradition, he mobilized the resources of philosophy to provide comfort for someone in a difficult position. Yet this consolation was addressed not, as was customary, to a friend, acquaintance or family member, but to himself.²² Unlike most of the Greco-Roman tradition of consolation, however, Boethius' *Consolation* is staged as a dialogue, written in prose interspersed with verse, between the imprisoned Narrator – Boethius himself – and a female personification of Philosophy.

Few ancient works have been subject to such divergent modern interpretations. Although its title and content seem to place it squarely within the literary genre of the consolation,²³ some influential commentators have claimed that the *Consolation of Philosophy* is in fact a parody

¹⁹ In 493, Theodoric defeated the Herulian Odoacer – who had deposed the last Roman Emperor Romulus Augustulus in 476 – and established himself as ruler over Ravenna. Under Theodoric's reign, Boethius became consul in 510, then *magister officiorum* in 522.

²⁰ More specifically, he came to the defence of the senator Albinus, accused of treason in 524 for corresponding with the Byzantine emperor Justin. Boethius seems to have been tried and convicted *in absentia* at Rome, perhaps on the basis of forged letters, and executed, perhaps by being clubbed to death, in Pavia; cf. Tränkle 1973. Beets (2005, 19) avers that Boethius died “sous la torture”, but does not reveal the source of his information.

²¹ Scheible, for instance (1971, 3), doubts that such a work could have been completed without access to a library.

²² This was not unheard-of in the Greco-Roman tradition of consolations; cf. Gruber 178, 27; Erler 1999, 116; Chadwick 1981, 224; Bechtle 2006, 267.

²³ I adopt Donato's definition of a consolation as “a text that (i) manifests the author's awareness that language has therapeutic power and (ii) tries to heal by employing whatever argument, register of language, or linguistic device the author deems appropriate for the case at hand”. Donato's work, excellent for its analyses of the first part of the *Consolation* and for its account of the history of

of a consolation.²⁴ In particular, the philosophical arguments of the work's second half are held to be deliberately feeble, in order that the reader may conclude that philosophy is ultimately unable to provide consolation.²⁵ I believe that this viewpoint is profoundly wrong-headed, and based on inadequate knowledge of the literary genre of the consolation and, above all, of the nature and structure of the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum at the end of Antiquity. In what follows I'll argue that Boethius' *Consolation* is an excellent example of the ancient conception of philosophy as therapy for the soul: as such, it uses both rhetorical techniques and rational arguments in a way that echoes the progressive nature of the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum. In the second part of this paper, I'll discuss the three main arguments Boethius uses to try to resolve the apparent conflict between divine prescience and human free will, paying particular attention to the way he mobilizes Neoplatonic definitions of time and eternity.

1. Boethius on philosophy as therapy

That philosophy was often considered as capable of providing therapy for the soul has been pointed out in a number of important publications.²⁶ This was especially true of the Hellenistic period, in which the various Schools concentrated their attention on teaching students how to achieve happiness during their earthly existence. It has been argued that in Neoplatonism, the emphasis shifts from this world to the next, in that the main concern is henceforth how to ensure the soul's flight

consolation as a literary genre, virtually ignores the contemporary philosophical context and must therefore be supplemented by the works of Baltes, Erler, and Beierwaltes. In particular, Donato's denial (p. 14 n. 49) of the relevance of the doctrine of *anamnêsis* is, I believe, quite mistaken; cf. e.g. Schmidt-Kohl 1965, 18ff, citing *Cons.* 3.c11.15-16.

²⁴ From a formal viewpoint, the *Consolation*'s mixture of poetry and prose is held to be more characteristic of Menippean satire, while its various parts seem so different that some have thought the work was a clumsy combination of two or three quite different sources.

²⁵ Most influentially, this is the view of John Marenbon (2003a, 146-163; 2003b; 2005). See also Relihan 2007, and the critical discussion of these views in Donato 2012.

²⁶ Cf. Voelke 1993; P. Hadot 1995; and the literature cited by Druart 2000, 25.

from the sensible and return to its intelligible homeland.²⁷ Far from being discarded, however, the Hellenistic teaching on how to ensure terrestrial happiness, including the notion of philosophy as therapy of the soul, were preserved, but relegated to the status of a preliminary ethical instruction to be administered to students before they embarked on the properly philosophical study of Aristotle and Plato.

In the Neoplatonic schools of Boethius' time,²⁸ students began by receiving a pre-philosophical ethical training, based on such works as the Pythagorean *Golden Verses*, the *Manual* of Epictetus,²⁹ or the speeches of Isocrates and Demosthenes. Only after completing this training did they advance to the study of logic, in the form of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, followed by Aristotle's *Organon* in the order in which we read it today. The student then moved on to what was sometimes called the "Lesser Mysteries" of philosophy, viz. Aristotle's works on physics and psychology (*De Caelo*, *Physics*, *De anima*), culminating in his *Metaphysics*, before moving on to the "Greater Mysteries" in the form of a selection of Plato's *Dialogues*, culminating in the *Timaeus* and, as the ultimate metaphysical revelation, the *Parmenides*.

Boethius' *Consolation* contains, as it were, an illustration of this Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum in action. In the person of the Narrator, who, although he is a philosopher, has forgotten almost all he learned as result of his personal misfortunes,³⁰ we have an example of a philosophical beginner who must first be purified of his mistaken beliefs and the consequent emotions of bitterness, self-pity, lethargy and despair. The fact that he is a professional philosopher, however, allows Philosophy to give him an accelerated course, as it were, and introduce him, after he has begun to recall his philosophical knowledge by the middle of the book, to some of the more difficult and advanced questions of metaphysics, culminating in the discussion of the relation be-

²⁷ Erler 1999; cf. Theiler 1964.

²⁸ On this curriculum, see I. Hadot *et al.*, 1990.

²⁹ The first part of Simplicius' commentary on this work, like the first part of the *Consolation*, is devoted inter alia mastering one's emotions; cf. I. Hadot 1996; Erler 1999, 114-115.

³⁰ In the words of Druart (2000, 26), he is "a slightly disabled learner" of philosophy.

tween divine omniscience and human free will. It is likely that the *Consolation* as we have it is incomplete, and that the missing final part would have described the Narrator's ultimate philosophical liberation, consisting in his return to the intelligible Fatherland and/or the vision of God in which, for Boethius as for Augustine, ultimate happiness consists.³¹

Following an ancient philosophical tradition, Philosophy begins her therapy with easier, more elementary philosophical remedies before moving on to more heavy-duty philosophical considerations.³² The work's first part corresponds to what's been called a "praeparatio platonica",³³ in which philosophical *topoi* culled from a variety of philosophical schools,³⁴ usually in the form of brief, easily memorizable sayings, are used to provide a preliminary ethical purification before the student, in this case, Boethius as Narrator, is ready to be initiated into more difficult philosophical arguments. In the book's second half, then, Philosophia uses a combination of arguments that are by no means lacking in rigor or persuasiveness, in order to come up with a solution to the age-old problem of the apparent conflict between human free will and divine omniscience that is, I believe, as philosophically respectable as any that have been suggested. It is, moreover, a solution that receives some support from the findings of contemporary physics.

The work begins with the Narrator³⁵ complaining to Philosophy about the main cause of his suffering: his loss of his freedom, possessions, and good name, and the injustice of a world in which evil men

³¹ On the incomplete nature of the *Consolation* as we have it, cf. Tränkle 1977; Baltes 1980, 333ff. Contra: Lerer 1985, 232ff. On happiness in Augustine, cf. Beierwaltes 1981.

³² Donato 2012, 28, citing *Cons.* 1.5.11-12; 1.6.21; 2.1.7-9; 2.3.4; 3.1.4. As Druart points out (2000), the same distinction between lighter/easier and weightier/more difficult remedies is to be found in al-Kindi's *Art of dispelling sorrows*.

³³ Erler 1999.

³⁴ On this "paraenetic eclecticism" (P. Hadot 1995, 124), cf. I. Hadot 1969, 3 n. 18; 21 n. 71; 44; 54 n. 86; 82-83.

³⁵ I will henceforth refer to the personage who recounts the *Consolation* in the first person singular as "the Narrator", in order to distinguish this literary persona from the historical Boethius.

are allowed to prosper, while the good – here of course the Narrator is thinking primarily of himself – are forced to submit to all kinds of undeserved indignities, from loss of possessions and honors to exile, imprisonment and even death. The Narrator asserts that he has no doubt that the world and all the events occurring within it are governed by God and His divine Providence,³⁶ but the apparent triumph of injustice almost makes him doubt the goodness of the divine economy.

The Narrator must be cured of this wallowing in self-pity, which has led him to forget himself.³⁷ Thus, after he has been allowed to unburden himself by complaining about his problems, Philosophy begins the process of consolation which will restore him to the philosophical knowledge he had once acquired but now, under the stress of prison and imminent death, has forgotten.³⁸

For a Neoplatonist, this forgetfulness is crucial. While the soul's initial descent into the body is not generally considered a misfortune or a sin,³⁹ its involvement with the material world and consequent subjection to the passions, which lead it to forget its divine origin, is held to be morally culpable as well as disastrous. Only by turning within⁴⁰ can

³⁶ This knowledge is the sign that the Narrator still retains a *scintillula* of the divine knowledge he enjoyed as a pre-incarnate soul, and which will allow him, by means of the *redux ignis/ anagôgos erôs*, to rise back up out of his current fallen state toward the intelligible, and then the *summum bonum* (*Cons.* I.6.3-20; cf. Baltes 1980, 326), homeland of the soul.

³⁷ Cf. 1.2.6; 1.6.18 (*oblivio sui*); Baltes 1980, 325. This is almost certainly the meaning of Philosophy's brusque dismissal of the Muses (1.1.7-12), who have been inspiring the elegiac poem in which Boethius pours forth his sorrows.

³⁸ Cf. 1.2.3-5; 1.6.7-20; 3c.12; 4.1, etc., Donato 2012, 14.

³⁹ Cf. Theiler 1966, 289 ff., citing especially Synesius, *De insomniis* 8, 3, vol. 1, p. 283 Lamoureux/Aujoulat; Pfligersdorffer 1976, 141.

⁴⁰ Cf. Boethius, *Cons.* 2.4.22-3: *Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra vos positam felicitatem? ...Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius?* On the importance of self-knowledge, cf. Theiler 1966 217f.; P. Hadot 1968, I, p. 91 n. 1; Simplicius, *In EE*, 30, p. 302, 32ff. ed. I. Hadot (1996): τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν τοῦ θεοῦ παράγγελμα... ὃ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος πάσης ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ εὐζωΐας. Cf. Ambrose, *De Isaac* 4, 11 (perhaps following Porphyry, cf. Dörrie 1964): ea [sc. anima] insurgens de corpore ab omnibus fit remotior atque intra semet ipsam divinum illud, si qua insequi possit, scrutatur et quaerit.

the soul remember its divine origin and thus begin the arduous⁴¹ upward path back to its intelligible homeland.

2. Boethius and the Neoplatonic theory of innate ideas

The background here, it seems to me, is the Neoplatonic doctrine according to which the pre-existent soul enjoys contemplation of the intelligible world⁴² as it accompanies the chariots of the gods in their journeys around the supracelestial place (*hyperouranios topos*, *Phaedrus* 247a),⁴³ but then becomes dissatisfied and turns its attention toward the lower regions of matter and the sensible world. In the instant it does so, the soul is provided with a vessel (Greek *okhêma*⁴⁴) made of a pneumatic substance intermediate between air and fire, which allows it to be transported through the celestial spheres⁴⁵ and also serves, during its earthly existence, as the intermediary between soul and body. Finally, when the soul reaches earth it is “sown” within a body (*in caelum terramque seris*, *Cons.* 3. c9), which, owing to the darkness and heaviness it derives from matter, obstructs the soul’s memory, so that it can no longer recall the visions of the intelligible world it enjoyed prior to its incarnation, nor can it perceive the order within the world (5. c3.8ff.).⁴⁶ Yet all is not lost:

⁴¹ Cf. Porphyry, *Ad Marc.* 6-7.

⁴² Cf. Boethius, *Cons.* 5. c3, 20-24:

*An cum mentem cerneret altam
pariter summam et singula norat,
nunc membrorum condita nube
non in totum est oblita sui
summamque tenet singula perdens?*

⁴³ The seat of God, according to Boethius (*Cons.* 4. c1.16ff.; 3. c2.17f).

⁴⁴ Cf. Boethius, *Cons.* 3. c9: *levibus curribus*; Ambrose, *De Isaac* 8, 67: *cur-
rilia illa animarum*.

⁴⁵ In Porphyry’s version of this theory, which was common to Gnosticism, Hermetism and the *Chaldaean Oracles*, the soul acquires specific features of its character as it descends through each of the planetary spheres. Cf. Chase 2004.

⁴⁶ The Neoplatonists often symbolize this state of forgetfulness by speaking of the drink of forgetfulness offered to souls as they enter the material world; cf. Theiler 1966, 289f. This forgetfulness is made worse, during the soul’s terrestrial existence, by the “twin founts” of pleasure and pain: cf. Synesius *Hymn* I, 658f. *ἰδίων τ’ ἀγαθῶν ἔπιεν λάθαν*; Porphyry, *De abstinencia* I, 33: *δύο πηγαὶ ἀνείνται*

although it is buried deep within the body, the soul retains a spark of divine fire or light, which Boethius refers to as the *semen veri* (3. c11.11); *redux ignis*, or *scintillula animae* (1.6.20).⁴⁷ This spark needs only to be revived by means of teaching, as if by blowing air on warm ashes (*uentilante doctrina* 3. c11.11-12).

This inner spark of truth, which Boethius describes as our inner fortress (4. c3.33ff.), to which the sage withdraws in times of trouble, constitutes the center of mankind and of the soul (4. c3.34ff.; 3. c11.11-14). It is the locus of happiness (2.4.22), our proper good (2.5.24), truth (3. c11.1ff.; 5. c3.20f.; 5. c4.24ff.), freedom (2.6.7), peace, and security (2. c4.19f.; 2.6.7). As the obligatory starting-point⁴⁸ for our metaphysical ascent back to the source of our being, it represents our unbroken link with the intelligible world.

The question of how we can remain in contact with the intelligible even when the soul is incarnated in a terrestrial body was one that always preoccupied the Neoplatonists. Plotinus solved it, at least to his own satisfaction, by his doctrine of the undescended part of the soul: although our lower or vegetative soul, seat of such psychological faculties as sensation, representation, memory, and discursive thought, comes down from the intelligible world at the moment of incarnation and is thenceforth present throughout the body, the higher part of the soul, intellect (*nous*) or intuitive thought, always remains above in the intelligible world.⁴⁹

πρὸς δεσμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνταῦθα, ἐξ ὧν ὥσπερ θανάσιμων πωμάτων ἐμπιπλάμενη ἐν λήθῃ τῶν οἰκείων γίγνεται θεαμάτων, ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη.

⁴⁷ Cf. Augustine, *Contra acad.* 1.3; *De ord.* 1.1.3; *De trin.* 10.3.5: An aliquem finem optimum, id est securitatem et beatitudinem suam, uidet *per quandam occultam memoriam* quae in longinqua eam progressam non deseruit, et credit ad eundem finem nisi se ipsam cognouerit se peruenire non posse? Cf. Porphyry, *On abstinence* 3.27.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Cons.* 3.3.1: Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, *tenui licet imagine* uestrum tamen principium somniatis uerumque illum beatitudinis finem licet *minime perspicaci* qualicumque tamen *cogitatione* prospicitis, eoque uos et ad uerum bonum naturalis ducit *intentio*...

⁴⁹ *Enneads* 9 (VI, 9), 5, 7-9. On this doctrine, cf. Sorabji 2004, vol. 1, 3(e), 93ff.

Plotinus' successors almost unanimously rejected this view, and to replace it Plotinus' student Porphyry⁵⁰ seems to have reactivated the Stoic doctrine of innate ideas as modified by Antiochus of Ascalon and later by the *Chaldaean Oracles*. A good summary of this doctrine is provided by a work ascribed to Boethius but now usually considered pseudonymous, the *De diis et Praesensionibus*⁵¹:

For we consist of two things, soul and body. The soul is immortal. If it is immortal, it descends from the divine things. But if it descends from the divine things, why is it not perfected by the possession of all virtues? Let the state of this matter be drawn from the very sanctuaries of philosophy. For the soul, before it is wrapped in the garment of bodily contact, examines *in that watchtower of its absolute purity* the knowledge of all things most perfectly. However, once it sinks into this body of clay, its sharp vision, obscured by the darkness of earthy mingling, is rendered blind to the clarity of its inborn vision. However, the seed of truth lies hidden within, and is awakened as it is fanned by instruction. For they say it can by no means happen that from childhood we have notions, which they call *ennoias*, of so many and such great things inserted and as it were sealed upon our souls, unless our soul flourished in its cognition of things before it was incarnated. Nor does the soul fully see these things, when it suddenly entered such an unaccustomed and turbulent abode; yet once it collects itself and becomes refreshed in the course of the ages of life, then it recognizes them by remembering. For after the soul is ensnared and enveloped by some thick cover of the body and undergoes some forgetfulness of itself, when thereafter it begins

⁵⁰ For Porphyry's doctrine of the innate concepts (*ennoiai*), see for instance *Ad Marcellam* 25-26: the Intellect has established the divine law in accordance with the concepts for the sake of salvation; it has imprinted and engraved them in the soul from the truth of the divine law (ὁ δ' αὖ θεὸς ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ σωτηρίας ἕνεκα ταῖς λογικαῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας διετάχθη (...) ὁ νοῦς τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐννοίας, ἃς ἐνετύπωσε καὶ ἐνεχάραξεν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ νόμου ἀληθείας).

⁵¹ Stangl (1893) declared the work to have been written as a completion of Boethius' lacunary *Commentary on Cicero's Topics*, probably in the first half of the twelfth century. I know of no more recent study of the *De diis et Praesensionibus*.

to be wiped clean and denuded by study and instruction,⁵² then the soul reverts and is called back to the manner of its nature (...) Socrates declares all this more clearly in the book entitled *Meno*, asking a certain little boy some geometrical questions about the dimensions of a square. He answers them like a child, yet the questions are so easy that by answering little by little he reaches the same result as if he had learned geometry. Socrates will have it that follows from this that learning is nothing other than remembering. He explains this much more accurately in the speech he gave on the day in which he left this life.⁵³

⁵² This is a key point: intellectual pursuits, perhaps the study of the liberal arts, can begin to wipe off (*detergeor* = Greek *apomassô*) the stains that accrue to the soul – or more precisely, to the soul's astral body – in its descent through the spheres toward incarnation. On the cycle of the liberal arts, which, in their codification by Porphyry, were to be studied before embarking upon a philosophical education, see I. Hadot 1984.

⁵³ Pseudo (?)-Boethius, *De diis et praesensionibus*, in I. C. Orellius – I. G. Baierus, eds., *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scholiastae*, I, Turici: Typis Orellii, Fuesslini et Sociorum, 1833, p. 390, 35–391, 24: duobus enim constamus, anima et corpore. Anima immortalis est. Si immortalis est, a divinis descendit. Si ergo a divinis descendit, cur omnium virtutum habitu perfecta non est? Quod quale sit, ab eiusdem philosophiae adytis eliciatur. Anima enim necdum in contagionis corporeae indumento evoluta, in illa absolutissimae puritatis suae specula omnium rerum peritiam perfectissime considerat. Postquam autem in hoc luteum corpus obruitur, acies eius terrenae admixtionis tenebris caligosa ab illa suae ingentiaeque visionis claritudine caecatur. Latet tamen introrsum semen veri, quod excitatur ventilante doctrina. Aiunt enim nullo modo fieri posse, ut a puritiae tot rerum atque tantarum insitas atque quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quae ennoias vocant, habemus, nisi animus ante, quum incorporaretur, in rerum cognitione viguisset. Neque ea plane videt animus, quum repente tam insolitum tamque turbulentum domicilium immigravit: sed quum se recollegit atque recreavit per aetatis momenta, tum agnoscit illa reminiscendo. Postquam enim quodam crasso corporis tegimine irretita anima et circumfusa quandam sui oblivionem subierit, quum deinde studio ac disciplina detergeri coepit atque nudari, tunc in naturae suae modum animus revertitur atque revocatur (...) Quod totum evidentius declarat Socrates in illo libro, qui Menon inscribitur, pusionem quandam interrogans quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad quae sic ille respondit, ut puer: et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut

In post-Porphyrrian Neoplatonism, it is this divine spark or inner seed⁵⁴ that provides the link between the fallen, incarnate human soul and the intelligible world. In Proclus, it develops into the doctrine of the “One within us”, which is itself a development of the Chaldaean concept of the “flower of the intellect” (*anthos noou*), a faculty of the soul that allows contact with the ineffable,⁵⁵ while in the Latin world, following Augustine, it becomes the doctrine of the *acies mentis*.⁵⁶

In the *Consolation*, therefore, Philosophy will attempt to fan the smothered spark of the Narrator’s soul, reviving his memories of his pre-incarnate intellectual visions by words which, to quote Simplicius “uttered forth from the [teacher’s] concept (*ennoia*), also move the concept within [the soul of the student], which had until then grown cold”.⁵⁷ The passage from Simplicius, which complements the passage from the Pseudo-Boethius we have just studied, is worth quoting:

As for the soul, when it is turned towards the Intellect, it possesses the same things [sc. as the Intellect] in a secondary way, for then the rational principles (*logoi*) within it are not only cognitive, but generative. Once, however, the soul has departed from there [sc. the intelligible world], it also separates the formulae (*logoi*) within itself from beings, thereby converting them into images instead of prototypes, and it introduces a distance between intellection and realities. This is all the more true, the further the soul has departed from its similarity to the Intellect, and it is henceforth content to project (*proballesthai*) notions which are consonant with realities. When, however, the soul has fallen into the realm of becoming, it is filled with forgetfulness⁵⁸ and requires sight and hearing in order to be able to recollect. For the soul needs someone who has already beheld

gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quasi geometrica didicisset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari. Quam rem multo accuratius ille explicat in sermone, quem habuit eo die, quo excessit e vita.

⁵⁴ Cf. Synesius, *De Insomniis* 4, 40 (*endothen sperma*); *Dion* 9, 16.

⁵⁵ On this doctrine, see, for instance, Gersh 1978 119-121, with further literature; Beierwaltes 1985, 275f.

⁵⁶ For references, cf. Hankey 1999, 35 & n. 162.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hoffmann 1987.

⁵⁸ The theme of forgetfulness goes back ultimately to Book 10 of Plato’s *Republic* (621a-c), with its myth of the plain of Lèthè.

the truth,⁵⁹ who, by means of language (*phônê*) uttered forth from the concept (*ennoia*), also moves the concept within [the soul of the student], which had until then grown cold⁶⁰ (...) For intellections (*noêseis*) which proceed forth from other intellections⁶¹ also cause motion immediately, connecting the learner's intellections to those of the teacher, by becoming intermediaries (*mesotêtes*) between the two. When intellections are set in motion in an appropriate way, they fit realities, and thus there comes about the knowledge of beings, and the soul/s innate *eros*⁶² is fulfilled.

Let's return to the *Consolation*. After the introductory first book, Philosophy's consolation takes place in three stages from books 2-5.⁶³

1. In *Cons.* 2.1-4, the Narrator's soul is purified of its false beliefs.

2. Stage two has two further subdivisions. In the first (*Cons.* 2.5-8), the Narrator's innate natural concepts are awakened and brought to light; while in the second (*Cons.* 3.1-8), these concepts are purified and made to appear as starting-points for further progress.

3. Finally, from *Cons.* 3.9 to the end of the work, the Narrator learns the doctrines which are to perfect his soul.

⁵⁹ That is, according to Hoffmann (1987, 83ff.), the philosophy teacher. Cf. Proclus, *Commentary on the First Alcibiades*, §235, 8-10 Westerink = vol. 2, p. 285 Segonds.

⁶⁰ On the *logoi* in the soul – portions of the *nous* which is the substances of the intelligible Forms – as a spark buried in ashes, the rekindling of which constitutes the process of learning, cf. Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's De anima*, p. 4, 30ff. Hayduck.

⁶¹ Sc. those of the teacher.

⁶² On the soul's innate *erôs* for knowledge, derived ultimately from Plato's *Symposium*, cf. Proclus, *Theol. Plat.*, I, 25, vol. I, pp. 109, 10-110, 8 Saffrey/Westerink; *In Tim.*, vol. I, p. 212, 21-22 Diehl.

⁶³ Baltes 1980, 326-327, who shows the parallel to the scheme utilized in the *Didaskalikos* of Alcinoos (2nd-3rd cent. CE). For an alternative analysis, cf. Courcelle 1943, 280: (1) in Book two, Boethius is brought back to the self-knowledge of which he'd been temporarily deprived; (2) from Book III to half-way through Book IV, he is reminded of the proper end of things. Finally, (3) from the last part of Book IV to the end of Book V, he is informed of the nature of the laws that govern the world. Cf. Zambon 2003.

3. Boethius on Providence and Fate

Throughout the first four books of the *Consolation*, Philosophy uses a mixture of rhetorical persuasion and philosophical *topoi*⁶⁴ to console the Narrator and reassure him that despite appearances to the contrary, there really is a benevolent, divine Providence behind the apparent injustices of life's events. Yet the problem of the suffering of the just and the flourishing of the unjust⁶⁵ has not yet been solved, and continues to trouble the Narrator. Beginning with the second half of Book IV, therefore, Philosophy discusses the themes of providence, fate, and free will. An initial distinction is to be made between providence and fate: Providence, characterized by simplicity and simultaneity, is the plan in the divine mind that embraces all things at once, while fate is the way, in which that plan unfolds in the sensible world, subject as it is to time and space. Providence is to fate as being is to becoming.⁶⁶ Like spheres⁶⁷ ro-

⁶⁴ Philosophy's consolatory *topoi* include a discussion of the nature of Fortuna; the ordinary, unsurprising nature of what is happening to the Narrator; a reminder of his previous successes and honors; and the ultimate insignificance of such honors. Cf. Donato 2012.

⁶⁵ A question that is discussed as the sixth of Proclus' *Ten problems concerning Providence*. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 466d-481d, cited by Zambon 2003, n. 79.

⁶⁶ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.3, 5.14-25 = Sorabji 2004 4b1; Proclus, *On Providence*, 10, 13-14 = Sorabji 2004 4b5; Sharples 1991, 29-31.

⁶⁷ Boethius, *Cons.* 4.6.15: *Nam ut orbium circa eundem cardinem sese vertentium etc.* In his translation of the *Consolatio*, Guillaumin (2002, 172, 64) is categorical: "Il s'agit bien de «cercles», *orbes*, et non pas de sphères". Yet when Boethius quotes Parmenides (*Cons.* 3.12.37: "sicut... Parmenides ait ... rerum orbem mobilem rotat"), he clearly renders the Greek σφαῖρα by *orbis*. As far as 4.16.15 is concerned, modern translators are pretty well unanimous: Lazam (1989) and Vanpeteghem (2005) translate *orbium* by "cercles", Moreschini (1994) by "circonferenze", Chitussi (2010) and Dallera (1977) by "cerchi", Gegenschatz/Gigon by "Kreise". It is also true that Boethius' closest immediate model, Proclus, *Ten doubts concerning providence* 5, 23ff., speaks of a *kuklos*. Yet I believe Boethius has deliberately modified his Greek model and chosen to speak of spheres: only spheres, not circles, rotate around an axis (*cardo*). Perhaps following Porphyry, Proclus envisaged the relation between universe and its place (*topos*) as that between two concentric spheres, one (immobile) of light

tating around a pivot, where the central sphere approaches the simplicity of the center and acts as a pivot for the rest, while those farthest away from the center sweep out greater distances, so the closer beings are to the simple center of providence,⁶⁸ the more they are removed from the intricate chains of fate. For Boethius, the main goal of this image seems to be to emphasize that while all things subject to Fate are also subject to Providence, the reverse does not hold true.⁶⁹ Fate is characteristic only of the spatio-temporal world, so that the possibility remains open to mankind, by rising up to the level of Intellect, of freeing himself from Fate.⁷⁰

In fact, we have the following analogies⁷¹:

and the other (mobile) containing matter: cf. Simplicius, *Corollary on Place*, in Simplicius, *In Phys.*, p. 612, 28ff. Diels.

⁶⁸ Cf. Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, ch. 145, p. 183, 18f. Waszink: et divina quidem atque intellegibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum providentiam solam, naturalia vero et corporea iuxta fatum.

⁶⁹ As I. Hadot points out (2001, p. CLI), the doctrine of the subordination of fate to providence is common to all Neoplatonists. Cf. Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, ch. 143-147, for instance p. 182, 4 Waszink: fatum quidem dicimus ex providentia fore, non tamen providentia ex fato. Boethius' immediate source is likely Proclus; cf. *De providentia*, III, 13 in the Latin translation by Moerbeke: [providentiam] omnibus superstantem intelligentialibusque et sensibilibus superiorem esse fato, et que quidem sub fato entia et sub providentia perseverare (...) que autem rursum sub providentia non adhuc omnia indigere et fato, sed intellectualia ab hic exempta esse.

⁷⁰ Liberation from fate was a main goal of Hellenistic religion and philosophy; cf. Festugière 1944-1954. According to Arnobius (*Adversus Nationes* 2.62), such liberation was what was promised by the *viri novi*, who may have been followers of Porphyry; cf. Courcelle 1953. But as Theiler has pointed out (1966, 102 & n. 235) freedom from fate was also promised by the Christians; cf. Tatian, *Ad Graec.* ch. 9, p. 10 Schwartz; Marius Victorinus, *Ad Galat.*, PL 8, col. 1175. According to Clement of Alexandria (*Extracts from Theodotus* 74, 2) Christ descended to earth in order transfer those who believed in him from fate (*heimarmenê*) to providence (*pronoia*). Like the Roman emperor according to Firmicus Maternus (2, 30, 5) so the Chaldaean theurges claimed to be above fate and the influence of the stars; cf. Theiler 1966, 292.

⁷¹ Boethius, *Cons.* 4.6.15-17; cf. Bächli 2001, 22; Bechtel 2006, 271.

Under jurisdiction of <i>providentia</i>		Under jurisdiction of <i>fatum</i>
center	:	sphere
being	:	becoming
eternity	:	time ⁷²
providence	:	fate
intellect	:	reason

In each of these cases, the items listed in the right-hand column can be viewed as an unfolding, development or emanation of the items in the column on the left. Viewed in another way, the left-hand column represents a condensed, concentrated version of the right-hand column.

We have here a kind of résumé of the late Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation. Entities are conceived as existing in concentrated (Greek *sunêirêmenon*), unextended, point-like form in the intelligible world, before being “unwound” like a ball of thread, “unrolled” like a carpet, or “unfolded” like a sheet of papyrus, into the temporally and spatially extended form they assume in the sensible world.⁷³

⁷² On the relations between being and eternity on the one hand, and time and the sensible world on the other, cf. for instance Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.28.11-14.

⁷³ For Proclus (*In Parm.* 1217.17f.; *In Tim.*, 3.26.23f.; 43.17), primary time, which he calls first (*prôtistos*), absolute (*apolutos*), and without relation (*askhetos*), remains itself immobile, before it develops (*anelittôn*) into the time that is counted. For Simplicius, *In Phys.*, p. 1155, 15f. Diels, time and temporal things “unwind (*ekmêruetai*) their integrality in accordance with motion and coming-into-being”, cf. Damascius *De princ.* I., p. 4, 23; 141, 25; 158, 7; 164, 15; 214, 17; 282, 23; *In Parm.*, 89, 5-13; 151, 28; *On time, space, and number*, quoted by Simplicius in his *Corollarium de tempore*, *In Phys.*, 9, p. 780, 30 Diels. In addition to *ekmêruô*, other Neoplatonic terms designating this process include *anelittô*/*anelixis*; *anaptussô*/*anaptuxis*. Cf. Boethius, *Cons.* 4.6., where providence is defined as *temporalis ordinis explicatio*. This notion has its origins as far back as Cicero, for whom (*De divin.* 127) future events develop *quasi rudentis explicatio*.

4. Boethius on predestination and free will

4.1. Aristotle on future contingents

The Narrator now finds himself confronted by a question similar to the one that arises in the case of contemporary block-time theory. If, as many contemporary philosophers believe, the entire future course of events is already laid out and already “exists” in a sense that is arguably just as strong as the sense in which the past and present exist, the problem arises of what becomes of human free will. If there is to be free will, we usually think that what seem to us to be our freely chosen decisions must have some causal efficacy: they must make a *difference* in the world, and if we had chosen to take some decisions other than the ones we actually did, we believe that the world would have turned out differently, to however slight an extent. Yet if the future *already* exists, how could our future decisions possibly change it? Similarly, says the Narrator in Boethius’ *Consolation*, if God is omniscient, He knows everything that will happen, including the thoughts, desires, inclinations and decisions of my own mind. If He knows *already*, for instance, that I will get up at 8.00 AM tomorrow, how could I possibly be free to choose to sleep until noon?

An excellent summary of this view is attributed to the Stoics by Chalcidius⁷⁴:

So, if God knows all things from the beginning, before they happen, and not only the phenomena of heaven, which are bound by a fortunate necessity of unbroken blessedness as by a kind of fate, but also those thoughts and desires of ours; if he also knows that, which is contingent by nature, and controls past, present and future, and

⁷⁴ Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, c. 160, p. 193, 17-194, 4 Waszink, translation Den Boeft 1970, 47: “Ergo, si deus cuncta ex initio scit, antequam fiant, nec sola caelestia, quae felici necessitate perpetuae beatitudinis quasi quodam fato tenentur, sed illas etiam nostras cogitationes et uoluntates, scit quoque dubiam illam naturam tenet quae et praeterita et praesentia et futura, et hoc ex initio, nec potest falli deus, omnia certe ex initio disposita atque decreta sunt, tam ea quae in nostra potestate posita esse dicuntur quam fortuita nec non subiecta casibus”. These concerns were already current in Origen’s day; cf. the fragment of his *Commentary on Genesis* preserved by Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation* 6.11.31ff. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 30.

that from the beginning, and if God cannot be mistaken, the conclusion must be that all things are arranged and determined from the beginning, things said to be within our power as well as fortuitous and chance events.

Although this passage from Calcidius is probably extracted from Stoic objections against the *Timaeus*, it is clearly a version of the famous problem of future contingents, set forth most influentially by Aristotle in ch. 9 of his *De interpretatione*. Aristotle's argument goes something like this: all assertoric statements are either true or false. But if we apply this universally valid principle to the case of individual future events, that means that the statement "There will be a sea-battle tomorrow", is also true or false right now. If that statement is true now, however, then it seems to be *necessarily* true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow; while if the statement is *false* now, then it seems to be *impossible* for there to be a sea-battle tomorrow. In either case, there is no room for chance here – everything is pre-determined or fore-ordained – and therefore none for free will. The occurrence or non-occurrence of the sea-battle tomorrow is already predetermined, and there's nothing we can do about it. Aristotle solves the problem, at least in his own view, by stating that while it is necessary now that either (p) there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or (\sim p) there will not be a sea battle tomorrow, i.e. in modern logical notation

$$N(p \vee \sim p)$$

Yet it is not the case that it is necessary now that (p) be true, and it is also not the case that it is necessary that (\sim p) be true, i.e.

$$\sim(Np) \wedge \sim(N\sim p)$$

Mountains of books have, of course, been written on this chapter of Aristotle's *De interpretatione*.⁷⁵ In Antiquity, the Stoics accepted that the proposition "There will be a sea-battle tomorrow" is true today, so that the occurrence/non-occurrence of the sea-battle is already fixed

⁷⁵ For contemporary interpretations, see Sorabji 1980; Gaskin 1995, Blank *et al.* 1998, Seel 2001.

now, while the Epicureans maintained that the statement is neither true nor false. Against these and other views, Boethius, following Ammonius, will argue that statements about future contingents are true or false, but are so indefinitely (Greek *aoristós*).⁷⁶

4.2. Boethius on divine omniscience vs. human free will

To solve the conflict between divine omniscience and human free will, Boethius, in the final book of the *Consolation*, will make use of three principles, all of which he takes from earlier or contemporary Greek philosophy, although it can be argued that his own particular way of combining them makes his solution original and distinct. These are

1. The distinction between absolute and conditional necessity;
 2. The principle that the nature of knowledge is determined by the nature of the knower, rather than by the nature of the thing known⁷⁷; and finally
 3. The notion that God experiences all of time as we experience the present; in other words, that God experiences all of time, past, present, and future, simultaneously, or that God lives in an eternal present.
- Let's go over Boethius' three principles in order.

4.2.1. The distinction between absolute and conditional necessity⁷⁸

Boethius distinguishes between two kinds of necessity.⁷⁹ Absolute necessity is that which is involved in statements like "the sun will rise tomorrow" or "all living beings have a heart", or "all men are mortal": they are true independently of any condition, such as when they are uttered or who utters them. Other propositions are true with only conditional

⁷⁶ Sharples 2009, 211.

⁷⁷ Scholars refer to this as either the Iamblichus principle or the Modes of Cognition principle. Cf. Ammon. *In De Int.* 135.14-137.1 = Sorabji 2004 3a10; Huber 1976, 40ff.

⁷⁸ Cf. Obertello 1989, 95ff.; Weidemann 1998; Bechtle 2006, 274f.

⁷⁹ Weidemann (1998) has, I believe, convincingly refuted the idea (Sorabji 1980, 122) that Boethius' distinction between simple and conditional necessity amounts to the distinction between *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis*.

necessity: “Socrates is sitting down”, for instance, or “Plato is going for a walk” is necessarily true while (and only while) Socrates is in fact sitting down and Plato is in fact going for a walk, respectively. The same is true for phenomena like chariot races: the drivers’ skillful maneuvers are necessary while I am observing them, but they were not necessary beforehand, since they are the result of the drivers’ free will. Thus, things and events that are simply necessary are so because of their own nature; things and events that are conditionally necessary are so owing to extrinsic or accidental circumstances.

This argument is in fact based on an adaptation of the Aristotelian definition of knowledge: if I *know* something, then the object of my knowledge *necessarily*⁸⁰ is the way I know it to be, simply because that’s the way knowledge (Greek *epistêmê*, Latin *scientia*, Arabic *‘ilm*) is defined – at least in one of its many Aristotelian senses.⁸¹

One Aristotelian text that is important in this regard is this one from the *De interpretatione* (19a23-6):

That what exists is when it is, and what does not exist is not when it is not, is necessary.⁸²

For Aristotle, there can be *epistêmê* in this strict sense – the sense, that is, in which such knowledge is always true (*APo* II, 19, 100b18) – only of universals.⁸³ Indeed, the reason why knowledge is bereft of false-

⁸⁰ As Weidemann points out (1998, 198), Boethius’ addition of the modal operator “necessarily” transforms Aristotle’s consequentiality relation of *being* into a consequentiality relation of *necessity*.

⁸¹ “It is impossible for that of which there is knowledge in the absolute sense to be otherwise <than it is>,” says Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* (I, 2 71b9-15), which led Thomas Waitz to comment (II, 302) that “veram scientiam non darsi nisi eorum quae aeterna sint nec umquam mutantur”.

⁸² Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὄν ὅταν ᾗ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾗ, ἀνάγκη. Cf. Frede 1972.

⁸³ Cf. *Metaph.* K 1, 1059b26; 2, 1060b20; B 6, 1003a15; M 9, 1086b5.10; 1086b 33; *Anal. pr.* 31 87b33, *De an.* 2.5417b23; *EN* 7, 6, 1140b31; 1180b15. This is perhaps why the Narrator begins by speaking not of knowledge but of opinion, only to slip into talking about knowledge by virtue of the (Platonic!) equivalence true opinion = knowledge.

hood is that it is *necessary* for things to be in the way knowledge understands them to be.⁸⁴ This is clear, for instance, from a passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (VI, 3, 1139b20-25):

We all suppose that what we know is not capable of being otherwise (...) therefore the object of knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal, for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal⁸⁵; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.

The reason this distinction is important is as follows: the Narrator reasons that (1) necessarily, if an event p will happen, then God foresees it ($N(p \rightarrow F(G, p))$); and (2) necessarily, if God foresees p , it will happen ($N(F(G, p) \rightarrow p)$). Note that the necessity here bears upon the entire implication: it is a *necessitas consequentiae*. It has been argued⁸⁶ that Boethius now makes a simple logical mistake, inferring from (1) and (2) that (3) if p , then necessarily God foresees p ($p \rightarrow NF(G, p)$), and (4) if God foresees p , then necessarily p ($F(G, p) \rightarrow Np$), where in both the latter cases the necessity bears upon the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*).

I believe this analysis is mistaken. Boethius does believe both (3) and (4) are true, but they are true only *conditionally*, where the condition is God's knowledge. In other words, the necessity imposed by God's knowledge of a future event is of the same kind as that which necessitates that Socrates be sitting when I know he is sitting: such conditional necessity (*kath' hupothesein* in Greek⁸⁷; *secundum praecessionem* in the

⁸⁴ Cf. *Cons.* 5.3.21: Ea namque causa est cur mendacio scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese habere scientia comprehendit.

⁸⁵ Cf. *De Caelo* I, 12, 281a28-282a4.

⁸⁶ Graeser 1992; Marenbon 2003a, 533ff.

⁸⁷ Cf. Eustratius, *In EN VI*, p. 293, 1-2 Heylbut (CAG 20): ὡς εἶναι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντα αἰδία. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅσα μὴ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι τινα εἶσθ' ἂν κἀθῆται ὁ καθήμενος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι λέγομεν τὸ καθῆσθαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἀπλῶς ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ("thus, all things that are simply by necessity are perpetual [*aidia*]. We call 'simply by necessity' whatever is not hypothetically (*kath' hupothesein*) by necessity: for instance, the fact of sitting: as long as the seated person is sitting, we say that the

Latin of Chalcidius⁸⁸) imposes no constraint upon Socrates, but simply concerns the nature of knowledge.⁸⁹ As Boethius will claim, such future events can be said to be necessary with regard to God's knowledge but free with regard to their own nature.

These considerations go some way toward explaining the key point of how God can know future events, which are by their nature indeterminate, in a determinate way. The reason why this seems counter-intuitive to us is that we believe there can only be knowledge of things that are certain, so that if God has certain knowledge of future events, such events must already be decided. Yet this view presupposes at least two further assumptions: that knowledge is determined by its object, and that God's knowledge of the future is like ours. Boethius' additional two principles will attempt to undermine both these assumptions.

4.2.2. The principle that the nature of knowledge is determined by the nature of the knower

Like his opponents the Stoics, the great Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias had considered it axiomatic that modes of knowledge are conditioned by the objects of their knowledge.⁹⁰ In the case of future contingents, it follows from this principle that the gods can possess only an open, uncertain, or indeterminate knowledge of future events, which are by their nature open, uncertain, and indeterminate. The Middle Platonists and the fifth-century Latin author Chalcidius agreed that God or the gods can have only a contingent knowledge of what is contingent.⁹¹

According to such Neoplatonists as Proclus and Ammonius, probably the most immediate influences on Boethius,⁹² it is because we assume that the gods' knowledge is like ours that we end up with either

fact that he is sitting is necessary, yet not simply but by hypothesis (*ex hupotheseôs*)”.

⁸⁸ Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, p. 186, 15 Waszink.

⁸⁹ In the words of Bächli 2001, it is an “epistemological necessity”.

⁹⁰ Huber 1976, 13f., citing Alexander, *De Fato* 200, 15ff.

⁹¹ Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, c. 162, p. 195, 1-17 Waszink.

⁹² Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus* 7; *De prov.* 64, 1-4 Ammonius, *In de interpretatione* 132, 6ff.; 135, 16-19. Zambon (2003) has made a persuasive case

the Stoic view that everything is determined in advance, or the Peripatetic view that providence extends only as far as the sphere of the moon. In fact, says Proclus, the reverse is true: it is not the nature of the known objects that determines knowledge, but the nature of the cognitive faculties of the knower. Thus, for instance, the gods know the objects of their knowledge in a manner that is superior to the ontological status of the objects they know⁹³:

Every god has an undivided knowledge of things divided and a timeless knowledge of things temporal; he knows the contingent without contingency, the mutable immutably, and in general all things in a higher mode than belongs to their status (...) their knowledge, being a divine property, will be determined not by the nature of the inferior beings which are its object but by their own transcendent majesty (...)

Proclus states the same view in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*⁹⁴:

(...) the gods themselves know what is generated (*genêton*) in an ungenerated way, and what is extended in an unextended way, and what is divided undividedly, and what is temporal atemporally, and what is contingent necessarily.

for the argument, against Courcelle, that many elements in Boethius' thought derive from his reading of Porphyry rather than any hypothetical sojourns in Athens or Alexandria. In the present case, however, the parallels between Boethius and Proclus/Ammonius seem so close that influence of the latter on the former seems highly likely, unless we were to postulate the existence or some otherwise unknown source (a lost work, or part of a work, on providence by Porphyry?) common to both Boethius and Proclus/Ammonius.

⁹³ Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 124, p. 110, 10-13 Dodd; translation Dodds, p. 111: Πᾶς θεὸς ἀμερίστως μὲν τὰ μεριστὰ γινώσκει, ἀχρόνως δὲ τὰ ἔγχρονα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἀναγκαίως, καὶ τὰ μεταβλητὰ ἀμεταβλήτως, καὶ ὅλως πάντα κρείττονως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τάξιν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν, ὅ τι περ ἂν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ιδιότητα, δηλον δὴπουθεν ὡς οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χειρόνων φύσιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς οὐσα ἢ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηρημένην ὑπεροχὴν.

⁹⁴ Proclus, *In Tim.* I, 352, 5-8 (my translation): αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ γενητὸν ἀγενήτως καὶ τὸ διαστατὸν ἀδιαστάτως ἐγνώκασιν καὶ τὸ μεριστὸν ἀμερίστως καὶ τὸ ἔγχρονον διαιωνίως καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀναγκαίως.

Yet that this doctrine of the dependence of knowledge on the knower's cognitive faculties goes back at least to Porphyry is, I believe, implied by a passage from the latter's *Sententiae*⁹⁵:

...to that which is by nature multiple and endowed with magnitude [i.e., the sensible. – MC] the partless and non-multiple [i.e., the intelligible] is endowed with magnitude and multiplicity [i.e., with the characteristics of the sensible] (...) to that which is naturally partless and non-multiple [the intelligible] that which has parts and is multiplied [the sensible] is partless and non-multiple [i.e. has the characteristics of the intelligible]...

This passage is difficult, and has occasioned quite a bit of discussion, but its gist seems clear: the way *x* appears to *y* depends not upon *x*, but upon *y*. According to standard Platonic doctrine, intelligible or incorporeal realities (*x*) are in themselves partless, non-multiple and unextended, while material and corporeal realities (*y*) have the opposite characteristics: they are divided, multiple and extended in space and time. What Porphyry claims, in his clumsy, jargon-laden language, is that to *y*, *x* appears as endowed with the properties of *y*. To *x*, by contrast, *y* is endowed with the properties of *x*. To sensible reality, which is divided, pluralized and located in space, intelligible reality – in itself bereft of these characteristics and qualified by their opposites – appears as endowed with plurality and magnitude.

For Porphyry, then, at least at the time he wrote the *Sentences*, it seems that the way an object of knowledge appears to a knower is determined not by the object's characteristics, but by the cognitive faculties of the knower. All the more strange then, is the testimony of Proclus, who writes, immediately after the passage quoted above⁹⁶:

⁹⁵ Porphyry, *Sententiae* 33, in Brisson *et al.*, 2005, vol. I, p. 346, 21-33 = p. 36, 12-37, 5 Lamberz. Translation J. Dillon, loc. cit., vol. 2, p. 816-817: τῷ μὲν ἄρα πεπληθυσμένῳ φύσει καὶ μεμεγεθυσμένῳ τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἀπλήθυντον μεμεγέθυνται καὶ πεπλήθυνται (...) τῷ δ' ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἀπληθύντῳ φύσει ἀμερὲς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπλήθυντον τὸ μεριστὸν καὶ πεπληθυσμένον (...)

⁹⁶ Proclus, *In Tim.* I, 352, 11-16 = Porphyry, *In Tim.*, fr. 2.45 Sodano: μὴ γὰρ οἰηθῶμεν, ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γνωστῶν φύσεσιν αἱ γνώσεις χαρακτηρίζονται, μηδ' ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀραρὸς οὐκ ἀραρὸς ἐστὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος –

Let us not think, then, that knowledge is characterized by the objects of knowledge, nor that what is not fixed is not fixed among the gods⁹⁷, as the philosopher Porphyry says – for he affirmed that which would have better left unsaid – but that the mode of knowledge becomes different along with the differences of the knowers.

According to Proclus' testimony, then, Porphyry (wrongly) believed that it is the known object, not the knower that determines the mode of knowledge.

I can see only two possibilities of resolving this apparent contradiction. Either Proclus has misunderstood Porphyry, attributing to him, for instance, a Peripatetic doctrine upon which Porphyry may have been reporting; or else Porphyry's commentary on the *Timaeus* was an early work, and he later changed his views on this subject under the influence of Plotinus. More research would be needed to enable a choice between these two alternatives.

In any case, the view that knowledge depends on the knower, not the object of thought, became standard Neoplatonic doctrine after Iamblichus. According to Proclus' student Ammonius, since all things are present to the gods in an eternal now,⁹⁸ their providence, like their creative activity, is exercised without the change implied by ratiocination or deliberation, but by their very being (*autōi tōi einai*). Since their own nature is determinate, the gods know all things, including future contingents, in a determinate way. Boethius, then, following his Greek

τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνος ἀνεφθέγγετο, ὅπερ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον – ἀλλ' ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γινωσκόντων διαφοραῖς ἀλλοίως γίγνεται τῆς γνώσεως ὁ τρόπος.

⁹⁷ In other words, Porphyry allegedly claimed that what is in reality not fixed or established (*mê araros*) also appears to the gods in the same way: as non-fixed or indeterminate (*mê araros*). This is precisely the position of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

⁹⁸ Ammon., *In De int.*, p. 133, 25: ἀλλὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν ἐστὶ τῷ αἰωνίῳ ἰδρυμένα. Cf. Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, ch. 25, p. 76, 4-5 Waszink: temporis item species praeteritum praesens futurum, aevi substantia uniformis *in solo perpetuoque prasenti*. Waszink 1964, 43, 47, 70 traces the source of this Chalcidian chapter back to Porphyry.

sources, concludes that “all that is known is comprehended not according to its power, but rather according to the faculty of the knowers”.⁹⁹

4.2.3. The notion that God lives in an eternal present

Now that it has been established that knowledge is determined by the knower, Boethius moves on to deducing God’s mode of cognition from His nature. God is eternal (*Cons.* 5.6.2.10-14), and this leads us to Boethius’ definition of eternity, perhaps the most famous and influential ever formulated in the Western tradition: Eternity is the perfect possession, all at once, of unlimited life (*Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*).¹⁰⁰ This definition can be better understood, Philosophy claims, by comparison with temporal things: whatever lives in the present proceeds, when it is present, from the past to the future, and nothing constituted within time can equally embrace the complete extent of its life. Temporal beings cannot yet apprehend the future, while they have already lost the past. Even in today’s life, Philosophy continues, you mortals live in no more than that mobile, transitory moment. Whatever is subject to time, even if, as Aristotle thought was true of the world, it never begins nor ends, should not be called eternal, for its does not embrace all at once the extent of its life, even if it should last forever: it doesn’t yet possess the future, and it no longer possesses the past. What does deserve to be called eternal is what comprehends and possesses the entire fullness of unlimited life, lacking nothing future nor past: in full possession of itself, it must always both remain present to itself, and have present to itself the infinity of mobile time. People are wrong to conclude from Plato’s statements that this world had neither beginning nor end¹⁰¹ that this makes the world co-

⁹⁹ Boethius, *Cons.* 5.4.25; cf. 5.4.38; Huber 1976, 40ff.; Den Boeft 1970, 53ff.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* III 7 (45), 11, 3-5: Eternity is “that unchanging life, all together at once, already infinite, completely unswerving, standing in and directed toward the one”. For a complete list of the parallels between *Consolation* Book V and *Ennead* III 7 (45), cf. Beierwaltes 1967/1981, 198-200.

¹⁰¹ Presupposed here, as if it went without saying (as indeed it did for the late Greek Neoplatonists) is the view that Plato’s creation narrative in the *Ti-maeus* is to be understood symbolically or allegorically.

eternal with its creator¹⁰²: it's one thing to lead a life through an unlimited period, as Plato says of the world, and quite another to have equally embraced the total presence of limitless life, as is proper to the divine mind. The world cannot properly be called eternal, therefore, but should be called perpetual.¹⁰³

5. Boethius on the eternal now

God, Boethius continues, is not greater than created things by the mere quantity of time, but by the characteristic property of his simple nature. As Plotinus had already argued, Time's infinite motion tries vainly to imitate the presential status of immobile life, but cannot equal it, so that it sinks from immobility into motion, and into the infinite quantity of past and future. Unable to equally possess the complete plenitude of its life, temporal beings strive to fill this void by constantly accumulating an unending series of transitory instants. Perhaps we can use a modern analogy: let's assume Bill Gates is not just rich, but infinitely rich. Then time's attempt to equal eternity would be analogous to, and as futile as, trying to equal Bill Gates' infinite wealth by saving, say, a penny a day. Nevertheless, since time bears within it, in the guise of the present moment, a kind of image of eternity's eternal present, it lends to whatever it touches the appearance of existence.¹⁰⁴

5.1 Boethius and the Neoplatonic theory of time

To understand this notion, we need to bear in mind the basic structure of the Late Neoplatonic theory of time.¹⁰⁵ Beginning with Iamblichus, the Neoplatonists proposed a three-level hierarchy, in line with the doctrine of the triple universal, according to which each Intelligible Form

¹⁰² Origen was accused of making the creation coternal with God: cf. Methodius, *On generated things*, ap. Photius, *Library* 302a30ff.

¹⁰³ On this distinction, cf. Chase 2011, 127-130.


¹⁰⁴ *Cons.* 5.6.12: huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur.

¹⁰⁵ The best exposition of this difficult theory is probably Sambursky/Pines 1987; cf. Sorabji 1983, 33-45.

or Idea has three phases: unparticipated, participated, and in the participants.¹⁰⁶ Corresponding to the unparticipated Form is Eternity (Greek *aiôn*), followed by two kinds of time: corresponding to the participated Form, an intellectual time that is stable, motionless, partless, and generative; and corresponding to the participants, the time we experience in the sensible world, which is generated and constantly flowing.

This inferior time flows from the future into the past along the sides of a triangle (Table 1), and only at the vertex of the triangle does the flowing now that constitutes our present moment touch the immobile Intellectual time, which is a direct emanation from, and therefore an image of eternity. This is, as it were, the metaphysical background for Boethius' assertion that the now represents our only point of contact with eternity, an idea he shares with his near-contemporary Damascius, for whom the present instant is a "trace of eternity" (*ikhnos aiônion*) at which eternity comes to be within time (*en khronôi to aei on estin*).¹⁰⁷

Table 1



¹⁰⁶ Cf. Iamblichus, *In Tim.*, fr. 60 Dillon; Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 24.

¹⁰⁷ Damascius, *In Parmenidem* II, 12³.c¹, vol. III, p. 189, 20 Westerink-Combès. Cf. already Proclus, *In Tim.* III, p. 44, 21-22 Diehl: "Everything is present in the now" (*Kai en tōi nun to pan*). Similarly, although more colorfully, Meister Eckhart describes the now as "a taste of time" (*Nū...ez ist wol ein smak der zît*, cf. *Werke*, ed. N. Largier et al., 2 vols., Frankfurt a.M. 1993, vol. 2, p. 48). On the concept of the eternal now in the philosophy of Proclus, cf. Roth 2008.

Since, according to Boethius' second principle, every nature understands what's subject to it according to its own nature, and God's nature is always eternal and praesential, it follows that his knowledge remains in the simplicity of his presence, embracing the infinite extent of the past and future, considering everything in his simple cognition as if it were happening now.¹⁰⁸ The presence by which God discerns everything should be characterized, Boethius informs us, not so much as foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of the future as knowledge of a never-deficient instant; it should be called providence (*pro-videntia*) rather than foreknowledge, where the prefix *pro-* can be interpreted as a kind of spatial priority rather than a temporal one.¹⁰⁹ From his supratemporal vantage point, God sees all the temporal events in the world's history simultaneously, like clothespins on a laundry line, or the slices of a sausage or a loaf of bread. The events we see as occurring in succession, one after another, or in *taxis* (to speak in Aristotelian terms), God sees as simultaneously present and separated only by their *thesis* or position.

We see here several themes that are present *in nuce* in Plotinus, and are more fully developed in such post-Plotinian thinkers as Iamblichus and Damascius:

1. In order to overcome time and perceive eternity, we must eliminate the difference between them: that is, we must convert space into

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Cons.* 5.c2.11-12: quae, sint, quae fuerint, veniantque/uno mentis cernit in ictu.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Cons.* 5.6.17: Unde non praevidentia sed providentia potius dicitur, quod porro a rebus infimis constituta quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Boethius is very fond, particularly in Book V, of the term *prospicio* in the sense of "look forward or into the distance, look out, look, see" (Lewis & Short s.v. I) for designating the divine vision. Cf. *Cons.* 5.2.11: Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens providentiae cernit intuitus; 5.3.4: Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest; 5.3.28: ... diuina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta prospiciens; 5.4.33: ...illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens. As Bächli points out (2001, n. 83), Boethius uses the verb *prospicere* "mit Bezug auf den quasi-zeitlosen 'Blick von oben'". On the spiritual exercise of the "View from above" in ancient philosophy, cf. Hadot 1995, 238-251.

time.¹¹⁰ In our everyday phenomenal experience, space is characterized, as Aristotle affirms, by position (*thesis*) or the fact that all its parts are simultaneously present; time by order or succession (*taxis*), i.e. the fact that no two of its parts exist simultaneously. In contrast, Boethius' near-contemporary Damascius taught that we can learn to perceive "integral" or "intellectual time", which exists simultaneously as a whole.¹¹¹

2. One way to achieve this perception of time as simultaneously existent is to concentrate on the present moment. As we've seen, as the "nows" or instants of phenomenal time surge forth from the future, only to disappear into the past, there is an instant at which they touch immobile, stable, intellectual time, which is itself an emanation of eternity. In the midst of time, we can experience a glimpse of eternity thanks to the present moment, which is not point-like, according to Damascius, but is divisible and has a certain extension (*diastêma*).

Thus, while Boethius seems mainly to follow Plotinus, perhaps through the intermediary of Porphyry, as far as his doctrine of time and eternity is concerned, the *Consolation* nevertheless shows traces of familiarity with post-Plotinian developments of that doctrine, particularly those of Iamblichus and Damascius.

6. Boethius and Relativity

I believe that Boethius' use of the principle that God lives in an eternal present involves notions very close to those mobilized in the current debate in the philosophy of time between eternalists, or advocates of the block-time view, and presentists, who defend the objective reality of the flow of time. For the Block-timers, who take seriously the view of reality as a four-dimensional continuum as set forth by Einstein and Minkowski, all the moments of time exist simultaneously, so that the past con-

¹¹⁰ Likewise, in a mystical narration by the Iranian philosopher Qāzī Sa'īd Qummi, "succession becomes simultaneity, and time becomes space, as a function of that sublimation which brings it to a more and more subtle state" (Corbin 1969). It is, of course, a basic postulate of Einsteinian special relativity that temporal coordinates can be transformed into spatial ones, and *vice versa*; see for instance Davies-Gribbin 1992, 79-82.

¹¹¹ Cf. Galpérine 1980.

tinues to be, while the future already is, just as real as the present. Presentists, in contrast, subscribe to the common-sense view that time flows: only the present is real, while the past is no longer and the future is not yet real. In a nutshell, Boethius will argue that God views reality from the block-time perspective (which, of course, also corresponds to an objectively true picture of reality), while we humans see things from a presentist perspective.

It is only the element of time that introduces what seems to be a contradiction between God's universal foresight and our free will. In other words, it is only because we imagine that God knows our *future* acts and thoughts *beforehand* that we believe, since only what is certain can be known, that our acts and thoughts are already determined. As we've seen, Boethius' ingenious solution will consist in denying that God *fore-knows* or *fore-sees* anything at all.¹¹² Since the future tense does not apply to Him or to His knowledge, he sees all things as if they were present; and since the mere fact of our observing human actions in the present imposes no necessity on such acts, neither does God's omniscient vision and knowledge of all our acts and thoughts – past, present or future – necessitate those acts and thoughts. God sees all the moments of the world's history, and hence, all the moments of our lives, spread out before him at once. If he distinguishes between, say, my decision to rob a bank tomorrow and my actual robbing of the bank, it is not because one event is chronologically "later" than another, but because they occupy different positions in the series of spacetime events, all of which are simultaneously present to God's vision. It is in this sense that one might say that God sees the world the way Einstein and Minkowski taught us, in the first decades of the 20th century, to see space and time: the world consists not of a three-dimensional space and a separate one-dimensional time, but of a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, consisting of spacetime events. Although God does not see these events as *temporally* prior or posterior to one another, he can perfectly well perceive their *causal*, *logical*, and *ontological* anteriority or posteriority. Likewise, Boethius argues, God can tell which events are necessary (the sun's rising), and which are contingent (my going for a walk), just as a

¹¹² Cf. *Cons.* 5.6.16-17: *praevidentiam...non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis.*

human being simultaneously observing necessary and contingent events in the present is able easily to distinguish them. This is what allows Boethius to conclude that God's foreknowledge (*praevidentia*) should in fact be called *pro-videntia*, where the prefix *pro-* may connote priority in space, not time. If we could raise ourselves up to this God's-eye view, we would see that there is no conflict between divine omniscience and our free will, since God's supratemporal vision introduces no necessity into contingent events. Our idea that there is such a conflict is, almost literally, an optical illusion, caused by the fact that we cannot help but think in terms of temporality.

Boethius' view of God's ontological state as an eternal present, developed primarily from Plotinus' theory of time as eternity as presented in *Ennead* 3.7, is thus the crowning jewel in the argumentative apparatus Boethius uses to solve the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human freedom of the will. There is no such thing as divine *praescientia* (foreknowledge): God sees all things in an eternal present, whereby he distinguishes between past and present events not by their *chronological* order or occurrence, but their *casual* anteriority or posteriority. His knowledge of events that seem to us future is therefore no impediment to our freedom, any more than my observation of a man crossing the street imposes any necessity on him. To be sure, if I *know* that he is crossing the street at time *t*, then it is *necessary* that he be crossing the street at time *t*, but this kind of factual, conditional, or epistemological necessity, based as it is on the Aristotelian definition of knowledge and the fact that things must necessarily be *as they are when* they are, imposes no constraints on the man in question. As I observe the man walking and a contemporaneous sunset, I know immediately that the former is a free act originating in the individual's volition, while the latter is a necessary event. Likewise, God's vision observes all our thoughts and acts, past, present and future, as if they were simultaneously present, but like our human vision this divine vision imposes no necessity on what it observes, and like our own vision, God's vision is perfectly capable of distinguishing, among the phenomena it observes, between the necessary and the contingent.

It has been objected¹¹³ that this characterization of divine knowledge entails that I know something God does not know: I know which events are past and which are future. But this seems to me to be incorrect, or at least misleading. First of all, from a divine perspective, the past-present-future distinction has no objective reality but is a mere illusion caused by our limited conceptual apparatus. Alternatively, if we wished to say that this division is objectively real, it is so only in the sense that the distinction between “x is standing to my left” and “y is standing to my right” is real: these are mere relations that depend on my individual perspective at a given instant. Likewise, what I consider past and future depends merely on my perspective as a temporal being. To claim that God is unaware of such relational properties does not seem to present a serious challenge to his omniscience.

I submit, moreover, that it is not even true that God is unaware of the past-present-future distinction. As we have seen, Boethius’ conception of divine vision corresponds rather closely to the way reality should be viewed from the perspective of relativistic physics, that is, as a four-dimensional spacetime continuum. Here, the history of the world and of any individual object can be envisaged as a world-tube, where each instant can be viewed as a three dimensional slice of the tube. Given that any spatio-temporal event can be identified on the tube by a series of four coordinates, it would be easy for God to situate on my world-tube my instantaneous existence in my Paris study at, say, 12:43 on May 2, 2013. But it would be just as easy for him to deduce that an event x, which can be situated at a point on the tube corresponding to my study at 12:32 on May 1, would be in what *I consider* the past, and that an event occurring in the same place at 12:32 May 3 would be in what *I consider* the future. True, God would not “know” that a given event is past or future, because such alleged facts are not genuine objects of knowledge but at best mere relational properties, and at worst illusions. We must bear in mind that, for Aristotle and for Boethius, for x to be *known* implies that x is not only *true* but *necessarily true*. But it is not *true*, much less *necessarily true*, that a given event is past or future with regard to me: such a viewpoint is merely an illusion caused by my par-

¹¹³ Sorabji, in Blank *et al* 1998.

tial, limited temporal perspective. Similarly, if a stick partially submerged in water looks bent to me, we would not say that an omniscient God “knows” that the stick is bent, but that He knows that the stick *looks* bent *to me*.

7. Conclusion

Far from being a parody or a conglomeration of unconvincing arguments thrown together any old way, Boethius’ *Consolatio* represents a meticulously crafted whole, although it may be an unfinished one. In its first half, it shows how philosophy, which is a way of life rather than a mere series of abstract arguments, can be used as therapy of the soul. It does so by providing an illustration of the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum in action, whereby, after an initial moral purification from false ideas and opinions, the beginning philosophy student’s innate ideas are gradually awakened and reactivated, thus rendering his soul capable of undertaking the return to its intelligible homeland. In the work’s second half, the narrator, now restored to his status as an advanced student of philosophy, is presented with a coherent set of arguments intended to show why and how divine omniscience does not jeopardize human free will. This is done by a skillful interweaving of the distinction between absolute and conditional necessity, the principle that knowledge is conditioned by the knower rather than the object of knowledge, and the principle that God’s eternal mode of being grants Him a cognitive mode whereby He sees past, present and future as given simultaneously in an eternal present.

Finally, lest this latter point be dismissed as mere Neoplatonic mysticism, I have argued that it corresponds to the view that seems to be a virtually inescapable consequence of special relativity. As a number of contemporary scientists, historians, and philosophers of science have concluded, if Einstein and Minkowski are right, the passage of time we seem to experience is in fact an illusion, and reality must be represented from the perspective of block-time, in which all spacetime events, regardless of whether they seem to us to be past, present, or future are, as it were, laid out in advance and endowed with equally objective existence. Boethius speaks of the possibility of raising oneself up to this

Gods-eye view of things,¹¹⁴ and he is echoed by the theoretical physicist Thibault Damour:

The structure of the theory of relativity suggests that if one could free oneself from the thermodynamic and biological constraints that condition us, in everyday life, to live reality in the form of a “temporal flux”, one could, by analogy, “super-live” our life “in a block”, as a part of the four-dimensional space-time block of Minkowski.

To give some idea of what such a perception might be, I’d like to conclude by comparing two texts, one attributed to Mozart,¹¹⁵ the other by Boethius:

My brain catches fire, especially if I am not disturbed. It grows, I develop it more and more, ever more clearly. The work is then finished in my skull, or really just as if, even if it is a long piece, and *I can embrace the whole in a single glance*, as if it were a painting or a statue. In my imagination, I do not hear the work in its flow, as it must appear in succession, but *I have the whole in one block*, as it were. What a gift! Invention, elaboration, all that happens within me as in a magnificent, grandiose dream, but when I manage to super-

¹¹⁴ Boethius, *Cons.* 5.5.12: *Quare in illius summae intelligentiae cacumen si possumus erigamur.* Bächli (2001, 45f & n. 102) argues on the basis of 5.5.11: ‘Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus ita diuinae iudicium mentis habere possemus’, that human beings possess the *intellectus* as an inherent faculty: “Nach Boethius verfügen wir als vernünftige Wesen über ein «Kriterium» (*iudicium*) zur Beurteilung des göttlichen Geistes”. But Bächli is basing himself on the reading *possumus* at p. 154, 45 Moreschini, a reading supported only by Ms. N = Neapolitanus = Napoli, Bibl. Naz. G IV 68 *post correctionem*: Mss. O² M L Ha T N W C V² H A and B have *possemus*, while Mss. O K T F V H² A² G have *possimus*. Moreschini rightly prints *possemus*, a subjunctive which indicates a remote possibility. Thus, here at least Boethius is not claiming we can have such a faculty (*habere possumus*), but discussing what *would* happen if we *could* or *did* have it (*habere possemus*). On the question of whether the intellect is constitutive part of man, cf. Magee 1989, 141-149.

¹¹⁵ Cited by Jean and Brigitte Massin (1970, 474). The authenticity of this text, first published by Rochlitz in 1815, is subject to caution. I thank M. Thibault Damour for pointing out this reference to me.

hear the assembled totality, that's the best moment (...) it is perhaps the greatest benefit for which I must thank the Creator.

For as a craftsman, taking beforehand in his mind the form of the thing to be made, carries out the effect of his work, and leads it through the orders of time *what he had seen simply and in the mode of the present*, so God arranges the things that are to be made singly and stably through providence, but he administers the very things he has arranged through fate in a multiple, temporal way.¹¹⁶

Thanks to his genial intuition, Mozart (or his plagiarizer) was able to view his finished work all at once (cf. Boethius' *uno ictu*¹¹⁷) in his mind, in a manner completely free of temporal succession. Similarly, Boethius' craftsman first perceives the whole of his product simply and in a manner characteristic of the present (*praesentarie*), then sets about realizing this preconceived image within space and time. Boethius' God acts in an analogous way: From the summit (*cacumen*) of his lofty vantage-point, God perceives, through his providence, the totality of the world's occurrences as simultaneously present. He then realizes this divine plan in the spatio-temporal order by means of Fate, or the inexorable chain of causes and events. Yet fate has no access to the innermost citadel of human freedom: while my act of walking may be determined

¹¹⁶ Boethius, *Cons.* 4.6.12: Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praeciens mouet operis effectum et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat per temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter amministrat. Cf. Proclus, *On Providence* 12, 65: "Your machine, which uses cylinders, pulleys and corporeal materials, did not exist corporeally in your foreknowledge, but here imagination contained, in an incorporeal and living way, the logos of what was to be, whereas the machine came into being corporeally, put together out of inner knowledge which was not such. If this is how things are in your creation, what would you say of the foreknowledge of the gods, in which pre-exists what is, for us, is ineffable, truly indescribable and impossible to circumscribe...the gods know divinely and intemporally what depends on us, and we act as we naturally tend to do, and what we choose is foreknown to them, not by the term in us, but to the one in them".

¹¹⁷ The Latin *uno ictu* almost certainly corresponds to the Greek *haplêi epibolêi*. On the meaning of this expression in Proclus, cf. Roth 2008, 318f.

by cause and effect, my decision to go for a walk is completely free of all determinism.¹¹⁸

While most contemporary advocates of the block-time view, including Einstein, seem content to accept that this perspective implies a universal determinism, Boethius thus suggests a possible way out. Only time,¹¹⁹ or rather the notion of time, gives us the impression that divine omniscience implies predestination, with its concomitant assumptions of determinism and lack of human freedom. Through the study of the Late Neoplatonist philosophical curriculum, perhaps with the addition of divine grace, Boethius believes we can achieve the "View from above" that would allow us to view reality as it truly is in itself: timeless and eternal. Should we reach this goal, we will see that the alleged conflict between divine prescience and human free-will was as illusory, albeit just as persistent, as time itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aouad, M. (1989) "Théologie d'Aristote," in R. Goulet, ed., *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* I (1989), 580–590.
- Bächli, A. (2001) "Bemerkungen zu Substanz und Wissen Gottes in Boethius' *Philosophiae consolatione*," *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für die Antike und Mittelalter* 6, 21–51.
- Baltes, Matthias (1980) "Gott, Welt, und Mensch in der *consolatio Philosophiae* des Boethius," *Vigiliae Christianae* 34, 313–340.
- Baltes, Matthias (2005) "Boethius, Staatsman und Philosoph," in *Epinoemata*. Leipzig: 49–66.
- Bechtle, Gerald (2006) "Der Trost der Freiheit: das fünfte Buch der «*Consolatio Philosophiae*» des Boethius zwischen Vorlagen und Originalität," *Philologus* 150 (2), 265–289.
- Beierwaltes, Werner (1967, 1981³) *Plotin: Über Ewigkeit und Zeit* (Enneade III 7). Übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

¹¹⁸ Bächli 2001, 37f.; Bechtle 2006, 272–273.

¹¹⁹ Sorabji (1998) argues that it is the irrevocability of the gods' knowledge that implies that my future acts are already determined. As he points out, however, the notion of irrevocability seems tied to that of the irreversibility of time's flow: take away the latter and the former would seem to disappear.

- Beierwaltes, Werner (1981) "Regio beatitudinis. Zu Augustins Begriff des glücklichen Lebens," *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse*, Bericht 6.
- Beierwaltes, Werner (1983) "Trost im Begriff. Zu Boethius' Hymnus *O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas*", in H. Bürkle, G. Becker, eds., *Communicatio fidei. Festschrift für E. Biser*. Regensburg: 241–251 = Beierwaltes 1985, 319–336.
- Beierwaltes, Werner (1985) *Denken des Einen. Studien zum Neuplatonismus und dessen Wirkungsgeschichte*. Frankfurt: Klostermann.
- Blank, David, et al. (1998) *Ammonius, On Aristotle's On interpretation 9, translated by David Blank, with Boethius, On Aristotle's On Interpretation 9, translated by Norman Kretzmann, with essays by Richard Sorabji, Norman Kretzmann and Mario Mignucci*. London: Duckworth (The ancient commentators on Aristotle).
- Chadwick, Henry (1981) *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*, Oxford/New York.
- Chase, Michael (2004) "Omne corpus fugiendum? Augustine and Porphyry on the body and the post-mortem destiny of the soul," *Chôra: Revue d'Études Anciennes et Médiévales* (Bucharest-Paris), 2, 37–58.
- Chase, Michael (2011) "Discussions on the Eternity of the world in Late Antiquity", *ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* 5.2, 111–173.
- Corbin, Henry (1969) "Le Récit du nuage blanc (*Hadīṭ al-ghamāma*), commenté par Qāzī Saʿīd Qummī (1103-1691)," *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 38, 195–259.
- Courcelle, Pierre (1943) *Les Lettres grecques en Occident, de Macrobie à Cassiodore*. Paris: De Boccard.
- Courcelle, Pierre (1953) "Les Sages de Porphyre et les *virī novi* d'Arnobe," *Revue des Études Latines* 31, 257–271.
- Courcelle, Pierre (1967) *La Consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire. Antécédents et postérité de Boèce*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- D'Amour, Thibault (2005, 2012²) *Si Einstein m'était conté. De la relativité à la théorie des cordes*. Paris: Cherche-Midi (Collection Documents).

- Davies, Paul (1995) *About time. Einstein's unfinished revolution*. New York: Orion Publications.
- Den Boeft, J. (1970) *Calcidius on Fate: his doctrine and sources*. Leiden: Brill (Philosophia Antiqua 18).
- Diebler, Stéphane (2002) "Les canons de Proclus. Problèmes et conséquences de l'interprétation syriano-proclienne du *De interpretatione*," *Dionysius* 20, 71–94.
- Dörrie, Heinrich (1964) "Das fünffach gestufte Mysterium. Der Aufstieg der Seele bei Porphyrios und Augustin," *Mullus, Festschrift Theodor Klauser, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Erg.-Band 1*, 79–92. Reprinted in idem, *Platonica Minora*, München 1976 (Studia et Testimonia Antiqua 8), 474–490.
- Donato, Antonio (2012) "Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and the Greco-Roman consolatory tradition," *Traditio* 67, 1–42.
- Druart, Thérèse-Anne (2000) "Philosophical consolation in Christianity and Islam: Boethius and Al-Kindi," *Topoi* 19, 25–34.
- Einstein, Albert (1949) *The World as I see it*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Erler, Michael (1999) "Hellenistische Philosophie als «praeparatio platonica» in der Spätantike (am Beispiel von Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae*)," in Th. Fuhrer & M. Erker, eds., *Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike: Akten der 1. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 22.–25. September 1997 in Trier*. Stuttgart: Steiner: 105–122.
- Festugière, André-Jean (1944–1954) *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 4 vols. Paris: Éditions J. Gabalda.
- Frede, Dorothea (1972) "Omne quod est quando est necesse est esse," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 54, 153–167.
- Galpérine, Marie-Claude (1980) "Le temps intégral selon Damascius," *Les Études Philosophiques* 3 (juillet-septembre), 325–341.
- Gaskin, Richard (1995) *The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the metaphysics of the future*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, Band 40).
- Gegenschatz, E. (1958) "Die Freiheit der Entscheidung in der 'consolatio philosophiae' des Boethius," *Museum Helveticum* 15, 110–129.

- Gegenschatz, E. (1966) "Die Gefährdung des Möglichen durch das Vorauswissen Gottes in der Sicht des Boethius," *Wiener Studien* 79, 517–530.
- Gersh, Stephen (1978) *From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*. Leiden: E. J. Brill (Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 8).
- Greene, Brian (2004) *The Fabric of the cosmos. Space, time, and the texture of reality*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gruber, Joachim (1978, 2006²) *Kommentar zu Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae*. 2., erweiterte Auflage. Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter (Texte und Kommentare 9).
- Guillaumin, Jean-Yves (2002) *Boèce, La Consolation de philosophie, introduction, traduction et notes*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres (La Roue à Livres).
- Hadot, Ilsetraut (1969) *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Hadot, Ilsetraut (1984, 2004²) *Arts libéraux et Philosophie dans la pensée antique, contribution à l'histoire de l'éducation et de la culture dans l'Antiquité*. 2e édition revue et considérablement augmentée, Paris: Vrin (Textes et Traditions 11).
- Hadot, Ilsetraut et al. (1990) *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de Ilsetraut Hadot, Directeur de Recherche au C.N.R.S. Fascicule I: Introduction, première partie (p. 1-9,3 Kalbfleisch, Traduction de Ph. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot), Commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec des appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (= Philosophia Antiqua vol. L)*. Leiden/New York/København/Köln: E. J. Brill, 1990.
- Hadot, Ilsetraut, ed. (1996) *Simplicius, Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète, Introduction et édition critique par Ilsetraut Hadot*. Leiden/New York/Köln: E. J. Brill, 1996 (Philosophia antiqua, vol. LXVI).
- Hadot, Pierre (1968) *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Hadot, Pierre (1995) *Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, edited with an Introduction by Arnold

- I. Davidson, translated by Michael Chase, Oxford/Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
- Hadot, Pierre (2009) *La philosophie comme manière de vivre: entretiens avec Jeannie Carlier et Arnold I. Davidson*, Paris: A. Michel, 2001 (Itinéraires du savoir). English translation: *The Present Alone is Our Happiness, Second Edition. Conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold I. Davidson*, by Pierre Hadot, Translated by Marc Djaballah and Michael Chase, Stanford: Stanford University Press (Cultural Memory in the Present).
- Hankey, Wayne (2001) "Secundum rei vim vel secundum cognoscen-tium facultatem: Knower and known in the *Consolation of Philosophy* of Boethius and the *Proslogion* of Anselm," in J. Inglis, ed., *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, Richmond: Curzon Press: 126–150.
- Hoffmann, Philippe (1987) "Catégories et langage selon Simplicius – la question du σκοπός du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*," in I. Hadot, ed., *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie. Actes du Colloque international de Paris (28 sept. – 1er oct. 1985), organisé par le Centre de Recherches sur les Oeuvres et la Pensée de Simplicius (RCP 739 – CNRS)*. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter: 61–90 (Peripatoi Band 15).
- Huber, P. (1976) *Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*, Diss. Zürich.
- Jammer, Max (1999) *Einstein and religion: physics and theology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Knuuttila, Simo (1993) *Modalities in Medieval philosophy*, London/New York: Routledge (Topics in Medieval Philosophy).
- Lerer, S. (1985) *Boethius and dialogue. Literary method in the consolation of philosophy*. Princeton.
- Lockwood, M. (2005) *The Labyrinth of time. Introducing the universe*. Oxford: OUP.
- Marenbon, John (2003a) *Boethius*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marenbon, John (2003b) "Le temps, la prescience et le déterminisme dans la *Consolation de Philosophie* de Boèce," in A. Galonnier, ed., *Boèce ou La chaîne des Savoirs*. Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, présidée par

- Monsieur Édouard Bonnefous, Paris, 8–12 juin 1999. Louvain-La-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie/Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters: 531–546.
- Marenbon, John (2005) *Le temps, l'éternité et la prescience de Boèce à Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Vrin.
- Marenbon, John, ed. (2009) *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, Cambridge: University Press.
- Massin, Jean & Brigitte (1970) *Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart*. Paris: Fayard.
- Mignucci, Mario (1983) "Truth and modality in Late Antiquity: Boethius on future contingent propositions," *Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica: le teorie della modalità (San Gimignano 5–8 Dez. 1982)*. Bologna: Cooperativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice Bologna: 47–78.
- Obertello, Luca (1989) *Boezio e dintorni. Ricerche sulla cultura altomedievale*. Firenze: Nardini Editore (Biblioteca Medievale).
- Panofsky, Erwin (1930) *Hercules am Scheidewege und andere antike Bildstoffe in der neueren Kunst*. Leipzig: Teubner. I have used the French translation: *Hercule à la croisée des chemins, et autres matériaux figuratifs de l'Antiquité dans l'art plus récent*, traduit de l'allemand et présenté par Danièle Cohn. Paris: Flammarion, 1999 (Idées et Recherches).
- Panofsky, Erwin (1993) "Titian's allegory of prudence: a postscript," in E. Panofsky. *Meaning in the visual arts*. London/New York: Penguin Books: 146–168.
- Pfligersdorffer, G. (1976) "Der Schicksalsweg der Menschenseele nach Synesios und nach dem jungen Augustinus," *Grazer Beiträge* 5, 147–179 = idem, *Augustino praeceptor. Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Augustinus*, hgg. von K. Forstner und M. Fussl, Salzburg: Abakus Verlag 1987: 133–163 (Salzburger patristischen Studien 4 / Veröffentlichungen des Internationalen Forschungszentrums für Grundfragen der Wissenschaften Salzburg, Neue Folge, Band 27).
- Price, Huw (1996) *Time's arrow and Archimedes' point. New directions of the physics of time*. New York/Oxford: OUP.

- Regen, F. (2001) *Praescientia. Vorauswissen Gottes und Willensfreiheit des Menschen in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Göttingen.
- Roth, Veronika M. (2008) *Das ewige Nun. Ein Paradoxon in der Philosophie des Proklos*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (Philosophische Schriften Band 72).
- Sachs, Mendel (1973) *The field concept of contemporary science*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas.
- Sambursky, Shmuel, & Shlomo Pines (1987) *The Concept of time in late Neoplatonism: texts with translation, introd. and notes*. Jerusalem: Israel academy of sciences and humanities, (Publications of the Israel academy of sciences and humanities. Section of humanities).
- Scheible, H. (1971) *Die Gedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Heidelberg.
- Schmid, W. (1956) "Philosophisches und Medizinisches in der «Consolatio Philosophiae» des Boethius," *FS B. Snell*. München: 1131–44; repr. in G. Maurach, ed., *Römische Philosophie*, Darmstadt 1976: 341–384.
- Schmidt-Kohl, V. (1965) *Die Neuplatonische Seelenlehre in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Meinsenheim am Glan (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 16).
- Schumacher, Thomas (1993) "Heilung im Denken. Zur Sache der philosophischen Tröstung bei Boethius," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 40, 20–43.
- Seel, Gerhard, ed. (2001) *Ammonius and the Seabattle*. Texts, commentary, and essays, ed. by G. Seel in collaboration with Jean-Pierre Schneider and Daniel Schulthess. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter (Peripatoi, Band 18).
- Sharples, Robert (1991) *Cicero: On Fate and Boethius: Consolation of Philosophy IV.5–7 and V*, Warminster: Aris and Philips.
- Sharples, Robert (2009) "Fate, prescience, and free will," in Marenbon 2009, 207–227.
- Sorabji, Richard (1980) *Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory*. London: Duckworth.
- Sorabji, Richard (1983) *Time, creation and the continuum*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

- Sorabji, Richard, ed. (2004) *The philosophy of the commentators, 200-600 AD. 400 years of transition: a sourcebook*, 3 vol. London: Duckworth.
- Stangl, Th. (1893) "Pseudoboethiana," *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* 29 = *Neue [Jahnschen] Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik* 53, Bd. 172, 193-208; 285-301.
- Steel, Carlos (2001) "The Neoplatonic doctrine of time and eternity and its influence on medieval thought," in P. Porro, ed., *The Medieval concept of time. Studies on the Scholastic debate and its reception in early modern philosophy*, Leiden etc.: Brill: 3-31 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band LXXV).
- Theiler, Willy (1942) "Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse*, t. XVIII, I. Halle; reprinted in id., 1966, 252-301.
- Theiler, Willy (1964) "Antike und christliche Rückkehr zu Gott," in *Mullus, Festschrift Theodor Klauser*, München/Westf.: 352-361 (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum. Ergänzungsband 1/1964); reprinted in id., 1966, 313-325.
- Theiler, Willy (1966) *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 10).
- Tränkle, H. (1977) "Ist die *Philosophiae Consolatio* des Boethius zum vorgesehenen Abschluss gelangt?" *Vigiliae Christianae* 31, 148-156.
- Tränkle, H. (1973) "Philologische Bemerkungen zum Boethiusprozess," in W. den Boer et al., eds., *Romanitas et Christianitas. Studia I. H. Waszink oblata*, Amsterdam/Modon: 329-339.
- Voelke, André-Jean (1993) *La philosophie comme thérapie de l'âme: études de philosophie hellénistique*, préf. de Pierre Hadot. Fribourg/Suisse: Éd. Universitaires; Paris: Éd. du Cerf.
- Waszink, J. H. (1964) *Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius, I. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars (mit Ausnahme der Kapitel über die Weltseele)*. Leiden: E. J. Brill (Philosophia Antiqua, 12).
- Weidemann, Hermann (1998) "Die Unterscheidung zwischen einfacher und bedingter Notwendigkeit in der *Philosophiae Consolatio* des Boethius," in A. Newen and U. Meixner, eds.,

Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy. 1. Philosophiegeschichte im Überblick / History of Philosophy in general. Paderborn/München etc.: Ferdinand Schöningh: 195–207 (Philosophiegeschichte im Überblick 1).

Weyl, H. (2009²) *Philosophy of mathematics and natural science*, translated by Olaf Helmer with a new introduction by Frank Wilczek. Oxford/Princeton: Princeton University Press (1st edition 1949).

Wind, Edgar (1968²) *Pagan mysteries in the Renaissance*. London: Faber.

Zambon, Marco (2003) “Aristotelis Platonisque sententias in unam revocare concordiam. Il progetto filosofico boeziano e le sue fonti,” *Medioevo* 28, 17–49.

WHITEHEAD'S ORGANISMIC CONCEPTION OF GOD AND ITS RELIGIOUS AVAILABILITY

LEONIDAS BARGELIOTES
The University of Athens

*Religion will not regain its old power
until it can face change in the same
spirit as does science.
A. N. Whitehead*

God as the third formative element

Whitehead conceives God, as the third formative element which binds together the two other formative elements, namely, creativity and eternal objects. It emerges, as in the case of Aristotle's Prime Mover, from the metaphysical demand for a unique actual entity which binds together the realms of actuality and potentiality, providing for the actuality the definiteness without which no single actual occasion could exist, and for potentiality the relationship to actuality, to agency, without which the resulting violation of the ontological principle would make an incoherence of the notion of a "realm" of eternal objects. Whitehead's system internally requires a First Principle to relate the realms of actuality and potentiality, thereby providing a metaphysical basis for the emergence of definiteness. As he notes, "nothing, within any limited type of experience, can give intelligence to shape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless the general character of things requires that there is such an entity" (Whitehead 1925, 174). In what follows will be shown the manner in which the "general character of things" requires that there is a God. Thus God cannot be arbitrarily introduced *deus ex machina*, else the system itself lapses into incoherence. Whitehead argues that the exact opposite is the case:

"God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (Whitehead 1929, 521). This system demands that the eternal objects which constitute a Category of Existence (Whitehead 1929, 32), will obtain its link with actuality. Hence the scope of the ontological principle: Everything must be somewhere; and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity'. Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere, since it retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which is unrealized. This 'proximate relevance' reappears in subsequent concrescence as final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This 'somewhere' is the non-temporal actual entity. Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance as in the primordial mind of God' (Whitehead 1929, 73).

The system therefore requires God to preserve the ontological principle. But God plays a far more crucial role in the operation of eternal objects than this rather obvious relationship suggests by itself. A more basic question concerns how it is possible for unrealized, abstract forms to be relevant to emerging actual entities. Whitehead asks: "In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant?"

What is the basis of relevance? 'Relevance' must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: "All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality". So if there is relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of non-temporal actuality (Whitehead 1929, 48).

For eternal objects to be relevant to creative process it is required a "real togetherness" of eternal objects, namely a web of general relationships of eternal objects. This real togetherness must be a formal aspect of God. Whitehead makes this point clear in another context: "The general relationships of eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their relationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from this realization, there is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity" (Whitehead 1929, 392).

So far God's primordial valuation of the realm of eternal objects is identical with the web of relationships constituted by the internal relatedness of eternal objects. This complies with Whitehead's main basis of

his system that God links concrescing actualities with the eternal objects. Whitehead's doctrine of the primordial nature of God is strengthened by his claim that God's conceptual valuation is identical with the web of relationships constituted by the internal relatedness of eternal objects: "Things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal".

The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity [God] is the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization... By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescence process. Apart from such orderings, there would be complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable (Whitehead 1929, 63–64).

It is clear from the above that the dynamic surge of the creativity into novel concrescence presupposes not simply a realm of possibility but also the primordial valuation of pure potentials which generates the relevance of each pure potential to each instance of concrescence process. God, however, according to Whitehead, 'does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require him. This is an exemplification of the coherence of the categorical types of existence' (Whitehead 1929, 392). If it is true that apart from God's primordial existence eternal objects are 'indistinguishable from nonentity' it is also true that God's primordial existence is impossible without eternal objects: "Eternal objects are inseparable from God's primordial existence; they are the primordial 'definiteness' apart from which no existence or creativity, even in the primordial instance of God, is possible at all" (Leclerc 1958, 199–200). Actuality, even the primordial instance of actuality which is God, presupposes definiteness; hence creativity also presupposes eternal objects even in its primordial, aboriginal instance. This scheme of eternal objects in the "isolation indistinguishable from nonentity" inert, lifeless, and ungraded in relevance to God's primordial vision can be compared with Plato's *Timaeus*. According to Cornford's interpretation: "Both the Demiurge and chaos

are symbols: neither is to be taken quite literally, yet both stand for real elements in the world as it exists..." (Cornford 1937, 37 and 176).

These three formative elements have the same role to play in Whitehead's philosophical system. Each formative element stands for some element that is now and always present in the working of a world without beginning or end. Their interaction are mutually interdependent; the universe of actual occasions emerges from their mutual interaction. In what follows we will describe the basic facet of the interaction that produces the process of concrescence, the coming-to-be, which is common to all actual occasions, beginning with the study of the formative element, God, through a consideration of how concrescence initiates with the concrescing actual occasion acquiring a subjective aim from its prehension of God (Sherburne 1961, 40).

As we have seen, from "concrescence", the generic characteristic of the process, results the mutual interaction of the formative elements from which emerges the concrete actual entity. We have also seen that God was related to eternal objects; he will now be related to actual occasions by showing how, as final cause, he initiates the concrescence of each and every actual occasion via subjective aims.

An actual occasion, to begin with, to be mature, has to be fully definite. Basically, this means that all actual occasions are depended upon God, for without God the forms of definiteness would be indistinguishable from non entity and decisions productive to concreteness would be impossible. But there is more to it, since in a limited sense can be said that God can "create" all actual occasions. As the aboriginal instance of creativity, God is the eternal primordial character (Whitehead 1929, 344), which means that in addition to each ordinary actual entity 'conditioning' creativity, God also 'conditions' creativity in every instance of its individualization. This happens through God's basic metaphysical role of providing the subjective aim of every actual entity (Leclerc 1958, 195).

Whitehead, then, is insisting that God has a crucial role in the birth of every actual occasion. By playing this role, God does in a very real sense "create" each actual occasion, though Whitehead warns us that the phrase "God as creator" is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition (Whitehead 1929, 343–344).

God is also conceived as an objectification of hybrid physical feeling, the third type of prehension—the other two are the physical and conceptual. In its hybrid physical prehension of God, this actual occasion prehends not God in his full concreteness as an actual entity but God as objectified by those conceptual prehensions of eternal objects which constitute relevant alternatives capable of leading to the satisfaction of that particular actual occasion conditioned by its particular anteceded circumstances.

God, in Whitehead's technical term, "lures" the actual occasion towards the realization which will result in the achievement of maximum value in the world. "God's immanence in the world in respect to its primordial nature is an urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present" (Whitehead 1929, 47). Where this lure is successful the actual occasion in question realizes in its satisfaction the relevant possibility leading to the greatest intensity of value.

God as the Principle of Concretion

God is the principle of concretion in the sense that he is the actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings with its conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes (Whitehead 1929, 374). From the point of view of the initial stage of the subjective aim it can be said that it is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject (Whitehead 1929, 373). In the words of Whitehead, "each temporal entity derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modification, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings" (Whitehead 1929, 343).

Modification of actual occasion the initial vision of itself derived from God however may fail to realize the full intensity of value present in God's appetition. This is the freedom in the universe. It may also be the case that events have reached an impasse where the most desirable alternative is bad: if the best is bad, then the truthfulness of God can be

personified in *Ate, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt*" (Whitehead 1929, 373). The formal aspect of novelty in the world is then derived from God's primordial conceptual valuation of eternal objects which constitutes the relevance for the concreting actual occasion. Such a coupling of the concrete and the abstract, Whitehead calls a proposition, as it can be seen in the formal definition of subjective aim: "The 'subjective aim,' which controls the becoming of a subject, is the subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of purpose to realize it in the process of self-creation" (Whitehead 1929, 37). Thus, the subjective aim of any given actual occasion is derived from God and constitutes the goal toward which that entity directs its self-creative process. The attainment of the goal constitutes the satisfaction of that actual occasion. From the hybrid physical prehension of God may, finally, arise a conceptual feeling of a novel eternal object: "The light that never was, on sea or land" (Whitehead 1933, 270). Only God can conjure up conceptual feelings that do not depend on prior physical feelings. "Unfettered conceptual valuation... is only possible once in the universe, since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action" (Whitehead 1929, 378).

God's Consequent Nature

As we have pointed out, God preserves the opposition of physical and mental pole, synthesized in a final "satisfaction". We have also seen that mental pole comes first and constitutes the "primordial appetition," which is timeless pattern of order pervading the creative process, and determining the mental pole of each successive occasion. The Primordial Nature is the repositum of all possible values, but only as possible. As N. Lawrence points out (1963, 172), "in this repositum there lies the entire multiplicity of eternal objects, which are all the qualities, characteristics, or properties that could characterize any event or set of events." God as primordial is mental in that the concepts of all possibilities lie in Him, only ideally, not actually (Whitehead 1929, 521–522). It is the realm to which the formation of the process of events is drawn as it proceeds from its fixed background of fact. The Primordial Nature of God is like Aristotle's Prime Mover in that it is eternal, complete, and the object of desire towards which all things are drawn. They differ,

however, in that it is not conscious, for consciousness requires the fusion of conceptual and physical feeling. It is the aspect of God not available for religious purposes. Hence the importance of the Consequent Nature of God.

The Consequent Nature of God, the Physical pole, is "the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe" (Whitehead 1929, 134). Where the Primordial Nature is complete, the Consequent Nature is incomplete. Where the Primordial Nature is nonconscious and complete, the Consequent Nature is conscious and incomplete. Where the Primordial Nature proffers possible values and it is eternal, the Consequent Nature conserves actual values and is everlasting (Whitehead 1929, 521–524).

The fusion of the two Natures, the Primordial and the Consequent, constitutes "the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the primordial conceptual fact." It is the reconciliation of permanence and flux" (Whitehead 1929, 525) in an everlasting reality.

The Religious availability of God

The next question to consider refers to the religious availability of God. Whitehead himself had once questioned Aristotle's metaphysical deity as "available for religious purposes" (Whitehead 1925, 249). In what follows will be an attempt to show that Whitehead's task was to fill in the gap between God of thought and a God of feeling. The idea of a felt God, Himself capable of feeling and therefore a God not wholly remote or intellectually defined, seems to be Whitehead's correction of Aristotle's barren conception of a Prime Mover.

In particular, God is the "nontemporal actual entity, otherwise called the "supreme rationalized religion" (Whitehead 1929b, 90). God's nontemporality should not be confused with His eternality, that is, the property of His Primordial Nature. The eternal is nonfactual, in the sense that is not time-structured or time-dependent in order to be what it is. The Consequent Nature of God is derived "from the temporal world" with the characteristics of "permanence" and "perfection" but without completion for God and the world (Whitehead 1929, 529). The static characteristics of completion belong to the Primordial Nature. In the words of Whitehead, "The purpose of God is the attainment of value

in the temporal world” (Whitehead 1929b, 100). In the words of Lawrence (Whitehead 1929b, 173) “the incompleteness of the everlasting nature of God rests on the fact that time is real, and the Consequent Nature of God constantly receives the datum of completed actual into the unending completion of Consequent Nature.” Thus, besides the time-free of the eternal objects of the Primordial Nature of God, and the time-structured actual occasions, there is the time-concerned and time-dependent type of existence of the Consequent Nature of God, abiding, everlasting, temporal and incomplete.

The objects of God’s will, therefore, when complete, slip backward into the stream of time by replacing one another. What does not change is the will to harmonize them, the unchanged by the time will, which is everlastingly the same, yet always engaged in the struggle with what is temporal. What these temporal entities become in some sense free for them and irrevocable, in so far as they are individual. It is evident that Whitehead tries so far to incorporate and rationalize the familiar Christian language by substituting concepts like “eternal” and “will” with “everlasting” and “aim” correspondingly.

Whitehead’s statement, for example, that God “saves” the world (Whitehead 1929, 525) through harmonizing, points to an inseparable connection of morality with art. This is explicitly stated in his words, that “The canons of art are merely the expression, in specialized forms, of the requisites for depth of experience. The principles of morality are allied to the canons of art, in that they also express, in another connection, the same requisites (Whitehead 1929, 483). The connection seems to save the morals from self-interestedness and irrationalism. He argues that the “defense of morals is the battle-cry which best rallies stupidity against change. Perhaps countless ages ago respectable amoebae refused to migrate from ocean to dry land – refusing in defense of morals” (Whitehead 1933, 345). This allows Whitehead to distinguish between “rational” and “rationalized religion”. The latter points to the rational coherence with the rest of experience. Thus the temporality of God leads to “the Supreme God of rationalized religion that is rational coherence with the religious experience, in the sense that disparate elements of experience must be rendered coherent. His metaphysical description makes this organismic coherence abundantly clear in that it

sets out for immediate comparison with "deliverances of religious experience" (Whitehead 1929b, 89), considered as a "fact" (Whitehead 1929b, 86) as the "Religious Consciousness in History" and the "Quest of God" phrases which point to a religious experience within the whole of experience. One of these levels, the most significant from existential point of view, is the aesthetic vision of the Consequent Nature of God, forever completing His own existence by a harmony which rescinds the objective evil, but without a comfort in return, because it is not likely to give anyone much comfort to know that no matter what happens in this world, God can see it in an ideal setting that makes it an enjoyable sight. From the point of view of those who have reached a state of stable goodness in so far as their own interior life is concerned and of the type of their moral correctitude is, on a larger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial.

God however, as actual entity which enters into every creative phase and yet is above change, He must be exempt from internal inconsistency which is the note of evil. Since God is actual, He must include in himself a synthesis of the total universe. "There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of the world as qualified by the forms" (Whitehead 1929b, 98).

Whitehead's main concern then is to explain the relation of religious experience to experience generally. The latter includes the former, namely the religious aspect. We can trace the relation genetically: "The moment of religious consciousness," Whitehead states, "starts from self-evaluation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. The intuition into the actual world gives a particular definite content to the bare notion of a principle determining the grading of values. It also exhibits emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, as subservient factors in the emergence of values (Whitehead 1929b, 58-59).

The edifice of this metaphysics of religious experience has to overcome certain facts, and entertain the ability of the subjective purposes in consciousness to raise their common limits, trans-personally or even trans-morally to a grasp of value that erases temporal losses. It entertains not only private authenticity but also publicly noticeable beatifi-

cation. The correlation of the two movements are apparent: the subjective persuasion of religious experience, which stretches beyond standard conception of value and the worth of lives so guided. The correlation of these facts is what Whitehead call *rationalization*. Some men have such vision beyond average values, and it has publicly noticeable consequences. As N. Lawrence points out, "any metaphysics worthy of the name must accommodate these facts. The primary role of a metaphysics is to describe what is, systematically and rationally. Derivatively it may lead men to deeper insight" (1963, 176).

REFERENCES

- Cornford, F. M. (1937) *Plato's Cosmology*. London: Routledge.
- Lawrence, N. (1963) "Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophical Theology", in Kline G. L., ed., *A. N. Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy*. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
- Leclerc, I. (1958) *Whitehead's Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, New York The Macmillan Co.)
- Sherburne, D. W. (1961) *A Whiteheadian Aesthetic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1925) *Science and the Modern World*. Lowell Lectures 1925. New York: The Macmillan Co.; repr. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1929) *Process and Reality*. New York: The Macmillan Co.; repr. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1929b) *Religion in the Making*. New York: Meridian Books; 7th printing 1971.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1933) *Adventures of Ideas*. New York: The Macmillan Co.; repr. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

ARISTOTLE ON LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP

DAVID KONSTAN

Brown University, Providence, USA

Philia is exceptional among ancient Greek value terms for the number of still unresolved, or at least intensely debated, questions that go to the heart of its very nature.¹ Does it mean “friendship”, as it is most commonly rendered in discussions of Aristotle, or rather “love”, as seems more appropriate in some contexts? Whether it is love, friendship, or something else, is it an emotion, a virtue, or a disposition? The same penumbra of ambiguity surrounds the related term *philos*, often rendered as “friend” but held by some to include kin and other relations, and even to refer chiefly to them. Thus, Elizabeth Belfiore affirms that “the noun *philos* surely has the same range as *philia*, and both refer primarily, if not exclusively, to relationships among close blood kin” (2000: 20). In respect to the affective character of *philia*, Michael Peachin (2001: 135 n. 2) describes “the standard modern view of Roman friendship” as one “that tends to reduce significantly the emotional aspect of the relationship among the Romans, and to make of it a rather pragmatic business”, and he holds the same to be true of Greek friendship or *philia*. Scholars at the other extreme maintain that ancient friendship was based essentially on affection. As Peachin remarks (*ibid.*, p. 7), “D. Konstan [1997] has recently argued against the majority opinion

¹ This paper is a much revised version of the talk I presented at the conference on “*Philia* in Aristotle’s Philosophy,” held at University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve and at the University of Leuven jointly with the Société Philosophique de Louvain on 10–11 May 2004. It is hoped that this paper will subsequently be published in the proceedings of that conference, to be edited by Pierre Destrée. Fuller discussion of some of the issues raised here may be found in Konstan 2006.

and has tried to inject more (modern-style?) emotion into ancient *amicitia*". Some critics, in turn, have sought a compromise between the two positions, according to which ancient friendship involved both an affective component and the expectation of practical services. Renata Raccanelli (1998: 20), for example, comments: "Certainly, Konstan is right to observe that the common model of true friendship must grant major importance to sentiment... But it is nevertheless well not to ignore the role that notions of obligation, mutual exchange of gifts, and prestations also play within relations of friendship... The element of concrete and obligatory exchange seems inseparably bound up with friendship, which can not be identified with the mere affective dimension of the relationship". Thus, in Plautus' *Epidicus*, when Chaeribulus insists that he does not have the wherewithal to lend money to his age-mate Stratippocles (114–19), Stratippocles exclaims that "a friend is one who helps out in difficult circumstances, when there is need of cash" (113; cf. 116–17, Raccanelli pp. 164–66).

One might well wonder how thoughtful and learned investigators can be at variance over so fundamental a matter as the emotive character of ancient friendship, not to mention the very meanings of the words *philia* and *philos*. There are, I think, various reasons why the problem of emotion in friendship has proved difficult to resolve. For one thing, the modern notion too lends itself to ambiguity and disagreement. Those who most insist on the pragmatic and formal quality of ancient friendship tend to contrast it with the emotive basis of friendship today. Yet we too expect friends to assist us in times of crisis, and this without contradicting the affective nature of the bond. The implicit logic is: "If you loved me as a friend, you would assist me in my time of need; since you do not, you are not a true friend". Nothing prevents us from ascribing a similar view to Plautus' Stratippocles. Doubtless, one can raise questions about the inference from affection to obligation, but the problem is no different for ancient than for modern friendship. The idea that *philia* was importantly different from modern friendship in respect to sentiment has also been motivated in large part by theoretical views about the nature of Greek and Roman society and the ancient concept of the self. The centrality of affect has been taken to be specific to the modern notion – some would say mirage – of an autonomous ego that relates spontaneously and freely to other selves, whereas the ancient self

was constituted principally in and through ascribed relations, such as kinship and status, which carry with them prescribed codes of behavior.

Let us turn to the texts. Among our ancient sources, Aristotle's detailed discussion of *philia* in Books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* stands out, and has been exhaustively examined. His parallel treatment in the *Rhetoric*, however, has received less attention. In this treatise, Aristotle includes *philia* and *philein* – the verb that is cognate with *philia* and *philos* – in a discussion of the *pathê* or “emotions”, along with such passions as anger, fear, envy, and pity. He begins his analysis as follows (2.4, 1380b35-36): “Let us speak of those whom people *philein* [the third-person plural of the verb is used here] and whom they hate, and why, by first defining *philia* and *to philein*”. The latter expression, *to philein*, is a nominalized infinitive, produced by prefixing the definite article (to = “the”) to the infinitive form of the verb. About the verb *philein* there tends, curiously enough, to be relatively less disagreement than about its congeners *philia* and *philos*. *Philein* is commonly translated as “love”, “regard with affection”, “cherish”, or “like”; it sometimes carries the more concrete sense of “treat affectionately”, that is, “welcome”, but this is chiefly poetic. The nominalized or articular infinitive, in turn, is ordinarily translated as “loving”; its opposite, according to Aristotle, is *to misein* or “hating”.

Now, are *philia* and *to philein*, or “loving”, one thing or two? Aristotle continues (1380b36-81a1): “Let ‘loving’ [*to philein*] be wishing for someone the things that he deems good, for the sake of that person and not oneself, and the accomplishment of these things to the best of one’s ability”. Here, then, Aristotle defines not *philia* but *to philein*. But before proceeding further, Aristotle pauses to offer a second definition (2.4, 1381a1-2): “A *philos* is one who loves [*ho philôn*: present participle] and is loved in return [*antiphiloumenos*]”, and he adds: “Those who believe that they are so disposed toward one another believe that they are *philoî* [plural of *philos*]”. *Philoî*, then, constitute a subset of those who love, namely, just those who both love and know or believe that their love is reciprocated. These are precisely what we would call “friends”, and I suggest that this definition is in the present context meant to correspond to the term *philia*.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle notes (8.2, 1155b27-34) that “in the case of affection [*philêsis*] for inanimate things, one does not

speak of *philia*: for there is no reciprocal affection [*antiphilêsis*] nor the wish for their good... But they say that one must wish good things for a friend [*philos*] for his sake. They call those who wish good things in this way 'well-disposed' [*eunous*], if the same wish does not occur on the other person's part as well. For they say that goodwill in people who experience it mutually [*en antipeponthosi*] is *philia*". Aristotle then adds the further condition that each must know that the other is so disposed. Once again, Aristotle reserves the term *philia* for the reciprocal benevolence that is characteristic of friends or *philoï*. Accordingly, the term is not appropriately applied either to affection for inanimate objects, such as wine, or to people who do not like us in return. For the first, Aristotle coined the word *philêsis* or "affection". In the case of a one-way fondness for another human being, Aristotle adopts the term *eunous*, "well-disposed" or "bearing goodwill".² It differs from liking wine in that we do wish good things for the other's sake, even if our sentiment is not reciprocated; but it is still not full-fledged *philia*, just because it is not mutual. As such, it corresponds precisely to *to philein* or "loving" as Aristotle defines it in the *Rhetoric*: "Let *to philein* be wishing for someone the things that he deems good, for the sake of that person and not oneself".

Two points are clear from Aristotle's definition of love. First, it is unequivocally and emphatically altruistic: one wishes and acts to realize good things for the other's sake, in accord with what the other conceives of as good – reciprocally so in the case of friendship. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle affirms that a *philos* must share in the pleasure and pain of the other on account of the other and for no other reason. This is because, if the other has what is good, we ourselves will be pleased at this realization of our wish, and otherwise not (1381a3-7). For the same reason, *philoï* will have the same friends and enemies in common.

Second, love is described not as a sentiment or feeling but as a settled intention. Here, Aristotle's conception of *philia* and *to philein* differs in an important respect from modern definitions of "love". The second

² This is not the sense of *eunous* and *eunoia*, of course, in *NE* 9.5, 1166b30-67a21, where Aristotle explicitly contrasts *eunoia* with *philia* and with *philêsis* (cf. *EE* 7, 1241a3-14). But here, in his definition of *philia* between *philoï*, Aristotle has not yet introduced these technical distinctions, and he reaches for a convenient term to express one-way *philia*.

edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary* (1959), for example, defines "love" as "a feeling of strong personal attachment" and "ardent affection". Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson, writing in the *Handbook of Emotions* (2000: 655), observe: "Companionate love... combines feelings of deep attachment, commitment, and intimacy". The emphasis is on feeling, together with a notion of attachment and closeness. Aristotle, however, says nothing about feelings but looks exclusively to intention,³ an intention which, moreover, has as its object the well-being of the other.

Taken together, these two points allow Aristotle to escape, I think, the post-modern paradoxes about the possibility of altruism posed, for example, by Jacques Derrida, who observes (1997: 128, 131): "For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If the other *gives me back* or *owes me* or has to give me back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift"; this is the ground of "the impossibility or double bind of the gift" (131). So too Pierre Bourdieu insists (1997: 231) "The major characteristic of the experience of the gift is, without doubt, its ambiguity. On the one hand, it is experienced (or intended) as a refusal of self-interest and egoistic calculation, and an exaltation of generosity – a gratuitous, unrequited gift. On the other hand, it never entirely excludes awareness of the logic of exchange or even confession of the repressed impulses or, intermittently, the denunciation of another, denied, truth of generous exchange – its constraining and costly character". For Aristotle, we do not enhance the well-being of the other in order to receive benefits in return; but if the other fails to wish good things for us in turn, then there is no friendship. We may still love the other: Aristotle points to a mother's love for an infant child as an instance of such *philia*; but since it is not reciprocal, it does not qualify as *philia* in the more restricted acceptance of friendship.

Aristotle explains that love results from the belief that a thing or person is *philêton*, that is, of the sort to elicit *philia*. As he puts it (*Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2, 1155b18-19): "Not everything is loved [passive

³ In general, Aristotle treats the emotions in terms of cognitive states rather than as "qualia", that is, the physical awareness of a feeling state that is ostensibly specific to each different emotion.

form of *philein*], but just what is *philêton*, and this is the good or the pleasing or the useful” (since a thing is useful because it leads to what is good or pleasing, the three categories of *philêta* are reduced to two).⁴ For Aristotle the nature of the other (or a belief about that nature) provides the reason why one loves, that is, why one wishes that good things accrue to the other; the several kinds of *philia* or mutual loving differ, accordingly, in respect not to this wish but rather to their eliciting causes. If *philia* that is based upon the good character of the other is more durable than that based on one that is pleasing, it does not alter the fact that it is *philia* only insofar as it is an altruistic (and reciprocal) desire for the well-being of the other.⁵ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle identifies the character traits that inspire love in others, such as justness and moderation. Such people will not seek their own advantage unfairly, and hence are likely to wish good things for us; if we favor justice, we in turn will be similarly disposed toward them, and that is what it is to love. In general, Aristotle adds, we are inclined to love those who are agreeable and not quarrelsome, as well as toward those whom we admire and those by whom we wish to be admired. Clearly, we may in these cases love another without that love being reciprocated; we will be *philoi*, however, only in the case that the love is mutual. Aristotle also affirms that people love (*philein*) those who have treated them well, or who, they believe, wish to do so, and also those who love the ones they love (1381a11-14), and adds that we love those who hate the same people we

⁴ These two (or three) classes of the *philêton* do not exhaust the reasons for feeling *philia* toward another; Aristotle treats kinship, for example, as an independent motive for *philia* (*Nicomachean Ethics* 8.12, 1161b16-24).

⁵ Aristotle argues (*Nicomachean Ethics* 8.3, 1156b7-11) that *philia* is complete or best (*teleia*) in the case of those who feel *philia* for one another, and hence desire good things for one another, because they regard each other as good. For *philia* requires wishing good things for the other for the other's sake, and people are good in themselves (*kath'hautous*), whereas they are useful or pleasant incidentally (*kata sumbebêkos*). This is something of a sleight of hand on Aristotle's part. Goodness, unlike usefulness or affability, may be considered a quality of character independent of the effect it produces on the other; but it does not follow that one who feels *philia* for another because that person is useful or pleasant desires what is good for the other only incidentally (at 8.3, 1156a6-10, Aristotle states plainly that all three types of *philêsis* and *philia* involve a desire for the other's good for the other's sake).

do, or are hated by the same people (1381a15-17). The reason is that in these cases, the same things will appear good and bad to both parties, so that they will desire the same things as good, and this is what it is to be a *philos*. Aristotle has apparently ignored the condition that the desire be for the other's sake, and not one's own: the mere fact that two people regard the same things as good does not guarantee that they will desire these things for each other. But Aristotle is not defining love here, but rather identifying the reasons why one loves: the awareness that we share the same idea of what is good and bad with others disposes us to wish good things for their sakes.

Most often in the two treatises under consideration, Aristotle employs the term *philia* to designate the reciprocal affection between friends, but he occasionally uses it in the simple sense of love, irrespective of mutuality. In this, he is in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, which did not employ two distinct terms for what we call "love" and "friendship", but left the precise sense to be inferred from the context (Latin, which had available *amor* and *amicitia*, was more precise in this respect). A problem arises, however, concerning the status of *philia* between *philoï* as an emotion or *pathos*. For if, in order to be a *philos*, it is necessary not only to love another but that the other love in return, then *philia* does not depend solely on one's own love. The *philia* between *philoï* has, as it were, two distinct loci. To put it differently, the *philia* that obtains between *philoï* seems to have the character of a relationship. Does the idea of a relationship, then, enter into Aristotle's conception of the mutual *philia* between *philoï*? Martha Nussbaum has addressed this question most directly; she writes (2001: 473-74): "love, while an emotion, is also a *relationship*. I may feel love for someone, or be in love with someone, and that love is itself an emotion...; but there is another sense in which love is present only if there is a mutual relationship... Aristotle... does, however, hold that love – or at least *philia* – is not merely an emotion. Although it involves emotion, it also has requirements that go beyond the emotional... In other words, the term 'love' is used equivocally, to name both an emotion and a more complex form of life". Nussbaum goes on to indicate how love might be conditioned by the mutuality condition attaching to friendship: we must not imagine, she writes, "that the emotions involved in love are unaffected by the

presence or absence of a reciprocal relationship of the sort Aristotle depicts". Specifically, the knowledge that another loves me may affect that quality of my love toward him or her; we recall that, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle insists that each *philos* must be cognizant of *eunoia* or affection on the part of the other. Apart from one's knowledge of the other's love, Nussbaum continues, "lovers will have emotions toward their relationship itself, and the activities it involves. Thus we cannot even understand the emotional aspects of love fully without seeing how it is frequently related to interactions and exchanges of the sort Aristotle is thinking about" (474). Aristotle, however, never suggests that *philoï* in some sense love their relationship itself. The mutual love that obtains between *philoï* may be better described as a state of affairs, consisting simply in the fact that each party loves (that is, *philein*) the other.

Philia, then, has two uses. In one sense, it coincides with *philein* and refers to an altruistic wish for the good of the other; in another, it names the state of affairs that obtains between *philoï*, which requires that each *philos* have the corresponding wish for the other. If one of the parties fails to have this desire, or does not act to provide good things for the other to the extent possible, it convicts him or her of a lack of *philia* in the sense of loving, and hence the state of affairs that depends on reciprocal love – *philia* in the sense of friendship – ceases to exist.

In sum, love and friendship in Aristotle are best understood not as entailing obligations or as based on kinship, but as an altruistic desire which, when reciprocated, results in a state of affairs that Aristotle, and Greeks in general, called *philia*.

REFERENCES

- Belfiore, E. S. (2000) *Murder among Friends: Violation of Philia in Greek Tragedy*. New York and Oxford.
- Bourdieu, P. (1997) "Marginalia – Some Additional Notes on the Gift", trans. Richard Nice, in Alan D. Schrift, *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity* (London) 231–41.
- Derrida, J. (1997) "The Time of the King", trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Alan D. Schrift, *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity* (London) 121–47.

- Hatfield, E., Rapson R. L. (2000) "Love and Attachment Process", in Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, eds. *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed. (New York) 654–62
- Konstan, D. (1997) *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge)
- Konstan, D. (2006) *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*. Toronto.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2001) *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge.
- Peachin, M., ed. (2001) *Aspects of Friendship in the Graeco-Roman World*. Proceedings of a Conference held at the Seminar für Alte Geschichte, Heidelberg, on 10-11 June, 2000. Portsmouth.
- Raccanelli, R. (1998) *L'amicizia nelle commedie de Plauto: Un' indagine antropologica*. Bari.

THE ART OF LIFE. AN ANCIENT IDEA AND ITS SURVIVAL

TEUN TIELEMAN
UCLA / Utrecht University

Introduction

Among the many clubs and foundations that advertise themselves on Bruin Lane on the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles one is called 'The Art of Living'. The Buddha-like figure on its poster suggests that its members look East for the origins of this idea. But clearly it is part of Western culture. The 'art of life' (German 'Lebenskunst') most often refers to the ability to conduct one's social life in an appropriate and satisfactory manner. As such, it is connected with etiquette, i. e. a set of rules regulating social behaviour. A related idea is encapsulated in the French expression *savoir vivre*, which however is often used to indicate the ability to derive sensual pleasure from life.

What most people do not know is that the idea of an art of life goes back to the Greek philosopher Socrates (469–369 B. C.). If we take a closer look at how he and his ancient successors understood this, it becomes apparent that a few elements of the modern notion were already in place in ancient times, viz. the following of particular rules and happiness as the goal towards which this leads. There is also an important difference. For the ancients it is a *philosophical* concept, not etiquette in the sense of a collection of traditional, undemonstrated rules. But what then does 'art of life' mean as a philosophical concept? This is not a merely historical issue. In present-day philosophy the concept has been

resuscitated—and those redefining it today are fully aware of their ancient precursors. In what follows I will trace its development from its origin until the present day.

The Birth of an Idea

Halfway through the Platonic dialogue *Alcibiades I* Socrates and Alcibiades consider how a person could achieve moral progress and even perfection. In this context Socrates introduces the notion of *technê*: ‘expertise’, ‘art’, ‘skill’. Which *technê* will enable us to attain this ideal and, in this sense, care for ourselves? Trying to answer this question Alcibiades runs into various self-contradictions. He loses all confidence and admits to being perplexed. Socrates encourages him to persevere and answer another series of questions (127d-e). Making a fresh start Socrates explains that as there is an art that takes care of what belongs to the foot (the shoemaker’s art), so too there is an art that takes care of the foot itself (gymnastics). Socrates concludes:

Socr.: So the art (*technê*) through which we care for each thing in itself is not the same as that through which we care for what belongs to that thing?

Alc.: Apparently not.

Socr.: Taking care of your own things, then, is not the same as taking care of yourself.

Alc.: Certainly not (128d).

From here Socrates proceeds to a precise definition of the self.¹ It cannot be the body, which is the instrument used by the self. The self is the soul (*psychê*). One should therefore get to know² and care for one’s soul. This is achieved through cultivating the soul’s most precious and divine potential, viz. that for wisdom.

Thus Socrates expounds his philosophical ideal of caring for one’s soul or self. That we have an inside self or character worth caring for

¹ On this part of the discussion cf. Gill (2006) 344–59.

² 129a. This refers to the ‘wise Delphic inscription’ (132c) ‘Know thyself’. Cf. also Plato, *Prot.* 343a and for more material Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (18. Aufl. 1989), part I, nr. 10, 2.

was not an entirely novel idea. Pythagoras and Heraclitus had made the first steps towards a philosophical reflection on personality, from which they drew inferences for a responsible way of life, that is to say, for an ethics. Socrates was enormously influential in further developing this idea of the care of the self, in particular by introducing the notion of 'art' (*technê*). But exactly what was its function?

Anyone who starts reading Plato's dialogues soon becomes familiar with the recurrent situation where Socrates' critical examination (*elenchos*) of the views of his interlocutors ends with their being exposed as pseudo-experts. They laid claim to knowledge but deluded themselves and others on this score. Typically the knowledge concerned is that of a particular moral or social subject: justice, piety, courage, political excellence etc. Socrates' interlocutors prove unable to present an adequate account (*logon didonai*) of their beliefs. Often this is how it ends: the dialogue ends with an impasse, a perplexing difficulty (*aporia*). In consequence, Socrates has earned himself a reputation for having usefully seen through and exposed all kinds of specious wisdom – without however replacing it with a systematic doctrine of his own. For this his dialogic method of *elenchus* is taken to have been too limited and insufficient.³ Still, this impression is too one-sided. The *technê* analogy introduced in the *Alcibiades I* seems designed to develop, alongside the *elenchus*, a procedure that makes it possible to 'give an account'. Having a *technê* means having a rational and explicable method, a coherent set of rules. This is why an art can be learned and taught. The subject-matter of the art envisaged by Socrates is our inner self. The use of the *technê* analogy in connection with the call for the care for the soul is found in several passages throughout Plato's work. We may assume that these related ideas derive from the historical Socrates.⁴

³ Cf. the end of book I of the *Republic* where Socrates having refuted the sophist Thrasymachus is challenged by his companions to set out an alternative theory of justice. When the transition from the dialogic first book to the far more monologic books II-X is made, the *elenchus*, i.e. the method of the historical Socrates, is in fact abandoned by Plato.

⁴ For a good discussion of Socrates' *technê* analogy on the basis of the relevant Platonic passages see Irwin (1977) 71–101.

The *Technê* Analogy Contested and Rehabilitated

Socrates had introduced his *technê* analogy to present the moral principles he defended as mutually coherent. But he was still far from constructing a complete system of morality. The precise way in which we could achieve moral perfection (or virtue, *aretê*) and happiness had remained largely unimplemented. Moreover, there was Socrates' controversial intellectualism, i. e. his view of moral excellence as a form of knowledge, encapsulated in his dictum 'nobody errs wittingly'. The criminal acts out of ignorance: he wrongly believes that he pursues what is good, i. e. what is conducive to his happiness. This theory of action leaves no room for acting against one's better judgement: to know the good is to act on it. Socrates, then, denied the reality of weakness of the will (*akrasia*), the conflict between (right) reason and the desires whereby the desires prevail but we simultaneously believe that the resulting action is wrong.

Socrates' intellectualism was abandoned by his pupil Plato in book IV of the *Republic* on empirical ⁵ and logical grounds. Aristotle followed suit in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (I, 12) and *On the Soul* (III, 9–10). They postulate two (Plato) or one (Aristotle) psychic powers alongside, and irreducible to, reason. These other power or powers explain emotions such as desire and anger. The conflict between emotion and reason, then, is what constitutes weakness of the will. For our present purposes it is important to note that this rejection of Socratic intellectualism also involves the rejection of the *technê* analogy, i. e. the view of moral perfection as a form of technical knowledge, an expertise.⁶ According to Plato and Aristotle, becoming good is not only a matter of knowing certain things but of influencing our emotions through a variety of means that are not confined to reasoning. For Aristotle the constant interplay

⁵ This term should not be taken to refer to systematic-empirical or experimental research, which has become typical and requisite in modern, i.e. post 19th century, psychology. Plato and other philosophers of the Greco-Roman world appealed to general human experience, that is to say, the behaviours they observed in others and in themselves. Thus Plato operates with examples such as that of the Athenian Leontios who takes a look at the corpses of executed criminals in spite of the fact that the voice of reason tells him not to.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle's criticism of this use of *technê* at *EN* VI, 6; cf. also *Met.* I, 1.

between emotion and practical wisdom shapes a particular pattern of behaviour that becomes habitual, i. e. that shapes our character, including, as the case might be, a perfect character.

Plato and Aristotle delivered a well-argued critique of Socrates, a critique that derived support from the general intuition that reason and emotion are two separate factors in our mental functioning. It is therefore striking that the Socratic model made a powerful comeback. This was due to the emergence of Stoicism, one of the most influential philosophical schools from the beginning of the Hellenistic period until well into the Imperial period. The Stoics espoused the Socratic insight that our mental life including emotions such as desire is cognitive, that is, consciousness, in a way that differentiates (adult) humans from animals in a fundamental sense. In other words, emotions too are ways of (erroneous) thinking and in this, non-normative sense rational. Thus the great Stoic Chrysippus defined desire as 'reason (*logos*) commanding man to act'.⁷ In Stoic philosophy the dominant model is that of the inner dialogue: thinking is having a talk with oneself. This model replaces that of the relations – and conflict – between reason and the irrational emotions according to the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition.

What motivated the Stoics to fall back on the older, Socratic model? For one, this move is in line with their general reverence for Socrates as the thinker who had lived his philosophy right until the end. There were also conceptual problems with the faculty approach of the soul, problems that had already worried Aristotle.⁸ But another factor deserves special emphasis, namely the radical counter-cultural side of Stoicism – a feature that it shares with other Hellenistic schools such as Epicureanism and Cynicism.⁹

⁷ Cited by Plutarch, *On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics* 1037F (=SVF 3.175).

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, 9–10: the problem of how to justify a particular number of different faculties and the related one of how to account for their interaction; cf. Tieleman (2003) 275–77.

⁹ According to the connoisseur of Hellenistic philosophy, A. A. Long, this radicalism goes some way towards explaining why ideas such as 'Stoic' and 'Epicurean' still live on in cultural memory as indicating a particular attitude towards life: see Long (2006) 27.

Aristotle's ethics had taken its starting point from an existing morality, viz. in particular that found among the aristocracies in the Greek city-states. The Stoics do not start from man as already shaped by his culture but rather from human, i. e. rational, nature as uninformed by a particular cultural setting. This radicalism expresses itself in the assumption that on this empirical and natural basis man can shape his own life regardless of (unfavourable) social and cultural circumstances. Philosophy points the way – a way which for the Stoics as for Aristotle leads towards, and is motivated by, *eudaimonia*, the happy or successful life. But the Stoics went beyond Aristotle in elaborating a normative account of this moral development towards perfection, viz. their theory of *oikeiôsis* ('familiarization'), the process whereby individuals become attached to ever widening circles of fellow-human beings – a process based on the recognition of our common rationality and ideally culminating in a sense of unity with all humankind and indeed the divine Reason ruling the cosmos. Other new themes are the doctrine of 'appropriate actions' (*kathêkonta*) and roles (*prosôpa*, Latin *personae*).

Stoic philosophy is the instrument by means of which happiness can be pursued and, ideally, attained. It does not only involve theoretical study but practice and exercise (*askêsis*, *epitêdeusis*). Here the Stoics look back at Socrates and restore the latter's *technê* analogy to the central role it has lost under the influence of Plato and Aristotle. The Stoics define philosophy as an 'art (*technê*) with respect to life aimed at a useful goal'.¹⁰ This definition brings out the nature of philosophy as a rational but not purely theoretical activity: it refers to a goal useful for life, a goal that is pursued by learning and consistently using philosophical concepts. The Stoics define *technê* as a 'system of concepts' so that their definition of philosophy includes the notion of systematicity, an ideal the Stoics were the first to thematize. Logic, ethics and physics constitute an organically coherent whole, the basis of a consistent life.

This is an art which effects no less than a transformation of one's life, as is made clear by the later Stoic Epictetus (c. 50–130 A. D.):

¹⁰ SVF vol. 1 (Zeno) 73; 3 (Chrysippus) 111, 526. Latin authors refer to philosophy as an *ars vitae*: see Cicero, *On Moral Ends* (*De finibus*) 3.4; Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 95.7, 117.2, fr. 17.

Philosophy does not profess to give man any of the external goods. Otherwise it would admit of something that lies outside its proper subject-matter (*hylê*). For just as wood is the material of the carpenter and bronze that of the bronze-caster, so too is each person's life the material (*hylê*) of the art with respect to life (*tês peri bion technês*).¹¹

The techniques of argument and mental exercise that make up this philosophical art of living are found throughout Epictetus' discourses, but also in the work of other Stoics of the same period such as Seneca (1–65) and Marcus Aurelius (121–180).¹²

Modern Revival

In his essay *Schopenhauer as Educator* Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) states:

I attach importance to a philosopher only insofar he is able to set an example [...]. The philosopher must provide this example through his visible life and not through his books only; that is to say, this [life] must be shown in manner taught by the philosophers of Greece: through facial expressions, demeanour, dress, nutriment and habit rather than through what they said, let alone what they wrote.¹³

Nietzsche no doubt exaggerates when he presents the written and spoken word as of subordinate significance in Greek philosophy. But we may have to make allowance for the fact that he is trying to correct a by his time deep-rooted and widespread conception of philosophy as an

¹¹ Epictetus, *Dissertations* 1.15.2 (my translation).

¹² The importance attached by the Stoics to this conception of philosophy, as well as their influence in this period, is illustrated by the extensive criticism at Sextus Empiricus (2nd cent. A. D.) *Against the Mathematicians* 11.168–215. On Seneca considered from this perspective see further e. g. I. Hadot (1969); for Marcus Aurelius see Hadot (2001).

¹³ Fr. Nietzsche, *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* § 3 (KGW III, 1, 346); my translation.

abstract, theoretical activity far removed from everyday life. This conception (which is due to German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th century in particular) has all too often been projected back on to Greco-Roman philosophy. Nietzsche, the classicist who had worked on Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of the Distinguished Philosophers*, saw the distortion involved here. He paved the way for an approach of ancient philosophy that has been developed in our own time by Pierre Hadot (1922) and others.¹⁴ It was through his influence on Michel Foucault (1926–84) in particular that Hadot has caused many historians and others to rediscover the true nature of ancient philosophy (or at least large parts of it) as a philosophy of life, or in Hadot's own words 'philosophy as a way of life'. His work also provided stimuli that have led to the formulations – by Foucault, Schmid (1953), Onfray (1958) and others – of a philosophical art of life for our time.

The still very influential Foucault became interested in the ancient idea – and ideal – of the art of life during the research for his *History of Sexuality*, which has remained limited to three out of six planned volumes. He had embarked upon this project with the aim of tracing the roots of modern sexual repression in early Christianity and the Greco-Roman world in general. In the third volume, *The Care of the Self* (*Le souci de soi* – a clear Socratic echo) he makes a rather unexpected turn when he discerns from the Hellenistic period onward certain changes, in particular a more favourable appreciation of marriage:

It is not the emergence of particular prohibitions that underlie these changes in sexual morality: it is the development of an art of life (*art de l'existence*), which revolves around the question of the 'I', its dependence and independence, its general manifestation and the relations it can and has to engage in with others, the method through which it controls itself and the way in which it can establish complete authority over itself (p. 273; my translation).

It is very striking (although certainly due to Hadot's influence) that Foucault is here sensitive to the ancient *self*-disciplining, thereby taking leave of his usual theme of institutional repression, the subjugation of

¹⁴ For relevant publications by Hadot see the Bibliography. Also note the earlier studies by Rabbow (1954) and I. Hadot (1969).

the individual by a scientific and/or social discourse. Thus there will be room, within certain limitations, for an original self or 'I' that makes its own choices.

Foucault was clearly impressed by the ancient art of life with its self-imposed rules. This discovery led to his advocacy of a 'technology of the self' for us here and now:

What strikes me is the fact that in our society art has become something that pertains to objects only, not to persons or to life [...] But why could not everyone's life become a work of art? Why should a lamp or a house be a work of art but not our life?¹⁵

We must note that Foucault introduces here an esthetic aspect that is unknown from our ancient sources. Once again Nietzsche, another of Foucault's sources of inspiration, casts his shadow. In his early work *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (*Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*, 1871) Nietzsche ascribes to the Greeks of the pre-classical period (especially as represented in the Homeric epics) the ideal of life as a work of art – a completely unhistorical, Nietzschean projection but nonetheless an idea that stimulates the imagination and has become influential. In consequence, one often comes across such aesthetic conceptions of the art of living.

Epilogue

It is no exaggeration to say that the moral philosophy of the Greeks and Romans today, at the beginning of the 21st century, constitutes one the most influential heirlooms of classical civilization. Referring back to philosophers such Aristotle and other Greek thinkers contemporary philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Philippa Foot and Alisdair MacIntyre have made classical virtue ethics relevant for our time, thus filling certain lacunas left by modern, post-Kantian ethics. This had become an abstract discipline with little appeal to most people except a relatively small circle of academic specialists. Ancient philosophers by contrast did address the practical questions of everyday life; they did address universal human needs and emotions in a very di-

¹⁵ Foucault (1994b) 392; cf. 617; my translation.

rect way. This makes their extant work an indispensable source of inspiration and ideas for all those who try to make philosophy again relevant for a wider public and the existential questions with which it grapples. In this revival of ancient virtue ethics a prominent part is played by the Socratic and Stoic ideal of the art of life.¹⁶ It is typical of this philosophical art of living that it does not offer a superficial lifestyle or shortcut to happiness; it remains philosophical in that it constitutes a discipline that requires effort and perseverance of its practitioners. This makes it to some extent elitist, despite its universal appeal. But this paradox, too, is part of the ancient heritage.¹⁷

REFERENCES

- Foucault, M. (1984) *Histoire de la sexualité*, vol. 3: *Le souci de soi*. Paris.
- Foucault, M. (1994a) *Dits et écrits*, vol. III (1976–9). Paris.
- Foucault, M. (1994b) *Dits et écrits*, vol. IV (1980–8). Paris.
- Gill, C. (2006) *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*. Oxford.
- Hadot, I. (1969) *Seneca und die griechisch-römischen Tradition der Seelenleitung*. Berlin.
- Hadot, P. (1993) *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*. Paris (nouvelle édition revue et augmentée 2002).
- Hadot, P. (1995) *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Paris; eng. translation: *What Is Ancient Philosophy?*
- Hadot, P. (2001) *The Inner Citadel. The "Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius*. Cambridge, Mass.; transl. of *La citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marce Aurèle*. Paris, 1992.
- Irwin, T. (1977) *Plato's Moral Theory. The Early and Middle Dialogues*. Oxford.
- Long, A. A. (2006) 'Hellenistic Ethics as the Art of Life', *From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (Oxford) 23–42

¹⁶ For the art of life (in the philosophical sense) today see esp. Schmid (1998).

¹⁷ An earlier Dutch version of this article, ("Levenskunst") appeared in *Lampas. Tijdschrift voor classici* 40.4 (2007) 234–42.

- Nehamas, A. (1998) *The Art of Living. Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault*. Sather Classical Lectures 61. Berkeley.
- Rabbow, P. (1954) *Seelenführung: Methodix der Exerzitien in der Antike*. München.
- Schmid, W. (1998) *Philosophie der Lebenskunst. Eine Grundlegung*. Frankfurt.
- Sellars, J. (2003) *The Art of Living. The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy*. Aldershot/Burlington VT; cf. the review by J. B. Gourinat in *Philosophie Antique* 6 (2006) 223–6
- Tieleman, T. (2003) *Chrysippus' On Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation*. Leiden.

LES STOÏCIENS SUR LES TEMPERAMENTS DU CORPS ET DE L'ÂME

TEUN TIELEMAN
Université d'Utrecht

1. *Introduction*

Des historiens et philosophes comme Pierre Hadot et Michel Foucault ont beaucoup contribué au intérêt actuel inspiré par le Stoïcisme ancien en dehors du cercle étroit des spécialistes. Au centre de cet intérêt se trouve la conception stoïcienne de la philosophie comme 'l'art de vivre' (ἡ τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον, *ars vitae*) et tout ce que cet idéal implique pour le ménage de la vie quotidienne. En particulier, il s'agit de maîtriser les émotions et les désirs physiques en s'imposant un ensemble des règles pratiques. Ainsi on pratique le souci de soi ou bien de l'âme, comme les anciens ont préféré dire. C'est une tradition morale qui remonte à Socrate et Pythagore. Mais ce sont les Stoïciens qui, à leur époque, semblent avoir été les plus radicaux en ce qui concerne la valeur spéciale, sinon absolue, qu'ils ont attribuée à l'âme. Ils réservaient les qualifications 'bon' et 'mauvais', au sens strict de ces mots, à l'âme seule. Tout ce qui tient au corps, comme la vie et la mort, la santé et la maladie, la beauté et la laideur, est 'indifférent' (ἀδιάφορον), c'est à dire: ni bon ni mauvais. Il en est de même avec les choses 'extérieurs': prospérité et pauvreté, honneur et infamie etc. La perfection morale (ou la vertu) et le bonheur ne dépendent pas de ces choses indifférentes—doctrine avec laquelle les Stoïciens se distinguent des traditions platonicienne et péripatéticienne: le Sage est heureux même dans le taureau de

Phalaris'.¹ Bien entendu, ça ne veut pas dire que le corps ou les choses extérieures sont absolument indifférent, comme la nombre exacte de ses cheveux. Par nature nous préférons la vie, la santé et des possessions comme nous évitons leurs contraires. Mais en fin de compte, la vertu morale est suffisant pour la perfection, pour le bonheur.²

Néanmoins la pensée stoïcienne sur le corps est plus nuancée, sinon plus ambiguë, qu'elle semble d'être à première vue. Parmi les choses indifférentes, le corps occupe une position spéciale et privilégiée. Sur ce point-ci les Stoïciens disent leur adieux à tous ceux qui exhortent à la négligence du corps: leur neveux philosophiques plus rustiques, les Cyniques, ainsi que des stoïciens cynisants comme Ariston.³ L'appréciation plus favorable des Stoïciens relève de la doctrine que l'âme, qui est corporelle elle-même, se mélange avec le corps entier, ce qui explique le fonctionnement physiologique de l'organisme. Par conséquent, l'âme est exposée à l'influence du corps. En d'autres termes, sa condition intellectuelle et morale dépend en large mesure de celle du corps. C'est ce qui donne au corps une signification et une valeur spéciale. Or cette doctrine ne s'accorde pas bien avec la classification morale du corps comme indifférent et de l'âme comme le seul bien. Dans cet article je veux examiner ce problème de nouveau à partir de la pensée stoïcienne sur la relation entre l'âme et le corps—relation qui est expliquée par les Stoïciens au moyen du concept fondamental du mélange total ou intégral, la *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*. Dans ce cadre je propose de discuter la relation entre disposition intérieure et morale d'une part et la physique extérieure d'une autre; en d'autres termes, leur pensée sur la physiognomie. De cette façon nous supplémentons les études existants, qui concernent plutôt le concept du mélange total au niveau macrocosmique ou qui l'ont discuté par rapport à la doctrine

¹ SVF 3.586. Le tiran Phalaris d'Acragas en Sicile (6ème s. av. J.-C.) possédait un taureau en bronze dans lequel il grillait ses victimes en allumant du feu là-dessous. Leur cris échappaient par des petits conduits dans le nez en imitation du mugissement: Cic. *In Verr.* 4.73, Diod. Sic. 9.19.1.

² Sur la valeur des trois classes des choses d'après les Stoïciens voir, dans la collection de Von Arnim, les textes collectionnés dans volume III (*Ethica* iii: 'De indifferentibus'); nos. 117-168. Cfr. aussi Long-Sedley (1987) ch. 58 ('Value and Indifference') 349-54.

³ Voir Cic. *Fin.* 4.68 (SVF 3.27); cfr. Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1071F (SVF 3.26).

épistémologique des 'notions communes', sur lequel le concept du mélange total se fonde. À côté des notions philosophiques propre au système stoïcien, on pourra déceler plusieurs réflexions de la médecine ou du moins des idées médicales assez répandues dans le monde Gréco-Romaine. Or, je m'occupe aussi de la question comment et dans quelle mesure le Stoïcisme a interagi avec son contexte intellectuel en ce qui concerne la relation entre l'âme et le corps.

2. *Le souffle et le mélange*

Le concept central de la physique matérialiste stoïcienne, c'était le souffle (πνεῦμα). À partir d'idées médicales, de la théorie ébauchée par Aristote et des autres Péripatéticiens et peut-être inspirés aussi par des intuitions présocratiques (Anaximène, Diogène d'Apollonie), les Stoïciens ont fait usage de ce concept d'une plus façon plus systématique et plus ample que tous ces prédécesseurs. En principe macrocosmique, le souffle pénètre à travers l'univers entier. Il est le véhicule de Dieu, le principe créateur, la Raison (*logos*). Étant donné que seuls les corps peuvent agir sur les corps, le souffle doit pénétrer à travers toute la matière pour expliquer les processus du monde physique. C'est le principe actif lié indissolublement au principe passif et matériel. Le souffle explique la cohésion (ἔξις) du cosmos et de tout qu'il contient grâce à la tension, c'est à dire aux tendances opposées du froid (air) et du chaud (feu). La cohésion implique que le souffle agit aussi en principe formatif, qui crée ou même coïncide avec les qualités sensibles des choses. Tout l'être se marque par un degré du souffle cosmique: les objets inanimés par cohésion seule (ou souffle cohésive), les plantes par 'nature' (ou souffle physique), les animaux (l'homme y compris) par l'âme ou 'souffle psychique'.⁴ L'âme de l'homme grâce à la pureté de sa substance pneumatique se distingue par rationalité, ce qui nous apparente à Dieu. L'intelligence humaine est même un drageon, une particule du Dieu lui-même.⁵

⁴ Sur le souffle comme principe physique et cosmique, voir les fragments SVF 2.439-62.

⁵ Sur la substance de l'âme humaine en sa relation avec l'âme du monde ou Dieu voir: SVF 1.128, 134-51, 2.773-89, 885; Sexte, *M.* IX, 101-103 (SVF 1.134, part); cfr. Tieleman (2002) 189 sqq.

Le concept du souffle est étroitement lié à la notion technique du mélange total: le souffle est un mélange total de l'air et du feu. À son tour ce souffle se mélange d'une façon intégrale aux éléments passifs. En effet, il semble que l'usage que les Stoïciens ont fait du concept du souffle — lui-même inspiré par leur matérialisme — a occasionné le développement de la notion typiquement stoïcienne du mélange total. Le souffle devait être omniprésent ce qui nécessitait l'interpénétration totale des corps. Certains phénomènes physiologiques comme la croissance paraissent d'avoir démontré cette nécessité.⁶

La notion du mélange total implique, d'abord, que les composants se mêlent tellement qu'il préservent leur identité sans compter leur proportion entre eux: 'Les mélanges se produisent de manière intégrale, comme Chrysippe l'affirme au troisième livre de ses *Physiques*, et ces mélanges n'impliquent pas une circonscription et une juxtaposition. Car un peu de vin, lorsqu'on le jette dans la mer, se propagera sur une certaine distance, puis s'y mélangera' (D.L. 7.151).⁷ 'Chrysippe [...] dans le premier livre de ses *Recherches physiques* [...] affirme que rien n'empêche une goutte de vin de se mélanger à la mer. Afin que nous ne soyons point étonnés de ce fait, il prétend que la goutte, grâce au mélange, s'étendra au monde entier' (Plutarque, *De comm. not.* 37, 1078e). Ici on voit une réaction directe contre Aristote qui avait précisément nié qu'une goutte de vin se mélangera à une très large quantité d'eau, car 'sa forme se dissout et se change à la totalité de l'eau'

⁶ Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* p. 233, l.14 sqq. Bruns (SVF 2.735).

⁷ Diogène écrit *συμφθαρῆσεται* ('se corrompra'), mais évidemment le term requis est *συγκραθήσεται* (ainsi Long-Sedley *ad loc.*). Autrement dit, le rapportage de Diogène est confus à cet égard — la conséquence, semble-t-il, de l'abréviation du original qui contenait la description d'une autre espèce de mélange, à savoir la fusion (*σύγχυσις*). Cfr. le reportage parallèle mais plus extensif offert par Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *De mixtione*, p. 216 Bruns (SVF 2.473, part): τὰς δὲ τίνας [scil. μίξεις] συγχύσει δι' ὅλων τῶν τε οὐσιῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ποιότητων *συμφθειρομένων* ἀλλήλαις, ὥς γίνεσθαι φησιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱατρικῶν φαρμάκων κατὰ *σύμφθαρσιν* τῶν μιγνυμένων, ἄλλου τινὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν γεννωμένου σώματος. Le troisième type de mixtion distingué par les Stoïciens, c'est la juxtaposition (*παράθεσις*) de composants qui ne touchent que leur surfaces comme un tas de blé. Ce dernier type de mélange s'est, comme on voit, inséré dans le témoignage Laërcien.

(GC A.10 : 328a24-8).⁸ Les Stoïciens avaient consciemment pris cette position contraire à celle d'Aristote en vue du rôle qu'ils accordent au *pneuma*. La notion du mélange total qui en résulte semble d'être moins convaincante que la négation d'Aristote de la même notion. Mais n'oublions pas que le *pneuma* est une substance extraordinairement subtile et rarifiée, ce qui rend plus acceptable la thèse Stoïcienne qu'un corps peut pénétrer à travers un autre.

Les composants du mélange préservent leur identité, c'est à dire leur qualités originales. Aussi peuvent-ils être séparés de nouveau. Comme preuve, les Stoïciens ont renvoyé au processus par lequel on sépare un mélange de vin et d'huile en se servant d'une éponge (Stob. *Ecl.* I, p. 155.5-11 W.). Mais la doctrine stoïcienne non seulement garantit que le composant de quantité (très) inférieure est préservé. La volume de la mer aide la goutte de vin de s'étendre. C'est pourquoi nos sources insistent que les composants sont co-extensifs (Diog. Laerc. 7.151, Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* p. 216 Bruns).

Si les Stoïciens ont introduit leur concept novateur du mélange total en vue du rôle du souffle (*pneuma*), il s'agit, comme nous avons vu, à la fois de la substance du Dieu et celle de l'âme individuelle. Aussi trouve-t-on la relation entre l'âme et le corps parmi les exemples, sinon preuves, de la mélange intégrale. L'âme en se répandant à travers tous les parties du corps conserve sa propre identité. Elle se sépare du corps quand l'organisme meurt (bienque les Stoïciens nient l'immortalité).⁹

Il (scil. Chrysippe) s'exprime ainsi : "L'âme est un souffle qui nous est naturel, s'étendant de manière continue dans le corps tout entier tant que la respiration vitale est présente dans le corps" (Galien, *PHP* 3.1.10 = *SVF* 2.885, partie; trad. R. Dufour).¹⁰

⁸ Voir Mansfeld 1984.

⁹ Après la mort de l'organisme humain l'âme survit pour une certaine durée dépendante de sa qualité (c.-à-d. sa tension, voir *infra* dans notre texte). Selon Chrysippe les âmes sages survivent jusqu'à la prochaine conflagration du monde: voir *SVF* 2.809-11. L'âme se forme juste après la naissance quand sous l'influence de l'air froid le souffle (*pneuma*) physique change à souffle psychique: *SVF* 2.806.

¹⁰ οὕτως τί λέγει· ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον ἔστ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὐπνοία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. Cfr. Calcidius, *In*

Ce passage a été tiré directement de l'ouvrage de Chrysippe *Sur l'âme*. Se fondant sur le même ouvrage, Galien ajoute les renseignements suivants sur la doctrine chrysippéenne de la substance de l'âme:

Ce souffle possède donc deux parties, éléments ou natures, qui se mélangent intégralement (δι' ὅλων [...] κεκραμένα) l'une avec l'autre : le froid et le chaud. Si l'on veut également les désigner par d'autres noms, tirés de leurs substances, il s'agit de l'air et du feu. Ce souffle reçoit tout de même de l'humidité à partir des corps dans lesquels il réside (Galien, *PHP* 5.3.8 = *SVF* 2.841, partie; trad. R. Dufour).

Cette âme se nourrit de deux sources: d'abord, de la respiration, c'est-à-dire, de l'air du dehors, ce qui l'expose aux influences de l'environnement physique. Puis, il y a la vaporisation du sang dans le cœur où réside son organe directif ou bien l'intellect.¹¹ Cette exhalaison est causée par la chaleur innée qui se concentre dans le *pneuma* psychique. Évidemment ce processus rend l'âme susceptible aux facteurs corporels aussi. Puis, on peut constater que, d'une part, les quatre éléments se divisent à deux parmi le corps et l'âme (le premier étant caractérisé par une prépondérance de l'eau et de la terre, la dernière par celle de l'air et du feu), mais que, d'autre part, le mélange de l'âme et du corps entraîne une considérable interdépendance physiologique de l'une de l'autre. La division selon deux paires d'éléments n'est même pas totale: inévitablement, comme nous voyons Galien remarquer, l'âme reçoit un peu d'humidité du corps. Mais c'est non seulement l'âme qui est exposée aux influences du corps et de l'environnement physique. Inversement, le corps est conditionné par l'âme. Selon la formulation stoïcienne, l'âme et le corps ont une relation de 'sympathie', comme il

Tim. c. 220 (*SVF* 2.879), passage qui semble refléter le même ouvrage de Chrysippe.

¹¹ Nourriture de l'âme: *SVF* 2.778-83; cfr. aussi *PHP* 2.8.44 (*SVF* 3 Diog. Bab. 30), 48 (*SVF* Zeno 140, Cleanthes 521). Les Stoïciens avaient emprunté cette doctrine physiologiques, comme des autres, au médecin Praxagore de Kos, sur lequel v. *infra*: Praxagore Fr. 32 Steckerl.

est évident par des phénomènes comme les manifestations physiques des émotions.¹²

La santé de l'âme relève d'un bon mélange (εὐκρασία) des éléments physiques, à savoir l'air et le feu. La santé psychique est aussi caractérisée comme la force de l'âme, qui consiste dans un bon degré de tension. On parle de la maladie ou de l'infirmité de l'âme si la tension est lâche.¹³ La tension résulte des tendances contraires du feu et de l'air mélangés dans le souffle psychique: le premier se meut vers le bord, le dernier vers le centre de la substance.¹⁴ L'âme faible et incontinente se marque par trop peu de tension ou bien d'un déséquilibre entre ces deux tendances. Elle est donc constamment encline à se contracter ou expander. Il s'agit du base physique de la psychologie morale: un âme infirme ne résiste pas sous l'impact de certaines impressions d'objets extérieurs mais répond par une impulsion excessive et irrationnelle, ce qui est l'émotion vue du perspective physique. Il s'agit d'une impulsion à se contracter en cas des passions (littéralement) froides: la crainte et la douleur avec leur espèces subordonnées. Il s'agit d'un mouvement expansive de l'âme pneumatique en cas des passions chaudes: le désir et le plaisir avec leur espèces.¹⁵ (Alternativement on peut décrire le phénomène comme un jugement faux sur la situation ou on se trouve: la théorie stoïcienne est cognitive comme elle est matérialiste. Et comme on sait, les émotions—c'est le mal.)¹⁶ Les émotions sont comme les attaques de fièvre irrégulière provenant d'une condition psychique

¹² Voir SVF 1 Cléanthe 518.

¹³ Gal. PHP 5.2.26-7, 31-8 (SVF 3.471), *Quod Animi Mores*, ch. 4, *Scripta Minora*, T. II, pp. 45-6 Müller (SVF 2.787). Le déséquilibre entre le chaud et le froid plus ou moins grave commence dès la naissance: Calcidius *In Tim.* 165-6 (SVF 3.229) avec Vegetti 1983. La division des passions chaudes et froides était traditionnelle et se rencontre aussi chez les poètes grecques: voir Zink 1962.

¹⁴ Voir les textes rassemblés par von Arnim sous les numéros SVF 2.446-62 ou alternativement, dans la collection de Long-Sedley (1987), la documentation présentée comme chapitre 47.

¹⁵ Voir p. ex. Gal. PHP 4.3.2, 5.1.4 (SVF 1.209); 4.7.14 (SVF 3.466), 4.2.1 (SVF 3.463), Cic. *Tusc.* 4.15 (SVF 3.380), 66-7; Diog. Laerc. 7.114. Cfr. Sedley 1993, 329 ff.

¹⁶ Sur l'interchangeabilité des deux sortes de description cfr. Sedley 1993, 327, 329.

infirmes ou bien un caractère mauvais.¹⁷ Par contre, l'âme saine et puissante préservera son équilibre et continue à réagir d'une façon rationnelle.

Se servant des théories médicales contemporaines les Stoïciens concevaient de la santé psychique par analogie à la santé du corps. Ils souscrivaient à la conception assez répandue à l'époque hellénistique de la philosophie comme médecine de l'âme. Chrysippe dans son ouvrage *Sur les passions* a traité l'analogie médicale d'une façon tellement détaillée qu'il ait provoqué la critique de Cicéron (pour des raisons stylistiques, qui montrent qu'il sous-estime l'importance physiologique de l'analogie).¹⁸ Ici il fait appel aux philosophes de se familiariser avec la médecine à côté de l'étude du comportement psychique de l'homme.¹⁹ Évidemment sa conception de la santé comme une balance des éléments composants du corps est bien traditionnelle.²⁰ Il y a beaucoup de parallèles avec le corpus hippocratique sur ce point.²¹ Toutefois l'influence médicale dominante sur le Stoïcisme paraît avoir été Praxagore de Kos (deuxième moitié du quatrième siècle av. J.-C.), qui passait pour médecin hippocratique lui-même.²² Malheureusement nous ne possédons que des fragments de ses nombreux ouvrages – fragments d'ailleurs qui nous offrent peu de chose sur le domaine thérapeutique.²³ Quant à la physiologie de Praxagore il faut mentionner le rôle prominent qu'y joue le *pneuma*, concept fondamental dans la réception de la médecine hippocratique à cet époque.²⁴ Selon Praxagore, comme plus tard les Stoïciens, le *pneuma* était le véhicule des fonctions psychiques et se nourrit du souffle ainsi que des vapeurs cardiaques. Praxagore aussi a-t-il regardé le cœur comme l'organe principale et

¹⁷ Voir Gal. *PHP* 5.2.13-14 (SVF 3.465).

¹⁸ Cic. *Tusc.* 3.6, 4.23; cfr. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.22-24 (SVF 3.471).

¹⁹ Gal. *PHP* 5.2.22-24 (SVF 3.471).

²⁰ Voir surtout Fr. 11 Steckerl.

²¹ Cfr. Tieleman 1999.

²² Pour Praxagore comme Hippocratique Test. 1 Steckerl. Sur son influence sur le Stoïcisme voir Tieleman 1996, 83 ff., 189 ff.

²³ Les témoignages et fragments préservés ont été collectionnés par F. Steckerl 1958.

²⁴ Cfr. Celse, *Proem.* ch. 15 avec Langholf 1986, 17 n. 60 et Tieleman 1999, 416 ff.

directive. En outre, il semble avoir contribué à la conception stoïcienne de la tension.²⁵ Le fait que aussi d'autres Hippocratiques ainsi que les Péripatéticiens contemporains (qui suivaient certaines suggestions d'Aristote) avaient attribué un rôle semblable au *pneuma*, aura confirmé les Stoïciens en élaborant leur conception physiologique de l'organisme. Bien sûr le *pneuma* était un concept scientifique qui était accepté par la plupart des théoriciens médicaux et qui par conséquent pouvait être adopté par les Stoïciens sans grand risque de devenir désuet par des nouveaux avancements anatomiques. Même ceux qui ont découvert et exploré le système nerveux pendant la première moitié du troisième siècle av. J.-C., Hérophile de Chalcédon et Erasistrate de Kéos, ont retenu le *pneuma* qu'ils ont reconcilié avec leur découvertes.²⁶

Mais si la thèse du *pneuma* et ses fonctions sensori-motrices n'était pas limitée aux Stoïciens mais par contre était assez répandue, il faut noter que les derniers ont élaboré la notion d'une façon systématique et originale comme une idée cosmique, en se servant de la relation entre le *pneuma* et l'air que nous inhalons. Le *pneuma* cosmique c'est l'âme du monde (ce concept-ci n'est pas complètement original mais se rencontre chez Platon parmi d'autres) et la Raison divine, dont nos âmes sont des particules.²⁷

3. La physiognomonie

Comme l'a démontré F. Kudlien (1974), l'interdépendance du corps et du *pneuma* psychique qui se fonde sur l'idée du mélange intégrale rend le status moral du corps ambivalent (voir ci-dessus, p. 9). Notre corps n'est pas un 'indifférent préféré' comme des autres mais occupe une place spéciale dans cette classe. Puis nous avons examiné l'interaction entre l'âme et le corps et remarqué que l'âme se nourrit du sang dans le

²⁵ Gal. *PHP* 1.7.1 (SVF 2.879, quatrième texte, Prax. Fr. 11 Steckerl).

²⁶ Notons que leur idées sur les nerfs et leur thèse encephalocentrique sont rejetés par Chrysippe et la plupart des Stoïciens: voir Gal. *PHP* 2.5.69-70 (SVF 2.898) avec Tieleman 1996, 51 f.

²⁷ Diog. Laerc. 7.141-2 (SVF 2.633); cfr. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* XV, 20, 1 (= Arius Did. Fr. Phys. 39 Diels, SVF 1 Zenon 128); Cic. *ND* 2.22, Sext. *M.* IX, 101-3; cfr. *ibid.* 85 (SVF 1.113-4) avec Tieleman 2002, 189-203; Posidonius ap. Gal. *PHP* 5.6.4-6 (= Posid. Fr. 187 Edelstein-Kidd); cf. Pl. *Tim.* 90a.

cœur comme de l'air que nous inhalons. Cette situation rend l'âme particulièrement susceptible de subir l'influence de la condition du corps comme des facteurs environnementaux comme le climat. Maintenant voyons quelques conséquences morales de cette doctrine physiologique.

La dépendance de l'âme du corps pour sa santé physique et morale nécessite que nous procurer un soin spéciale au corps. Il y a des anecdotes sur le fondateur de l'école, Zénon, qui réparait les fautes de son caractère mélancholique en prenant certaines mesures, par exemple en buvant des quantités modestes de vin.²⁸ Aussi nous avons des prescriptions sur des actes propres (καθήκοντα) qui concernent le souci du corps et de la santé (SVF 3.705-15). Il est clair que les Stoïciens étaient connus pour s'être éloignés des Cyniques et Stoïciens cynisantes comme Ariston précisément à l'égard du soin qu'on doit procurer au corps.²⁹ En somme, si l'âme est d'une importance centrale, le corps doit avoir un grand valeur lui aussi.

Le Stoïcien Posidonius a affirmé dans son ouvrage *Des passions* que les caractères des peuples (courageux ou lâche, jouisseurs ou prêt à subir des efforts) diffèrent selon la région où ils habitent. L'environnement physique selon son mélange conditionne le mélange des éléments du corps humain qui à son tour détermine 'les mouvements passionnels'.³⁰ Notre source, Galien, tente à associer Posidonius avec la psychologie platonicienne et aristotélicienne, mais il faut noter que la doctrine de Posidonius est conforme à la physique des fondateurs de son école et que la même supposition concernant l'influence des facteurs environnementaux est attribuée à ses prédécesseurs dans l'école, Chrysippe et à Panétius.³¹ Le dernier parle du bon *mélange* (εὐκρασία) des saisons, qui est favorable à l'intelligence des habitants d'une certaine région—ce qui explique pourquoi l'Attique a produit tant d'hommes intelligents.³² Mais notons que selon Chrysippe l'environnement

²⁸ Athénée, *Sophistes au Banquet* II 55F (SVF 1.285); cfr. aussi SVF 1.286-7.

²⁹ Voir Cic. *Fin.* 4.68 (SVF 3.27); cfr. Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1071F (SVF 3.26).

³⁰ Galen, *PHP* 5.5.22-6 (Posid. Fr. 169 E.-K.).

³¹ Chrysippus *ap.* Cic. *Fat.* 7-9 (SVF 2.950-1) avec Sedley (1993) 314 ff.; cfr. Cic. *ND* 2.17; Panaetius fragm. 157 Alesse.

³² Voir note précédente.

détermine le caractère des hommes mais ne fixe pas tout ce qu'ils font dans leur vie.³³

Étant donné que Posidonius et Panétius ici suivent ce que nous savons de Zénon en Chrysippe, textes comme celui-ci ne supportent pas la thèse historiographique d'un phase nouveau qui justifierait le term Moyen-Stoïcisme.

Puis il faut considérer les conséquences du mélange de l'âme et du corps pour le corps. Non seulement l'âme subit-elle l'influence du corps. Le contraire est aussi le cas. On peut se référer aux quelques fragments peu connus qui montrent que les Stoïciens ont mis leur thèse sur l'organisme humain en rapport avec la tradition grecque de la physiognomie. Cet intérêt remonte aux fondateurs de l'école, Zénon et Chrysippe :

Le sage aimera les jeunes gens qui manifestent, par leur aspect, leur aptitude à la vertu, comme disent Zénon dans sa *République*, Chrysippe au premier livre *Des Vies* et Apollodore³⁴ dans sa *Morale* (Diogène Laërce 7.129 = SVF 3.716, 718 ; trad. Bréhier/Goldschmidt/Kucharski).³⁵

Ce texte doit être comparé avec la discussion polémique de la théorie stoïcienne de l'amour inclus par Plutarque dans son ouvrage *Des notions communes contre les Stoïciens*, ch. 28. Celui conserve la même doctrine physiognomique, disant que selon les Stoïciens 'les jeunes gens sont laids quand ils sont mechants et insensés, tandisque les sages sont beaux' (*op. cit.* 1072F) et 'chez les hommes très laids il ne peut y avoir

³³ Voir *supra* n. 30.

³⁴ Stoïcien mineur du seconde moitié du 2ème s. av. J.-C. Élève de Diogène de Babylon: voir Ind. Stoic. LI.7-8 Dorandi. Documentation à SVF vol. 3, pp. 259-261 (Von Arnim ne présente que dix-huit fragments, dont Diog. L. 7.129 est le no. 18).

³⁵ καὶ ἐρασθήσεται δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ. Cfr. *ibid.* 130: εἶναι οὖν τὸν ἔρωτα φιλίας, ὥς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἔρωτός φησι· καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιμεμπτον αὐτόν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἀνθος ἀρετῆς. Stob. *Ecl.* II, p. 65 W. (SVF 3.717): Τὸν δὲ ἔρωτα οὕτε ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι οὕτε τινὸς φαύλου πράγματος, ἀλλ' ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποίας διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν.

une apparence (ἔμφασις) de beauté, puisque, disent-ils, le vice moral se manifeste dans leur mine (εἶδος) L'amour, disent-ils, est la chasse aux jeunes gens encore imparfaits, mais doués pour la vertu (εὐφροῦς πρὸς ἀρετῆς)' (1073B). Ailleurs Plutarque cite une thèse énoncée par Chrysippe au premier livre *De la fin* selon laquelle les biens et les maux sont perceptibles (αἰσθητά): non seulement les passions sont perçues, mais aussi les actes droits et 'la prudence, le courage et les autres vertus' (*De Stoic. Rep.* 19, 1042E-F = SVF 3.85; cfr. *De comm. not.* 1062C. Les deux textes sont: SVF 3.85). Les vertus sont des dispositions de l'âme: comment pourrait-on les percevoir? Je crois que ce passage devient plus facile si l'on le rattache avec les passages physiognomiques précédents.

Le fragment de l'ouvrage *Des passions* de Posidonius nous a montré que l'environnement physique et plus immédiatement le corps influencent la qualité de l'âme. Étant donné l'interaction du corps et de l'âme sur laquelle les Stoïciens insistent,³⁶ il est raisonnable de supposer que la physiognomie stoïcienne va aussi dans l'autre direction; en d'autres termes, l'âme influence la forme du corps et surtout du visage. C'est l'opération normale du souffle étant donné sa fonction de principe actif et formatif.³⁷ En outre, il y a des textes qui insistent sur l'action de l'âme pendant certaines actions comme la perception ou l'impulsion passionnelle.³⁸

³⁶ Cfr. Hierocles, *Éléments d'Éthique* IV.38-47 Long-Bastianini, qui insiste sur le caractère mutuel de l'interaction de l'âme et le corps—interaction qui se fonde sur leur mélange total: 'Puisque l'être vivant est une combinaison du corps et de l'âme et ils sont tous les deux tangibles et impressionable and bien sûr sujets à résistance, et aussi complètement mélangés, et un d'eux est une faculté sensorielle qui est en mouvement [...], il est évident que l'être vivant se perçoit constamment. Car en s'étirant et en se relâchant l'âme fait une impression sur toutes les parties du corps, parce qu'elle est mélangée avec toutes, et en faisant une impression elle reçoit une impression de son côté. Le corps, comme l'âme, réagit à la pression; le résultat c'est une condition de pression et résistance réciproques ...' Cfr. aussi la description du colère donnée par Chrysippe dans *Sur l'âme* (Gal. PHP 3.1.25 = SVF 2.886).

³⁷ SVF 2.449, 389, 393.

³⁸ Cfr. Hierocles, *Éléments d'Éthique* IV.38-47 Long-Bastianini, qui insiste sur le caractère mutuel de l'interaction de l'âme et le corps—interaction qui se fonde sur leur mélange total et explique la perception de soi-même: 'Puisque l'être vivant est une combinaison du corps et de l'âme et ils sont tous les deux

4. Épilogue

Dans nos sources nous trouvons une nombre des formulations radicales et provoquantes selon lesquelles l'âme est plus précieuse que le corps ou même que le corps est sans aucun valeur.³⁹ C'est une façon d'insister sur le status spécial de l'âme comme objet de nôtre souci en harmonie avec une vieille tradition auquel Héraclite et Socrate ont contribué.⁴⁰ D'autre part, les Stoïciens adhèrent à la these du *Timée* Platonicien que l'âme doit prendre soin du corps et que le corps est digne de soin.⁴¹ Comme nous avons fait remarquer au début de cette étude, le corps est un 'indifférent préféré' selon leur classification des choses selon leur valeur morale.⁴² Dans cette classe le corps occupe une place spéciale étant donné sa relation intense avec l'âme que nous avons expliqué. Ici le concept stoïcien original du mélange total joue un rôle central. L'âme et le corps se trouvent dans une relation mutuelle et constante. Dès la naissance leur contact physique cause la conscience de soi-même⁴³ comme un composé d'une âme et d'un corps.⁴⁴ Celle-ci sert de point de départ de nôtre développement moral et social, parce que la première impulsion (πρώτη όρμή) qui en résulte se dirige vers nous-même, c'est

tangibles et impressionable and bien sûr sujets à résistance, et aussi complètement mélangés, et un d'eux est une faculté sensorielle qui est en mouvement [...], il est évident que l'être vivant se perçoit constamment. Car en s'étirant et en se relâchant l'âme fait une impression sur toutes les parties du corps, parce que'elle est mélangée avec toutes, et en faisant une impression elle reçoit une impression de son côté. Le corps, comme l'âme, réagit à la pression; le résultat c'est une condition de pression et résistance réciproques...' Cfr. aussi la description du colère donnée par Chrysippe dans *Sur l'âme* (Gal. PHP 3.1.25 = SVF 2.886).

³⁹ SVF 3.149, 150, 752, 136 (p. 33.14-18).

⁴⁰ Héraclite: par ex. fragm. 22B 96, B117-8 DK; Socrate: par ex. Plato, *Apol.* 29c, 30b, *Phédon* 64dc-66d, 107c.

⁴¹ Cfr. *Tim.* 42c ff., *Phèdre* 246b.

⁴² Voir *supra*, n. 8-9.

⁴³ C'est à dire l'homme individuel ou le Soi ne coïncide pas avec l'âme mais c'est le composé de l'âme et du corps: Sexte, *M.* XI, 46 (SVF 3.96).

⁴⁴ Diog. Laërc. 7.89-90 (SVF 3.178); cfr. Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1038B (SVF 3.179). Sur la perception de soi-même voir surtout Hierocles, *Éléments d'Éthique*; cfr. le texte cité *supra*, n. 37 (à lire avec son contexte).

à vers nôtre propre conservation. Voici le base naturel du comportement moral. C'est seulement quand l'action morale n'est plus possible (ou la vie prolonguée n'ajouterait rien à la perfection morale déjà atteinte) que la séparation du corps et de l'âme est acceptable ou, *Deo volente*, même activement poursuivable.⁴⁵ Mais si la mort termine le mélange microcosmique, ses composants sont absorbés dans le mélange macrocosmique.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- Bloos, L. (1973) *Probleme der stoischen Physik*. Hamburg, 106–114.
- Dufour, R., trad. (2004) *Chrysippe Oeuvre Philosophique*, 2 Tômes. Paris.
- Hahm, D. E. (1977) *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*. Columbus, Ohio.
- Kudlien, F. (1974) 'Die stoischen Gesundheitsbewertung und ihre Probleme', *Hermes* 102, 446–56.
- Langholf, V. (1986) 'Kallimachos, Komödie und hippokratische Frage', *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 21, 3–30.
- Long, A. A. & D. N. Sedley (1987) *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, deux tomes. Cambridge.
- Mansfeld, J. (1984) 'Zeno and Aristotle on mixture', *Mnemosyne* 36, 306–10; repr. in *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy* (Assen 1990) 452–6.
- Sambursky, S. (1959) *Physics of the Stoics*. London, 11–17 ('The problem of mixture').
- Sedley, D.N. (1993) 'Chrysippus on psychophysical causality', in J. Brunschwig & M.C. Nussbaum, *Passions & Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge / Paris, 313–31.
- Tieleman, T. (1996) *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De placitis Books II-III*. Leiden.
- Tieleman, T. (1999) 'Chrysippus' *Therapeutikon* and the *Corpus Hippocraticum*. Some Preliminary Observations', in: I. Garofalo – D. Manetti – A. Roselli (eds.), *Aspetti della terapia nel Corpus Hippocraticum*. Actes du IXe Colloque Hippocratique. Firenze, 405–418.

⁴⁵ SVF 3.757–68.

- Tieleman, T. (2002) 'Zeno and Psychological Monism: The Evidence Reconsidered', in: T. Scaltsas & A.S. Mason (eds.), *The Philosophy of Zeno. Zeno of Citium and His Legacy*. Larnaca, Cyprus, 185–219.
- Tieleman, T. (2003) *Chrysippus' On Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation*. Leiden, ch. 4.
- Todd, R.B. (1976) *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden.
- Vegetti, M. (1983) 'Passioni e bagni caldi', dans: *Tra Edipo e Euclide*. Milano, 71–90.
- Viano, C., dir. (2005) *L'alchimie et ses racines philosophiques. La tradition grecque et la tradition arabe*. Paris. (nondum vidi).
- Zink, N. (1962) *Griechische Ausdrucksweisen für Warm und Kalt im seelischen Bereich* (diss. Mainz) 203–10.

HERACLITUS AND LOGOS – AGAIN

THOMAS M. ROBINSON¹
University of Toronto, Canada

Another paper on *logos* in Heraclitus? The mind quails. But Delian divers, it seems, are still called for, if we are to judge by the continuing controversy over the word's various possible meanings. Among the many I might mention are 'operation of thought' (Wundt), 'meaning' (Snell), truth (Boeder), insight (Jaeger), Fate (Spengler – of course), *das Legen* (Heidegger), *Weltsinn*, or *die ewige Wahrheit* (Neesse, Gigon), *die geistige Welt-Macht* (Neesse again),² along with 'value', 'norm' and 'principle', and old faithfuls like 'God', 'fire', and 'war', and a raft of terms like 'statement', 'proposition', 'account', 'word', 'law' (the preference of Marcovich), and the like. Then add to these 'measure' (Freeman), and 'formula' or 'plan' (Kirk), a formula or plan which he finishes up equating with 'structure', a structure he finds 'corporeal' in nature;³ and no doubt many more that have escaped my attention.

The technique I shall be adopting will be that of the 'process of residues' beloved of John Stuart Mill, in which I shall do all that I can to point out the impossibilities and high improbabilities running in the pack, in the hope that the residue which survives my strictures lies somewhere on a spectrum ranging from low improbability to low possibility to – dare we even mention it? – moderate to high possibility.

Let me lay out my hermeneutical assumptions at once, so that you can start sharpening your weapons without further ado.

¹ First published in *Nuevos Ensayos sobre Eraclito* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2009), pp. 93–102, this article is here republished with the gracious permission of the volume's editor, Enrique Hülsz.

² I draw gratefully for this list on Gottfried Neesse (1982, 60 ff).

³ G. S. Kirk (1954, 69–70).

– I shall be talking about the use of the word *logos* in DK fragments 1, 2, 31b, 39, 45, 50, 87, 108, and 115, but especially 1, 2 and 50.

– I shall attempt to use as my evidence nothing but Greek-language sources known to be antecedent to, or contemporaneous with, Heraclitus.

– I shall attempt to take note of what passes for a context, among ancient commentators, for various DK texts, and comment on what I think may or not prove valuable about it. In so doing, I shall attempt to distinguish what I shall call ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ contexts. The latter are the easiest to pin down, being simply the place in which we find statements that have settled down as B fragments in Diels-Kranz, and this place can be fat or thin, depending on whether we feel inclined to quote a page or more around the quotation, or simply the phrase ‘and Heraclitus also says’, or something similar.

Primary context is what purports to be the Heraclitean context for the secondary context. This will be of particular interest to me, especially if it demonstrates that our source clearly has in front of him a text of Heraclitus which might turn out to be all or at least a large part of what Heraclitus actually wrote (or uttered). It will be of even more interest if our source looks as though he is using this primary context as some sort of guide to any interpretation he happens to be offering of what is going on.

– I shall do my level best to bring a minimum number of personal assumptions to the reading of the various fragments, knowing full well how difficult this is, but still shooting for it as an objective.

– In particular I shall try to avoid reading the texts through the lens of Stoicism, or Gnosticism, or Philonism, or early Christian apologetics, or Hegelianism, or Marxism, or Heideggerianism, or contemporary Anglo-American logico-linguistic pre-occupations, or existentialism, or post-modernism, or any other fashionable contemporary –ism. This may prove impossible, of course, but I just want to signal here that I plan to give it a good try anyway.

Let me begin with a word on the DK ordering of the fragments. It’s an absurdity, of course, but a helpful absurdity, I think, because it at least offers us a totally neutral working space in which to operate; the case has not been pre-judged for the reader by a contemporary editor’s

own particular ordering. So I shall cheerfully refer simply to the DK text from this point on.

A second point I wish to touch on at the outset is the constant use of transliteration of the word *logos* by translators rather than a translation. This, it seems to me, simply further confuses an already confusing situation, and signals a putative 'strangeness' to the term, when in fact it was a standard word (though not, admittedly, a common word) in the language. My point is that the first hearers of the word *logos* in Heraclitus' book would not have found anything strange about the word as such, though they might well have finished up puzzled about what Heraclitus did with it.

So my instinct would be to offer what seems to be a viable translation of the word in any context, appending a footnote (ten pages long if necessary) to talk about nuances, on the grounds that the first hearers were hearing a standard word in their language, not a word that was foreign to them, in the way *logos* is clearly a foreign word to us.

Finally, to conclude these introductory comments, I would like to say a very brief word about the use of the word *logos* in fragments other than 1, 2 and 50, since I consider this a relatively unproblematic matter. All of them make sense, or some sort of sense, in terms of four standard translations of *logos*, statement, account, measure and proportion, and a mound of philological evidence from antecedent and contemporary sources corroborates this. So I take it that Heraclitus wants to say, among other things:

- Sea is poured forth <from earth> and is measured in the same proportion (*logos*) as existed before it became earth (fr. 31b)
- In Priene was born Bias, son of Teutames, who <is> of more account (*logos*) than the rest < of his compatriots?> (fr. 39)
- One would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road – so deep a measure (*logos*) does it possess (fr. 45)
- A stupid (sluggish?) person tends to become all worked up over every statement (*logos*) he hears (fr. 87)
- Of all those accounts (*logoi*) I have listened to, none gets to the point of recognizing that which is wise, set apart from all (fr. 108)
- Soul possesses a measure (or: proportion, *logos*) which increases itself (fr. 115).

The only point I would wish to make here is that all four senses share something basic and going back to the word's linguistic roots. That is to say, each can be formulated as a rational proposition. A measure, a proportion (or ratio), an account (in the sense of a reputation), and of course a statement are clearly grounded in our ability to describe the world in various ways, whether by using human language or a natural substitute for it, like arithmetic or geometry. They are all still firmly moored, like ships, to the word's focal meaning.

That said, I would begin, in fragment 1, (and, proleptically, in fragments 2 and 50) by translating *logos* as 'account' or some such word, and subjoin a lengthy footnote defending my choice. It would be my choice of the word *in those particular instances*, of course; the whole point of the footnote would be to indicate how other translations make better sense in other fragments, as I have just mentioned, and how translations *other than* 'account' might also make reasonable sense in *these* ones too, even if they are not my preference.

I choose 'account' because that was the word used by Ionian prose authors of the day when they came back from their travels (Hecataeus of Miletus, for example, or Ion of Chios),⁴ and offered an account of what they had seen. Any hearer of Heraclitus' text would have naturally taken it this way until informed that perhaps there was more to it than that. As for being asked (fr. 50) to 'listen', not to Heraclitus himself but rather to 'the account', he would have naturally asked 'Whose account, if not yours?', since Heraclitus had unfortunately not made this clear. Had Heraclitus wanted to say 'My account', he could have said it with great clarity by saying *tou logou mou*. But he simply said *tou logou*, and the hearer's question remains in the air, in tantalizing suspension.

Are there any translations of the word *logos* in fragments 1, 2 and 50 as likely as, or better than, 'account'? On the assumption that these fragments contain the first uses, or very close to the first uses, of the word in Heraclitus' book, a 'primary context' point we learn very usefully from Sextus (*Adv. Math.* 7.132, 8.133), would say Probably No. But of course I would have to leave open the possibility that, in light of what might be said in further fragments, this opinion would need to be revised. Just as the first hearer of the book, if he were honest, would have

⁴ For the references see Charles H. Kahn (1979, 97).

had to do the same. At the back of my mind, among viable-looking alternates, would from the outset be 'description', 'story', and possibly even 'word' – provided it were being used in the sense of 'the word on the street' (where we are talking about the circulation of *talk* about things), or perhaps in the sense of word in the sentence 'I give you my word', but in no way in the sense of the word 'word' usually attributed to the author of the Fourth Gospel.

In the final analysis, however, I would reject the word 'word' as a translation, on the grounds that fragment 1 already contains an excellent word for 'word' – *epos* – and there is nothing to suggest that Heraclitus is using *logos* as a synonym of it.

And I would certainly have to reject a number of possibilities that seem to preclude any intelligible use of the word 'hear' or 'listen to'. So there seems to me no chance for Freeman's 'measure' or Kirk's 'structure'; we don't listen to measure or measures, and we certainly don't listen to structure or structures, corporeal or not.

As for Snell's 'meaning', or Marcovich's 'law', it can certainly be said that the *logos* of which Heraclitus speaks in fragments 1, 2 and 50 is *de facto* the law of the real, and is totally meaningful. But no reader hearing the word right at the beginning of Heraclitus' book could reasonably be expected to be aware of this at that early stage. What he thinks he knows is that he is listening to an account of something, whatever that account finishes up amounting to, and whoever, other than Heraclitus himself, turns out to be the proponent of the account.

So I plan to move on, in search of enlightenment, with the phrase 'Whose account?' goading me just a little, as Heraclitus' first hearers must have been goaded. When has an account ever been claimed to 'hold <true?> forever' (fr. 1), except perhaps in the case of an account of things uttered by some divinity? And what could possibly be made of the assertion that all things happen 'in accordance with this account' (*ibid.*)? Is the word 'account' starting to be used, right from the outset, in a way that is beginning to stretch its normal boundaries?

Fragment 2 certainly offers more information, if not enlightenment: the account now turns out to be 'common', glossed by Sextus as 'universal', and something we 'must follow'. But we are in difficulties with this statement right away; for many commentators it is simply a piece of moral exhortation by Sextus, and not the work of Heraclitus at all. It

is also, as it stands, probably corrupt as a piece of Greek, and the crucial word <‘common’> at the beginning is what looks like a necessary insertion of Bekker.

On the other hand, the locution ‘follow’ in the sense of ‘obey’ is an archaic one, and if the ‘account’ turns out to coincide with the ‘divine <law>’ of fragment 114, it might just be referring to an account which is to be thought of as prescriptive not just descriptive, and in each instance something of universal import. Or to put it a little differently, an account which, unlike other accounts we know of, has the force of deontological and physical universality. Leaving us, and I imagine, Heraclitus’ earliest readers too, with the question: are we talking here of the everlasting, ongoing formulation of this remarkable account by some divinity, and if so, which one? And if not, by what other competing entity?

Let us start with the putative competition, which would in reality amount only to one serious possibility, Heraclitus himself. This is the position adopted by Nussbaum,⁵ who sees Heraclitus as the stand-in for all of us as we, in our ‘discourse (she is presumably translating *logos*) and thought’, impose order on a changing world. But this sounds more like Kant than Heraclitus.

On the other hand, a missing *mou* clearly doesn’t exclude the possibility that the subject of the account is *inter alios* Heraclitus, if he sees himself as some sort of *prophetes* for a true source of the account, which will be a divinity. And in so doing he would of course have been in the excellent company of Parmenides and Empedocles.

With that as a concession, we can continue our search for what we might call the basic proponent of the account. And we do find him/it, in fragment 32, where he/it is named as that sole ‘wise thing’ that is ‘willing and unwilling to be called Zeus’, and is (fr. 108) ‘set apart from all’.

Willing to be called divine but unwilling to be specified, *to sophon* (in fr. 108 it is called, synonymously, *ho ti sophon esti*) is eternally engaged in offering an account of things which amounts basically to a statement that ‘all things are one’ or ‘all things constitute a single thing’, (fr. 50). The word I have translated as ‘all things’ seems to mean all things

⁵ Martha C. Nussbaum, Internet window “Heraclitus”, last modified 1997.

as a collectivity, or the universe seen in terms of the sum total of its component parts, and it is this universe which is being claimed, apparently, to be one.

Why is this important? Because the alternate – a chaos theory of matter, a boundless universe, and such a universe's ultimate unknowability *because* boundless – is easy to affirm, however false, and will be so affirmed in detail very soon by Democritus.

But our most significant source for these fragments, Hippolytus (Ref. 9. 9), has his own views on these things. Heraclitus, he tells us, says that 'the all', or universe (*to pan*), is a number of things, as follows: 'divisible, indivisible, created, uncreated, mortal, immortal, *logos*, *aeon*, father, son, god, just'.⁶

He then proceeds to offer us his evidence for the claim, and this turns out to be a fairly lengthy – and precious – series of what are now B fragments in Diels-Kranz.

Looking at them, we find that at various junctures Heraclitus does indeed talk of god (fr. 67), of *aeon* (fr. 52), of father (53), of *logos* (1, 2, 50, *alib.*), and so on, but nowhere that I can see does he come near claiming that they constitute a 'list' of realities that adds up to that sum of things which is *to pan*. And the substitution of 'son' for 'child' (fr. 52) in his list is an importation of what looks like Hippolytus' own trinitarianism. But the deeper problem lies in his misunderstanding of the import of Heraclitus' claim (fr. 50) that '*hen panta einai*'. Assuming that that the 'one thing' in question is that 'one thing' which is the universe (*to pan*), he understands Heraclitus to be saying that the universe is made up of all the things he, Hippolytus, has just listed, including something called *logos*.

But there has been a major and wholly unacceptable move of his own that vitiates his reasoning. Even if we grant that, linguistically, the phrase *hen panta einai* is as reasonably translated 'one thing is all things' as 'all things are one thing', and imagine him opting for the former interpretation rather than the latter, he offers no evidence for further understanding this *hen* as *to hen*, and then to read this in turn as *to pan* ('the universe'), or for apparently reading *panta* as meaning 'All the

⁶ See Catherine Osborne (1987, 329).

things appearing in the little list I have just put forward'. On the contrary, the pieces of evidence he adduces seem to be saying something quite different. What they say, with some clarity, is not that *to pan* is father, but that war (*polemos*) is father (fr. 53); not that *to pan* is *aeon*, but that *aeon* (whatever that turns out to mean) is a child playing (fr. 52); not that the child in question is somebody's son, but that he is a child at play (*ibid.*); not that *to pan* is God, but that God is day and night, winter summer, etc. (fr. 67). In the quotations attributed to him, Heraclitus talks unequivocally of God, father, child, *aeon* etc. as subjects; Hippolytus has turned them all into predicates, with bewildering results.

Even if we understand him as having, a little more plausibly, read Heraclitus' phrase as meaning 'all things are one thing', and getting his own subject, *to pan*, from a reading of *panta* as meaning, effectively, *ta panta*, his case still turns out to be a poor one. Because now his route would be even longer and more tortuous than the first one, in which he would now need to say that *to pan* consists of the items on his little list and furthermore, that they all constitute one thing (*hen*) in reality. But for this idea to convince the evidence he proffers in support of it must convince, and this it conspicuously fails to do, for the same reasons as I suggested before.

One could spend a long time on Hippolytus' list, and what in his mind it counts as supposed evidence for, but my subject is *logos*, so I will confine myself to that strange item on it. Why is *it* there? The answer turns out to be purely Hippolytean, and again seems to turn on a very peculiar translation of his own. At *Ref.* 9. 3 he writes: 'He (Heraclitus) says that the all (*to pan*) is always *logos*', and he goes on to quote as his evidence what we now know as fragment 1. For this to really serve as evidence, however, the opening lines will of course need to be translated as something like 'Of this thing which is always *logos* men are always uncomprehending, etc.', and Osborne (1987, 331) offers us something like this translation. But again a definite article, this time a real one rather than an absent one, wrecks Hippolytus' case. Heraclitus' words talk not of *logos*, but of *the logos*, leaving us with the much more natural, and rightly preferred translation, 'Of this *logos*, which holds forever, men prove forever uncomprehending, etc.', and continuing to goad us into asking the question, 'Whose *logos*?'

But surely, it might be urged, Hippolytus has the advantage of likely having in front of him a much more complete text of Heraclitus than we can hope to have? Is not this grounds for at least initial respect? Possibly, but only on the assumption that he offers us evidence that he does indeed have a bigger text of Heraclitus than he is quoting (possibly the complete book, or the complete set of aphorisms, or whatever it was), and that the evidence of this bigger text is guiding him towards his interpretation. But there is unfortunately no reason to believe the latter, even if the former happens to be the case; the quotations he presents us with, not some other source of information in Heraclitus' broader text, are apparently *themselves* the evidence that he – amazingly – seems to think substantiates his interpretation of what Heraclitus is trying to tell us about the real. What now constitute a score of B fragments in the DK text float as cheerfully context-free in *Ref.* 9 as they do in Diels-Kranz, and, by contrast with the precious primary evidence offered us by Sextus about the place in Heraclitus' opus where he found it, we are in Hippolytus' case left simply to guess at the nature of the womb from which the quotations were untimely ripp'd.

So at this point I plan to bid farewell to Hippolytus and return to the notion of *to sophon* as the most natural utterer of the account that Heraclitus speaks of. And being divine, he/it will utter an account that holds forever (fr. 1), and has the force of law (fr. 114), be this descriptively the laws of physical nature (fr. 1) or prescriptively the laws of civic conduct (fr. 114).

What can Heraclitus possibly have had in mind by calling his divinity *to sophon*? Three things are I think worth noting. First, the neutral form of the noun, suggesting a strong desire to get rid of all suspicion of anthropomorphism while still identifying the divinity as divine. Then the specific attribution of rationality, allowing him to claim that any utterance of *to sophon* will have the force of rational constraint, in the realm of both physics and ethics. As for the use of the adverb *aei*, this will reinforce his claim that we are dealing with an unchanging state of affairs, and unchanging constraints, in a universe that is itself eternal (fr. 30).

A natural conclusion from this that we are talking some sort of pantheism here, with *to sophon* describable as the world's mind, or perhaps as the universe *qua* rational. And a little-quoted source on the matter –

Plato, perhaps surprisingly – is worth a mention in this regard. In the *Timaeus* he describes World Soul as purely rational, and forever sequentially uttering true descriptions of the real as it does an everlasting tour, so to say, of the physical body it inhabits. The operative, and, I think, very significant word he uses is '*legei*':⁷ the World Soul is in an everlasting state of uttering an account or description (*logos*) of the way things are.

This sounds to me remarkably Heraclitean, and evinces a much more accurate understanding of what Heraclitus was after by his use of the word *logos* in what we know as fragments 1, 2 and 50 than anything achieved by the Stoics, or by Hippolytus. And it is an understanding which has, paradoxically, come into its own in more recent times.

At a low level, it emerges as the notion, propounded with force by Galileo and then more recently by Einstein, that the universe is a book, in which is written, in language comprehensible to those who wish to learn it, the world's description of its own operations. We have earned to think of that language as largely mathematical, with one of the major chapter-headings in the book undoubtedly being ' $e = mc$ squared'.

But there has been in recent times a quantum leap, I would maintain, to a new and more exciting level of metaphor that seems to me even closer to the vision I think Heraclitus espoused. Let me explain what I mean.

With the passage of time we have become aware that moving systems in the universe, from planets to stars to galaxies to galactic clusters to super-clusters, spin round central point and while doing so give off a series of waves, notable among them being radio waves. These waves radiate ceaselessly in all directions, and are now traceable by us in some detail. What they offer us, once we download the information they provide us, is, so to speak, an ongoing self-description of what is going on. If we take the nearest star, for example, Alpha Proxima Centauri, we can quickly learn in some detail from our radio telescopes the size, weight, speed of rotation, heat, gaseous content, mineral content, etc. of that star.

⁷ For World Soul's 'statements' see *Tim.* 37ab.

We can make mistakes in interpreting the signals, of course, and probably frequently do. But the star itself, like every other moving system in the universe, makes no mistakes. The account that the real is forever offering of itself is forever correct, and illuminating to all who bother to learn the language it speaks. Heraclitus would have understood this perfectly.

What contemporary astrophysics is also telling us is that the world is, in four-dimensional terms, precisely what Heraclitus, bound to a three-dimensional view of things, claims that *to sophon* propounds, and that is, that the real, in sum (*panta*), is a single, finite entity. The only difference between the two claims, and a simple function of the difference between tri- and quadri-dimensionality, is that the finitude of a Greek universe that is *hen* is a bounded one, and the finitude of an Einsteinian universe that is *hen* is an unbounded one.

Heraclitus, Plato's Timaeus, and Einstein, could they but know it, have finished up with a notion of the universe and what it has to say about itself that is staggeringly similar. Who could have imagined it?

REFERENCES

- Neesse, Gottfried (1982) *Heraklit Heute*. Hildesheim: G. Olms.
 Kirk, G. S. (1954) *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments*. Cambridge.
 Kahn, Charles H. (1979) *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*. Cambridge.
 Osborne, Catherine (1987) *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy. Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics*. London: Duckworth.

BEAUTY, LOVE AND ART: THE LEGACY OF ANCIENT GREECE

DAVID KONSTAN
Brown University, Providence, USA

If someone were to ask you what feature was most important in judging the quality of a work of art – any work of art – I suspect that a majority would, like myself, answer “beauty”. If I were to modify the question slightly and inquire: What is the principal ingredient in the aesthetic appeal of an art work, my guess is that still more of us would identify it as beauty. This is not surprising, since the discipline of aesthetics, which arose in the eighteenth century, took beauty as its central category, the concept which it sought to analyze and explain. This again is natural enough, if we think of the visual arts of that epoch, and earlier still, in the Renaissance and all the way back to the classical era of Greece and Rome: we would not hesitate to describe many such works, and certainly the most famous among them, as beautiful.

The idea of artistic beauty came under fire, however, toward the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, when modernism not only distanced itself from naturalistic representation, thus calling into question the relevance of beauty to art that was highly abstract, but also launched more polemical attacks on beauty as a distraction from the true calling of art, which is not to prettify the world but to expose its ugliness and demand reform. As Arthur Danto puts it in his book, *The Abuse of Beauty*: “From the eighteenth century to early in the twentieth century, it was the presumption that art should possess beauty” (p. xiv). And yet, as he notes, “beauty had almost entirely disappeared from artistic reality in the twentieth century, as if attractiveness was somehow a stigma, with its crass commercial implications” (p. 7). Danto goes on

to affirm: “I regard the discovery that something can be good art without being beautiful as one of the great conceptual clarifications of twentieth-century philosophy of art, though it was made exclusively by artists – but,” he adds, “it would have been seen as commonplace before the Enlightenment gave beauty the primacy it continued to enjoy until relatively recent times” (p. 58). This last comment is, I think, only a partial truth, as I shall attempt to show. But Danto’s argument concerning the lack of beauty in modern art is not as self-evident as it may seem.

Danto illustrates his claim with reference to a painting by Matisse: “Matisse’s *Blue Nude*,” he writes, “is a good, even a great painting – but someone who claims it is beautiful is talking through his or her hat” (pp. 36–37).



Danto quotes (p. 82) a remark by Roger Scruton: “If one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in the subject.” Yet many critics do not agree. Alexander Nehamas, in his book, *The Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), writes: “As long as we continue to identify beauty with attractiveness and attractiveness with a power of pleasing quickly and without much thought or effort, we can’t even begin to think of many of the twentieth century’s great works as beautiful” (pp. 29–30). In particular, he replies directly to Danto’s assertion that Matisse’s *Blue Nude* cannot be called beautiful by any stretch of the

imagination, and insists: “Beauty is not identical with an attractive appearance” (p. 24).

But is that so? And in particular, is it so of works of art? Are we prepared to say that a painting of an ugly subject can in fact be beautiful *as a painting*? As a student of ancient cultures, this question takes on, for me, a historical cast: when did people first begin to speak of the beauty of a work of art, as distinct from the subject that it represents? Did the Greeks and Romans think of beauty this way? Michael Squire, in his recent book, *The Art of the Body: Antiquity and its Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), affirms: “like it or not – and there have been many reasons for *not* liking it – antiquity has supplied the mould for all subsequent attempts to figure and figure out the human body” (p. xi), and he adds: “Because Graeco-Roman art bestowed us with our western concepts of ‘naturalistic’ representation... ancient images resemble not only our modern images, but also the ‘real’ world around us” (p. xiii). Thanks to the classical heritage, in other words, we think that a statue of a man or woman looks like a real man or woman; we can even imagine a person falling in love with the statue as though it were a real person – this is the basis of the story of Pygmalion, after all, and there are other examples of such a perverse passion that purport to recount real events. There is even the word agalmatophilia, from the Greek roots *agalma* or “statue” and *philia*, “love”; it is defined in the Wikipedia article as a perversion (“paraphilia” is the technical term used in the article) “involving sexual attraction to a statue, doll, mannequin or other similar figurative object” (accessible at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agalmatophilia>).

The article informs us that “Agalmatophilia became a subject of clinical study with the publication of Richard von Krafft-Ebbing’s *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Ebbing recorded an 1877 case of a gardener falling in love with a statue of the Venus de Milo and being discovered attempting coitus with it.” I doubt the gardener was aware that there was a Greek precedent for his behavior, but there was. Praxiteles created a nude statue of Aphrodite, which was enough of a scandal, we are told by ancient sources, in its own right.

But a man fell so in love with the statue that he attempted to make love with it, and left a stain on it that remained visible afterwards (Pliny, *Natural History* 36.21; cf. Lucian, *Images* 4). Now, a question arises here too: did the man fall in love with a statue, and hence exhibit the perversion of agalmatophilia, or did he fall in love with the goddess represented by the statue,



and so coupled with it in the hope, perhaps, that it would come alive, like Pygmalion's sculpture, or indeed that it was in some sense the goddess herself? Let us remember that the Greeks carried statues of their gods and goddesses in their religious processions, and worshipped them in various rites. When the Athenians wove the great robe or *peplos* for Athena, and carried her, dressed to the nines, in the Panathenaic festival parade, they thought of the statue not as some inanimate stone but as a living symbol, energized in some fashion by the spirit of the deity.¹ Calistratus, who lived in the third or fourth century A.D. and wrote a set of descriptions of statues, explains in reference to a particularly fine statue of Paean: "What we are seeing seems to me to be, not an image [*tupos*], but a fashioning of the truth [*tês alêtheias plasma*]. For see how art is not unable to represent character; rather, when it has made an image of the god it passes over to the god himself. Though it is matter, it breathes divine intelligence, and though it happens to be handiwork, it does what is not possible for handicrafts and in an ineffable way begets signs of the soul." Art opens a window on the true nature of things.²

¹ I recall reading somewhere that the Hebrews invented idolatry as the worship of inanimate idols, as a consequence of their faith in a transcendent deity, and the absolute contrast between the material and the spiritual; so-called idol-worshippers did not conceive of the objects of their devotion as inanimate.

² Lucian, it is true, draws a distinction between comparing human beauty to that of a statue of a god and to the deity itself; statues are manmade, and so there is no sacrilege or exaggeration involved (*Pro Imag.* 23: Τάχ' ἂν οὖν φαίης, μάλλον δὲ ἤδη εἴρηκας, "ἐπαινεῖν μὲν σοι εἰς τὸ κάλλος ἐφείσθω· ἀνεπίφθονον

Clement of Alexandria, in his *Exhortation to the Greeks* (that is, pagans), observes that the pagan gods are recognized by their conventional attributes, for instance, Poseidon by his trident, “and if one sees a woman represented naked, he knows that she is ‘golden’ Aphrodite” (4.47.2). Clement goes on to explain that Pygmalion “fell in love with an ivory statue; the statue was of Aphrodite and she was naked” (4.57.3), and he went so far as to make love to it (*sunerkhetai*). He also mentions the man who was enamored of Cnidian Aphrodite and had intercourse, as he puts it, with the stone (*mignutai tēi lithōi*). But Clement is puzzled by such behavior, and ascribes it to the power of art to deceive (*apatēsai*). Clement goes on to affirm that effective as craftsmanship is, it cannot deceive a rational person (*apatēsai logikon*). He grants that stallions will neigh at accurate drawings of mares, and that a girl once fell in love with a painting (*eikōn*), just as the boy did with the Cnidian Aphrodite, but he explains that “the eyes of the viewers were deceived by art” (4.57.4), since no human in his right mind (*anthrōpos sōphronōn*) would have embraced a goddess, or would have fallen in love with a stone daemon (*daimonos kai lithou*, 4.57.5). It is all the more absurd, Clement concludes, to worship such things. Unlike many Church Fathers, Clement is hostile to graven images, and fails to understand the subtle, even mysterious interplay between the work of art and the figure it reproduces.

I recall marching in the Holy Week processions in Seville, where enormous floats are lifted on the shoulders of penitents, displaying larger than life figures of Jesus, Mary, and others. Mary is always

μέντοι ποιήσασθαι τὸν ἔπαινον ἐχρῆν, ἀλλὰ μὴ θεαῖς ἀπεικάζειν ἄνθρωπον οὖσαν." ἐγὼ δὲ—ἤδη γάρ με προάξεται τὰληθὲς εἰπεῖν—οὐ θεαῖς σε, ὦ βελτίστη, εἴκασα, τεχνιτῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν δημιουργήμασιν λίθου καὶ χαλκοῦ ἢ ἐλέφαντος πεποιημένοις· τὰ δὲ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γεγεννημένα οὐκ ἀσεβές, οἶμαι, ἀνθρώποις εἰκάζειν). But he promptly has his character insist that tradition permits direct comparisons with gods as well, so the distinction remains blurred. See Verity Platt, *Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Graeco-Roman Art, Literature and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 12: “Greek literature is riddled with examples in which gods appear to their viewer-worshippers in the form of their images.”

adorned with a long, woven cape that is truly resplendent, and it is impossible not to see that she is beautiful.



But is it the same kind of beauty as Aphrodite's – the kind that might inspire erotic desire in a perhaps oversexed young man? Some critics would deny this absolutely. Roger Scruton, for example, writes in his recent book entitled *Beauty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): "There are no greater tributes to human beauty than the medieval and Renaissance images of the Holy Virgin: a woman whose sexual maturity is expressed in motherhood and who yet remains untouchable, barely

distinguishable, as an object of veneration, from the child in her arms... The Virgin's beauty is a symbol of purity and for this very reason is held apart from the realm of sexual appetite, in a world of its own." Following in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant, Scruton affirms: "In the realm of art beauty is an object of contemplation, not desire." All very well: but this does not seem to be the way the ancient Greek man viewed Aphrodite. Scruton speaks here of *images* of the Virgin, and his comment about contemplation and desire pertains to the realm of art. But what of the figure *represented* in the work of art? Is there a difference in our response to the woman, as opposed to the representation of the woman? And if so, is this a feature of our modern perception, in which we do distinguish, in some form or other, between the beauty of the subject and the beauty of the artwork?

Scruton attempts to address this problem, and does so in connection with the beauty of children. He writes: "There is hardly a person alive who is not moved by the beauty of the perfectly formed child. Yet most people are horrified by the thought that this beauty should be a spur to desire, other than the desire to cuddle and comfort... And yet the beauty of a child is of the same kind as the beauty of a desirable adult, and totally unlike the beauty of an aged face." The point of his argument, it seems to me, is that the beauty of an adult woman, or at least of some adult women – and in particular, that of the Virgin Mary – is analogous to a child's beauty, and if this is so, then such beauty, physical and natural, nevertheless does not arouse sexual desire. Frankly, I am not convinced that a child's beauty is like that of a sexually desirable adult, so Scruton's argument does not hold. But apart from theory, is it even true that people view images of the Virgin in a purely contemplative way?

Let me return to the Easter procession in Seville. As the grand image of the Virgin, borne on the shoulders of a dozen strong men, progressed in its stately march along the streets lined with worshippers, while others gazed down from the windows and balconies of their apartments, from time to time a man, in the throes of rapture, would compose a spontaneous song to the Virgin, called in Spanish a *saeta*. The word itself is an abbreviated form of the Latin *sagitta*, or "arrow" (hence Sagittarius), and evidently the songs were imagined as being shot forth; and indeed, they do give that impression. Others in the crowd, equally

moved but perhaps less gifted as poets, shouted out words of adoration, and frequent among them one will hear “Guapa!,” that is, “Beautiful!” Now, *guapo* or *guapa* (masculine or feminine) is a special term in Spanish: it refers only to human beauty, and is never applied to such things as landscapes or works of art or creatures other than human beings. This does not necessarily mean that it connotes, in the context of the Holy Week procession, sexual attractiveness (one can call a child *guapo*), but neither does it pertain to a special territory of artistic beauty, of the sort that, according to Scruton, elicits contemplation rather than desire. Might it be that worshippers of the Virgin recognize that her beauty is not essentially different from that of ordinary women, and that sexual desire is repressed or absent not because she is perceived as having the beauty of a child, but for much the same reason that we recognize sexual attractiveness in certain women – our mothers, sisters, daughters, or our neighbors’ wives – or, as the case may be, in certain men, and yet discriminate between those who are legitimate objects of desire and those who are not?

If the ancient Greeks and Romans did not think of works of art as beautiful, independently of the figures represented in them – and we may recall that they were almost obsessed with the human body, and the great majority of their sculptures and paintings, if we can judge from vases and surviving wall decorations, were of human beings and gods – then they might not have worried about whether paintings like the *Blue Nude* were beautiful; they would have enjoyed representations of beautiful things, of course, and responded in other ways to representations of things that were not in themselves beautiful. As for the effect that beauty, whether as represented in art or in life itself, had on them, it would likely have been what beauty normally inspires, namely desire. And indeed, our evidence points in this direction: when the Greeks spoke of beauty, especially human beauty, it was most often associated with sexual attractiveness. To be sure, ancient Greeks, being rather philosophically disposed, might stand back and wonder what it was that made a body beautiful, and in this sense treat a beautiful person or object as matter for contemplation.³ But the double perspective on beauty

³ Cf. Ernst Gombrich, review of David Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response*, in *The New York Review of Books*

that has troubled modern aesthetics did not arise for them, or rather, where it did it took a different form, namely, the tension between transcendent beauty, invisible to the physical eye, and the ordinary beauty of worldly creatures. But this was an issue above all for mystically minded philosophers like Plato and for Christian theologians, who were concerned about whether and how one might ascribe beauty to so elevated a figure as God. Ordinary beauty, and even divine beauty, aroused desire, and insofar as a work of art captured such beauty, desire was the natural reaction.

But who was considered beautiful? Aphrodite, for sure; and Helen, too. So too Paris, with whom Helen fell in love and eloped to Troy, setting off the great war, described in the *Iliad*. In general, the Greeks applied the term beauty precisely to those individuals who had sexual allure. Some women might be what we would perhaps call handsome or dignified or powerful, but they did not seem primarily pretty. I am thinking here of a goddess like Athena, in full military garb with spear and helmet and the gorgon-faced aegis on her chest; and indeed, where Athena is so represented, the texts that describe her seem not to attribute beauty to her. At all events, her other attributes, such as wisdom, skill at the arts, and military might, are the ones that are usually emphasized. With such an imposing presence, there was perhaps less emotional conflict among viewers as to her potentially erotic attractiveness.

But was desire the only response to a work of art, as the Greeks understood it, or could art also arouse other sentiments? Indeed, Greek aesthetic ideas embraced a wide variety of reactions to art, which I may briefly outline here. But these responses were not necessarily conceived of as inspired by the beauty of the work, or the object in the work. There are, after all, other qualities that are characteristic of art, despite the narrow focus of eighteenth-century aesthetics.

[1990], pp. 6–9: “Painting an exact copy of Titian’s *Venus* an artist may well disregard the erotic effect of the picture and so may the restorer who examines its state of preservation. What is even more relevant: the art student in the life class may have to disregard his response to the model and to concentrate on getting the shapes and proportions right. Maybe it is this shift of attention that has led to the aesthetic doctrine of disinterested contemplation.”

To begin with, a work of art may inspire pleasure. But the pleasure deriving from art was typically understood to derive from its technical excellence, above all in fidelity to the object, which was called in Greek *mimêsis*, that is, "imitation." The word is familiar today largely from the discussion in Aristotle's *Poetics* (4, 1448b4-27). Aristotle explains that there are two reasons why poetry came into being. First, imitating is innate in human beings and everyone enjoys simulations; that is why we enjoy watching the exact likenesses of things that are in reality painful to see, "for example the figures of the most contemptible animals and of corpses." Now, we may remember that Aristotle is discussing tragedy, which one might think is not in itself very pleasant to see. It is worth remarking that he nowhere says that tragedy is beautiful, save perhaps when he suggests that plays should have a reasonable length, neither too long nor too short, in the same way that bodies cannot be fine or handsome (*kalós*) if they are too small to make out their individual parts or too large to take in at a single look (1450b34-51a15). So why do we enjoy tragedy? Because we enjoy seeing good representations, irrespective of whether the object represented is pretty or ugly. Aristotle's second reason is that it is pleasurable to learn, and when people see likenesses they realize the connection with the real thing. Aristotle is, as I mentioned, explaining here why poetry came into existence, not why people enjoy representations of repugnant things, but his account illuminates the source of tragic pleasure. What is more, his theory presupposes that art does not deceive in the way Clement argues; to enjoy a work of art, one must recognize that it is a representation and not the real thing.

Some centuries later, Plutarch, in his essay, *How a Youth Should Listen to Poems*, observes that poetry, like painting, is imitative, and that the pleasure poetry provides is due not to the beauty of the thing represented but rather to the faithfulness of the reproduction (18A). This is why, he says, we enjoy imitations of sounds that are by nature unpleasant, such as a pig's squeal, a squeaky wheel, the rustle of the wind or the beating of the sea (18C). As Plutarch puts it: "imitating something fine [*kalón*] is not the same as doing it well [*or finely: kalôs*]" (18D). Plutarch is seeking here to prevent young people from thinking that the satisfaction they derive from a good imitation means that the person or thing represented is good. But he explains incidentally why people derive

pleasure from images of ugly things. Once again, pleasure is not associated with beauty.⁴

There were other explanations for why tragedy is pleasurable. A comic poet named Timocles, who was a slightly later contemporary of Aristotle's, has a character in one of his plays affirm (*Dionysiazousae* fr. 6 Kassel-Austin = Athenaeus 6.2) that tragedy takes our mind off our own troubles and we enjoy seeing that others are suffering more than we are. Others maintained that our pleasure derives from the knowledge that the actor is not really being harmed: again, this view depends on awareness that what we are seeing is a representation. Pleasure is also said to result simply from novelty. As Telemachus tells his mother Penelope in the *Odyssey* (1.346-52): "People praise whatever song circulates newest among the listeners" (351-52). But none of these accounts mentions beauty in particular.

Apart from pleasure, which the Greeks regarded as a sensation, a work of art may also elicit various emotions. Aristotle affirmed that the emotions proper to tragedy were pity and fear, and he presumably supposed that others were suitable to other genres. Aristotle seems to have meant that these emotions are a response to the entire work, that is, the plot or story as a whole, and not to individual events or moments in the action; that is why he maintained that we should be able to experience pity and fear even upon reading a summary of a good tragic plot. Much later, in the eighteenth century, some philosophers would argue that the response specific to any work of art is a special kind of aesthetic emotion, and even that we are equipped with an aesthetic faculty for appreciating great art. This idea is foreign to classical thought, so far as I

⁴ In Cicero's *On the Orator* 3.178-81, Crassus argues that anything whose structure is in perfect accord with utility and necessity has charm (*venustas*) and indeed beauty (*pulchritudo*), and produces pleasure; examples are nature itself, the human body, a seaworthy ship, architectural monuments, and a well-turned and convincing speech (3.181: *hoc in omnibus item partibus orationis evenit, ut utilitatem ac prope necessitatem suavis quaedam et lepos consequatur*). The emphasis here is not on imitation but on service to a function. On *pulchritudo*, Mankin compares *N.D.* 2.58 (Balbus speaking), and notes that in Balbus' account of human anatomy (*N.D.* 2.123-01, 133-45), "the emphasis is on *utilitas*, not *venustas*" (271 ad 179).

know; the emotions we feel in response to works of art are the same ones we experience in real life, with the difference, however, that we know that the events we are witnessing on the stage or reading in a book are not actually happening.⁵

⁵ In Cicero's *On the Orator*, Crassus argues that even those who are not masters of an art can judge whether a work succeeds or fails (3.195-96): *Illud autem ne quis admiretur, quonam modo haec vulgus imperitorum in audiendo notet, cum in omni genere tum in hoc ipso magna quaedam est vis incredibilisque naturae. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava diiudicant; idque cum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum vocumque iudicio; quod ea sunt in communibus infixis sensibus nec earum rerum quemquam funditus natura esse voluit expertem.* (196) Itaque non solum verbis arte positus moventur omnes, verum etiam numeris ac vocibus. Quotus enim quisque est qui teneat artem numerorum ac modorum? At in eis si paulum modo offensus est, ut aut contractione brevius fieret aut productione longius, theatra tota reclamant. David Mankin, ed., Cicero, *De Oratore*, Book III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 286 ad 195, renders *tacito quodam sensu* as "a kind of inarticulate feeling" (following James M. May and Jakob Wisse, trans., *Cicero on the Ideal Orator* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001]), and comments: "the phrase may be meant to approximate Greek *alogos* ['irrational'] but also 'unspeaking'] *aesthesis*, and compares *Orator* 203 on verses *quorum modum notat ars, sed aurae ipsae tacito enim sensu sine arte definiunt*. (cf. also *Brutus* 184). Stefan Büttner, *Antike Ästhetik: Eine Einführung in die Prinzipien des Schönen* (Munich: Beck, 2006) 119, sees in the expression *sensus tacitus* an anticipation of Kant's conception of an aesthetic response: "Damit sind wir schon ganz nahe an einem Geföhlsvormögen [feeling-capability] angelangt, das – in nicht-rationalem, gleichwohl intersubjektiv-allgemeingöltigem Urteil – das Kunstschöne mit intereslosem Wohlgefallen [pleasure] goutiert; also bei einem ästhetischen Konzept, das Kant in seiner *Kritik der Urteilskraft* vorschlagt. Man darf wohl vermuten, dass Kant, der rein gutt Cicero-Kenner war, sich von Passagen wie diesen beim Schreiben seiner *Kritik der Urteilskraft* und der Bestimmung des Kunst- und Naturschönen hat inspirieren lassen." But this is reading too much into Crassus' argument; he means simply that a person can recognize a well-made speech or other artifact (there is no mention of beauty in this passage) without having a professional or scientific knowledge of the art in question. *Sensus* is better rendered as "awareness" rather than "feeling."

Ancient thinkers, from the fourth-century B.C. orator Isocrates to Saint Augustine, puzzled over why we sometimes react more sensitively to purely fictitious events than to real life catastrophes. Isocrates wrote, for example, that “people consider it right to weep over the misfortunes composed by poets, while ignoring the many true and terrible sufferings that happen on account of war” (4.168). And Augustine asked in his *Confessions*: “What kind of pity is there in fictional stories and dramas? For the listener is not moved to offer help, but is invited only to feel pain, and the more he suffers the more he approves of the author of these imaginings” (3.2; cf. Dana Munteanu, “*Qualis Tandem Misericordia in Rebus Fictis?* Aesthetic and Ordinary Emotion,” *Helios* 36 [2009] 117-47). But even if the emotions elicited by literature are not quite real emotions, they are nevertheless analogous to such emotions, and do not constitute a distinct aesthetic feeling; nor are they responses to the beauty of a work.

Seneca believed that our responses to theatrical events are almost instinctive, like shivering when we are sprayed with cold water or the vertigo we experience when looking down from great heights, or again blushing at obscenities. He meant that we do not give rational approval to any of these reactions: we no more judge that a battle we read about is cause for fear than we decide to feel ashamed when someone tells a bawdy story. Seneca calls these automatic responses “the initial preliminaries to emotions” (*On Anger* 2.2.6), and other Stoics refer to them as “pre-emotions.” One of Seneca’s examples, indeed, is the feeling of pity we may experience even for evil characters who are suffering: this runs counter to the classical definition of pity, adopted by Aristotle and the Stoics, which holds that we feel pity at the sight of undeserved suffering, not suffering per se. In any case, whether emotion or pre-emotion, Seneca does not list here the response to artistic beauty, and in this, he is in accord with ancient ways of speaking about art generally.

There are still other ways to respond to art. One is awe, the feeling elicited upon an encounter with the sublime or “lofty,” to use the Greek term (*hupsos*) adopted by Longinus in his essay that is conventionally translated as *On the Sublime*. Longinus writes that “what is extraordinary draws listeners not to persuasion but rather to ecstasy [*ekstasis*]” (1.4), and he affirms that what is marvelous (*thaumasion*) and accom-

panied by shock (*ekplêxis*) overwhelms all else.⁶ In modern romanticism, the sublime came to replace beauty as the primary feature of art, due in large measure to the influence of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant; beauty was too insipid a quality for the grand vision of artistic genius that took hold in the nineteenth century. Insofar as Longinus himself speaks of beauty, it is as a feature of style that can have good effects or ill (5.1); it is associated with figures of speech (17.2, 20.1) and the choice of appropriate words, which can contribute, when properly deployed, to the effectiveness of the whole work. In this respect, Longinus is in accord with the major writers on style in antiquity, who regarded beauty as one feature of style. Demetrius (second or first century B.C.) identified four basic styles: plain, elevated, elegant, and forceful. Beautiful effects, according to Demetrius, can be in tension with and undermine forcefulness (252, 274). Hermogenes of Tarsus (second century A.D.) expanded the number of styles to seven: clearness, grandeur, beauty, poignancy, characterization, truth, and mastery (the last is the combined virtue of the first six; the translations of the technical terms are those of Rhys Carpenter). Beauty here is one device among others; Hermogenes defines it as “symmetry of limbs and parts, along with a good complexion,” in a clear analogy to the beauty of the human body.

Finally, one can respond to a work of art with approval or disapproval, that is, with an evaluation its moral content. This is the basis on which Plato excluded certain art forms, such as epic and tragedy, from his ideal republic: they provided bad examples of comportment among gods and heroes, and would corrupt young minds.

My review of the various responses to art recognized in antiquity suggests that the beauty of a work was not the primary consideration, as Danto indeed remarked. True, certain features of style might be called beautiful or, more precisely, “beauties,” and the same is true for certain colors and other devices in painting; but it was very rare to call a work of art as such beautiful. Much more commonly, the beauty of a work of art was equated with that of the figure in the work: just for this reason, the kind of problem that arises with a painting like the *Blue Nude* was not a subject of inquiry in our classical texts. What is more,

⁶ See Timothy M. Costelloe, *The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

there does not seem to have been any systematic effort to distinguish between kinds of human beauty. To be sure, writers sometimes spoke of the beauty of the soul, as opposed to that of the body. I have found that when they do so, they often make the contrast explicit. Aristotle, for example, in arguing that physical beauty is not necessarily a sign of excellent character, observes that it is “not equally easy to perceive the beauty [*kállos*] of the soul and that of the body” (*Politics* 1254b38-39); one has the sense that the metaphorical extension of beauty to the psychological realm is facilitated by the comparison with corporeal beauty. Plato makes a similar move in the *Symposium* (210B), when he declares that one must value more highly beauty in souls than in the body (cf. Plutarch *Amatorius* 757E). But beauty is more generally seen as a specifically physical attribute, as when Socrates states in Plato’s *Philebus* (26B5-7): “I am leaving out thousands of other things in my comments, such as strength and beauty [*kállos*] together with health, and in turn many other lovely [*pankala*] things that are in souls.”

Toward the end of the fifth century B.C., the sculptor Polyclitus published a work called the “Canon” or “Measure,” in which he sought to explain the characteristics that rendered a work of art beautiful. In addition, he illustrated his principles in a statue, called the *Spearbearer* (*Doryphoros*), which became famous as a model for subsequent representations of the human body.

Although Polyclitus' treatise, like the original statue, is lost, we know from numerous later citations that he emphasized above all symmetry and harmony among the body's parts as essential to beauty, a view that was dominant among classical thinkers – we have seen one example of its application to rhetoric, in the citation from Hermogenes – and has remained so right down to today. But here again we have to ask, as we have done two or three times so far: do these precise proportions render the artwork beautiful, or the human figure that the sculpture represents? Indeed, would Polyclitus even have seen a difference between these two questions, or would he



have replied: The work is beautiful because its proportions capture those of a beautiful human being? What is more, although the figure represented in the statue is that of a young male, there is no apparent reason to assume that his beauty is in some sense a reflection of his virtue or other spiritual qualities. In classical Greece, male youths were considered to be sexually attractive, and the nude statue of the beardless, spear-bearing young man might well have been viewed, not like an image of an immature child or divinity somehow sheltered from male desire, but as sexually alluring.

I have been arguing that the problems and paradoxes associated with beauty, art, and desire in modern aesthetics, including the contemporary rejection of beauty as an artistic ideal, did not arise in classical antiquity, or at least did not assume the same form. There was no ten-

sion between the beauty of the work of art and that of the object represented, because artworks as such were not deemed beautiful. Of course, the ancients knew perfectly well the difference between an imitation and the thing imitated, and an awareness of this distinction entered into their interpretations of the pleasure we take in representations, as well as their theories concerning our emotional responses to art. But when they looked at a representation of a beautiful figure, they responded to its beauty as they would to that of a live person, much the way we can feel a certain kind of desire at the photographic image of a beautiful man or woman. Needless to say, normal people did not think that they could satisfy an erotic desire with the represented object, any more than they ran out of the theater, or sought to intervene in the action, when they saw a frightening event on stage. The stories of exceptional cases, such as the young man who attempted to have intercourse with the statue of Aphrodite, testify, I think, not so much to a confusion between art and reality as to the direct appeal of the beautiful body represented and a kind of fantasy, encouraged by the cultic role of statues and paintings universally, that in some sense the statue was an embodiment of the deity herself.

Maurizio Bettini, in his engaging book, *The Portrait of the Lover* (trans. Laura Gibbs, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), documents a wide variety of tales all based on what he calls the “fundamental story,” which involves three elements or, as Bettini calls them, a “restricted set of pawns – the lover, the beloved, and the image” (p. 4). To take one of the most striking examples, in Euripides’ *Alcestis*, after the king Admetus’ wife elects to die in his place so that his life may be prolonged, Admetus declares that he will never marry again, but will rather have craftsmen create a likeness of his wife, and he will keep it in his bed and embrace it and call out his wife’s name, “and imagine that I have my wife, although I do not have her” (vv. 348-52; cf. Bettini p. 19). The theme here is conjugal love rather than erotic desire, and nothing is said of Alcestis’ beauty in this context (a servant girl describes her skin as lovely in an earlier scene, v. 174). But it suggests how porous the boundary may sometimes be between art and life.

ПОСЛЕСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ

С 2007 по 2013 гг. в Новосибирском Академгородке проходили философские антиковедческие школы.¹ При поддержке Института «Открытое общество» (Будапешт) в Новосибирском университете дважды в год проводились семинары, в которых приняли участие около 30 молодых преподавателей из России, Украины, Грузии и Таджикистана и несколько приглашенных профессоров – крупных антиковедов из университетов России, Европы и Америки.² Активная работа продолжалась и в периоды между школами, для чего был создан специализированный журнал *ΣΧΟΛΗ*.³ Именно на его страницах впервые были опубликованы тексты, вошедшие в настоящую антологию.

В статье «Платонизм и мировой кризис» Джон Диллон (Тринити колледж, Дублин) рассматривает в контексте философии Платона важнейшие проблемы современности, такие, как разрушение окружающей среды, религиозная нетерпимость и кризис легитимации публичной власти, и предлагает в поисках решений

¹ Программы школ и учебные материалы к ним по-прежнему доступны на сайте Центра изучения древней философии и классической традиции НГУ (<https://classics.nsu.ru>).

² В числе приглашенных профессоров в разные годы были Джон Диллон (Дублин), Леонидас Баргелиотис (Афины), Лилиан Карали (Афины), Доминик О'Мара (Фрибург), Джон Рист (Кембридж), Теун Тильман (Утрехт), Леонид Жмудь (Санкт-Петербург), Люк Бриссон (Париж), Александр Подосинов (Москва), Дэвид Констан (США), Майкл Чейз (Париж), Андрей Родин (Москва) и др.

³ Выпуски журнала: classics.nsu.ru/schole.

этих проблем еще раз обратиться к наследию великого мыслителя прошлого.⁴

В серии из трех статей Доминик О'Мара (Фрибург, Швейцария) сначала обращается к общему вопросу трансформации метафизики в подзнеантичный период. Статья посвящена истории развития метафизики, понимаемой как философская дисциплина или наука. В ней обосновывается предположение о том, что последний период развития греческой философии, длившийся примерно с III по VI вв. н. э., внес много нового в процесс становления метафизики как философской дисциплины, а именно превратил метафизику в метафизическую науку, выявляя в то же время пределы такой науки. Работа состоит из четырех частей. В части первой показано, как Александр Афродисийский (нач. III в.), интерпретируя *Метафизику* Аристотеля, стремился отыскать в ней метафизическую науку. Во второй части показано, каким образом философ-неоплатоник начала V в. Сириан не только принял интерпретацию Александра, но и, вдохновленный ею, начал искать ту же самую метафизическую науку уже у Платона. В третьей части статьи показано, как все это приводит к появлению шедевра метафизики – *Началам теологии* ученика Сириана Прокла. Наконец, в четвертой части, автор обращается к последнему великому метафизическому труду греческой философии – *Трактату о первых принципах* Дамаския – труду, в котором границы метафизической науки исследуются с необычайной проницательностью и упорством. Приспосабливая предпринятую Александром формализацию аристотелевской метафизической науки к платонизму, Сириан знал, что такая наука представляет собой лишь средство к достижению познания о трансцендентном, а не само это познание. Знал это и Прокл, хотя его *Начала теологии*, в которых метафизическая наука представлена с такой систематической красотой, могут на первый взгляд показаться окончательными определениями. Если после этого у нас все еще остались иллюзии относительно адекватности нашей метафизической науки, Дамаский исцеляет

⁴ ΣΧΟΛΗ 1.1 (2007) 7–24 (здесь и далее в сносках дается ссылка на оригинальную публикацию).

нас от них, открывая наши умы тому, что лежит за пределами или превышает наших собственных метафизических усилий.

Вторая статья исследует понятие красоты мира в античной философии. Платон в *Тимее* описывает мир как «прекраснейший» (*kallistos*, 29a5) из сотворенных вещей. Возможно, это исторически первое систематическое описание красоты мира. В любом случае, перед нами одно из наиболее влиятельных рассуждений на эту тему. В свое время, оно оказало фундаментальное влияние на стоиков и позднее, в третьем веке н. э., когда презрение и ненависть к миру стали базовым элементом гностического движения, Плотин, также истолковывая *Тимей*, высказал немало соображений о красоте и значимости мира. Однако, что Платон считал «красотой» мира? Что делает мир прекрасным? Обсуждая эти вопросы в данной статье автор, во-первых, кратко рассматривает различие между красотой и благом, которое Платон, по-видимому, проводит в *Тимее*. В одном месте (*Tim.* 87c) это различие связано с понятием «мера». В этой связи, во-вторых, представляется уместным обратиться к другой поздней работе Платона, *Филебу*, на основании которого темы красоты, блага и меры могут быть сопоставлены более подробно. Тема «меры» снова возвращает нас к *Тимее*, где, в-третьих, мы исследуем роль меры, в особенности, математической, в придании миру красоты. Особое внимание уделяется обсуждению того, как математические структуры порождают красоту в душе и теле, создавая цельное живое существо, которое и есть мир.

Наконец, в третьей статье Доминик О'Мара обращается к более частной и, возможно, необычной проблеме – проблеме связи между осознанием нашей смертности и самосознанием. Обратившись в качестве примера к Пармениду, Платону, Эпикуру и Плотину, он отмечает, насколько различно эти философы понимают связь между самосознанием и смертью, как они пытаются разрешить эту напряженность и даже противоречивость между этими двумя гранями нашего существования.⁵

Две статьи Люка Бриссона (CRNS, Париж) посвящены неоплатонизму. В первой рассматривается функция и природа «логоса» и

⁵ ΣΧΟΛΗ 3.2 (2009) 416–432, 8.1 (2014) 24–33 и 9.1 (2015) 283–291.

«логосов» у Плотина. Неоплатоник считает, что космос возникает не в результате деятельности творца, но согласно природе. Это возникновение не предполагает мышления или концептуализации, но является результатом действия силы, которая запечатлевает себя в материи. Ум сообщает умопостигаемые формы, которые в нем содержатся, гипостазированной Душе, в которой они превращаются в рациональные формулы (*logoi*). Затем Душа передает эти рациональные формулы мировой душе, которая порождает одушевленные и неодушевленные сущности, словно по указанию, полученному свыше. Однако, поскольку за порождение ответственна низшая часть мировой души, которая действует по своему разумению, возникшие в результате сущности уступают по качеству своему образцу, что объясняет несовершенство чувственно воспринимаемого космоса и наличие зла, несмотря на присутствующую в нем направляющую силу Промысла. Во второй статье, посвященной афинской неоплатонической школе, выясняется, как ей удалось более столетия сохранять свои позиции во враждебном окружении, в оппозиции к христианству, которое не только поддерживалось большинством населения, но и стало государственной идеологией. В статье делается попытка ответить на этот вопрос, обрисовав ясный и точный портрет неоплатонической школы в Афинах и изучив ее функционирование на семейном, политическом и экономическом уровнях.⁶

Майкл Чейз (CRNS, Париж) подробно изучает проблему времени и вечности в греческом и латинском неоплатонизме и показывает, что представления о времени и вечности у Плотина и Боэция аналогичны так называемой теории «блок-времени» (этернализму) в современной философии времени, основанной на математической физике Эйнштейна и Минковского. Как Эйнштейн, так и Боэций использовали свои теории времени и вечности в практических целях, для утешения людей в горе. Эта практика «утешения» (*consolatio*) сопоставляется в статье с размышлением Пьера Адо, который во «Взгляде свыше» рассуждает о важности

⁶ ΣΧΟΛΗ 3.2 (2009) 433–444 и 11.2 (2017) 333–340.

сосредоточения на текущем моменте и значимости античной философии в качестве лекарства для души, а не отвлеченной спекуляции. В первой части статьи идеи Эйнштейна сопоставляются с воззрениями Плотина и развитием его теории в арабской «Теологии Аристотеля». Во второй части рассматривается «Утешение философией» Боэция, которое, вопреки мнению некоторых авторов, следует считать настоящим утешением, а не пародией на него. В «Утешении» показано, как неоплатоническая образовательная программа может помочь ученику на пути спасения, пробуждая и развивая в его душе врожденные идеи. Эта доктрина иллюстрируется выдержкой из малоизвестного трактата *De diis et praesensionibus*, приписываемого Боэцию. Наконец, после очерка учения Боэция о судьбе и промысле и Аристотелевой теории о будущих случайностях, рассматриваются три основных аргумента Боэция в пользу согласования божественного всезнания с человеческой свободой воли: различение между абсолютной и условной необходимостью; принцип, согласно которому природа знания определяется познающим; и наконец, доктрина, согласно которой бог живет в вечном настоящем, одновременно созерцая прошлое, настоящее и будущее. Можно показать, что этот последний аргумент, восходящий в общих чертах к Плотину, также аналогичен рассуждениям современных теоретиков «блок-времени», основанных на теории относительности Эйнштейна. Само по себе божественное сверхвременное видение не делает случайные события необходимыми. Высшая, объективная действительность, как для Боэция и Плотина, так и для Эйнштейна, вневременная, и наша идея о том, что существует конфликт между человеческой свободной волей и божественным всезнанием – это результат своего рода оптической иллюзии, обусловленной тем, что мы можем мыслить только в терминах временности.⁷

В статье профессора Афинского университета Леонидаса Баргелиотиса исследуется организмическая концепция бога в трудах Уайтхеда и показывается, как в рамках своей метафизической схемы британский философ обосновывает необходимость суще-

⁷ ΣΧΟΛΗ 8.1 (2014) 67–110.

ствования первого принципа и определяет его сущностные характеристики. Первый принцип Уайтхеда сопоставляется с Перводвигателем Аристотеля, причем выясняется, что основные «исправления» аристотелевской схемы Уайтхедом могут быть прочитаны в ценностно-ориентированных терминах.⁸

Дэвид Констан (Университет Брауна, США) показывает, что, вопреки мнению многих исследователей античности, термин *philia* у Аристотеля означает избирательные и действенные отношения между людьми, а не связи вроде родства, обусловленные обоюдными обязательствами и не предполагающие действенного элемента в качестве существенной своей характеристики. Кроме того, он разрешает проблему неоднозначности слова *philia*, которое может означать как «любовь», так и обоюдную привязанность, характерную для дружбы.⁹

В двух своих статьях Теун Тилеман (Университет Утрехт) сначала прослеживает эволюцию понятия «искусства жизни» со времен Сократа и его античных преемников вплоть до современности. Кроме Сократа особое внимание уделяется стоикам, Ницше и Фуко. Автор показывает, что то, как это понятие переопределялось и функционировало на протяжении европейской истории философии, являет собой исключительно интересный пример взаимодействия традиционности и оригинальности. Затем он обращается к физической стороне стоической антропологии. Забота о душе – это центральная идея стоического «искусства жизни». И все же человеческое тело не теряет особого статуса – несмотря на то, что оно относится к классу (предпочитаемого) «безразличного». Этот статус подкрепляется и тем, что душу они считают своего рода тонким дыханием (пневмой) и, следовательно, также телесной. Как таковая она совершенно смешана с человеческим телом. Следовательно, забота о душе предполагает заботу о теле. Кроме того, внимание стоиков к человеческому организму определяет их интерес к физиогномике. Эти взаимосвязанные аспекты рассматриваются в контексте медицинских теорий, используемых стоиками.¹⁰

⁸ ΣΧΟΛΗ 1.2 (2007) 195–202.

⁹ ΣΧΟΛΗ 2.2 (2008) 207–212.

¹⁰ ΣΧΟΛΗ 2.2 (2008) 245–253 и 7.1 (2013) 9–19.

В статье Томаса Робинсона (Университет Торонто) исследуется значение слова «логос» в фрагментах Гераклита (прежде всего, в фр. 1, 2 и 50 DK). Показано, что основное значение термина, – это ‘account’ (речь) и ‘statement’ (утверждение) и что данное «утверждение», в особенности в фр. 1, 2 и 50, – это утверждение, вечно изрекаемое «мудрым» (to sophon), божественным началом Гераклита. Платон приспособливает эту идею к Мировой душе, которая также вечно находится в состоянии «изречения» (‘legei’, *Tim.* 37ab), то есть само-описания. Представляется, что современная версия идеи о том, что космос вечно пребывает в состоянии само-описания, связана с нашим убеждением в том, что мы способны понять его «речь», изучая «язык» радиоволн и подобных им сигналов, вечно излучаемых всеми движущимися системами, образующими реальность, и, следовательно, постоянно доставляющих нам частицы само-описания бытия.¹¹

Наконец, в еще одной статье Дэвид Констан (Университет Брауна, Провиденс, США) обращается к античной идее красоты. Автор начинает с дилеммы, сформулированной Роджером Скратоном в книге *Красота* (2009): «В области искусства красота – это объект созерцания, а не желания». Красота обычно приравнивается к сексуальной притягательности. Однако красота присуща и искусству, которое способно вызвать эстетическую реакцию в ответ на отвлеченное созерцание. Не означает ли это, что красота двойка? Обратившись к классической античной идее красоты, автор показывает, как возникла эта современная дилемма и каковы пути ее разрешения.¹²

¹¹ ΣΧΟΛΗ 7.2 (2013) 318–326.

¹² ΣΧΟΛΗ 7.2 (2013) 327–339.

SYMMARY

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE CLASSICAL TRADITION.

ΣΧΟΛΗ SUPPLEMENTS

Vol. I (2020): The Pythagorean Tradition. Selected works by Eric Dodds, Walter Burkert, and John Rist in a Russian translation.

Vol. II (2021): The Poem of Parmenides. A Translation into Russian and Commentaries by Eugene Afonasin.

Vol. III (2021): The Strasburg Papyrus of Empedocles. A Translation into Russian and Commentaries by Anna Afonasina.

Vol. IV (2021): Classical Philosophy in Novosibirsk Scientific Center. An Annotated Bibliography. Edited by Eugene Afonasin and Marina Volf.

Vol. V (2021): Igor Berestov. Zeno of Elea in Contemporary Translations and Philosophic Discussions.

Vol. VI (2022): Teaching Classics. Novosibirsk schools 2007–2013. Invited lectures by John Dillon, Dominic O'Meara, Luc Brisson, Michael Chase, Leonidas Bargeliotes, David Konstan, Teun Tieleman, and Thomas Robinson.

Научное издание

ПРЕПОДАВАЯ АНТИЧНОСТЬ

НОВОСИБИРСКИЕ ШКОЛЫ 2007–2013

ИЗБРАННЫЕ ЛЕКЦИИ

ПОД ОБЩЕЙ РЕДАКЦИЕЙ

Е. В. АФОНАСИНА

Формат 60х84/16. Усл. п. л. 12,5

Подписано в печать 15.01.2022

Напечатано в ООО «Офсет-ТМ». Заказ № 699
630117, Новосибирск, ул. Арбузова, 1/1, корп. 14